Prachinburi at risk of industrial waste contamination after flood Pictures of oil-like scum on floodwater in Prachinburi have led to concerns of toxic contamination from industrial waste dumping sites in the area. Oil-like scum floating on floodwaters in Prachinburi (Photo from EARTH Foundation) On 29 September, the Ecological Alert and Recovery (EARTH) Thailand Foundation posted on its Facebook page that it had received pictures from locals in Prachinburi of oil-like scum on floodwaters covering rice fields in Prachinburi’s Si Maha Phot district. Locals said that the scum extends across waters flowing into the Si Mahosot district. EARTH Foundation speculated that it may originate from an industrial waste landfill operated by Green Environment Technology company, which has a permit for waste sorting and landfill disposal. The company also has a permit for processing used lubricant and solvent, shredding electronic parts, and converting non-toxic waste into bricks. Sumet Rianpongnam, an environmental activist from the Strong Prachinburi group, said that locals also informed his group about the scum. He said that chemicals and toxins were seeping out of the landfill before the flood. On  25 September, heavy rain caused a flood, and rainwater in the landfill overflowed, spreading toxic chemicals into rice fields. “Oil was leaking before … but the problem has gotten worse with the flood. It now extends across thousands of rai … [and] we don‘t know how far the toxins will spread,“ said Sumet. Observing that it depends on the flow of floodwaters, he expressed concern that as the water rises, more contamination could leak out of the site, which is now underwater. The Strong Prachinburi group lodged a complaint with Prachinburi’s Provincial Industry Office on 28 September, according to EARTH Foundation. They have not received a response. Meanwhile, officials from the Environment and Pollution Control Office 7 visited the Si Maha Phot district on 1 October to collect samples of the floodwater. eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-10-03 - 15:58 * News * Flood * Prachinburi * Industrial waste * environment * Ecological Alert and Recovery – Thailand (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Cartoon by Stephff: The baggages of Anutin have been found Cartoon by Stephff: The baggages of Anutin have been found eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-10-03 - 15:53 * Multimedia (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Activists call on Pheu Thai, Democrat to back repeal of 1976 coup-era order The October 6 Memorial Network went to Parliament yesterday (1 October) to file petitions calling on the Pheu Thai and Democrat parties to back the repeal of an order made following the military coup of 1976 which increased the penalty for royal defamation. Network representatives submitting their petition to Pheu Thai representatives (Photo by Ginger Cat) The activists said that laws and orders made by a junta should not be allowed to stand without review and called on the political parties to support the repeal of these relics of military coups to show that laws should come from the people and be made following a democratic process.   The Network visited Bhumjaithai Party and People’s Party headquarters on 22 September to file similar petitions. They initially planned to file the petitions at the Pheu Thai Party headquarters on 28 September and the Democrat Party on 29 September, but postponed the visits to 1 October and moved the location to Parliament due to heavy rain and floods affecting Bangkok. The petition is part of a campaign marking the 50th anniversary of the 6 October 1976 Thammasat University Massacre, a violent crackdown and lynching by police and right-wing paramilitaries of protesters gathering at Thammasat University and nearby Sanam Luang to protest the return of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. The massacre resulted in the death of at least 45 people. That evening, Admiral Sangad Chaloryu ousted the government of Seni Pramoj in a military coup. He became head of the National Administrative Reform Council (NARC), the junta which would rule Thailand until 1980. Within 15 days of the coup, the NARC issued Order 41, amending the Criminal Code to increase the penalties for several offences, such as defaming a foreign head of state, insulting a place of worship, flag desecration, defamation, and defamation by publication. It also increased the penalty for royal defamation from up to 7 years to between 3 and 15 years. The October 6 Memorial Network plans to propose a bill repealing Order 41 and has launched an online campaign for voters to back the bill at https://decoup6octsins.com/. As of 1 October, the bill had over 31,000 signatures. eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-10-02 - 15:36 * News * 6 October * Thammasat University massacre * October 6 Memorial Network (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Government expedited pathway advances legal status for 140,000 migrants, but 345,000 still await processing A Cabinet-approved expedited programme has helped hundreds of thousands of long-term migrants and their children obtain permanent residence and Thai nationality, but documentation problems, administrative gaps, and implementation challenges continue to limit their access to rights. On 30 June 2026, the Cabinet approved a one-year extension of the deadline for the expedited pathway aimed at resolving nationality and legal status issues for long-term migrants and children born in Thailand, extending the programme until 30 June 2027. The decision follows a proposal by the National Security Council. The current administration, led by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, has continued an initiative introduced under the previous government of Srettha Thavisin, based on the Cabinet resolution of 29 October 2024. While the extension is a one-off measure, it offers a degree of relief. Among more than 483,000 migrants and children born in Thailand from 19 ethnic minority groups included in Srettha’s government initiative, only around 140,000 cases have been completed to date.  On paper, the resolution reduces processing time from 270 days to just 5 days for permanent residence applications, and from 180 days to 5 days for citizenship applications. In reality, waiting times can be significantly longer. The policy covers four main groups: migrants recorded in surveys conducted between 1984 and 1999 (approximately 120,000 persons, classified as ID category 6); migrants surveyed between 2005 and 2011 (around 215,000, classified as ID category 0, group 89); children of ethnic minorities born in Thailand (about 29,000); and children born in Thailand to individuals without civil registration status, of whom about 113,000 had already been surveyed. All criteria and qualifications remain unchanged. For example, long-term migrants may be granted a Certificate of Residence provided they meet conditions such as being unable to return to their country of origin and lacking evidence of holding or having used any other nationality. Children of ethnic minorities born in Thailand may be eligible for Thai nationality if their parents were included in registration surveys conducted up to 1999 and in subsequent surveys carried out between 2005 and 2011. A Prachatai interview with Dr Prommin Lertsuridej, Secretary-General to the Prime Minister during the Srettha Thavisin administration, highlighted that the fast-track programme has faced significant delays due to bureaucratic processes and widespread public misunderstanding, particularly following the controversy over a network that allegedly helped Chinese families obtain Thai citizenship for their children through fraudulent birth registrations.  The Cabinet tasked the Department of Provincial Administration with developing guidelines for screening and managing the remaining cases, accelerating updates to registration databases to ensure accuracy, and strictly enforcing laws to mitigate security risks posed by ill-intentioned actors and criminal networks. While many individuals have obtained permanent residence status, some recipients continue to face barriers to accessing everyday services. Others remain unable to benefit from the Cabinet resolution because they fall outside the eligible groups or face difficulties meeting the required conditions. Civil society actors working closely with communities to support state implementation, as well as provincial authorities, also face operational challenges and have called for further support.  The ‘new card’ changes lives Ploy, who lives in Fang District, Chiang Mai and is in her early 40s, is among those who have obtained permanent residence under the Cabinet resolution of 29 October 2024 on resolving nationality and legal status issues. Ploy’s parents migrated from Shan State to Thailand for work in 1987, when she was just six months old. When Ploy entered the education system, she was included in the 2005 survey, which granted her a 0-89 card, an ID card for individuals without civil registration status who are temporarily permitted to reside in Thailand. Holders of the 0-89 card can access basic education and live and work in Thailand, but face restrictions on travelling outside designated areas. Although later policy changes allowed travel within the province, travelling beyond the province still required formal permission. “When we just arrived, 0-89 cardholders faced some hardship all the same. If we wanted to go into Chiang Mai city, we had to request a travel permit from the district every time. Travel was difficult. Healthcare rights were also not as comprehensive as they are now,” said Ploy.  The 2024 Cabinet resolution opened a pathway for Ploy to apply for permanent residence under Section 17 of the 1979 Immigration Act. She submitted her application in September 2025 but was discouraged by delays caused by discrepancies between her parents’ current names and misspellings in official records. Correcting the records required verifying her parents’ identities and presenting them in person as witnesses. “Officials asked how they could know that we were really parents and daughter. … So I brought my mother there to be questioned. Luckily, our faces are similar.” Unlike in the past, when dismissive attitudes discouraged her from approaching authorities, she notes that her interactions with district officials have improved. Officials are more willing to provide guidance, and she feels more confident asserting her rights. “Maybe it’s because of the law,” she said. “Now I feel that they are more open. They listen more to people like me.” Now, with a “Type 8 card”, an ID card confirming her permanent residence status, Ploy can travel freely across provinces without seeking permission. She can also purchase property and register a motorcycle under her own name, something she previously had to do through her Thai husband. “I feel proud,” said Ploy. Ploy will be eligible to apply for Thai citizenship after holding permanent residence for five years and meeting other criteria. Holders of the Type 8 card still cannot obtain a standard Thai passport. Instead, they must apply for a Travel Document for Aliens, which is valid for one year. She is undecided for now, but says that if her children pursue opportunities abroad, particularly in China, she may consider applying for citizenship to make travelling easier. Disconnects with daily lives Obtaining the Type 8 card did not immediately resolve all challenges. Mot, a 30-year-old Shan woman who moved to Thailand with her parents in 2003 and now lives in Fang, is one such recipient. Her application process was smoother than Ploy’s, partly due to consistent documentation. She also said she paid around 5,000 baht to a local intermediary who helped facilitate the process. Other sources reported similar experiences. In practice, however, the new status did not translate into immediate access to everyday services. Previously, her 0 card allowed her to purchase local transport tickets, though travel outside designated areas required special permission. After receiving a card that formally granted unrestricted travel, she found herself unable to buy bus or train tickets because they require a national ID card.  “Suppose that I want to.go to Bangkok, I could use my personal car to go there, but if I would like to take the bus, they would not let me o buy a ticket,” she said of the initial issue, which was resolved several months later. Similar problems arose with mobile services. “I bought a new SIM card for my phone. At first, they did not allow me to register, but they allowed it just 2-3 months ago. When I just received my Type 8 card, I still couldn’t do anything. I couldn’t even buy a SIM card,” said Mot.  Banking access also remains limited. She is still unable to open a new account using the Type 8 card and must rely on her previous account linked to her old ID. “To open a bank account, you either need to be stateless or Thai, but my nationality is Myanmarese. So I still can’t do anything about it. To be able to do it, I’d need a work permit and salary slips. It’s complicated, so I haven’t done it yet.” After 20 years, citizenship still out of reach Koi, a 44-year-old Shan volunteer teacher who moved to Thailand in 1985, has held permanent residence since 2004. She completed a bachelor’s degree in Thailand, speaks fluent Thai, and has taught generations of ethnic minority children. Yet she remains unable to apply for Thai citizenship despite holding permanent residence for more than two decades. A common misconception is that simply holding permanent residence for five years is sufficient to apply for citizenship. Koi received the same information from authorities when she obtained her permanent residence. In reality, applicants must also meet several additional criteria under the 1965 Nationality Act and its amendments, including a minimum monthly income of 20,000 baht, proof of tax payments for at least three years, and official salary certification. “I am limitated in that my salary isn’t enough,” said Koi. Her brother, who obtained his Type 8 card at the same time as she did, was also unable to obtain citizenship after his application was rejected for the same reason. “Mr brother’s earnings weren’t enough. My brother’s case is clear because he had a definite employer. His salary comes in monthly with payslips. But I work as a volunteer teacher. My income is not much. And it does not come with payslips. I don’t have those kinds of evidence.” “Emotionally, I understand. For us to become Thai, we should have a job and income so we’re not a burden on Thai society. But the income threshold should not be this high. It should be around 15,000 baht without any deductions.” Koi estimates that in her community alone, Ban Lan, Village No. 5, Mon Pin Subdistrict, Fang District, more than a hundred people have held permanent residence for many years but face similar challenges. Not eligible, but still benefiting Kat, a Shan woman originally from Namsang in Shan State, moved to Thailand at the age of six with her parents. Despite having spent most of her life in Thailand, she remains classified as a migrant worker. She holds two key documents used together: a Certificate of Identity (CI), often referred to as the “green Myanmar passport”, and a pink ID card (a non-Thai national identification card with a 00 prefix). Although she is not eligible for the legal status development process under the 2024 Cabinet resolution, Kat nonetheless speaks with relief and happiness about the policy’s impact on her family. Her husband, also from Shan State, previously held a 0-89 card after a school assisted with his registration when he was enrolled as a student. This enabled him to apply for and obtain permanent residence.  Once he obtained it, their three children, who share his surname and have proof of birth in Thailand, became eligible to apply for Thai citizenship based on descent. The children submitted their applications in October last year and received their Thai national ID cards in late April 2026. Before her husband obtained permanent residence, Kat said “officials told us that the children would need to finish a bachelor’s degree before they could apply for Thai citizenship. Every time we went, they said only these words.” It was only after the 2004 Cabinet resolution that officials told him he could apply for permanent residence, eventually making their children eligible for Thai citizenship more quickly. Challenges faced by civil society May, a 40-year-old Shan woman, has worked with a civil society organisation for around two decades, focusing on legal status and documentation issues. Following the 2024 Cabinet resolution, she and a small team became actively involved in helping ethnic communities navigate the process of obtaining legal recognition. The first important step was communicating with ethnic communities. May recalled that when the information was first provided, the number of applicants remained low. Many people who had been surveyed in official records up until 1999, and therefore held Type 6 cards, did not understand why they needed to apply for Type 8 cards. Some were also concerned about the potential costs associated with submitting an application. May explained to them that if Type 6 card holders did not apply for Type 8 cards to obtain permanent residence, their cases could be subject to review, and their records could be removed if authorities determined that they were no longer present. Once villagers understood, they realised that they needed to submit applications. “Having only a Type 6 card was enough for them to stay because they would not expel them. At first, that was what they thought. They really thought that”, May said. Even though the state had already hired additional staff specifically for this work, government personnel remained insufficient. As a result, she and her team provided additional support to the Fang District Office, contributing their own resources, including personnel and funding to hire additional staff. “The District Office was happy for us to help … But when we went to help, our organisation had to pass a screening process to ensure that we were genuinely coming to help,” said May. “When I have funding, I go there every day. But I do not have funding at the moment. Now we can only help the District Office one day a week because we cannot pay for staff expenses.” According to the Fang District Registration Office, as of 30 June 2025, there were 22,993 people in the District who fell within the target groups, including those applying for permanent residence certificates and Thai nationality. However, the number of applications received so far stood at only 11,589 cases, meaning that more than 10,000 eligible individuals had yet to submit applications. “Why have they not come to apply? Or have they run away? Or have they returned to their country of origin? Or have they passed away? This number needs to become zero.” May highlighted the responsibility of local authorities to resolve the remaining cases. A lone interpreter Boy, a 30-year-old Shan interpreter, has worked in Fang District for over a decade with support from civil society organisations. Following the 2024 Cabinet resolution, he is now overwhelmed as the only interpreter still available in the District amid a surge in applications. At times, people come forward wanting to apply for permanent residence but are unable to express themselves in Thai. Officials may not understand them, leading to frustration and rising tensions. In such moments, his role as an interpreter becomes essential. “It’s not that when they come to inquire, every official will speak nicely. Some do get shouted at. But I have a duty to help with translation. Instead of letting their feelings run high, I may talk to the caseworker or those who come to the officials to inquire, so that they understand each other more and reduce the aggression in what they say. Actually, those who go to inquire, when the officials ask them questions, of course they would answer that they don’t know because they really don’t know.” Boy normally works at the civil registration office and on nationality and legal status work. He explains the required documents and procedures to Shan applicants before their cases are forwarded to officials for processing. At the processing stage, he accompanies them to meetings with district officials or the district chief. When he has to follow ongoing cases, other people seeking assistance are left waiting longer. Boy also produces Facebook posts and graphics explaining the required documents and procedures in the Shan language to help people in other districts. Although he speaks Thai fluently and plays a significant role in supporting administrative processes, Boy himself does not qualify for the same legal status he helps others obtain. Born in Shan State, he moved to Thailand to pursue his education at the age of seven or eight. He currently holds a pink ID card (Type 6 card for non-Thai nationals). If he wishes to improve his legal status, his only available pathway would be naturalisation. However, his income remains below the required threshold. “Actually, I do want citizenship. I understand that people not born in Thailand cannot directly obtain Thai nationality. But if they contribute to society and the community, I think that I’m also one of them. I think they should be considered,” said Boy.  Progress limited in Chiang Mai According to the Chiang Mai Provincial Administration Office, the Province has a target group of 88,524 individuals covered under the 2024 Cabinet resolution. Of these, 75,749 people are applying for lawful foreign residence and permanent residence status, while 12,775 are applying for Thai nationality. Progress remains limited. Between 30 June 2025 and 16 June 2026, a total of 35,622 applications were approved, 31,117 for lawful foreign residence and permanent residence status and 4,505 for Thai nationality. Chiang Mai provincial officials identified several key obstacles at the local level, particularly incomplete documentation. These include missing information on the year of entry into Thailand, uncertainty about countries of origin or point of entry, a lack of clear records on length of stay or residential history, and errors in the Survey Form for Compiling Personal Records of Persons Without Civil Registration Status (Form 89). Other issues involve inconsistencies between different sets of records. Officials found cases where documents indicated that an individual was born in Thailand while immigration data showed entry from abroad. There were also mismatched names of applicants, parents, or guardians between survey forms and civil registration databases. Another challenge involves misunderstandings about eligibility conditions and the application process among applicants, which have contributed to some individuals relying on informal agents. In some cases, this has raised concerns about informal payments, exploitation, and complaints, making oversight by the district authorities more difficult. In response to these challenges, Chiang Mai Province has proposed several improvements, from resource allocation to technical and procedural reforms. One key recommendation is to strengthen administrative capacity by increasing staffing levels and improving collaboration with private organisations, local administrative bodies, and community leaders. The Province also proposed providing additional equipment and mobile registration units that can operate directly in villages, helping reach applicants who face difficulties travelling to government offices. Chiang Mai also recommended extending or removing application deadlines to allow ongoing applications from eligible individuals. It proposed allowing community-level verification through village committees rather than relying on a single individual witness, as well as reducing the number of witnesses required during interviews and simplifying approval authority at the registrar level. Another proposed reform concerns data management and verification procedures. The Province suggested allowing local registration offices to directly amend Form 89 data without forwarding all cases to the central authorities. It also recommended clearer verification processes, such as interviewing parents or guardians to confirm birth and immigration histories. Finally, the Province called for improved digital connectivity between the Department of Provincial Administration and the Royal Thai Police to facilitate background and criminal record checks. Note: Pseudonyms are used for all sources to protect their identities and ensure their safety. eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-10-02 - 11:01 * Feature * stateless people * indigenous people * Chiang mai (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

16 Years On, Red Shirt Crackdown Cases Near Expiry with No Progress The cases concerning the crackdown on the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), also known as the Red Shirt protests in April–May 2010, have now reached their 16th year. In the 12 years since the military coup by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the cases have stagnated with no progress and only four years now remain before they expire. The case files have passed back and forth between various state agencies. As far as can be understood from statements by the relevant authorities, prosecutors have now referred the case back to the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) to conduct another round of investigation. This raises questions about how much physical evidence from the crime scenes still remains after all these years, and how many witnesses are still alive and available to testify in court.  “This case is a case that is about politics. We cannot deny that, because it arose from political protests. There was a crackdown on the protests and orders to use force, which comes from politics.” said Chokchai Angkaew, one of a loosely organised group of lawyers who are helping the families of those killed in the crackdown pursue the cases and who have represented them in several inquests into the deaths.  “There are clear signs that those who were in power at the time, including the military itself, do not want this matter reopened. If it were reopened it would be clear, because the facts from the findings of the court inquests into the deaths show who was responsible,” Chokchai believes that responsibility for prosecuting these cases ultimately lies with the state. However, this has left members of the public with little ability to advance the cases, contributing to their stagnation. The inquests into the deaths, which made some progress under the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, were not pursued further following the military coup in 2014, which was led by officers who had been involved in the 2010 crackdown. Criminal proceedings against state officials, which the activist group argues should be heard in the criminal courts, fall under the jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), where no progress has been made. Military prosecutors have also declined to indict in cases referred to military courts, including the six deaths at Wat Pathum Wanaram. Where do the cases stand now? In May 2026, Pol Lt Gen Rutthaphon Naowarat, Minister of Justice, addressed the Senate in response to a question from Senator Thewarit Maneechai regarding progress in cases related to the crackdown on the protests. He said the Ministry has established a “Main Operations Centre for the Investigation of Special Cases Concerning the 2010 Unrest” to expedite investigations and prevent 383 cases from reaching the statute of limitations. The cases are divided into four categories: 156 terrorism-related; 25 involving threats or coercion against the government; 181 involving attacks on members of the public and state officials; and 21 involving damage to government military equipment. Under the third category, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) has recommended prosecution and taken legal action in 13 cases. 13 Cases where the Department of Special Investigation has recommended prosecution and taken legal action Case Location Status 2 assault cases Lumpini Police Station Police sought prosecution and issued arrest warrants, but suspects were not arrested before the statute of limitations expired. 6 murder/attempted murder cases Sala Daeng BTS station and U Chu Liang Building, Rama IV Road All defendants were acquitted due to insufficient evidence. 3 cases involving Abhisit and Suthep — Supreme Court dismissed the cases, ruling they fall under NACC jurisdiction. NACC later dismissed the complaints and instructed DSI to identify perpetrators. DSI has suspended investigations after failing to identify suspects. Wat Pathum Wanaram (6 deaths) Wat Pathum Wanaram Military prosecutors decided not to indict. M79 grenade attack (attempted murder) Lumpini Police Station Attorney General ordered the case not to proceed with prosecution. Status of Cases involving deaths The Minister of Justice’s statement does not clarify the status of cases involving deaths. Thida Thavornseth, a leader of the UDD and co-founder of the People's Council Demanding Justice for 2010, provided reporters with a document from the DSI’s Bureau of Security Crime that had been submitted to the House Committee on Law, Justice and Human Rights in October 2024.  The document identifies 89 deaths that fall under the DSI’s responsibility but does not include one case in Khon Kaen (Songsak Sinongbua), two cases in Udon Thani (Aphichat Rachiwa and Phoen Wongma), and one case linked to tear gas exposure (Anan Chinnasongkhram). Local police investigators conducted post-mortem examinations in all 89 cases under Section 150, Paragraph 1, of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires an inquest to determine the cause of death in cases of unnatural death. Of these, 58 cases ended at the post-mortem examination stage. The DSI subsequently took the following actions in these cases: 40 cases were discontinued; 9 cases resulted in no prosecution orders; 2 cases resulted in no prosecution orders because the suspects had died; and 7 cases led to prosecutions, but the courts later acquitted the defendants. The seven deaths that led to prosecution orders included three main cases. In the “Black Shirt” case involving five military personnel killed by M67 grenades at Dinso Road, all five defendants were acquitted due to unreliable evidence and concerns over double jeopardy. In the case of Kittiphong Somsuk, a UDD protester found dead at Central World, the court ruled he died from fire-related suffocation but could not prove arson by the defendants; one person was convicted only for violating the Emergency Decree, while three others were acquitted. In the case of Thanyanan Thaepthong, who died in an explosion on Silom Road on 22 April 2010, no court reports or judgment details were found. The other 31 cases in which the DSI determined that deaths were potentially caused by state officials proceeded under Section 150, Paragraph 3, requiring a court inquest. Of these, 25 investigations were discontinued, while 6 cases involving deaths at Wat Pathum Wanaram were referred to military prosecutors and later dismissed on the grounds of insufficient evidence.  Outside these 31 cases, there are additional incidents suggesting that deaths may have been caused by state officials. These include the case of Sane Nilluang, who was shot on Rama IV Road on the afternoon of 14 May 2010, during the military advance from the Lumphini Park area toward Bon Kai. A foreign photographer, positioned behind the military line, captured soldiers aiming their weapons at protesters at the moment Saneh fell. Another case involves Samaphan Srithep and Suphacheep Chullathat, who were killed on Ratchaprarop Road on the morning of 15 May 2010. Both were found lying face down, facing a military checkpoint. Photographs, eyewitness accounts, and post-mortem findings suggest that the bullets may have originated from military positions. There are also incidents from the night of 14 May near the Din Daeng area on Ratchaprarop Road, including the death of Boonthing Pansila, a volunteer emergency responder killed while on duty. Video footage shows him facing the military line at the moment he was shot, and the direction of his wounds is consistent with this account. These cases have seen no meaningful progress for years. The DSI’s own briefing document indicates that the cases proceeded only as far as the post-mortem examinations before prosecutors ordered the investigations suspended.  Prosecutors later reopened the investigations, but many of the original crime scenes have since changed significantly. For example, the Bon Kai area on Rama IV Road has been redeveloped into a shopping complex. Whether witnesses can still be located and brought forward to testify remains a question for investigators.  Family members who have spent years waiting for justice for their loved ones have gradually passed away. The younger sister of Italian photojournalist Fabio Polenghi travelled across continents from Italy to personally follow the investigation into her brother’s death for several years but died of cancer in April 2014. Questions around Abhisit–Suthep’s acquittal Last year, former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said that the courts had acquitted both him and his former Deputy Prime Minister, Suthep Thaugsuban, at the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court over their roles in the crackdown on protests, a ruling that sparked heated debate. At the time, Abhisit ordered the establishment of the Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES), while Suthep served as its Director during the crackdown on Ratchadamnoen Avenue on 10 April. Command was later transferred to Gen Anupong Paochinda, then army chief, before the second phase of the crackdown took place around the Ratchaprasong intersection between 13 and 19 May. The acquittals did not result from the courts’ assessment of the facts, but were based on jurisdictional grounds. In 2014, the Court of First Instance ruled that the case fell under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions of the Supreme Court, with the NACC responsible for the initial inquiry into whether the case should proceed. During the proceedings, Thongchai Senamontri, the Chief Justice of the Criminal Court, issued a dissenting opinion under his authority arguing that the Criminal Court did in fact have jurisdiction. He also allowed injured parties, including Samorn Maithong, and the family of Phan Khamkong, killed beneath the Airport Rail Link station at Ratchaprarop on 14 May 2010, to join the case as co-plaintiffs. This was one of the first inquests in which the court found that the death was caused by military officers. Thongchai argued that the death of Phan Khamkong and the injuries sustained by Samorn Maithong constituted criminal offences, namely jointly committing or ordering intentional murder and attempted murder. This was based on the inquest finding that Phan was killed by military officers acting under claims of official duty, and that Suthep had authorised the use of weapons, live ammunition and sniper units, indicating acceptance that lethal force could be used against civilians. He further argued that murder falls outside official duties and should be treated as a criminal offence against the state. In his view, even if the NACC found no grounds for misconduct in office, the Criminal Court would still retain jurisdiction. Dismissing the case on jurisdictional grounds risked preventing victims from pursuing criminal proceedings. He argued that where a single act may constitute multiple offences, the cases could be consolidated, with the Supreme Court empowered to transfer or combine proceedings. At the time, the case was still under consideration by both the Criminal Court and the NACC, with no final ruling yet issued.  Despite these dissenting opinions, all three levels of the criminal courts ultimately ruled that the case was outside their jurisdiction. The NACC later concluded that there were insufficient grounds to proceed. As a result, cases brought by members of the public affected by the crackdown under the Abhisit administration have remained without meaningful progress to this day. What about the military courts? In September 2019, the case concerning Phan Khamkong, with Samorn Maithong also appearing as an injured witness, was filed by the families and their lawyers directly with the Criminal Court. However, both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal ruled that the case fell under the jurisdiction of the military court, on the grounds that the alleged perpetrators were soldiers, despite the fact that CRES included not only military officers but also civilian officials and politicians. In the same month, the DSI also forwarded the case concerning the six deaths at Wat Pathum Wanaram to the military court. In the inquest proceedings, the court had already made a clear finding that soldiers positioned on the BTS tracks in front of the temple, as well as those advancing from Rama I Road, were responsible for the shootings that killed all six victims. The inquest included photographic evidence taken by police officers stationed at the Royal Thai Police headquarters, which captured the military operation, as well as testimony from police witnesses who had recorded both photographs and video footage. However, this case concluded more quickly than the Phan Khamkong case. Under the Military Court Act, only military prosecutors have the authority to file cases in military courts. After the DSI submitted the case file to the military prosecutor, the military prosecutor later issued a non-prosecution order, stating that “in this case, it does not appear that there are eyewitnesses, circumstantial evidence, or any other form of evidence that can confirm that the eight suspects committed the alleged offences.”  Did the NCPO hit the brakes? It is important to note that the 31 inquest cases in which the DSI submitted petitions for the courts to initiate death inquests on the basis that the deaths were caused by military officers had gradually begun moving forward. Within a two-year period, cases involving deaths entered the initial judicial stage at an average rate of about 15 cases per year. While this could not be described as fast, it did show steady progress. Then the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) led by Prayuth Chan-o-cha staged a coup in 2014. In 2010, he had served on CRES board as Deputy Army Commander, alongside other senior military figures, many of whom later rose steadily through the ranks. Among them was Apirat Kongsompong, then a colonel and commander of the 11th Infantry Regiment (King’s Guard), who later retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army. Just 24 hours after the NCPO staged the coup, Tharit Pengdit, then Director-General of the DSI, was removed from his position, along with Attapon Yaisawang, the Attorney General who had overseen cases related to the crackdown deaths. Tharit believed that these prosecutions were a key reason behind the military coup. The Supreme Court sentenced Tharit to two years in prison for malfeasance in office under Sections 157 and 200 of the Criminal Code, on the grounds that he had acted dishonestly with intent to cause others to face criminal punishment. This verdict was given after Abhisit and Suthep were acquitted on jurisdictional grounds. Two days before the verdict, he revealed that he was also threatened and the DSI prosecution of the high-ranking military officials was a key reason behind the military coup.  “I was summoned to a military camp on Ratchadamnoen Road. The name of the person who summoned me should perhaps not be disclosed, but he was a very high-ranking military officer and was involved in the coup. He told me ‘Tharit, do not proceed with the 99 death cases. If you do not listen and our lot stage a coup, what would you do?’ “When the court had already ruled that the deaths were caused by military personnel using war weapons, and there were orders, if I did not act, I would not be able to remain in my position. Others would have to take over. It was unavoidable, and I did not act alone. It was handled by an investigation committee that included the police and prosecutors. Is there still hope? Each year’s commemoration is a countdown toward the expiry of the statute of limitations for the families of the deceased, yet there has never been a clear answer from the justice system. The current government, Chokchai noted, has not shown any effort to revive or accelerate these cases. With the current administration potentially remaining in power for up to four years, this period nearly coincides with the time remaining before the statute of limitations expires. “I look at the trajectory from the incident until now. It’s already been 16 years. It turns out that there have only been certain periods in which these death-related cases were actually pursued under the law.” At most, Chokchai said, it is up to the families of the deceased, or civic movements to continue pressuring the government to keep the issue alive.  Some possible solutions have been proposed including amendments to the Organic Act on the Prevention and Suppression of Corruption, to allow citizens to directly bring cases against politicians, and the Organization of Military Courts Act so that criminal cases involving military personnel could be brought before civilian courts instead.  Thida called for cases involving state officials to be returned to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts. She warned that opening a channel for citizens to file complaints directly with the NACC risks shifting cases to an independent body that has often been used by conservative factions to target democratically elected politicians. Moreover, offences relating to misconduct in public office carry a maximum penalty of five years in prison, even in cases involving deaths, significantly lower than the penalties available under the Criminal Code. Thida proposed three measures: first, to amend the law so that cases arising from the 2010 crackdown are not subject to any statute of limitations; second, to ensure that military officers and politicians who commit criminal offences against civilians are tried in the ordinary criminal courts; and third, to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, at least in specific cases. Thida argued that these measures would not only deliver justice for the families of the deceased but could also serve as a deterrent: “If in the future a political party colludes with the military to suppress the people again, they will be afraid.” She added, “We are pushing for these amendments to the law. Even if we do not succeed on the matter of the events in 2010, we hope it will be useful in the future.” eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-10-01 - 15:18 * Feature * red shirts * April-May 2010 massacre * April-May 2010 political violence (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Supreme Court convicts activists for royal defamation charge over protest speech The Supreme Court has sentenced activists Jatupat Boonpattararaksa and Atthapol Buapat to prison on a royal defamation charge for speeches made during a protest in Chaiyaphum in 2021. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) said on Wednesday (30 September) that Jatupat was sentenced to 2 years and 12 months, or almost 3 years, in prison, while Atthapol was sentenced to 2 years. The Supreme Court ruled that, although the royal defamation law mentions the monarch as an individual and not the monarchy as a whole, the monarchy includes the reigning monarch as well as past monarchs in the Chakri Dynasty. This is because there are continuous cultural and historical ties as well as legal structures, and because the respect the people have for the monarchy is partially the result of what each king has done. The Court ruled that Jatupat’s speech defamed the King and past kings because he accused them of not being righteous. The Court believed that the monarch and the monarchy were connected and that issues concerning the monarchy were national security issues, so Jatupat’s speech referred to every monarch.  It ruled that Atthapol’s speech caused a misunderstanding that the King ordered the blasting of a mountain for the benefit of a cement factory in Saraburi. It also ruled that being a monarch could not be considered a position in the same way as other bureaucratic positions. It ruled not to suspend the sentence because the speech was given in public, defamed the King, and caused others to believe that the King is not righteous. Jatupat and Atthapol were charged with royal defamation, sedition, and violation of the Emergency Decree and the Sound Amplifier Act for speeches they made at protests in front of Phu Khiao Police Station and Phu Khiao School in Chaiyaphum on 1 February 2021. The protest was to call for the police to apologize for intimidating students who registered for a “Ratsadon on Tour” camp, a forum organised by pro-democracy activists to exchange opinions about issues in the country. Jatupat and Atthapol gave speeches about monarchy reform, with Jatupat talking about the monarchy’s financial standing while Atthapol called for reducing the budget allocated to the royal family. In September 2024, the Phu Khiao Provincial Court found them guilty of royal defamation. Jatupat was sentenced to 2 years and 12 months in prison, while Atthapol was sentenced to 2 years. A year later, in September 2025, the Appeal court upheld the verdict. Jatupat and Atthapol have been detained pending appeal since 3 September 2025. On 11 March 2026, the Supreme Court granted them bail on the condition that they must wear an electronic monitoring bracelet. However, they remained in prison on other charges relating to participation in protests and have been transferred to the Bangkok Remand Prison. They are required to wear the monitoring devices although they are still in prison. After the Supreme Court’s verdict was delivered, Jatupat’s mother, who is also his guarantor, asked about the petition to have their electronic monitoring devices removed. The judge told her that, due to the floods around the Ratchadapisek Criminal Court and Bangkok Remand Prison, it was not possible to bring Jatupat and Atthapol to court to process removal of the monitoring devices. Prison officials will do so once the floods recede. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-10-01 - 12:56 * News * Atthapol Buapat * Jatupat Boonpattararaksa * Section 112 * Royal defamation (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Neighbourhood in Bangkok’s Bang Khen district still underwater Photos: Ginger Cat While floodwaters have receded from most locations in central Bangkok, the Saphan Mai neighbourhood in Bang Khen district is still underwater. As of Tuesday (29 September), side streets and communities near canals in Saphan Mai are still flooded. In Ruamjai Pattana Nuea community, which lines a canal, several areas remain under deep floodwater. Some houses in the community are lower than the street level and are the worst affected.  One resident said they own a boat and the district director brought residents food. The community flooded in 2011, when the water level was much higher, but this time the flood came suddenly and they did not have time to put her belongings on high grounds. Another resident said that the 2011 flood was worse, but she could not go out to get supplies because she is elderly. Community leaders have been bringing her food. Some residents have been scooping water out of their houses to prevent it from becoming stagnant. In some locations, the water is starting to become putrid as waste is caught in the area. Another resident has been transporting people in and out of the community in a boat. The resident said that the water is now lower than before, but normal travel is still not possible. Residents also said that people with two-storey houses can use the toilet and cook on the second floor, while those with single-storey houses cannot use the toilet or kitchen as the first floor of their houses are still flooded. Some said that they try to limit their water use, while others said they have been using trash bags in lieu of a toilet. Residents said that food have been brought in by government agencies and other individuals, such as the Land Development Department, the district director, local community leaders, and People’s Party MP Suphanat Minchaiynunt. They would like the authorities to drain the water from the community so they can return to normal routine. Meanwhile, stretches of Phahonyothin Road and its side streets remain flooded, such as in front of Big C Saphan Mai supermarket. Despite the flood, vendors have been setting up roadside food stalls, and deliver riders were coming back to work. For the locals, they still have to wade through water to get supplies, while some needed a boat to get through deep water in several locations. Some roadside shops were damaged by the flood and remain closed. Parts of Bangkok have been flooded since Saturday morning (26 September) following days of continuous heavy rain, rendering several main roads impassable. Floodwater have now receded from inner city locations and most of the main thoroughfares. However, eastern districts like Bang Khen, Bang Kapi, and Lat Krabang remain the worst affected. These locations are now entering their fifth day of flood. eng editor 1 Tue, 2026-09-29 - 23:56 * News * Flood * Bangkok flood 2026 * Natural disaster (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Constitutional Court upholds legality of ballot barcodes in 2026 general election The Constitutional Court has ruled that there was no illegality in the use of barcodes on the constituency ballots and party list MP ballots in the 8 February general election, and that the allegedly disclosure of voter identities did not violate the Constitution. The case stems from 22 complaints against the Election Commission (ECT) over the inclusion on ballot papers of controversial barcodes and QR codes. The Constitutional Court judges ruled, by 8 votes to 1, that the barcodes and QR codes on ballot papers were not unconstitutional. The QR codes on constituency ballot papers had to be decrypted to reveal a number corresponding to one on the ballot booklet. Since each ballot booklet contained 20 ballot papers, The barcodes could reveal individual voter identities only under the specific scenario where all 20 voters receiving ballot papers from the same booklet voted for the same candidate. The Court stated that such a scenario was highly unlikely. The Court concluded that the barcodes on the constituency ballot papers could not be used to identify how individual voters voted.  The party list MPs’ ballots had a QR code on the top and barcode at the bottom. It was found that the barcodes directly revealed a number which matched the one on the ballot stub, making it possible to track individual voters and how they voted. However, the Court stated that the identification of individual voters would require access to additional materials, including ballot stubs and voter lists, which were kept separately and securely. This made it impossible for ordinary citizens or even state officials to track individual voters, because when a voter enters a polling station, the polling official write on the ballot stub the voter’s number according to the voter list. The Election Commission officials responsible for each constituency retain the ballots and ballot stubs, while the voter lists must be submitted to the local registrar within three days. As a result, it is impossible to access all three sets of documents. The Court clarified that the secrecy o/f the ballot can be divided into two principles: “absolute secrecy” and “conditional secrecy”. Absolute secrecy requires that ballots be confidential, with no way to link ballot papers to individual voters This, however, contains the drawback is that all ballot papers will be identical, making them easier to counterfeit and making it difficult to investigate electoral fraud. Under the principle of conditional secrecy, ballots remain confidential, but specific markings may be added to ballot papers in order to help prevent counterfeiting and electoral fraud. The Court noted that this principle reflects the intent of the Constitution. The Court concluded that the barcodes and QR codes in this case were included to control the production of the ballots and to make it easier to track which constituencies specific ballot booklets were allocated to. They were also intended to ensure the integrity of the election administration process. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the voting procedures in the 2026 general election did not violate the constitutional principle of direct and secret suffrage prescribed in the Constitution. To restore public trust, the Court also ordered the ECT to implement measures to ensure that ballots are designed without any traceable markings and are securely stored. Barcode case saga After the 8 February 2026 general election, the ECT, which had been allocated over 7.8 billion of taxpayers’ money to stage the election, faced a legitimacy crisis over the transparency of the polls. Serious concerns were raised by the discovery of barcodes and QR codes with unique numbers on ballot papers.  Thai netizens raised concerns that each ballot paper may have been assigned a unique running number, as it was found that the 20 ballot papers in each booklet carried different numbers. The number on each ballot paper corresponded to the one on the ballot stub. Each ballot paper could therefore be scanned to connect it to its ballot stub where voters are required to sign their names. The ballot stub also contains the voter’s number from the voting lists in each constituency. This made it possible to identify which voter completed each ballot paper and which MPs or parties they voted for. On 13 February, the ECT argued that the election law allows it to prescribe codes or marks on ballot papers as a safeguard against “forgery”. The barcodes were also used to track the polling stations where the ballots were distributed, and that would help prevent ghost voting and electoral fraud. The ECT also asserted that identifying individual voters was impossible. It said that this would require access to additional materials, including ballot stubs and voting lists, which are now kept separately, and that the Commission could not verify whether the numbers on the barcodes aligned with the ballot stubs as requested by the media and general public. These concerns led to dozens of complaints filed with the Constitutional Court, asking for a ruling on whether the barcodes on ballots violated the secret ballot guaranteed in the Constitution. If it had ruled that the barcodes and QR codes violated the Constitution, the 8 February election could be declared void. On 22 February, a re-run election was held in Constituency 15 in Bangkok’s Khan Na Yao District where citizens gathered at one polling station to observe vote-counting to ensure electoral transparency. They allegedly took photos of marked ballot papers and zoomed in to display the controversial QR code on each ballot paper. They then attempted to decode the barcodes in question to demonstrate that the elections lacked transparency. The ECT later sued several citizens involved in this action for sedition and membership of an unlawful secret society.  On 10 March, the Ombudsman resolved to forward to the Constitutional Court 22 complaints that it had received, noting that there were grounds to question whether the ECT infringed on voters’ rights and freedoms, potentially violating ballot secrecy. On 18 March, the Constitutional Court judges resolved, by 6 votes to 3, to accept the 22 complaints forwarded by the Ombudsman.   The Court held a witness hearing on 26 August. The witnesses included the ECT Secretary-General Sawaeng Boonmee, two other ECT officials, and two individuals from printing companies. On the following day, the Constitutional judges also conducted an on-site inspection of the venue where the ballot papers, ballot stubs and other relevant materials were kept.  eng editor 3 Tue, 2026-09-29 - 11:02 * News * Constitutional court * 2026 General Elections * Ballot secrecy * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Royal defamation detainee released after serving three-year sentence A 23-year-old former secondhand clothes vendor sentenced to prison on a royal defamation charge was released yesterday (27 September) after completing his three-year sentence. Weeraphap Wongsaman was charged with royal defamation for spraying painting a message calling for monarchy reform during a protest at the Din Daeng Intersection in September 2021. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison on 28 September 2023. He was subsequently denied  bail by the Appeal Court and has been detained since. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) said that, in October 2025, Weeraphap withdrew his appeal as he has been detained for a long time and being detained pending appeal means he is not eligible for pardon, sentence reduction, or parole. On Sunday morning (27 September), activists and regular protest goers waited in front of the Bangkok Remand Prison despite deep floodwater. He was released at around 8.00. He then boarded a large truck driven by prison personnel to Ngam Wong Wan Road, where his father was waiting for him. The Bangkok Remand Prison and its vicinity has been affected by continuous heavy rain and flooding in Bangkok. As of Sunday (27 September), the prison was surrounded by deep floodwater and officials had to travel by large vehicles or boats to get in and out of the prison. Weeraphap said that the situation inside the prison has been difficult. Due to the flood, which he said was about knee-deep inside the prison, the use of water has been limited as the prison’s power generator and water pimp are on lower grounds. All activities have been cancelled, and food and drinking water amount have been reduced. He and other royal defamation detainees are held on the ground floor. When the cells were flooded, they were moved to the upper floor  and had to sleep in the hallway.  According to TLHR, 54 people remain imprisoned on charges relating to political expression or paticipation in protests, 30 of whom are detained for royal defamation. eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-09-28 - 15:34 * News * Weeraphap Wongsaman * Section 112 * Royal defamation * Din Daeng Intersection (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Empower Foundation demands ministerial support for sex worker protection law Representatives of the sex worker rights group Empower Foundation and other civil society groups marched from Ratchadamnoen Road to the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MSDHS) on Thursday (24 September) to call for Ministry support of a sex worker protection bill proposed by civil society organisations.  In an announcement, the Foundation noted that civil groups have spent some 40 years campaigning for sex work decriminalisation and demanded that sex workers have a say in drafting a law that directly affects them. The bill, backed by 10,293 voters, calls for the repeal of the 1996 anti-sex work law and outlines protection for sex workers. Empower formally proposed the draft in June 2026. On 10 July, in a meeting of the House Speaker and House Committee chairs, it was deemed to be a finance-related bill that must be approved by the Prime Minister before being considered in Parliament.  Civil society groups later raised concerns that Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul would shelve the bill.  It could be dismissed entirely if he does not sign off on it. At the Ministry, sex workers took turns giving speeches about the work-related rights violations they experienced, including underpayment and exploitation by employers, harassment from customers and the police, and discrimination against trans women and migrant sex workers. Empower said in a statement that the network is calling for the MSDHS to support sex worker protection in accordance with the recommendations made by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which called on Thailand to decriminalise sex work and protect labour rights. It noted that it has been waiting over 2 months for the Prime Minister to approve the bill. Acknowledging that MSDHS drafted its own version of a sex worker protection bill in 2023, it added that no progress has been made in adopting it.  Empower also disagreed with amendments in the Ministry draft, which included punishments for sex workers, as well as a provision that social security insurance for sex workers would be a financial burden for the government.  The Foundation stated that sex workers should be given the same rights as other labourers.  It also noted that a sex worker protection centre proposed in the bill could be set up using existing MSDHS agencies without the need to form a new system. Empower called on the Minister of Social Development and Human Security to push for Prime Ministerial approval of the draft so that it can be publicly debated in Parliament. It also asked that sex workers be included in every step of the legislative process. Anekchai Rueangrattanakorn, advisor to the Minister of Social Development and Human Security, received the petition. Asked if the MSDHS would push for the bill, he said that the Ministry had yet to receive any communication on the matter from the Prime Minister‘s Office.  The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Public Health have reportedly already contacted however and both have informed the Prime Minister‘s Office and Empower that they support the bill. Group members stayed at the Ministry until evening to hear back from Ministry representatives. Anekchai returned at 17.30 to inform them that the Ministry has received the petition and would need 2 weeks to follow up on the matter. Empower representatives plan to  return to the Ministry in two weeks for answers. eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-26 - 23:51 * News * Sex worker * Sex worker rights * Empower Foundation * 1996 Prevention and Suppression of Prostitution Act * Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Social Security Board election postponed due to flood The Social Security Board election, which was to take place tomorrow (27 September), has been postponed to 11 October due to heavy rain and flooding in several areas. The Social Security Office said that the election is being postponed so that the election can be conducted fairly, ensure that voters can participate, and so that no particular candidate would be put at a disadvantage. Heavy rain and flooding have been reported in several areas of the country. The Social Security Office said that this may affect voters’ ability to get to the poll and disrupt the voting process. A meeting of board election commission therefore decided on Saturday (26 September) to postpone the election.  Calls for the Social Security Board election to be postponed began on Saturday morning (26 September). The Progressive Social Security group, a team of reformist candidates running in the election, issued a statement saying that the flood situation mean voters may not be able to fully participate and going ahead with the election as scheduled would mean disenfranchising voters in flooded areas. Sahassawat Kumkong, a People‘s Party MP for Chonburi, published an open letter to the Minister of Labour and the Social Security Board election commission calling for postponement. He said that over half of those eligible to vote in the Social Security Board election are registered in Bangkok, Chonburi, Samut Prakan, Nontaburi, Pathumthani, and Rayong — areas on alert for heavy rain and flood. Voters in these areas or may be preoccupied with moving their belongings out of the flood or taking care of family, and should not be asked to put themselves at more risk than others to get to the poll. The election observation network We Watch issued a statement calling on the Social Security Office and the board election commission to postpone the election. Flooding would affect the voting process, and although some polling stations might be able to open, voters who live in flooded areas may not be able to get to their designated polling station. Polling officials might also be among those affected by the flood.  Panas Thailuan, President of the National Congress of Thai Labour and a candidate in the Social Security Board election, wrote on his Facebook page that the election should be postponed so that every candidate are competing on even ground. Bangkok declared all 50 of its districts a public disaster zone after nearly 48 hours of coninuous rain caused flooding in several areas and closure of several main roads. Flooding has also been reported in other provinces, while the Thai Meteorological Department has issued a heavy rain warning until Sunday (27 September).   eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-26 - 23:35 * News * Social Security Board * Social Security * Flood (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Bangkok declared public disaster zone after sustained rainfall, flooding All 50 districts of Bangkok have been declared a public disaster zones after sustained rainfall caused widespread flooding across the city. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) announced this morning (26 September) that the declaration, which previously covered three districts, has been extended to cover all of Bangkok to enable relevant agencies to promptly and systematically respond to the situation. Several main roads have been flooded, with some impassable, including stretches of Vibhavadi Road, Ratchadapisek Road, Phattanakan Road, Chaeng Wattana Road, Phaholyothin Road, and New Phetchaburi Road, as well as side streets in Lat Phrao and Ramkhamhaeng. Small cars are advised to avoid heavily flooded locations due to safety concerns. Residents can check which locations are flooded on the BMA’s flood alert website before travel. Meanwhile, those living near canals have been advised to move cars and belongings to high grounds. Nearly 48 hours of continuous rains have caused widespread flooding in several areas of the city, especially in the eastern districts, said Bangkok governor Chadchart Sittipunt on Saturday morning (26 September). Several districts, including Min Buri and Klong Sam Wa, experienced almost 300 milimetres of accumulated rainfall, while more water is coming down from Pathumthani and Nontaburi. The BMA is working to reduce water levels in main canals, provide assistance to vulnerable population, and open temporary shelters. Residents are advised to stay home due to flooding on main roads. On social media, netizens reported convenience stores and supermarkets being emptied as residents stock up on essentials in case the flood worsens. Meanwhile, the Thai Meteorological Department has issued a heavy rain warning until 27 September, with continuous rainfall and isolated heavy to very heavy rain likely in the central region including Bangkok and its vicinity. Floodings have also been reported in Nontaburi, Pathumthani, Nakhon Pathom, and Ayutthaya. People living in low-lying areas along the Chao Phraya River and downstream from the Chao Phraya Dam have been advised to be on alert as discharges from the dam are gradually being increased.   eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-26 - 16:04 * News * Bangkok * Flood * Natural disaster (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Activist network calls for repeal of 1976 coup-era order The October 6 Memorial Network has filed petitions with the Bhumjaithai Party and the People’s Party calling for the repeal of an order made following the military coup of 1976 which increased the penalty for royal defamation. Network representatives at the People‘s Party headquarters. (Photo by Ginger Cat) Network representatives visited the Bhumjaithai Party on the morning of 22 September, before going to the People‘s Party in the afternoon. The network also plans to visit the Democrat Party on 28 September and the Pheu Thai Party on 29 September. The petition is part of a campaign marking the 50th anniversary of the 6 October 1976 Thammasat University Massacre, a violent crackdown and lynching by police and right-wing paramilitaries of protesters gathering at Thammasat University and nearby Sanam Luang to protest the return of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. The massacre resulted in the death of at least 45 people. That evening, Admiral Sangad Chaloryu ousted the government of Seni Pramoj in a military coup. He became head of the National Administrative Reform Council (NARC), the junta which would rule Thailand until 1980.  Within 15 days after the coup, the NARC issued Order 41, amending the Criminal Code to increase the penalties for several offences, such as defaming a foreign head of state, insulting a place of worship, flag desecration, defamation, and defamation by publication. It also increased the penalty for royal defamation from up to 7 years to between 3 and 15 years. The October 6 Memorial Network plans to propose a bill repealing Order 41 and has launched an online campaign for voters to back the bill at https://decoup6octsins.com/. As of 25 September, the bill had over 25,000 signatures. In its petition, the Network calls on political parties to back their proposal. The NARC no longer exists, says the petition, but the effects of its order still linger as people continue to be detained on royal defamation and similar charges. Repealing the order would show that juntas and their laws have no place in Thai society. Relics of military coups should not be allowed to stand without review, says the statement. eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-09-25 - 17:14 * News * Thammasat University massacre * 6 October 1976 * Section 112 * Royal defamation (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Thailand passes new deportation regulation despite human rights concerns A new regulation concerning the deportation of foreign nationals came into effect on 28 August, despite warnings from civil society groups that the proposed framework could weaken due process, undermine existing human rights safeguards and create uncertainty in the country’s relations with foreign governments and international organisations. The government says that the regulation is meant to make deportation of foreign nationals who break the law more efficient and improve coordination among agencies responsible for immigration, corrections and foreign affairs. It states that foreign nationals who commit six categories of offences will be deported after serving their sentences. These include illegal entry or stay, violations of foreign-worker legislation, violations of foreign-business laws, forgery or use of forged official documents, criminal offences carrying imprisonment of five years or more, and people acting as principals, instigators or supporters of those offences. The regulation would also strengthen coordination between government agencies. The Department of Corrections would be required to notify the Interior Ministry before a foreign prisoner is released, allowing the Interior Minister to consider a deportation order without delay. The government argues that the system would close administrative gaps and prevent foreign nationals who have violated Thai law from remaining in the country because of procedural delays. Civil society raises concerns over due process, non-refoulement A draft of the regulation was approved by the Cabinet on 14 July. Civil society groups then campaigned for it to be suspended and reviewed before adoption. Organizations like the Thailand Migration Reform Consortium (TMR), the Migrant Working Group (MWG), and the Coalition for the Rights of Refugees and Stateless Persons (CRSP) said Thailand does not lack the sovereign authority to deport people, but raised concerns that the proposed mechanism could allow that authority to be exercised without sufficient legal and procedural safeguards. “Deportation, in and of itself, does not constitute a human rights violation, provided that it is carried out in accordance with the rule of law,” the three organizations said in a statement issued on 15 July. They call on the government to incorporate legal safeguards into the regulation, including an explicit non-refoulement provision in line with Thailand’s anti-torture and enforced disappearance law. The regulation must also guarantee due process and individualised risk assessment prior to removal, as well as protection for children and family unity. The coalition is also calling for stronger safeguards governing immigration detention. The regulation does not establish a clear maximum period of detention, judicial review mechanisms, or a clear time limit and review procedures for re-entry ban. Without effective review mechanisms, a system designed to speed up deportation could potentially leave people in prolonged detention when removal itself is not practically possible. The groups said that the regulation presents structural concerns that could affect compliance with international human rights treaties to which Thailand is a state party. They also raise concerns about the hierarchy of laws and the coherence of Thailand’s legal framework. Thailand already has several laws governing immigration, deportation, child protection and trafficking, and the coalition argues that the problem is not a lack of legal authority but the fragmentation of existing rules. Introducing another executive regulation risks adding another layer to an already complicated system. They argue that this could weaken legislative scrutiny and create uncertainty if subordinate legislation conflicts with provisions or principles contained in primary legislation They are also concerned about using a Prime Minister’s Office regulation to establish rules that directly affect fundamental rights instead of going through the legislative process in parliament. The most serious human rights concern raised by the civil society is about those who cannot safely return to their country of origin. The regulation states that people whose nationality cannot be determined will be sent back to the country where they last habitually resided. It does not explicitly require individual risk assessment of whether the person being deported will be safe upon return. This creates particular risks for stateless persons and those whose nationality is disputed. For the civil society, the absence of explicit safeguards could mean an individual is removed before the risks awaiting them have been properly assessed. Thailand‘s Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act prohibits the return of individuals to countries where they would be in danger. Meanwhile, UN experts have stressed that removal decisions should involve an individual assessment of protection needs and access to fair procedures and an independent mechanism for challenging negative decisions. Another concern is that there is no procedural guarantee of due process. The groups have called for guarantees that individuals facing deportation will be told the reasons they are being deported, receive copies of relevant orders and evidence, obtain interpretation, or have access to legal counsel. They also called for an appeal mechanism that can suspend deportation where removal could expose an individual to serious harm and for access to a court or independent body with the authority to suspend removal while a serious protection claim is being examined. Another concern is the breadth of some of the proposed grounds for deportation. Civil society groups say terms such as “principal offender, instigator, or supporter” could create uncertainty if they are not accompanied by clear evidentiary standards. They also question provisions that could permit removal without requiring a final criminal conviction in every circumstance. A diplomatic problem hiding in the draft The civil society coalition has raised a second, less conventional concern: the language of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft. According to the coalition, the memorandum suggests that when a foreign government or international organisation asks Thailand not to return an individual but does not promptly take custody, this may indicate that the reasons given for the request are not genuinely serious or that the requesting party does not sincerely intend to receive the person. The groups say such wording is problematic because delays in receiving a person can have many explanations, including security screening, visa procedures, refugee-admission processes, legal restrictions and coordination between multiple governments. A delay, they argue, does not by itself establish that a protection claim is not genuine. The coalition therefore wants the language removed and replaced with neutral criteria based on measurable factors such as reasonable deadlines and demonstrable progress by the requesting government or organisation. The OECD question The concern is particularly sensitive for Thailand, which is seeking closer international cooperation on migration and has also opened accession discussions with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Thailand formally entered OECD accession discussions in 2024. The OECD Council’s decision made clear that Thailand would be required to complete extensive technical reviews and adopt necessary legislative changes as part of the accession process. Civil society groups argue that the proposed deportation regulation could therefore have implications beyond immigration policy. They point to three areas: rule of law, human rights protections and regulatory quality. The coalition also warns that uncertainty surrounding migrant workers could affect sectors already dependent on foreign labour, including construction, agriculture, food processing, services and tourism. However, some of the coalition’s broader economic projections — including the claim that failure to meet OECD-related standards could cost Thailand approximately 1.6 per cent of GDP — should be treated as an advocacy estimate rather than an established OECD forecast. The OECD’s official accession documents confirm the significance of legislative and institutional reforms but do not establish that the proposed deportation regulation itself would produce a specific GDP loss. That distinction is important as the debate moves from human rights advocacy into economic policy.   eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-09-25 - 17:03 * News * migrant workers * deportation * immigration * Refugee (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Thai Court to rule on detention of Chinese journalist on 9 October The South Bangkok Criminal Court will rule on 9 October whether Bai Zhaodong, a Chinese journalist and UN-recognised refugee held in immigration detention, is being unlawfully detained.  A hearing took place on 18 September at the South Bangkok Criminal Court after Bai’s lawyers filed a petition requesting his release due to unlawful detention. According to the Immigration Act, the authorities can detain a person for as long as necessary pending departure to another country. Bai’s lawyers have argued that the Immigration Bureau may no longer have a reason to detain Bai since a third country has already approved his resettlement.  Bai was brought to court for the hearing. He testified that he was detained 6 times by the Chinese authorities. During each detention, he was placed on a chair with his hands tied behind his back and interrogated for 24 hours straight while officers beat him. He would then be released without being formally charged. He said that he came to Thailand in mid-2024 after being advised to do so by a friend. Nadthasiri Bergman, Bai’s lawyer, said that Bai has tried to apply for a visa extension, but his application was refused and he was told that he has an arrest warrant on a charge of extortion issued by the Public Security Bureau of Yulin City. Bai subsequently filed an application with the UNHCR to be recognised as a refugee and received refugee status. Bai previously said that the extortion charge was fabricated so that the Chinese authorities would have an excuse to bring him back to China.  Bai said that during his stay in Thailand, strangers often came asking around for him. This made him feel unsafe and he had to move around often. In 2025, he was detained by immigration officers in Chiang Mai. He also said that he does not know what would happen to him if he is deported to China. Pol Lt Col Anan Insai from the Immigration Bureau‘s Investigation Division said that the Chinese authorities first requested Bai‘s extradition in 2024. He said that Bai was originally staying in Thailand on a visa which was valid until 31 October 2024. On 28 October 2024, the Foreign Affairs Division of the Royal Thai Police received a letter from the Chinese Embassy stating that Bai was wanted in China. The Immigration Bureau revoked his visa on 11 December 2024. On 30 May 2025, Bai was arrested in Chiang Mai for staying in Thailand without a visa. He was sentenced to 2 months in prison and fined 2000 baht. His sentence was suspended for 2 years. Pol Lt Col Anan said that on 3 June 2025, the Chinese Embassy send an informal letter to the Foreign Affairs Division requesting Bai’s extradition. Meanwhile, Bai was granted bail from immigration detention. He was subsequently approved for resettlement. With his flight scheduled for 5 February 2026, Bai reported to the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre and was detained there while waiting for the Thai authorities to grant his exit permit. On 16 September, the Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Bai on charges of extortion, triggering the extradition process. Bai‘s lawyer asked Pol Lt Col Anan why the Immigration Bureau did not allow Bai to leave for resettlement. Pol Lt Col Anan said he was not sure because he is only responsible for detention, but he speculated that Bai was not allowed to leave because the Immigration Bureau had to check with the Office of the Attorney General, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the police if there is an extradition request for Bai. The Office of the Attorney General and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the Foreign Affairs Division on 4 August 2026 that Bai is in the process of being extradited. Bai’s lawyer requested that the Court question Immigration Bureau representatives on when the Bureau receive a formal extradition request for Bai and whether there is documentation to confirm it. However, Pol Lt Col Anan did not bring the document to court. Nadthasiri told reporters after the hearing that Bai’s legal team will have to protest his extradition. She explained that when an extradition request is filed, the Thai authorities will check whether it was filed according to the legal procedure and if it was, the individual will be extradited. Nadthasiri said that the arrest warrant will be presented to Bai, who will be taken to the Criminal Court to be formally charged. He will then be detained at the Bangkok Remand Prison pending extradition. She alleged that the Chinese authorities tried to pressure Bai into returning to China voluntarily. A few days before the hearing, she learned that Chinese officials visited Bai‘s family and asked his child to try to convince Bai to return to China. The Criminal Court also issued an arrest warrant for Bai on 16 September, only 2 days before the hearing. For her, this shows that China will try everything to bring him back. When asked if there is a possibility of halting Bai‘s extradition, Nadthasiri said that the chances are slim but Bai‘s legal representation will try their best. She noted that the human rights situation in Thailand is not good since it seems like the government is friendly with China.  “It is clear in this case that there has been pressure from China since the beginning. It may not be directed at me, but they use the legal process and every means they have to put Bai Zhadong in the most difficult position so that he would agree to go back to China,” Nadthasiri said. Bai is a former investigative journalist for Caijing magazine. His work exposed large-scale corruption and a money laundering network involving local government officials and high-ranking officials in the Chinese Communist Party.  Between 2011 and 2022, at least five charges were brought against him by various public departments across the country due to his reporting on fraud and corruption, including a charge of inciting subversion of state power. In September 2024, the Public Security Bureau of Yulin City issued an arrest warrant for Bai on trumped-up charges of extortion. Bai fled China in 2023 and arrived in Thailand in 2024. In January 2026, he was placed in a detention facility pending relocation to a third country, but Thai authorities have barred him from leaving Thailand on scheduled flights twice in February and June. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-09-24 - 11:45 * News * Bai Zhaodong * Refugee * China * press freedom * non-refoulement * Nadthasiri Bergman (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Activist known for “Lost Faith” shirt faces another royal defamation charge Tiwagorn Withiton, an activist known for wearing a t-shirt printed with “I have lost faith in the monarchy” has been charged with another count of royal defamation over 5 Facebook posts made in 2022. Pattana Sriyai, Tiwagorn‘s lawyer, said he visited Tiwagorn on 18 September. During the visit, Tiwagorn told him that Pol Lt Intrachai Intra, a deputy investigation inspector from the Technology Crime Suppression Division (TCSD)’s Sub-Division 3, visited Tiwagorn on 22 July along with a lawyer from the Lawyers’ Coucil. Tiwagorn was then notified that he is being charged with another count of royal defamation. Pattana said that the charge stemmed from 5 Facebook posts Tiwagorn made in July 2022. The complaint against him was filed by serial complainant Sonthiya Sawasdee. Pattana said that Tiwagorn refused to acknowledge the new charge and did not sign documents. He told his lawyer that Pol Lt Intrachai said to him that he is not a man because he does not own up to his crimes. Tiwagorn responded by hanging up the phone used in the visiting room. He told Pattana he was disgusted and did not want to participate in an unjust process. Pattana said that Tiwagorn wrote a letter to him in early Augsut about the new charge but the letter never arrives. Pattana has not seen documents relating to the case since he has to request it from the prison. Tiwagorn also told the lawyer that he expects more royal defamation charges. Before his imprisonment, he received Facebook messages from members of royalist groups threatening to file complaints against him over a number of Facebook posts. Tiwagorn is currently detained at the Khon Kaen Central Prison. Her was sentenced to 6 years in prison on a royal defamation charge for posting a picture of himself wearing the t-shirt, which went viral in 2020. The Appeal Court in August 2024 overturned the Khon Kaen Provincial Court‘s ruling dismissing the charges against him, finding him guilty and sentencing him to prison. In May 2026, the Supreme Court upheld the Appeal Court‘s ruling. He was also charged with sedition and the Supreme Court is expected to soon issue a verdict. The sedition charge is one of the charges covered by the new political amnesty law, but Pattana said that Tiwagorn does not wish to participate in the amnesty process and wants a Supreme Court verdict. Nevertheless, he said there is nothing he could do if the court decides to dismiss the case under the new amnesty law. eng editor 1 Tue, 2026-09-22 - 12:14 * News * Tiwagorn Withiton * Section 112 * Royal defamation (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Thailand and Cambodia at UNCLOS: where they stand on maritime dispute Thailand and Cambodia have held the first compulsory conciliation meeting over their maritime dispute in the Gulf of Thailand. Their opening statements offered key clues about how each side frames the dispute and what they may seek from the process. The first three-day session (14-16 September) of compulsory conciliation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) between the two countries was held in Singapore, with Cambodia and Thailand exchanging opening statements on 15 September.  Cambodia does not rule out possibility of a joint development area Prak Sokhonn, Cambodia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, began with Cambodia’s history and its commitment to a peaceful resolution in accordance with international law.  He said that Thailand unilaterally terminated the 2001 MOU in May. With its commitment to peaceful settlement of the dispute, Cambodia chose to initiate compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS. “Cambodia sees this conciliation process as a means to rebuild trust, not a form of escalation,” said Prak Sokhonn.  Cambodia also hopes that Thailand will engage constructively and will work to implement all existing bilateral agreements, particularly the 27 December 2025 joint statement, This would facilitate the return of 20,000 displaced villagers to their homes and the preservation of cultural sites which have been damaged in the fighting. Cambodia’s objective in the proceedings is to conclude a treaty with Thailand in order to delimit a single all-purpose maritime boundary. Alternatively, Cambodia would be prepared to conclude an agreement on the joint development and equitable sharing of resources with Thailand, pending a final agreement on the maritime boundary. If a final agreement on either the maritime boundary or a joint development arrangement cannot be concluded, Cambodia would request the commission to prepare a report containing recommendations to the parties for further settlement. Thailand eyes ‘maritime boundary delimitation’ only In his statement, the Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow as a Deputy stated that Thailand has believed in addressing issues through dialogue. Cambodia has approached the issues differently. It always claims that it respects international law and portrays Thailand as flouting it, but its claims are self-serving and contain elements of hypocrisy.  “When Cambodia leaked a private telephone conversation between our leaders, when Cambodian rockets hit and killed innocent Thai civilians, and when our soldiers lost their legs to landmines planted by Cambodia, where was respect for international law?” said Sihasak. Thailand viewed international law and diplomacy as complementary foundations of peaceful relations between states. The country repeatedly sought resolutions to restore relations.  Instead of engaging fully and sincerely through bilateral dialogue, Cambodia has repeatedly vilified Thailand through false narratives, distortion of facts and unfounded accusations on an almost daily basis, including at international forums. “And it does this by playing the role of a victim with a sense of self-righteousness aimed at claiming the moral high ground,” said the Thai Foreign Minister. Regarding the termination of the 2001 MOU, Cambodia’s claim that Thailand’s decision left it with no option but to initiate these proceedings, is simply not true.  Over a period of 25 years, both counties managed to hold only two rounds of official talks. It is clear that the MOU had produced no concrete progress. Thailand therefore chose to make a fresh start in negotiations.  Thailand also believes that Cambodia’s recent ratification of UNCLOS would have provided a timely opportunity to resume talks. Thailand proposed direct talks on the maritime boundary, but Cambodia disregarded the option.  Sihasak asserted that the scope of these proceedings concerns only delimitation of the maritime boundary between Thailand and Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand. It does not concern sovereignty over land, including Koh Kut. There has never been a debate on this matter. Thailand also rejects Cambodia’s 1972 continental shelf claim line which is without legal basis. Thailand and Cambodia have disputed maritime boundaries for decades, leading them to enter into the 2001 MOU to delimit the boundary and share the natural resources. Playing along with nationalist sentiment, PM Anutin Charnvirakul vowed to cancel the MOU and kept his word by announcing the termination of the 2001 MOU, citing that it had made no progress.  On 2 June, Cambodia initiated the compulsory conciliation process under UNCLOS, which either party is allowed to invoke without consent from the other party. Compulsory conciliation has previously been invoked only once, in the dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia over the Timor Sea. Thailand later submitted a response agreeing to enter the proceedings, making this only the second case in the history of the international law of the sea. Each country appointed two conciliators, and these four selected a chair to form the Commission. Thailand named Judge Albert J. Hoffmann of South Africa and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum of Germany. Cambodia named French academic Jean-Marc Thouvenin and Danish diplomat Peter Taksøe-Jensen. Australian diplomat Katrina Cooper was then appointed as the Chair  What do their statements reveal? Given that compulsory conciliation proceedings typically aim at finding common ground for both parties to resolve an issue, several observers expressed concerns over Thailand’s assertive tone, as the proceedings rely on trust from both sides. Ultimately, both Thailand and Cambodia, under the UNCLOS mechanism, will inevitably have to find an amicable solution. The standpoints of both Thailand and Cambodia are also interesting. Cambodia laid out two options: ‘a single all-purpose maritime boundary,’ or ‘an agreement on the joint development and equitable sharing of resources, pending final agreement on a maritime boundary’. The inclusion of joint development also suggests that Cambodia continues to favour the model it has prioritised for the disputed maritime areas. Joint development is part of a provisional arrangement under UNCLOS in which disputing countries agree to share the natural resources pending final maritime delimitation. However, it is not mandatory.  In the Gulf of Thailand, we have seen one example of joint development: between Thailand and Malaysia.  Also, the term ‘equitable’ in Cambodia’s statement does not appear to be random. In the context of UNCLOS, this does not always mean a 50:50 split of resources in the disputed area. Maritime delimitation considers a range of factors, including geography, coastline, historical circumstances, economic considerations, and, in some cases, environmental concerns. Meanwhile, Thailand proposes only one solution: 'maritime boundary delimitation between Thailand and Cambodia,’ which was also its longstanding position before the negotiations to enter into the 2001 MOU.  Phattharaphong Saengkrai of Thammasat University's Faculty of Law observes that given the proceedings take approximately 12 months, it would be impossible to achieve a single all-purpose maritime boundary to cover the 26,000 sq km. overlapping area as Cambodia proposes. In addition, he noted that Sihasak’s statement indicates that Thailand does not want to be seen as allowing an external party to influence its decision-making. Although the Commission’s recommendations are not legally binding, they carry political and diplomatic weight. At the very least, in Phattaraphong’s assessment, Thailand and Cambodia are likely to negotiate a new detailed MOU that sets out a framework for further negotiations, while the two sides might agree on boundary lines in certain disputed areas.  Koh Kut is also the most controversial part in the dispute. Cambodia’s claimed line forms a U shape curve around Thailand’s Koh Kut. But Under UNCLOS, an inhabited island is entitled to its own territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf. Thailand, therefore, argues that Cambodia must redraw its line in a straight southwesterly direction away from the island. Thailand is likely to be in a strong legal position at this point. Whether their proposed options can be reconciled will depend on the extent to which both parties agree. It is to be noted that the Commission is not responsible for drawing the line for both parties, and there will be no winner or loser from the compulsory conciliation. eng editor 3 Mon, 2026-09-21 - 19:28 * Feature * Thai-Cambodian conflicts * Thai-Cambodia relations * Thai-Cambodian maritime disputes * Cambodia * Prak Sokhonn * Sihasak Phuangketkeow * UNCLOS (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Bhumjaithai executives should be prosecuted, says election commissioner Election Commissioner Sitthichot Intrawiset said in a press conference on 15 September that he believes the 20 Bhumjaithai Party executives implicated in the Senate selection fraud case should have been prosecuted. The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) voted 5 to 2 not to refer the Bhumjaithai executives to the Supreme Court. Sitthichot, along with Election Commissioner Chai Nakornchai, were the two who voted in favour of prosecuting. Sitthichot said that he and Chai believe there is enough evidence that the Bhumjaithai executives were involved in collusion during the Senate selection. Evidence was found of vote rigging in several provinces, where candidates were gathered in hotels and given voting instructions. Sittichotnoted that candidates ranked in the first 7 places from each group were included in the instruction sheets found and are being prosecuted, showing that those involved in making the instruction sheets have committed fraud.  All evidence in each province points to one political party, Sitthichot said. Each suspect is either a member of or connected to this party. A witness who later retracted their testimony said that an order was given during a party meeting for local MPs or party members to take part in collusion. Sittichotsaid that he found the witness’testimony credible because action took place that corresponded with the testimony. Another witness, a secretary to one of the senators, said that a group of senators met at a hotel in Bangkok after the ECT certified the selection result. Members of the party were also in attendance. According to Sittichot, the witness said the meeting was to select the senate president and vice presidents, and that they saw high-ranking figures in the party walking out of the room. This corresponds with call records to some ministers after the selection. Sittichot said that the minority Election Commissioners believe these instances can be considered involvement in colluding to produce voting instructions in each province. Sitthichot said that Direk Pornseema, another witness, gave testimony that corresponded with that of Witness No. 16/26, previously revealed to be former Bhumjaithai MP Ekkarat Changlao, concerning the action of a minister. Sitthichot said he does not believe Ekkarat retracted his testimony because he was threatened into testifying because Ekkarat was an MP at the time and an influential figure. Another witness who retracted his testimony is a politician’s father-in-law, and Sitthichote does not think anyone would threaten such a figure.  Sitthichot said that, although no records were found of money transfers by well-known politicians, there are records of transfers by people connected to them. One witness claimed that they went to the party headquarters to receive money in cash, but no one else can corroborate the account.  He also said that he told the ECT Chair about transaction records of a senator from Prachuap Khiri Khan and that a businessman named Worapoj Tangphanphian transferred a large amount of money to Surat Thani. However, when he asked the joint investigation committee where the money came from, he was told that they cannot investigate because the ECT voted 4 to 3 to reject the evidence. Sitthichot still considers it an offence because the money has to come from somewhere, but due to this limitation, he could not find out more. It is now up to the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) to continue investigating, since the DSI is investigating the Senate collusion case as a money laundering case and may prosecute other individuals. Regarding Ekkarat’s claim, after retracting his testimony, that the voting instruction notes were not real, Sitthichot said that CCTV footage from the national level selection showed a candidate bringing out the notes. A witness who testified to the joint investigation committee also took a picture of the notes on their phones, which shows the dates the notes were made. It is therefore not possible for the notes to have been made after the testimony was given or that the investigation committee made them up to make accusations. He noted that writing down the numbers of candidates to vote for would be wrong if the candidates are told which numbers to write down, which is different from the candidates taking notes in the introduction documents to remind themselves of the numbers. The Supreme Court previously ruled that voting with instructions given by others means that the candidates are not voting independently and is considered fraudulent.  On 14 September, the ECT voted to prosecute 77 out of 229 individuals implicated in the Senate selection fraud case. 26 of those prosecuted are sitting senators. Bhumjaithai Party executives, including Prime Minister and party leader Anutin Charnvirakul, were not prosecuted. Of the 7 election commissioners, 4 were appointed after they were approved by the incumbent Senate: Narong Klunwarin, Narong Rakroi, AnanSuwannarat, and Chirute Visalachitra.  Among this group, 3 were also bureaucrats serving under Bhumjaithai Cabinet ministers or working closely with Bhumjaithai politicians. Anan was the Permanent Secretary for Agriculture between October 2018 - September 2020, when Mananya Thaiseth — sister of Bhumjaithai deputy leader Chada Thaiseth, one of the suspects in the Senate selection fraud case — was Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Narong Rakroi was Governor of Uthai Thani between 2018 - 2021, during which time he worked with Alongkot Worakee, now a senator and a suspect in the selection fraud. He served as Governor around the same time that Mananya was Mayor of Uthai Thani Municipality. Chirute was formerly the Director-General of the Department of Land Transport when Saksayam Chidchob was Minister of Transport. Election commissioner Titichet Nutchanart was appointed in December 2018 by the National Legislative Assembly formed in 2014 following the military coup led by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). Titichet has been accused of bribing a former Auditor General and a complaint was filed against him with the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). All 5 voted against prosecuting Bhumjaithai executives. Meanwhile, Sittichot and Chai, who voted in favour of prosecution, were appointed following approval from the NCPO-appointed Senate, which was in office from 2019 to2024. eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-09-21 - 15:04 * News * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) * Sitthichot Intrawiset * senate * Senate election 2024 * Senate collusion * election fraud * Bhumjaithai Party (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Cartoon by Stephff: UNCLOS Thailand-Cambodia talks Cartoon by Stephff: UNCLOS Thailand-Cambodia talks eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-19 - 00:17 * Multimedia (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

ECT refers 77 Senate selection fraud suspects to Supreme Court; Bhumjaithai politicians excluded The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) has decided to refer 77 individuals accused of involvement in the Senate selection collusion case, including only 26 sitting senators, to the Supreme Court. Notably, none of the accused politicians from the Bhumjathai Party were referred. Meanwhile, iLaw, which has been following the Senate selection process since 2024, will be releasing more information from the case file, including testimonies of other witnesses. The ECT met on Monday (14 September) to decide whether to refer the Senate selection fraud case to the Supreme Court. According to the ECT’s resolution, only 77 individuals were referred to the Supreme Court.  According to the investigation, the individuals, who were accused of electoral fraud, included 138 sitting senators, 50 candidates and individuals on the reserve list, 21 Bhumjaithai politicians, and 20 other individuals linked to Bhumjaithai politicians. During its press conference, the ECT representatives clarified that a total number of the accused was actually 427, not 229, with 67 complainants. 77 individuals, who were referred to the Supreme Court, included 26 sitting senators, 36 candidates, and 15 others.  The ECT revealed that there were a total of 7 charges in accordance with the 2018 Organic Act on the Acquisition of Senators that were brought against the accused. However, 2 charges against a politician in connection with electoral fraud were dropped.  The ECT resolved that neither reasonable grounds nor evidence indicated that Bhumjaithai Party’s MPs and members of the executive committee were involved in the collusion as accused, despite phone call records and witnesses. According to the ECT, some witnesses were not credible and questionable, and their testimony was inconsistent. The investigation in this case began last year, but the case reached a tipping point after  the opposition and the legal watchdog NGO iLaw, which has been following the Senate selection process and noticed abnormalities, began releasing evidence of vote rigging and collusion and alleging that high-ranking Bhumjaithai members, including Cabinet ministers, were involved. In the past few months, Civil society organizations have insisted that the ECT must refer the case to court so that the evidence can be heard instead of just by the ECT, whose neutrality is questioned. iLaw has also said several times that it will release the information it has on those individuals if the ECT decides not to indict any one of the 229 accused. The ECT’s legitimacy has been under scrutiny due to the connection between commissioners and the ruling party, it should not be making a decision and should simply send the case to court. Election commissioners are appointed on the Senate’s approval and 4 out of the 7 sitting commissioners were approved by the incumbent Senate. 3 out of the 7 sitting commissioners were once bureaucrats under a Bhumjaithai minister. Some members of the nomination committee for election commissioners are also connected to Bhumjaithai-aligned politicians and senators. Following the ECT’s press conference, the People's Party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut revealed that the ECT’s decision not to take legal action against even a single Bhumjathai politician, despite solid evidence, was considered unlawful and against its own standards.  The resolution not only allows the majority of those accused in the Senate collusion to escape prosecution but also perpetuates the problems surrounding the independent institutions under the 2017 Constitution, which has been truly unable to operate independently.  He said that the party will take and support legal action against the ECT for wrongful exercise of power and ensure that the evidence concerning the suspects, who have not been indicted, is brought before the Court. The party will also scrutinize the accused politicians through parliamentary mechanisms, such as censure debates, as well as a public campaign.  Natthaphong reiterated that pushing for the constitutional amendment is the way to limit the Senate’s illegitimacy and to allow the public to scrutinize and remove those who hold a position in independent bodies under the Constitution. Response from iLaw iLaw held a press conference following the ECT’s announcement. Director Yingcheep Atchanont said that iLaw has been following the Senate selection process since 2024, even before the ECT announced how the selection would be conducted. It has campaigned for people to participate in the selection and has observed the selection process at every level. After the national level selection, Yingcheep said, iLaw noticed that something abnormal happened during the selection. He noted how over a thousand candidates were seen wearing the same outfits on voting day. Notes were found with numbers of candidates who would later be selected as senators, winning such a high vote count that not even the ECT thought possible. Yingcheep said that, given the information, it can be concluded that there is a large conspiracy to ensure a chosen group of candidates were selected. He noted that at least 120 senators are part of this plot, and that they tend to vote in the same direction so often that it would not be possible to say they are independent.  It was not easy to find evidence that such a conspiracy took place, he said, but the only people with a motif are large political parties with a network in several provinces. The evidence found pointed to the Bhumjaithai Party. Its MPs, former MPs, MP assistants, and politicians’ family members were accused of recruiting candidates and paying them, as well as gathering them in hotels and instructing them on how to vote. Yingcheep said that the ECT’s decision not to prosecute political party executives is not surprising, given that even ECT chair Narong Klanwarin was appointed following approval from the incumbent Senate and given that the Senate’s affiliation and connections are well-known. He speculated that it is likely that the 77 people whose case is referred to court are minor players in the game who made a mistake, such as by transferring money from their own accounts or from those of their spouses. As for the others, not being prosecuted does not mean they did nothing wrong, just that they did not slip up and leave behind a trail. Yingcheep stressed that 26 senators being prosecuted meant that fraud was committed during the selection. He noted that information the ECT presented during its press conference is related to senator Surachart Wichaya Suwannaphrom from Nong Bua Lumphu, since it is the same pieces of information previously disclosed by People’s Party MP Parit Wacharasindhu about financial transaction Surachart made.  Yingcheep noted that Surachart came 5th from 154 candidates and that he won the highest number of votes during inter-group voting. This means that a large number of candidates were involved beyond candidates from Nong Bua Lumphu who received money. He questioned how other candidates included in the same voting instruction note as Surachart can be uninvolved or unaware. Nevertheless, prosecuting some individuals means the ECT accepted that the Senate selection process was fraudulent. Boonyanooch Mattoojak, an iLaw representative, said that the ECT had acted as if it were the court. It is required by law to refer a case to court if there is reasonable evidence of fraud, but the ECT chair said during the press conference that some witnesses were not credible or that other evidence were not found. She said that the ECT should have searched for additional evidence instead of judging a witness’ credibility and refusing to find other evidence. Making a verdict should be up to the Supreme Court, which is a more neutral organization than the ECT, whose commissioners were approved by the Senate. Boonyanooch said that refusing to refer every suspect to court means the Supreme Court will not be able to find additional evidence and the public will never see whether those let off by the ECT were guilty. Kanlayakorn Sunthornpruk, another iLaw representative, noted that Ekkarat Changlao, a witness mentioned by the ECT as not being credible, is a former Bhumjaithai MP involved with recruiting candidates. Other witnesses said they met Ekkarat during the Senate selection and that they were candidates in Ekkarat’s network. Phone call records between Ekkarat and Newin Chidchob were also found. Kanlayakorn said iLaw will be releasing Ekkarat’s testimony to the public. Yingcheep added that iLaw considered Ekkarat a first tier witness because he was still a Bhumjaithai MP in 2024 and testified during the investigation that Bhumjaithai executives and several Cabinet ministers were involved with the Senate selection fraud, but the ECT chair said he dismissed Ekkarat’s testimony because Ekkarat has a prior conflict with the party executives. Yingcheep said iLaw will be releasing more information from the case file, including testimonies of other witnesses. Phatcha Chaimongkolsub, also an iLaw representative, said that it is necessary to rewrite the Constitution because it has become clear that the ECT, who came into office with approval of the Senate, uses its power to protect the Bhumjaithai-aligned senators. Bhumjaithai has also proposed a constitutional amendment bill that gives the Senate the power to select members of the drafting assembly and approve a new constitution. The only way out, she said, is to object to the drafting process proposed by Bhumjaithai and back a bill being proposed by the civil society calling for a Constitutional Drafting Assembly election. The civil society is now in the process of collecting signatures for the bill. Eligible voters can back the bill at conforall.com. eng editor 3 Mon, 2026-09-14 - 23:05 * News * Senate election 2024 * Senate collusion * Bhumjaithai Party * elector * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Protests demand ECT prosecute 229 senate selection fraud suspects Protests took place in several provinces over the weekend to demand that the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) prosecute 229 individuals accused of fraud during the 2024 Senate selection ahead of the ECT’s ruling on the case. On Friday (11 September), in Khon Kaen, a group of activists gathered at the Ratchadanuson Park in Khon Kaen city where they play a game of bingo and gave speeches before marching to the ECT office in Khon Kaen. Activist Nattaporn Artharn gave a speech saying that the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) has gathered evidence on the 229 suspects and all the ECT has to do is to refer the case to court. The group is calling on the ECT not to stall the case. Activists submitting their petition at the ECT’s Phitsanulok office. On Saturday (12 September), the Northern People Democracy Network (NPD) staged a protest in which they walked 229 steps to the provincial ECT office in Phitsanulok to file a petition demanding the prosecution of the 229 suspects. Oat, one of the members, said that the group also filed a petition with the ECT office in Phetchabun on Friday (11 September). The group wants every suspect to go to trial and prove their innocence in court. They found the ECT questionable and are concerned that the ECT might not refer every suspect to court. Sunday’s protesters marching through Ha Yaek Lat Phrao intersection.  On Sunday (13 September), iLaw staged a protest march from its office in Bangkok‘s Lat Phrao district to the Bangkok Art and Culture Centre (BACC) to demand the ECT prosecute all 229 suspects. Speaking to the media ahead of the march, iLaw director Yingcheep Atchanont questioned the independence of the ECT, noting that 4 out of 7 election commissioners were appointed by the incumbent Senate. He reiterated that the civil society is demanding that the ECT refer the case to the Supreme Court so the case can be heard by a neutral organization.  Yingcheep said that iLaw has the case file, and if the ECT refuses to prosecute any of the 229 individuals, information about that individual will be released to the public. He stressed that they would prefer not to do it, but it would be necessary if the ECT leaves anyone out. Protesters marching past the Victory Monument. While stopping in front of the Century shopping mall near the Victory Monument, police officers negotiated with the organizers for a route change to avoid having a protest march pass by Sa Pathum Palace. Protesters instead marched to the Phayathai BTS Station, where they dispersed and met up again at the Siam BTS station. They then marched through the Siam shopping district to the BACC, where an event was taking place. Opposition politicians like People‘s Party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, deputy leader Sirikanya Tansakun, and a number of MPs including Parit Wacharasindhu and Chayaphon Satondee joined the march. Former election commissioner Somchai Srisutthiyakorn, former senator Ruengkrai Leekitwattana and sitting senator Wuttipong Pongsuwan also joined the march. Participants in DRG’s activity running past a bus stop on Phayathai Road. (Photo: Kotcharak Kaewsurach) At around 14.29, the Democracy Restoration Group (DRG) staged an event where they ran from the Chamchuri Square shopping mall to the Bangkok Art and Culture Centre (BACC), where a mass protest was taking place to demand that the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) prosecute the 229 individuals suspected of Senate selection fraud.  At the BACC, they perform a symbolic act of protest by dropping clothes into a basket before joining the rest of the protesters. The march from iLaw arrived at the BACC at around 15.00, where they joined the gatherings. The event featured performances, speeches, and activities from other civil society groups.  At the end of the protest, participants stood holding pictures of the suspects in the shape of the number “229”. The other side of the card they were holding says “Prosecute the senators.” Of the 229 individuals being accused of collusion and fraud, 138 are sitting senators. 50 are former senator candidates and individuals on the reserve list. 21 are Bhumjaithai Party executives and MPs, including Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and several of his Cabinet ministers. 20 others are family members of candidates and Bhumjaithai MPs, MP assistants, and local politicians connected to the Bhumjaithai Party. An iLaw representative presenting a board showing connection between senator candidates and politicians implicated in the Senate Selection fraud case. (Photo: Kotcharak Kaewsurach) During the event, iLaw representatives gave a presentation on the case, including details of financial transactions made between senator candidates in exchange for votes and about meetings held at several hotels ahead of the national-level selection where candidates are given instructions on how to vote, as well as records of phone calls between candidates and Bhumjaithai politicians. They cited the joint investigation committee formed by the ECT and the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), which proposed that all 229 individuals be prosecuted, including Bhumjaithai Party members because they were participating in a plot to win seats in the Senate and were recruiting candidates and giving them notes for voting. Yingcheep said in his speech during the event that, if the ECT does not prosecute the suspects, these senators will stay in office and there will not be anything anyone could do. They will then be appointing election commissioners, Constitutional Court judges, as well as board members in other independent bodies that should be holding the government accountable. Yingcheep said that the only way of fixing the system is to amend the junta-backed 2017 Constitution. The problem is that constitutional amendments require approval from at least a third of the Senate. He noted, however, that there is hope in that 21 million people voted in favour of a new Constitution in the 8 February referendum. If the ECT does not prosecute the senators, the so-called “Blue seantors”, or those aligned with the Bhumjaithai Party, would be in control of the constitutional amendment process. A new constitution that comes out of this process will not be better, he said, and the people will have no choice but to vote against it. If the ECT refers the case to court, the majority of senators would be suspended. He said that this could be a way towards a new constitution where everyone is heard.  Protesters in front of the BACC holding cards saying “Prosecute the senators” in the shape of the number “229.” (Photo: Kotcharak Kaewsurach) Meanwhile, in Chiang Mai, people are camping out in front of the ECT‘s provincial office ahead of tomorrow’s meeting where the ECT will rule whether to refer the Senate selection fraud case to court. The gathering began at 16.00 and featured a free mic session, music from North Gate Jazz, and other activities. Nutchapakorn Nammuang from the Constitution Advocacy Alliance (CALL) said during the event that Monday (14 September) will be another watershed moment in Thai politics, and the people are gathering to tell the powers that be that the elites are doing something that is not right. If the Senate lacks legitimacy, it would affect other positions appointed by the Senate, including the ECT and the Constitutional Court.   Protesters in Chiang Mai camping out in front of the provincial ECT office. The Senate and the ECT have been put in the spotlight over the past few months as the opposition People‘s Party and the legal watchdog NGO iLaw release evidence of vote buying, vote rigging, and collusion during the 2024 Senate selection. Citing leaked official documents and witness testimony, they alleged that a number of senator candidates and high-ranking Bhumjaithai Party executives are involved in a plot to ensure that candidates aligned with the party are selected. The ECT will meet on Monday (14 September) to rule whether to prosecute the suspects and refer the case to court. Meanwhile, the civil society has been pressuring the ECT to prosecute all 229 suspects, saying that the ECT is required by law to refer a case of suspected election fraud to the Supreme Court if there is reasonable evidence and that, since appointment of election commissioners are approved by the Senate, the ECT should not make a decision regarding the case and should simply refer it to court so the evidence can be heard during trial. eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-09-14 - 14:34 * News * Senate election 2024 * Senate collusion * election fraud * election fraud * iLaw * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

ECT at the crossroad in Senate selection fraud saga Amidst mounting pressure from the opposition and the civil society, the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) is convening this coming Monday (14 September) to rule whether to prosecute the 229 individuals accused of fraud during the 2024 Senate selection. A controversial selection The incumbent senators came into office in July 2024 following a complex self-selection process marked from the beginning by controversies. The system was the brainchild of the Constitution Drafting Committee, led by Meechai Ruchupan, supposedly designed to eliminate political influence over the Senate and increase the diversity of senators. Candidates register by social and professional groups and senators qualify through both intra- and inter-group elections through a multi-level voting system at the district, provincial, and national levels.  The civil society have observed at the time of the selection that, instead of increasing public participation and diversity in the upper house, the process made it more difficult to participate as only candidates are allowed to vote and the general public was not allowed to closely observe the process. Meanwhile, 120 - 130 senators have been noted as voting in bloc on several motions. They came to be called the “Blue Senators” because of their alleged affiliation with the Bhumjaithai Party. Allegations of collusion, vote rigging, and fraud soon arose. In March 2025, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) launched an investigation into alleged collusion during the Senate selection with monetary offers being made to candidates. According to the DSI’s initial investigation, the acts constituted offences under Section 77 of the Organic Act on the Installation of Senators, under criminal laws regarding secret societies, and under the Money Laundering Act. The DSI eventually voted. 11:4 to take the case as a money laundering investigation. Tawee Sodsong, then the Minister of Justice, said that the DSI had around 7,000 witnesses, 3,000 of whom were present during the national level selection. In June 2025, Bhumjaithai left the government coalition led by the Pheu Thai Party, reportedly over the leaked phone call between then-Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen. When Paetongtarn was dismissed by the Constitutional Court in late August 2025, parliament elected Bhumjaithai Party leader Anutin Charnvirakul to replace her. In December 2025,  the DSI decided to indict 8 individuals, among whom were 2 senators, of money laundering. On 17 July 2025, the 26th investigation committee, a joint committee formed by the ECT and the DSI, recommended the prosecution of all 229 individuals. On 15 September 2025, soon after Anutin became Prime Minister, a set of documents was issued by Kanchit Charoen-in, Deputy Secretary-General of the ECT acting on behalf of ECT Secretary-General Sawaeng Boonmee. Kanchit proposed prosecuting 136 senators, 1 Cabinet minister, and 2 MPs. However, he proposed that the charges against Anutin and a number of Bhumjaithai Party executives be dismissed because he believes witness testimonies are insufficient. It was reported on 12 March 2026 that the ECT’s 36th Subcommittee, formed in September 2025 to rule whether to act on the proposal of the 26th investigation committee and refer the case to court. It eventually voted 5 to 2 to dismiss the case entirely. According to People’s Party MP Parit Wacharasindhu, an ECT representative told the House Standing Committee on independent bodies that the 35th subcommittee’s workload was too much for it to take a case that needs to be carefully considered. The House Committee and Parit himself have both asked the ECT to provide information on what the 36th subcommittee have done in regards to the investigation, but the information was never delivered. The House Committee met on 18 June 2026 to discuss the Senate selection fraud case, but the ECT representatives taking part in the meeting did not explain the role of the 36th Subcommittee. Questions were therefore raised about the 36th Subcommittee’s function and whether it was an attempt to steer the case in favour of the accused. Former election commissioner Somchai Srisutthiyakorn alleged that investigators from the 26th investigation committee were never summoned to speak to the 36th Subcommittee, and the Subcommittee never considered the over 10,000 pages of primary evidence. He claimed that its meetings mostly consisted of listening to its secretaries summarising the 26th committee’s case file. He also questioned its interpretation of the law, raising concerns that too narrow an interpretation might mean the Subcommittee does not see the political connection. People’s Party MP Chayapon Satondee has also alleged that members of the 36th Subcommittee participated in the ECT’s Advanced Certificate Course in Politics and Election Development and the Constitutional Court’s Rule of Law for Democracy programme along with several people accused of Senate selection fraud. Participating in these programme does not mean they committed an offense, Chayapon said, but it is questionable whether connection between these individuals affect the neutrality of the Subcommittee. Who are the accused? An infographic showing the number of Bhumjaithai MPs in each province and the number of senators. (Photo from WeVis) The 229 individuals included 138 sitting senators, 50 candidates and individuals on the reserve list, 21 Bhumjaithai politicians, and 20 other individuals linked to Bhumjaithai politicians, including family members, former MP candidates, MP assistants, and local politicians. The list was released to the public in late July, when iLaw submitted information to the opposition requesting an investigation into 9 politicians allegedly involved with collusion during the Senate selection, including Anutin and 5 other sitting Cabinet ministers. Among the 138 senators accused, 14 are from Buriram, Bhumjaithai’s main stronghold, where local MPs are also accused. Also on the list are Newin Chidchob, the patriarch of the province’s main political dynasty, and his son Chaichanok, the current Minister of Digital Economy and Society. Other politicians are included on the list who are members of Bhumjaithai-affiliated political dynasties, like Prime Minister’s Office Minister Paradorn Prisnanantakul and his brother Koravee who is an MP for Ang Thong, and deputy Interior Minister Jeseth Thaiseth, son of Uthai Thani politician Chada Thaiseth. There are also Bhumjaithai MPs from Si Saket, Ayutthaya, Phichit, Satun, Leoi, Buriram, Krabi, Surat Thani, Ubon Ratchathani, Sukothai, and Amnat Charoen. Parit said during an event organised by the opposition that, according to several witnesses, there is an attempt to take over the Senate and that individuals involved in the collusion targeted smaller provinces because it would require less people to ensure that a candidate aligned with said group get to the national level.  ECT in the hot seat  Individuals wearing yellow shirts at the national level selection. (Photo from ConForAll) The Senate and the ECT has been put in the spotlight over  the past few months as the opposition and the legal watchdog NGO iLaw and the opposition began releasing evidence of vote rigging and collusion and alleging that high-ranking Bhumjaithai members, including Cabinet ministers, were involved.  iLaw said that observers began noticing abnormalities on the day of the national-level selection. A large number of candidates were seen wearing the same yellow shirt and black jacket and carrying the same document folder. Observers noticed that they tend to move around in groups. When leaving the Impact Forum, one group left together and was picked up by vans parked behind IMPACT Challenger Hall, where there were no people around. One of the vehicles had a Buriram license plate. Some candidates were winning an unusually high number of votes while others got none. It has also been noted that provinces that are known Bhumjaithai strongholds have several senators in each province, such as in Buriram, where 14 candidates were selected, or Ang Thong, where 6 were selected. iLaw director Yingcheep Atchanont told the101world that, according to the DSI’s meeting minute, the candidates wore yellow shirts to blend in with ECT officials at the selection so they would be able to walk around or go to the toilet without being followed as people might think they work for the ECT. Nantawat Saksakulkunakorn from the ConForAll Network said during the same interview that, according to candidates, the yellow-clad candidates tend to gather in the toilet. Afterwards, a crumpled piece of paper was found on the floor containing number of candidates. Video clips were released by People’s Party MP Parit Wacharasindhu and former election inspector Pol Col Manas Nakornsri showing officials walking around and asking candidates to hand over their notes, telling the candidates to vote honestly. One of the officials was identified as election commissioner Thitichet Nutchanart, while one of the candidates was now-Senate President MongkoL Surasajja. In one video clip, ECT officials were seen putting confiscated notes into their pockets. The ECT issued a press release saying that it was not illegal to bring documents or notes into the selection venue as there is no law explicitly prohibiting candidates from doing so. However, the ECT issued a resolution on 26 June 2024 prohibiting candidates from bringing documents into the inter-group voting round. It may not be illegal, but the ECT is free to issue regulations for order during the selection, so such notes must be confiscated when found. Citing leaked official documents and witness testimonies, iLaw have released information from the investigation to the public, including concerning vote buying in several provinces. Former candidates have come forward saying they were offered money in exchange for voting for specific individuals.  In Surat Thani, for example, iLaw alleged that Subin Sakda, who claimed to be an assistant to local Bhumjaitai MP Pichai Chomphupol, transferred money to around 10 candidates during the provincial level selection. Among them is a former candidate named Nattapong Saroj, who later testified to the DSI. During an event iLaw organised on 23 August, Nattapong said he received a phone call from a local MP assistant offering him 3,000 baht and asking him to “help the boss,” which he believes refer to the MP. He also received an offer of an additional 2,000 baht at the provincial level. And in Nong Bua Lamphu, witnesses said that Sorachart Wichaya Suwannaphrom, who later became senator, transferred money to Pannipa Pasuk, who then transferred a total of around 105,000 baht to at least 7 candidates. Some were invited to the Tara Grand Hotel in Pathum Thani, where they met Sorachart and Pannipa and was offered 500,000 baht each. Pannipa also transferred money for their travel and gave them a yellow shirt. According to an opinion issued by Kanchit Charoen-in, Deputy Secretary-General of the ECT, which iLaw released, Kanchit believes that the ECT should prosecute Sorachart, noting that Sorachart transferred money to Pannipa several times and Pannipa transferred money to candidates. Given this, and the fact that they have a child together, Kanchit said there is enough reason to believe Sorachart and Pannipa were either accomplices or know what the other was doing. Both iLaw and the opposition have also made allegations about a vote rigging scheme where candidates were taken to hotel conference rooms and instructed to vote for a certain group. Witnesses say they had their phones confiscated while in these meetings and were told to to make a table in the last page of their introduction document and write down numbers of candidates to use during the selection. Documents found during the investigation contain the number of 140 candidates. Several witnesses said they were given money and gifts, as well as had their travel and hotel stay paid for. Ballots from the national level selection voting for the same candidates in the same order. (Photo from Phanida Mongkolsawat) It was also found that a large number of ballots contain the number on the document in the same order. According to People’s Party MP Phanida Mongkolsawat, the same pattern occurred in several groups, where 10 candidates were getting a notably high number of votes. During the afternoon round where candidates vote across groups, 6 out of the 10 candidates from the morning round emerge with a high vote count. Direk Pornseema, a former candidate from Maha Sarakham, said he attempted to raise the issue to ECT officials during the national-level selection. He said he noticed that the bellots being counted look identical, so he asked the officials if they were counting old ballots. He also said there were around 20 candidates in his group that did not get any vote. iLaw also release information from the DSI’s case file, including call logs showing phone calls from several candidates from Ang Thong to Paradorn and Koravee Prisnanantakul on the night of the national-level selection, when vote counting was still in progress. The location of both the callers and Koravee is shown to be Muang Thong Thani, where the selection took place. By law, senator candidates are prohibited from using communication devices throughout the selection process. Phanida said that now-senator Alongkot Worakee, former deputy governor. of Buriram, called Deputy Interior Minister Jeseth Thaiseth 31 time and called Bhumjaithai MP and Jeseth’s father Chada 3 times. Although making these calls is not wrong, Phanida said that it shows the relationship between politicians and individuals who became senators. Phone signals for at least 40 senators were found at the Pullman Hotel on 21 July 2024. Parit said that all 40 senators are being accused of fraud. On Thursday (10 September), iLaw published information from the 26th investigation committee’s case, which recommended the prosection of Bhumjaithai Party executives. According to the case file, Bhumjaithai MPs were instructed to recruit senator candidates, who were offered money in exchange for joining the scheme. At the national level, one candidate is tasked with covering the costs of travel, food, and hotel stay for other candidates in their network. Witnesses say the party aimed to win around 120 seats in the Senate. After the national-level selection, senators-to-be were asked to meet at the Kingpower Hotel in Bangkok, where they met Newin and given instructions. Newin also chose one senator among the “Blue-aligned” group to become Senate president. The 26th investigation committee ruled that, given the evidence and witness testimony, Bhumjaithai Party executives and their network were colluding in a nationwide scheme to win seats in the Senate and use their positions to ensure the plan succeed. By taking part in the scheme, candidates were not voting independently, while their action also mean the selection was not held in secret. This is unconstitutional and an offense under the Organic Act on the Acquisition of Senators. iLaw have also reported that, in many provinces, candidates were not running the groups that fit their profession. In Ang Thong, the stronghold of the Bhumjaithai-aligned Prisnanantakul family, none of the group 12 candidates in Pa Mok district were industrial operators. Most wrote on their introduction document that they “work for hire,” while one said they were a deputy village chief. Meanwhile, in group 17, candidates in every district wrote that they were village health volunteers. The group is supposed to be for NGOs, civil society groups, and public interest organizations, but village health volunteers are paid by the state.  It is also not a profession and several candidates wrote that they have other jobs, from agriculture to “work for hire.” iLaw also noticed that the group 17 candidates write very similar introduction or wear similar clothes in their photos. In Wiset Chai Chan district, they wrote that they were part of medical mobile units. In Samko district, all candidates wore a polo shirt with a village health volunteer logo on the left pocket in their photos. In Muang district, they all wear white collared shirts and a jacket. Similar phenomenon have been noted in other provinces. In Buriram, group 16 candidates (arts, culture, and sports) wrote that they participated in cultural events, while several group 17 candidates wore the same shirt and tie in their photos and wrote that they were village health volunteers. Chanchai Chaiyapit, a senator from Buriram, ran as a candidate in group 17. iLaw noted that he is an educator, a school principal, and President of the Association of Provincial Kindergarten Executive and Teachers. However, said association was registered in Buriram on 15 August 2023. Another association with the same name was registered in Bangkok in June 2011, but Chanchai’s introduction document said he was president between 2021-2023, or around 3 years, when the law requires 10 years of experience in a profession to run for the Senate. Meanwhile, in Amnat Charoen, 2 senators from group 10 (large enterprises) did not appear to own businesses that would qualify for the group. Senator Daeng Kongma said she sells pork. According to iLaw, Daeng has a stall at a local market, but does not appear to have enough employees or make enough profit to be a large enterprise.  Senator Sompan Palasak wrote in his introduction document that he sells chicken noodle soup, but later said in an interview that he actually sells fish ball noodle. iLaw attempted to check his claim but could not find the shop on Google Map. They found a picture online of Sompan working in a restaurant called “Krua Ton Kradon,” while his Facebook profile states that he works for “Nai Pan Noodles.” A witness visited a chicken noodle shop in Amnat Charoen and was told by an employee that Sompan used to work there but was not the owner. Nonetheless, each shop mentioned has been opened for less than 10 years and does not appear to employ enough people or make enough profit to be a large enterprise.  What’s next? Protesters at the ECT on 30 August holding pictures of the 229 individuals accused of fraud in the Senate selection. A banner hanging from the balcony says “Prosecute the senators.” Demands continued to be made for the ECT to prosecute all 229 individuals and refer the case to the Supreme Court so that evidence can be heard in court. Although the ECT previously said it would rule on the case by the end of August, it said on 28 August that it will rule whether to refer the case to court on 14 September. Civil society organizations have said that the ECT must refer the case to court so that the evidence can heard during a trial. And because the ECT’s legitimacy has been under scrutiny due to the connection between commissioners and the Bhumjaithai Party, it should not be making a decision and should simply send the case to court. Election commissioners are appointed on the Senate’s approval and 4 out of the 7 sitting commissioners were approved by the incumbent Senate. Not only that, as noted by the Constitutional Advocacy Alliance (CALL), 3 out of the 7 sitting commissioners were once bureaucrats under a Bhumjaithai minister. Some members of the nomination committee for election commissioners are also connected to Bhumjaithai-aligned politicians and senators. Under the 2018 Organic Act on the Acquisition of Senators, the ECT must refer a case to court if there is reasonable evidence of fraud. Once the Supreme Court accepts the complaint, senators implicated in the case will automatically be suspended. The ECT previously refer to the Supreme Court a case against a number of senator candidates over messages agreeing to vote for each other. The Supreme Court subsequently found them guilty and ban them from running in elections for 10 years, ruling that even trading votes is fraudulent as it means candidates are not voting freely or because of another candidate’s professional experience. The ECT has also referred to court the case of 7 candidates from Roi Et accused of vote buying. Concerns have also been raised that, if the ECT dismisses the case, it could also affect the DSI’s ongoing investigation. Phanida said that the DSI might close the case if the ECT does not prosecute the accused, but even if it does, DSI investigators will not be testifying in court as they were transferred to another unit. Several abnormalities have been noted over the past weeks as the People’s Party and iLaw ramp up the pressure by releasing evidence and bringing witnesses to speak at events. Rumours have been circulating that Pol Capt Piya Raksakun, director-general of the Department of Probation, will soon be appointed director of the DSI. Concerns were raised as Pol Capt Piya sat on the ECT’s 36th subcommittee and was among those who voted to dismiss the Senate election fraud case and the DSI is separately investigating alleged criminal association and money laundering associated with the Senate selection. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives’ Standing Committee on Police Affairs summoned Parit and Yingcheep to give a statement on the leaked documents after the DSI filed a complaint with the Crime Suppression Division over the leak on 25 August. The Chair of the committee insisted that he was doing his job and that he was not trying to obstruct the opposition. On 3 September, when parliament was supposed to discuss the ECT’s annual report, Bhumjaithai MPs proposed moving up an urgent motion on the Deep South. The House Speaker adjourned the meeting following arguments between MPs. Parliament has also dropped its Friday session (11 September) after delays and interruptions caused the debate on the budget bill to run past the original schedule of 7-9 September. The opposition has accused the ruling Bhumjaithai Party of protecting the ECT and trying to delay debate on its function until after 14 September. With the case now in its final stretch, the civil society are staging protests in several provinces to demand prosecution. iLaw have said several times that, if the ECT decide not to indict any one of the 229 accused, it will release the information it has on that individuals. A final gathering has also been called this Sunday (13 September) at the Bangkok Art and Culture Centre. eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-12 - 10:18 * Feature * Senate election 2024 * Senate collusion * election fraud * Bhumjaithai Party * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) * senate (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Cartoon by Stephff: Sondhi is back  Cartoon by Stephff: Sondhi is back eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-09-11 - 16:42 * Multimedia (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Thai student movement forms ‘Hope Theatre,’ making the stage its new battleground This past year, Thailand’s ‘Bad Student Organisation’ developed a new mechanism to question seemingly unbreakable cultural and educational taboos: theatre. In 2025, the organisation formed Hope Theatre in order to create a dialogue around long-held Thai cultural norms and practices, particularly those involving education and students’ rights. Such practices include corporal punishment, never questioning teachers, wearing school uniforms and compliance with haircut regulations. In September 2025, Hope Theatre delivered its first performance, a musical called Ribbon Club, which centred around four students who seek to uncover the truth behind a classmate’s mysterious death at an academy for magic similar to Harry Potter’s Hogwarts. At the behest of the character Jinny, a top ่student at the school, students gather to discuss the institution, its rigid rules, how teachers employ violence against them, and the identities they are forced to adopt. (Photo from Hope Theatre) As explained by Thamjuthi Thiangtham, 18, who recently completed his freshman year at Chulalongkorn University and works as an editor for Bad Student Organisation, “we started with the question of violence in the context of Thai schools … authoritarianism and violence directed against the lives and freedoms of students.”  He was referring to Thailand’s long-standing use of corporal punishment in schools. It was officially banned in March 2025 but the law has not been strictly enforced. Thamjuthi said that over the past year, his organisation received over 200 reports of student rights violations, including corporal punishment, mental abuse, and discrimination against LGBTQ+ students.  Thai teachers still frequently make headlines by imposing physical punishments on students. In June 2025, three months after the ban was implemented, a Bangkok teacher made a student do 200 squats as punishment for late homework. In February 2026, another student was hospitalised after his teacher ordered him to perform 800 squats for failing to submit an assignment. Raising the issue on stage allowed student actors to address the violence directed again their peers.  It also let them magically defend themselves from violent teachers. Another topic raised in Ribbon Club the Musical is the suppression of classroom questions and debate. In the play, the characters have a special room where they can go for open conversations, similar to the room Harry Potter and his friends secretly gathered in to train against dark magic after a corrupt teacher refused to teach them. It provides a safe space for the students to break free from strict school rules.  Inside, they can talk about anything, questioning, challenging, and debating with friends.” According to Thamjuthi, it frees them “to openly question the school power structure.” The room is a plot device which serves to challenge cultural notions of what makes a “good student.” In Thai society, Thamjuthi said, “ideal” students don’t just have academic ability; they obey their teachers and don’t ask questions. “Conversely, a student who is brave enough to ask questions and disagree is considered arrogant … and labeled bad.”  In the play, when students deemed ‘good’ and ‘bad’ by teachers meet each other and talk in the secret room, they discover there are no differences between them, however. In the world of Ribbon Club, it is magic which serves as an indicator of who is a good student. Anything unrelated is deemed useless. Students are expected to use magic every day or - according to an ancient belief - some sort of major disaster will happen.  The idea of using magic as a symbol, Thamjuthi said, was meant to help non-Thai audience members who might be less familiar with the context of the Thai education system understand the themes of the play. The audience included members of the Swedish Embassy, as well as some Chinese and American nationals.  According to Thamjuthi, around 80 percent of the audience were young people who already agreed with Hope Theatre’s message and protests. The rest were elderly people, who agreed with the play’s message but didn’t necessarily agree with direct protest. Younger audience members thanked the theatre group for making them more optimistic and hopeful about change in Thai schools.  As for the elderly, although the play “wasn’t polite enough for them,” Hope Theatre’s advocacy drew praise from some, including a very conservative high school principal.  Thamjuthi found it impressive that “art has this power to bring people, even those who might not stand on our side, to have more faith in us.” (Photo from Hope Theatre) Hope Theatre’s next performance will likely be staged in late 2026 or early 2027. It doesn’t have a script yet but Thamjuthi said it will explore the intense competition to be admitted to Thailand’s top schools. An idea in the works is for the plot to feature a reality or game show in which students must fiercely compete to demonstrate their ability. According to Thamjuthi, “contestants can do anything, no matter if it’s right or wrong, to compete for the prize. “ From the height of Thailand’s youth protests in 2020-22, the student movement has quieted down. In 2020, Bad Student led numerous protests for students’ rights and protections from strict uniform policies, haircut rules, and abusive teachers. Their protests often included costumes and creative expression, such as songs from the Japanese cartoon “Hamtaro.” These protests came amidst a larger protest movement demanding reforms of Thailand’s Article 112, which prohibits criticism of the country’s monarchy. Thamjuthi noted that Bad Student doesn’t engage in political issues at the national level, such as parties, the constitution or the justice system. However, regarding the larger protest movement, he remarked that as a result of the government’s ensuing crackdown, “most of our protest leaders had to go overseas … with negative consequences for the movement,” Thamjuthi said.  Thamjuthi remains hopeful for change, despite the election results earlier this year. He notes that ‘Bad Student’ has become a household name locally and no longer carries a negative connotation.  “If you’re a bad student in your school, maybe it’s because you’re rebellious. Maybe it’s because you’re brave enough to question your teacher or challenge their power,“ he said. Hope Theatre’s primary challenge, Thamjuthi said, is funding. Last year, the initiative was lucky enough to receive funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).  Now, however, it must find a new source of funding. It is not easy.  “To work with students in this society, to work with youth to promote democracy… few funders or businesses are confident enough.” Hope Theatre is a continuation of the student movement’s focus on art and culture. In the beginning, the organisation used dinosaurs to portray conservatives, promoting the slogan “goodbye dinosaurs.”  Bad Student has also provided students with cartoon guidebooks to help students understand their rights. Another of their past artistic endeavours involved translating songs from Matilda the Musical into Thai in order to explain learners’ rights.  eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-09-07 - 14:53 * Interview * Hope Theatre * Bad Student * Student rights (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Detention of Chinese dissidents draw continued pressure, attention to treatment of refugees Human rights organizations have urged Thailand to immediately halt the possible deportation of Chinese dissidents currently detained in Bangkok, warning that returning them to China would violate the international principle of non-refoulement and expose them to a serious risk of persecution, arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearance. The case has drawn renewed international attention to Thailand's treatment of refugees and political asylum seekers at a time when the country's diplomatic and economic relations with China continue to deepen. Rights advocates argue that the detention of the four dissidents illustrates a broader trend in which geopolitical considerations increasingly outweigh humanitarian obligations, raising concerns that Thailand is becoming an increasingly unsafe transit country for individuals fleeing political persecution in China.  A number of Chinese dissidents were detained at the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Center in Bangkok between July and August. At least four were known: former investigative journalist Bai Zhaodong, activist Zhou Junyi, Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Zhang Xinyan, and human rights advocate Tan Yixiang. All four are recognised as refugees by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). On 13 July 2026, Human Rights Watch publicly urged Thai authorities not to deport the detainees, stating that the Chinese government had intensified pressure on Bangkok ahead of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul's official visit to China from 16–20 July. HRW warned that any forced return would constitute a violation of Thailand's international legal obligations and would further damage the country's human rights reputation. Sunai Phasuk, Senior Thailand Adviser at Human Rights Watch, criticized Thailand's repeated willingness to comply with requests from Beijing concerning Chinese political dissidents. He argued that successive Thai governments have repeatedly ignored international human rights obligations in order to maintain favorable relations with China. According to Sunai, Thailand should instead permit the dissidents to travel safely to third countries where they have already been accepted for resettlement. Among this group, Zhang has since been released and resettled in Canada. A Falun Gong practitioner, journalist, and member of the “Hong Kong Parliament” exiled activist group, Zhang is wanted by the Hong Kong authorities along with 14 other members of the group for alleged “subversion” under Hong Kong’s draconian National Security law. Zhang had been approved for resettlement in Canada and was scheduled to leave Thailand on 8 July. However, Thai immigration authorities prevented her from departing shortly before her flight and transferred her to immigration detention. Human rights organizations issued statements calling for her release. Fortify Rights submitted a petition on 15 July to Thailand’s Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs, Justice and Human Rights requesting an investigation into Zhang’s detention and urging authorities to facilitate her departure to Canada. The organisation argued that preventing a UN-recognised refugee from reaching a country willing to provide asylum raised serious concerns regarding due process and Thailand’s human rights obligations. Zhang’s legal representatives were unable to contact her during the first few days of her detention and were not allowed to visit her. They filed for a court hearing under Thailand’s Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act, requesting that all relevant agencies be summoned to testity on why Zhang was not allowed to board her flight and why her representatives were not informed of her whereabouts. During the hearing on 16 July, a representative of the Immigration Bureau confirmed that the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok had requested that her resettlement be delayed, while Canadian authorities had already accepted her for resettlement and issued the necessary visa. The Thai Immigration Bureau subsequently prevented her departure while the case was considered by Thai authorities. Hong Kong Free Press reported on 6 August that Zhang has arrived in Canada. Her arrival ended weeks of uncertainty over her fate and concern over potential deportation to China. The case of Bai Zhaodong has also received particular international attention. Bai is formerly an investigative journalist for the investigative magazine Caijin. He has reported on high-level corruption in rural China and the social consequences of President Xi Jinping’s poverty alleviation initiatives on vulnerable populations, and fled China after facing pressure for his reporting. Bai told Reporters Without Border (RSF) that at least five charges were brought against him between 2011 and 2022 by various public security departments due to his reporting on fraud and corruption. He was also accused of “inciting subversion of state power,” which carries up to five years in prison. If a court classify it as a “major crime,” five year is the minimum sentence. Reuters reported that China has requested Bai’s extradition from Thailand, claiming that Bai is wanted on charges of extortion and bribery. Bai remains in detention. His lawyers have filed a petition with the South Bangkok Criminal Court for his release on the grounds that he is being unlawfully detained. A hearing will take place on 18 September. Nadthasiri Bergman, one of Bai‘s lawyers, said that Bai has a visa for a third country. He was initially scheduled to leave Thailand on 5 February, but the trip was cancelled after Thai authorities claimed that the exit clearance process was not completed. His re-scheduled trip on 22 June was also cancelled.  Nadthasiri said that exit clearance must not take more than 3 weeks and should be completed. She noted Bai has no criminal charge in Thailand and a third country has already agreed to his resettlement, and that it is unclear why he is not allowed to leave the country. Another detainee, Tan Yixiang, has reportedly been deported. A Catholic activist and vocal advocate for the rights of Tibetans and Uyghurs, Tan came to Thailand in 2022. According to Human Rights Watch, he was then arrested and later released on bail in mid-2023. The police arrested him again in February 2024 and placed in immigration detention. Thai Enquirer reported that Tan was deported around 11 - 12 July, days before Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s official visit to Beijing. Sunai told Thai Enquirer that Tan was deported, but there was no confirmation from the Thai or Chinese governments. It is unclear whether Zhou Junyi, a member of the banned China Democracy Party who fled China in 2015 and was arrested in Bangkok in 2025 after organising a memorial event for the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, is still held in immigration detention. The case of the detained dissidents follows a broader pattern of controversial deportations and forced returns by Thailand that have drawn international concern. Thailand has previously returned refugees and dissidents to countries like China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, where they are likely to be prosecuted or face other abuses. Many of those forcibly returned were UN-recognised refugees. Two Chinese activists and UN-recognised refugees, Dong Guangping and Jiang Yifei, were deported to China in 2015, despite being approved for resettlement in Canada. Both were subsequently detained upon their return. In February 2025, Thailand deported 40 Uyghur men to China despite repeated warnings from the UN and international human rights organizations that they could face human rights violations upon their return. Earlier, in 2015, Thai authorities also deported more than 100 Uyghur asylum seekers to China, triggering widespread condemnation from the international community. In November 2021, Thai authorities deported at least three Cambodian refugees despite UNHCR having notified the government of their refugee status and concerns about their safety if returned. UNHCR condemned the deportations, saying that it contravenes the principle of non-refoulement. Freedom House has also documented the case of four Cambodian dissidents who were deported from Thailand that same month despite being registered as refugees with UNHCR; all four were reportedly arrested immediately after their return to Cambodia. Thailand has also faced criticism over the forced return of Vietnamese dissidents. In November 2024, Thai authorities extradited Y Quynh Bdap, a Montagnard human rights and religious activist who had been recognised as a refugee by UNHCR, to Vietnam. Human Rights Watch said his return placed him at risk of torture and other serious abuses, while Bdap had previously been sentenced in absentia by a Vietnamese court to 10 years in prison on terrorism-related charges that he denied. The case prompted renewed concerns that Thailand may prioritise immigration enforcement and bilateral relations over the protection of people fleeing political persecution. Even refugees and asylum seekers who are not dissidents are not safe. Thailand has hosted displaced persons from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam for decades, and UNHCR reported that Thailand was hosting more than 80,000 refugees from Myanmar in nine border shelters and around 6,500 urban refugees and asylum seekers from more than 46 countries as of February 2026. In 2025, Human Rights Watch reported that Thai authorities continued to carry out mass deportations of Myanmar nationals, including children, despite the grave risks they could face if returned given continuing conflict and repression in Myanmar. More recently, in August 2026, rights groups warned that 26 ethnic Karen villagers detained in Phetchaburi province faced possible deportation to Myanmar after Thai authorities raided their community and arrested 28 people, including children and pregnant women. Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and has no national refugee law. However, its 2023 Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Dispparance Act prohibit the transfer of individuals to a countries where they may face torture or inhumane treatment. Human rights organizations have argued that deporting the dissidents would be in conflict not only with international human rights laws but also with Thailand’s own legislation. Meanwhile, the absence of secure legal status leaves many refugees and asylum seekers vulnerable to immigration detention, forced return and pressure from the governments they fled. Human rights advocates believe that these cases reflect a broader pattern of transnational repression, whereby governments are cooperating with each other to monitor, intimidate, detain, abduct, or forcibly return political oppositions and human rights defenders. In Southeast Asia, dissidents who fled to neighbouring countries continue to face surveillance, legal pressure, extradition requests, and diplomatic efforts aimed at securing their return. The pressure also operates in the opposite direction. Thai activists who fled to Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam have disappeared or been killed, such as Chatchan Buppawan and Kraidej Leulert, whose body was found in the Mekong River in December 2018 after they disappeared in Laos along with fellow dissident Surachai Danwattananusorn.  Siam Theerawut and Chucheap Chewasut, both Thai dissidents living in exile in Vietnam, were reportedly extradited back to Thailand but were never heard from again. Taken together, these cases illustrate how transnational repression can function through a combination of formal and informal mechanisms: extradition requests, immigration detention, diplomatic pressure, surveillance, cross-border policing and, in the most serious cases, alleged abduction or enforced disappearance. Freedom House has described Southeast Asia as a major centre of such cooperation, noting that authoritarian governments increasingly collaborate to pursue dissidents beyond their own borders. The result is a regional environment in which exile does not necessarily guarantee safety. For refugees and political activists, crossing into a neighbouring country may provide temporary physical distance from persecution without providing durable protection from the governments they fled. Observers also argue that Thailand's expanding strategic partnership with China has contributed to growing concerns regarding refugee protection. China has become one of Thailand's largest trading partners and a major investor in infrastructure, tourism, and transportation projects. While neither government has publicly acknowledged any connection between bilateral relations and the treatment of Chinese dissidents, Human Rights Watch warned that Beijing's increasing pressure ahead of Prime Minister Anutin's official visit has heightened fears that political considerations may influence decisions concerning refugee protection.  Thailand’s handling of the case may also affect its international standing ahead of its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) later this year. As a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Thailand has repeatedly committed to strengthening human rights protections, including for refugees and asylum seekers. Yet the detention, threatened deportation and forced-return cases involving people from China, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar have raised broader questions about whether Thailand can provide a safe and reliable place of refuge for people fleeing persecution. For refugee advocates, the cases of Bai Zhaodong, Zhou Junyi and Tan Yixiang therefore extend beyond the fate of three individuals: they are a test of whether Thailand will uphold the principle of non-refoulement when doing so may conflict with diplomatic or security interests. Human Rights Watch and Fortify Rights have urged Thai authorities to allow the remaining dissidents to travel to countries willing to receive them, arguing that Thailand's response will demonstrate whether its international human rights commitments are being implemented in practice. eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-09-05 - 23:05 * Round Up (Feed generated with FetchRSS)