When I was developing web applications in the 1990s, it was common for the server to generate HTML pages using templates, and a lot of template engines were written for this (including one by me). Starting in the early 2000s, Single-Page Applications (SPA) became widespread. In an SPA, the server mainly returns JSON, and a JavaScript (or TypeScript) framework generates the HTML in the browser. I’ve worked on some applications like this, and it struck me that they’re cumbersome to maintain, partly because the JavaScript frameworks are huge and complex and change rapidly.

_Needs That Bind_ reconsiders the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the construction of new regimes in the decade after World War I, to understand the consequential connections that remained among the new republican regime in Turkey and neighboring French and British Mandates in Syria-Lebanon and Iraq. Orçun Can Okan examines how these new states and their people managed problems of state succession through diplomatic, administrative, and legal interactions with and between bureaucracies. He foregrounds pressing questions of nationality as they were experienced by a diverse group of social actors, men and women, rich and poor. Okan tracks previously untapped Ottoman records, now spread across multiple regimes, to investigate claims to retirement pensions, alimony cases between former spouses who became nationals of different states, and disputes over land, property, and assets held in pious endowments. It is through these types of interactions and connections, he argues, that newly emerged post-Ottoman regimes materialized basic norms and understandings about nationality—an understanding more similar to subjecthood to state authority than rights-based citizenship. With an engaging, grounded historical narrative, this book contributes to thinking historically and critically about the tangible stakes and practical significance of nationality in times of profound political change and institutional instability. Orçun Can Okan, Needs That Bind: Materializing Nationality in Post-Ottoman Regimes, Stanford University Press, 2026.

## ## Siniša Malešević, _Nationalism as a Way of Life: The Rise and Transformation of Modern Subjectivities_ (Cambridge University Press, 2025) ## ____ ____Reviewed by John A. Hall (McGill University) __(This is a prepublication version of this review. You can find the published version in Thesis Eleven Journal, on theT11 Sage website)__ If a troubled background does not bring despair or a retreat into silence it can provide fuel for scholarship, especially within the world of social studies. Siniša Malešević’s early years were deeply marked by the break-up of Yugoslavia, giving him enough material for a lifetime; it is not surprising that he has become a leading expert in the interlinked fields of ethnicity, war and violence, and nationalism. He has not left this world behind, despite having his university career in Ireland, and an element of richness in his new book comes from interviews he conducted with participants in the wars of the period. I suspect that his background immediately gave him the intellectual tools to which he has remained committed. For the doctoral thesis that become his first book— _Ideology Legitimacy and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia_ (2002)—claimed that the organizational and coercive capacities of states together with ideological force and coherence within societies were the basic keys to understand the historical record. In the last years he has added a further element (drawing on the work of Randy Collins), namely the need for these two variables to work at the micro level. This resulting trinitarian approach is ever-present in this new book, not least as it is repeated in several chapters that were published previously as articles. We have something there that has the status of a metaphysic. The claim of the book is straightforward and powerful: the nation-state is the political form of modernity, a way of life that has become utterly dominant in the modern history of the world—either achieved or, in many cases, still desired. The book explains how and why this is so, concentrating on the means that allow our modern subjectivities to be maintained. He distances himself in the opening chapter from leading approaches in the field: structural claims are seen as lacking accounts of the long process by which the structures themselves were created, whilst those that center on agency fail to realize that they project a finished sense of identity on to the past where it did not exist. He stands close to Michael Mann in seeing our sense of identity resulting from the development of state capacities that nationalize and homogenize social interactions—but closer still to Ben Anderson when insisting that nationalism is less an ideology than a world, best seen as similar to the religious surrounds of the past. The next two chapters then underline the central claim. Modernity is in a generic sense democratic: social links are horizontal rather than vertical, so that even authoritarian regimes must speak as if they represent the people. One of the pleasures of the book is the sheer range of empirical material presented: a paired comparison of the historical development of Japan and Hungary powerfully supports his argument at this point. The insistence that social interactions take place within national boundaries is then addressed by considering religious identities—seemingly part of much larger social worlds. I think he is quite right to stress the way in which religion became nationally bounded, not least as the extensive power of Christianity within NW Europe came to an end with the Reformation. Malesevic makes his case, however, by concentrating on Islam, and more particularly on its role within Turkey, demonstrating the way in which institutional change has nationalized Islam, indeed turning into a support of that nation-state. The fourth chapter on national movements and imperial discontent turns in a different direction, to ask in detail how nationalism became dominant. Archival research on Bosnia and Herzegovina before the First World War shows that nationalist movements were weak and inchoate, presenting little threat to Vienna—an important claim that adds to the huge literature on the origins of the First World War. This is not to say that nationalism did not become stronger in the great land empires. But such strength most often came from the way in which the empires treated their different ethnic groups. Some groups never gained official recognition at all, often dying out as a result, but the increase in nationalist sentiment that did occur was the result of discrimination and oppression, especially as the empires faced defeat in war. There was no time for a larger Ottoman or Austrian identity to gain purchase; equally, the new states that followed imperial collapse were forced to nationalize populations whose identities were diverse. Five discrete studies follow that bolster the general argument by confronting claims present in the literature. First, he disputes the two main theories of a golden age of the past: the sentiments are not constant (as Smith suggested) nor are they mere manipulations by an elite (as claimed by Bauman and Hobsbawm). Rather they change over time as the result of his trinitarian forces, a view powerfully supported by evidence from the Balkans. Balkan material lies behind a second piece of analysis, that concerning the move between civic and ethnic versions of national belonging. The evidence here comes from the history of Yugoslavia, in the interwar years and in those following the end of the Second World War. In both periods the state lacked the organizational power to transcend ethnic differences, and to create civic sentiments at the micro level. Two chapters then concentrate on war. Both victories and defeats can gain mythical status for a nation, but both are not objective—rather they are socially and politically constructed, as it were according to need. The evidence here comes from analyses of Croatia and Ghana, the analysis of the latter being especially innovative and convincing. A rather different point is made about nationalist sentiments in times of conflict: soldiers fight and die for their close fellows, disliking any of their number whose enthusiasm encourage recklessness, whereas civilians often press for something much larger. Finally, an interesting piece of empirical research considers pandemics, particularly that of Covid. Though these are often seen as transnational, there is overwhelming evidence that the responses were distinctively national in character. A final chapter speculates on the future: given that nationalist subjectivities are relatively recent what forces might undermine them in the future? One striking general thought concerns time: memories can last longer than their institutional support. Then four possible futures and suggested and analyzed: a highly coercive world resulting from climate catastrophe; a world ruled by huge corporations; a quasi-imperial world with blocs largely autonomous unto themselves; and a new world of digital micro-communities, able to survive without the backing of an overarching state. For my own part, I find some combination of the first and the third most convincing, and remain puzzled by any account suggesting that states will wither away. The character of the book deserves highlighting: the tone has charm and courtesy, extracting the best from every contribution in the whole field. The fundamental judgement to be made is simple: this is the most complete book now available in nationalist studies, summing up the whole field and moving it forward in an original, cognitively impressive manner, altogether a stunning achievement. Nonetheless, I have three critical comments. First, there is something of an exception to the finding—essentially correct though it is—that soldiers fight for their fellows and their localities more than for larger nationalist sentiments: Danish soldiers in 1848 had little awareness of the stakes of the war but letters sent home in 1864 contained strong nationalist sentiments. Secondly, one can argue a little with the view that nationalist movements played little part in the origins of war in 1914. Such movements were weak and little threat to the regimes in question. But one should try to link nationalist studies to the field of interstate relations, thereby discovering a complex mixture. State leaders were not directly threatened but some of them felt that they might be threatened in the future—not least as their rivals tried to support and bolster the nationalist movements of their rivals. A part of the nationalizing drives of empires was to remain large, fearing the fate of the Ottomans, and aiming to preserve substantial territories for reasons of sheer power and to protect the sources of supply and the markets they felt were needed for their economies to prosper. Finally, there are surely some who still hold imperial rather that national sentiments. It is impossible to understand Brexit if one ignores the feelings of some of those who wished to leave—in order to create `empire-lite’. Perhaps that can be seen as a national way of life. But one thing is certain: empires continue to mark the world polity, not least in the United States now seeking tribute from the world as did China in the past. ### Share this: * Share on X (Opens in new window) X * Share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Facebook * Share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window) LinkedIn * Like Loading...

The US Supreme Court decided that the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) may not be independent anymore - with major implications for EU-US Data Transfers.

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**MAY 29, 2026 —** Katharine Halls’ translation of Shady Lewis’s _On the Greenwich Line_ won this year’s James Tait Black Prize in the fiction category. The prize is one of the UK’s oldest, and many at its home, Edinburgh University, didn’t want it to go ahead during a marking boycott. The James Tait Black Prizes were established in 1919. This year, they announced two winners: The fiction prize went to _On the Greenwich Line_ , which was published by Peirene Press, while the biography prize went to _The First and Last King of Haiti: The Rise and Fall of Henri Christophe,_ written by Marlene L. Daut and published by Yale University Press. Each winner receives £10,000. _On the Greenwich Line_ is based loosely around the death of a Syrian refugee in London. The narrator, an Egyptian who works in the British social services administration, who has promised a friend in Egypt to take care of the man’s burial in London, even if he never knew him. As our Olivia Snaije writes: What follows is a biting and hilarious journey through the British administrative services, run for the most part by immigrants, who have much to say about the gaping inequalities and absurdities of a system crumbling from years of neo-liberal economics. Lewis’s narrator highlights the arrival of the conservative party, which slashed the social housing budget by more than half, despite millions of requests for social housing. The administrative procedures necessary for these requests were multiplied so that each file can now take years, thus delaying the process. In a prepared statement, Professor Alex Thomson said that this year’s winners “demonstrate the remarkable power of literature to illuminate lives, histories and communities that are often overlooked. _On the Greenwich Line_ by Shady Lewis, translated by Katharine Halls, is a deeply humane and sharply observed novel about migration and belonging in contemporary Britain, while _The First and Last King of Haiti_ by Marlene L. Daut offers a powerful re-examination of Haiti’s revolutionary history through the life of Henry Christophe.” The prizes are judged by literature scholars and students at the University of Edinburgh; in comments to the _Edinburgh News,_ Sophia Woodman, President of the UCU Edinburgh Branch Committee, criticized university management for the “knock-on impact of refusing to pay staff on research, knowledge exchange, teaching and all the work that academic staff do beyond marking, which includes judging for the James Tait Black Prize.” Dr Hannah Kate Boast was the lead judge but pulled out of the judging process; she had earlier warned that the prize would not go ahead. ### Share this: * Share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Facebook * Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email * Print (Opens in new window) Print * Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit * Share on Tumblr (Opens in new window) Tumblr * Share on WhatsApp (Opens in new window) WhatsApp * Share on Bluesky (Opens in new window) Bluesky * ### Like this: Like Loading…

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::dusts off the blog:: Hi everyone! Things have been a bit quiet here at scatterplot. I wish we could say the same for the rest of the world. Instead, things have been very, very loud. Right now, President Trump is threatening to commit war crimes against Iran after the initial failures of his illegal war. Every day has felt like this for a year. I was just in a meeting for a new paper collaboration and we joked about how surreal it feels to plan to write something that might, if all goes well, come out in 2028 when it’s not clear there will even be a 2028. And yet, what else are we to do? One reason I’ve been blogging less* is that our collective public conversations in 2026 seem to fixate on basically two topics: Trump and AI. Many have noted how climate change has fallen off the agenda, for example.** One of the best essays I’ve read in a long time is about both Trump & AI and it helped me make sense out of why those two topics have so dominated conversations, and why that’s so frustrating. In _The Guardian_ , historian of science Kevin Baker published an excellent essay titled: “AI got the blame for the Iran school bombing. The truth is far more worrying.” If you haven’t read it yet, go do so and come back. Got it? Ok. One of the excellent points Kevin makes in the piece is that “AI” (and especially LLMs) are a charismatic technology: > A charismatic technology shapes the whole field around it, the way a magnet organises iron filings. LLMs may be the most powerful instance of this type in history. Kevin goes on to write about the coverage of the horrifying destruction of a girls’ school in Iran in the initial wave of the US bombing campaign: > In the days after the strike, the charisma of AI organised the entire political conversation around the technology: whether Claude hallucinated, whether the model was aligned, whether Anthropic bore responsibility for its deployment. The constitutional question of who authorised this war and the legal question of whether this strike constitutes a war crime were displaced by a technical question that is easier to ask and impossible to answer in the terms it set. The Claude debate absorbed the energy. That is what charisma does. Trump’s charisma combined with AI’s charisma made for an irresistible discursive black hole. The overall war – launched without legal authority, with unclear aims, by an increasingly incoherent authoritarian with access to nuclear codes, with immediate consequences felt most sharply by those directly killed or harmed but also diffusely by anyone who buys anything – has been hard to turn away from, perhaps the most egregious of Trump’s litany of crimes. Adding an AI angle took that gasoline and set it absolutely ablaze. In general, stepping back, we can feel this kind of charisma-absorption of energy effect ever since Trump’s rise to political prominence in the lead up to the 2016 election. I am sick of talking about Trump. I am sick of talking about AI. And yet talking about anything else feels like a struggle. But what other stories are we missing as the Trump-AI charisma absorption nexus sucks up all the energy in the room? How do we keep an eye on the very real and very consequential actions of Trump and the very real and very consequential transformations threatened by the rise of LLMs without losing our freaking minds/our ability to see other stories and other angles? I don’t have any answers right now. But having that language to pose the question has been helpful for me, so perhaps it will be for you too. * The main reason I’ve been blogging less is that I have two kids, ages 6 and 3, who together bring in average of something like 4-5 diseases per month. The four members of my household had five doctor appointments yesterday. Today is, knock on wood, the first day both my kids will have been in school all day in almost a month. Blogging was, suffice it to say, one of the first things to go. ** This can be overstated – we’re still talking a lot more about climate than in say 2007, but a lot less than during the Biden administration. See MeCCO for some data. ### Share this: * Share on X (Opens in new window) X * Share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Facebook * Like Loading... ### _Related_ ## Author: Dan Hirschman I am a sociologist interested in the use of numbers in organizations, markets, and policy. For more info, see here. View all posts by Dan Hirschman