5/ The interaction of these factors has limited reforms to visible, symbolic measures, leaving deeper systemic change stalled. However, establishing comprehensive integrity frameworks is a long-term endeavour that demands years of capacity building and gradual adaptation.

4/ This has produced a landscape where 𝙏𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙨𝙥𝙖𝙧𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙮 has increased in visibility, but hasn’t yet reached the decision-making processes; 𝙋𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘 𝙥𝙖𝙧𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙥𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 functions more as a signal of openness than as a substantive channel for influencing policy.

3/ The process will involve a representative from the Ministry of Defence, signalling HTS’s intent to co-opt, rather than confront, pre-existing civilian and military structures in #Daraa.

2/ Local armed factions will begin reorganising, focusing on dismantling or absorbing smaller autonomous groups—through persuasion or coercion—while excluding individuals with criminal records. Efforts will prioritise weapons collection, border security & maintaining local order

4/ For many local stakeholders, unless HTS recognises Daraa’s unique postwar trajectory and adjusts its strategy to engage with the region’s distinctive dynamics and power structures, the likelihood of escalating tensions in southern Syria will continue to rise.

3/ This resistance seems to be fuelled by HTS's wartime history, marked by tense relations with many local armed factions, and its efforts to rebuild its capabilities through covert activities in the border region following the regime's return to #Daraa in 2018.

2/ Meetings indicate agreement on broad principles, such as integration into a military institution. However, many leaders perceive HTS’s approach as a coercive effort to impose its institutional model & cadres, disregarding or failing to co-opt pre-existing structures.

Thanks, Reinoud. The local armed factions include those linked to the Central Negotiation Committee. The 8th Brigade has already clashed with military/security forces at checkpoints in eastern Daraa.