#BeardShell
Notícia da BleepingComputer

"APT28 hackers use Signal chats to launch new malware attacks on Ukraine" #bolhasec
APT28 hackers use Signal chats to launch new malware attacks on Ukraine
The Russian state-sponsored threat group APT28 is using Signal chats to target government targets in Ukraine with two previously undocumented malware families named BeardShell and SlimAgent.
www.bleepingcomputer.com
September 14, 2025 at 8:30 PM
CERT-UA sounds alarm on a new wave of ongoing UAC-0001 (APT28) attacks against Ukrainian state bodies using the BEARDSHELL framework and COVENANT backdoor. Detect malicious activity with curated Sigma rules available in the SOC Prime Platform.
buff.ly/vpPKAhJ
#cybersecurity #detectionengineering
June 24, 2025 at 11:59 AM
APT28 Uses BEARDSHELL and COVENANT Malware to Spy on Ukrainian Military

Ravie LakshmananMar 10, 2026Cyber Espionage / Threat Intelligence The Russian state-sponsored hacking group tracked as APT28 has been observed using a pair of implants dubbed BEARDSHELL and COVENANT to facilitate long‑term…
APT28 Uses BEARDSHELL and COVENANT Malware to Spy on Ukrainian Military
Ravie LakshmananMar 10, 2026Cyber Espionage / Threat Intelligence The Russian state-sponsored hacking group tracked as APT28 has been observed using a pair of implants dubbed BEARDSHELL and COVENANT to facilitate long‑term surveillance of Ukrainian military personnel. The two malware families have been put to use since April 2024, ESET said in a new report shared with The Hacker News. APT28, also tracked as Blue Athena, BlueDelta, Fancy Bear, Fighting Ursa, Forest Blizzard (formerly Strontium), FROZENLAKE, Iron Twilight, ITG05, Pawn Storm, Sednit, Sofacy, and TA422, is a nation-state actor affiliated with Unit 26165 of the Russian Federation's military intelligence agency GRU.
nexttech-news.com
March 10, 2026 at 1:30 PM
APT28利用Signal聊天部署BEARDSHELL恶意软件与COVENANT攻击乌克兰网络安全

https://qian.cx/posts/76163FDD-8B41-4764-B41C-6A2D1D249C5D
September 19, 2025 at 3:30 AM
ウクライナのサイバーセキュリティ当局によると、ロシア軍事情報機関関連のハッカーグループAPT28が、Signalアプリを悪用し、新たなマルウェアBeardShellとSlimAgentでウクライナ政府機関を攻撃している。 therecord.media/ukraine-new-...
Social engineering and Signal chats led to new Russian malware attacks, Ukraine says
Ukraine's cybersecurity agency said the Russian group tracked as APT28, Fancy Bear or Forest Blizzard was responsible for targeting new malware strains at government officials.
therecord.media
June 24, 2025 at 2:00 PM
Russia-linked APT28 is targeting Ukrainian military personnel with BEARDSHELL malware and the COVENANT framework in a new cyber-espionage campaign.

sctocs.com/apt28-beards...
APT28 Deploys BEARDSHELL And COVENANT Malware In Espionage Campaign Against Ukrainian Military - SCtoCS
APT28 is using BEARDSHELL and COVENANT malware in a cyber espionage campaign targeting Ukrainian military networks.
sctocs.com
March 11, 2026 at 12:01 AM
TL;DR

* ESET-SlimAgent and Xagent cyber threats detected in Ukraine and Russia, targeting critical infrastructure with malware
* Iran-linked APT28 deploys BeardShell and Covenant implants for long-term espionage against Ukrainian military targets
* AI-powered phishing and deepfakes surge as […]
120 Ukraine Gov Boxes Hacked 8 Yrs—Europe’s 2008 Servers Next Target
### TL;DR * ESET-SlimAgent and Xagent cyber threats detected in Ukraine and Russia, targeting critical infrastructure with malware * Iran-linked APT28 deploys BeardShell and Covenant implants for long-term espionage against Ukrainian military targets * AI-powered phishing and deepfakes surge as attackers reduce cost of social engineering by over 95%, per 2026 threat report * * * ## 🪓 120 Ukraine Gov Endpoints Hijacked: 8-Year GRU SlimAgent Grid Siege > 120+ Ukrainian gov boxes pwned for 8 yrs by GRU’s SlimAgent—same malware that siphons your keystrokes while you patch PowerPoint 🪓 68 % code recycle rate=green hacking for Putin. 2 % power dip=just enough to fry a grid. Europe, you’re next—still running Server 2008? Ukraine’s grid keeps hiccupping because eight-year-old malware is still squatting on government PCs like a drunk uncle who “just needs a minute.” SlimAgent/XAgent, the GRU’s favorite house-guest, has lived in 120+ Ukrainian ministry boxes since 2018 and is now encrypting its gossip with ChaCha20—because even spies hate ISP snooping. ### How it works (spoiler: duct-tape & PowerShell) * BeardShell, a .NET stowaway, rides in on a poisoned Word doc (CVE-2026-21509). * Once inside, it phones Icedrive—yes, the same freemium cloud you use for cat pics—exfiltrating screenshots, passwords, and SCADA schematics. * Covenant’s 90-in-one hacker Swiss-army-knife then impersonates admins, dumps credentials, and schedules reboot-proof tasks. * Average stay: 180 days, double the old single-implant record. ### Impacts in human-sized bites **Lights** : ≤2 % of Ukraine’s regional load shed last month after crooks re-configured substations. **Data** : 30+ industrial controllers now broadcast plant floor blueprints to Moscow. **Cash** : every re-clean costs ~$25 k per endpoint; 120 endpoints → $3 M babysitting bill. **Trust** : credential leaks trigger 3,200 spear-phish clones a day—your inbox is next. ### Short-to-long-term forecast (mark your calendar) * **Spring 2026** : BeardShell 2.0 skips files, lives only in RAM—hello “file-less” hell. * **Late-2026** : C2 scatters to Google Drive, Azure Blob, whatever’s cheapest—sink-hole-proof. * **2027** : AI obfuscation expected to raise detection workload 30 %—SOC analysts, buy espresso futures now. ### Cheap fixes that actually fit the budget 1. Patch Office today; tomorrow is too late. 2. Block Icedrive at the firewall—users can survive without 50 GB of free crud. 3. Flip PowerShell to ConstrainedLanguage—cripples BeardShell, doesn’t cost a dime. 4. Retire Server 2008 like it’s a mullet: nostalgic, but lethal. Bottom line: If legacy boxes remain the path of least resistance, Ukraine’s electrons—and everyone else’s—will keep dancing to a Russian playlist. Patch, block, retire, repeat—or stock candles. * * * ## 💥 200 Ukrainian Military PCs Drained: 12 GB/Month to Icedrive in Iran-Backed APT28 Heist > 200+ Ukrainian frontline laptops pwned—12 GB/month siphoned to Icedrive like a leaky bucket in a firefight! 💥 Tehran’s ‘Bear’ recycles 2010 malware & a fresh Office 0-day to keep the taps open. Your tax € fund the bandwidth they hide in. Soldiers—how many more blue-screens before we unplug the cloud? Iran-linked APT28 rebooted its malware sweat-shop last April and has since parked two digital parasites—BeardShell and Covenant—inside more than 200 Ukrainian military endpoints. The haul: 12 GB of fresh files **per month, per implant** , all quietly uploaded to Icedrive accounts that look just like any other corporate backup. ### How the sneaky duo works * **BeardShell** : a PowerShell blob that lives inside .NET, chats with Icedrive (no public API, so they rewrote the client), and hides its chatter behind Xtunnel-style obfuscation. * **Covenant** : an open-source post-exploitation Swiss-army knife the group turbo-charged with 90+ tasks, deterministic IDs, and multi-cloud fallback (pCloud, Koofr, Filen). * Entry ticket: CVE-2026-21509, a remote-code hole in Office docs that’s been exploited since January via spear-phish. ### Impacts so far * **Operational secrecy** : every keystroke, screenshot and clipped password is HTML-logged → real-time battlefield intel for Tehran. * **Bandwidth camouflage** : exfil rides the same TLS tunnels your marketing team uses for cloud storage → SOC barely blinks. * **Credential bloodletting** : harvested logins already enable lateral jumps into logistics and shared EU-NATO clouds. ### Where this is heading * **Q2-Q3 2026** : expect JIT-compiled PowerShell and OneDrive-for-Business pivot → harder to fingerprint, easier to justify as “normal” traffic. * **2027** : modular “C2Bridge” to auto-hop across ten-plus clouds; supply-chain targeting to mess with troop resupply. ### Fix-it list (no corporate PowerPoint required) 1. Patch CVE-2026-21509 **today** ; disable Office macros if you still allow them. 2. Flag any outbound TLS to Icedrive/pCloud/Koofr/Filen; 12 GB spikes should scream, not whisper. 3. Drop updated YARA rules for BeardShell’s PowerShell sigs and Covenant’s deterministic IDs—GitHub has drafts, use them. 4. Rotate creds weekly and slam MFA on every account that can read military email. Cyber-espionage used to mean bespoke zero-days and Bond-villan server farms. APT28 proves recycled open-source tools plus one fresh Office bug are enough to gut a war plan. If your network touches Ukrainian defense data, assume the parasites are already nesting—patch, hunt, kick them out before the next 12 GB shipment clears the digital border. * * * ## 💸 $30 B AI Scam Tsunami: 95 % Cost Drop Fuels Global Deepfake Plague > 95 % cheaper, 100 % nastier: AI now pumps phishing & deepfakes for the price of a pizza 🍕—and your CFO’s still clicking ‘pay’! $25.6 M gone in one Zoom, 47 % of India’s phones already duped. While regulators nap, $30 B vanishes. Ready to mute the machines, or keep footing the bill? Last Thursday Arup wired $25.6 million because a deepfake CFO said “jump.” Cost to the crooks? Thirty bucks for a monthly AI-phishing kit and three seconds of scraped audio. That 95 % price drop turns every bored script-kiddie into a con-artist with a Hollywood budget. ### How does this work Voice cloning needs < 3 s of your “hello?” from TikTok. Large-language models spin 1 265 % more phishing mails than last year, each tuned with breached HR data. Cisco’s red-teamers prove 60 % of “safety” guardrails fold after five chat turns—like a bouncer who lets you in if you ask nicely five times. ### Impacts * **Wallet** : synthetic-ID fraud already siphoned ≥ $30 B since 2023—equal to the GDP of Bolivia. * **Trust** : 47 % of Indian mobile users now flinch at every unknown call; Europe clocks +311 % fake-ID loans. * **Boardroom** : 94 % of login attempts are bots, so your multi-factor token is just another souvenir. ### Institutional response (spoiler: still buffering) Enterprises lecture staff with 2019-era slide decks that cover < 30 % of today’s scam surface. EU watermark rules? Pending until 2027—light-years in AI dog-years. Meanwhile open-source repos drop 200 new malicious models a week, priced at a latte. ### Timelines to watch * **Q3-2026** : voice-scam volume +30 %; detection false-positives still 12 %—your IT helpdesk drowns. * **2028** : attacker cost plateaus at < 5 % of 2022 levels; social-engineering becomes the default, not the exception. * **2030** : only media with cryptographic birth-certificates gets through—email without it hits the trash like spam from a prince. ### The takeaway When the cost of deception drops below a Netflix subscription, reputation becomes the only currency left. Start watermarking your Zoom recordings, bind logins to how you type—not what you type—and treat every unexpected “hi, it’s me” like a $25 million question. * * * ### In Other News * Hacker leaks 12GB of personal data from Cal AI, affecting 3 million users after exploiting MyFitnessPal breach * Mullvad’s GotaTUN WireGuard implementation passes audit with two low-severity padding deviations fixed * Law enforcement dismantles Tycoon 2FA phishing-as-a-service platform, disrupting 96,000+ phishing victims since 2023 * Prompt injection tops OWASP’s LLM Top 10 as attackers bypass safety filters to extract data and hijack AI agents
espresso.cafecito.tech
March 11, 2026 at 2:02 PM
Wie gefährlich Mobilfunk #Messenger, wie #Signal sind zeigt leider mal wieder die #Ukraine

Die russischen Hacker von #ATP28 verschicken inflitrierte Dateien & missbrauchen die Geräteverknüpfungsfunktion der #SignalApp.

#Threema kostet dort fast nichts!

www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/securit...
APT28 hackers use Signal chats to launch new malware attacks on Ukraine
The Russian state-sponsored threat group APT28 is using Signal chats to target government targets in Ukraine with two previously undocumented malware families named BeardShell and SlimAgent.
www.bleepingcomputer.com
June 25, 2025 at 3:08 PM
APT28 Deploys Enhanced Version of Covenant in Ongoing Threat Activity #AdvancedPersistentThreat #APT28 #BeardShell
APT28 Deploys Enhanced Version of Covenant in Ongoing Threat Activity
  In recent months, the contours of cyber warfare have once again become clearer as APT28 - an agent of Russian intelligence that has operated in Ukraine for a number of years - elicits renewed precision and technological sophistication in its operations against Ukrainian defense networks.  Fancy Bear has been referred to by multiple aliases, including Sednit, Forest Blizzard, Unit 26165, and TA422, throughout the cybersecurity community due to its ability to adapt to geopolitical objectives when necessary. With its latest campaign, APT28 has implemented a dual-pronged malware strategy based on innovation and intent.  The company has deployed an undocumented backdoor, BEARDSHELL, alongside a heavily customized implementation of the open-source post-exploitation framework COVENANT, which has been heavily customized.  The development indicates a calculated effort to refine persistence, avoid detection, and gain deeper operational footholds in sensitive military environments by modifying tactics, evading detection, and improving operational capabilities.  Designed specifically for stealth and long-term access, BEARDSHELL works in conjunction with the modified COVENANT toolkit, which has been modified to better suit the group's command-and-control requirements and operational procedures. Combined, these tools represent a growing trend toward modular and adaptable malware ecosystems that can be tailored to specific target and mission requirements.  It is becoming increasingly apparent that as the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate into the digital realm, state-backed actors are utilizing cyber capabilities in a variety of ways, often invisible but profoundly consequential, to gather intelligence and shape the strategic landscape.  The campaign illustrates a tightly coordinated intrusion chain designed to penetrate Ukrainian military and government networks with minimal friction and maximum persistence based on this operational shift.  Based on the investigations conducted, it has been determined that the activities attributed to APT28 are mainly directed towards central executive bodies, where access to strategic communications and operational data provides a valuable source of information.  As part of the initial compromise, spear-phishing lures are developed that masquerade as routine administrative or defense correspondence, distributed via email as well as encrypted messaging channels such as Signal, which are often distributed using spear-phishing lures. Upon opening the weaponized Office documents, these messages initiate a fileless infection sequence that is designed to evade conventional endpoint defenses.  It is comprised of a memory-resident backdoor derived from a substantially altered variant of the Covenant framework which has been repurposed to serve as a discreet loader for further payloads. During this stage, bespoke implants, such as BeardShell and SlimAgent, are deployed. The latter bears architectural resemblance to the earlier XAgent toolkit developed by the group in the past. The combination of these components creates a robust surveillance environment within compromised systems, facilitating continuous data collection of keystrokes, screen captures, and clipboards.  Exfiltrating intelligence is organized into HTML-based logs that include color-coded segmentation for rapid parsing and prioritization by operators. It is noteworthy that the group has implemented a command-and-control infrastructure that meets their requirements. A number of cloud storage platforms, including pCloud, Koofr, Filen, and Icedrive, are used by the attackers to relay instructions and store stolen data rather than using servers that are easily identifiable.  As a result, malicious activity is blended with routine user activity, resulting in significantly tampering with detection efforts. Based on the forensic analysis of these cloud-linked accounts, it has been determined that certain Ukrainian systems have been continuously monitored for extensive periods of time, demonstrating APT28's ability to collect intelligence in high-value environments in a low-visibility manner.  Moreover, the researchers at ESET have provided additional technical insight into the operation, tracing its deployment to at least April 2024, when a structured, sustained intrusion effort began. According to their findings, the coordinated use of BeardShell and Covenant was not an accident, but intentionally designed to provide prolonged, low-noise surveillance of Ukrainian military personnel and government organizations.  Recent incidents have indicated that the infection chain exploits a vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-21509, which is embedded within malicious DOC files designed to execute code upon opening. In the end, SlimAgent, a surveillance-focused implant that was identified within a compromised Ukrainian government system, enabled the discovery of this implant, which was capable of collecting keystrokes, clipboard contents, and screen captures systematically without causing immediate suspicion.  According to the subsequent analysis, BeardShell is a modern, modular backdoor that emphasizes stealth and flexibility. Icedrive's infrastructure is utilized to communicate with commands and controls. Remote PowerShell commands are executed within a managed .NET runtime environment using this infrastructure.  An obfuscation method previously associated with Xtunnel, a network pivot utility historically connected to APT28's earlier campaigns is included in its internal design, demonstrating a deliberate reuse of proven techniques. Meanwhile, the Covenant framework is used as the primary operational implant, having been reworked from its original open-source version.  There have also been changes observed in the generation of deterministic identifiers linked to host-specific attributes, in the execution logic intended to bypass behavioral detection engines, as well as the integration of cloud-based communication channels. As part of the group's infrastructure strategy, Koofr and pCloud have gradually been replaced by newer platforms such as Filen beginning mid-2025.  As a result of this architecture, Covenant serves as the primary access mechanism, while BeardShell serves as a contingency tool to ensure operations continue even in cases of partial detection or remediation. Further extending the scope of the analysis, researchers have also highlighted that the threat actor's toolkit reflects a deliberate blend of legacy codebases and newly developed capabilities, reflecting a deliberate combination of heritage codebases and newly developed capabilities.  SLIMAGENT, an implant that was formally disclosed by the CERT-UA in mid-2025 and examined in greater detail by ESET in the following year. With SLIMAGENT, granular data collection is possible through keystroke logging, screenshot capture, and clipboard harvesting, effectively turning compromised systems into persistent intelligence gathering nodes. It is designed for continuous data collection with granular data collection capabilities.  SLIMAGENT is distinguished by more than its functionality; it is also distinguished by its lineage. Based on technical comparisons, SLIMAGENT does not appear to be a completely new development, but rather is an evolution of APT28's earlier XAgent toolset, which was widely deployed by the group during the 2010s.  In support of this assessment, code-level similarities have been identified across multiple samples, including artifacts recovered from early-2018 intrusion campaigns targeting European governmental entities. Moreover, the correlation between the keylogging routines and an XAgent variant observed in late 2014 suggests an ongoing development rather than a one-time invention of the routines, suggesting continuity of development. The structured formatting of exfiltrated data remains one of the most distinctive features across these generations.  The SLIMAGENT surveillance software, like its predecessor, compiles its output into HTML-formatted logs, utilizing a consistent color code scheme to distinguish between application identification numbers, captured keystrokes, and active window titles. As a result of this seemingly inconsequential design choice, operators now benefit from a streamlined interface to speed up the data triage process, thereby reinforcing the campaign's operational efficiency. Additionally, BEARDSHELL's backdoor function as an execution layer within the compromised environment, facilitating remote command delivery via PowerShell within a controlled .NET environment in conjunction with SLIMAGENT's data collection capabilities.  By relying on Icedrive for command-and-control, the group maintains covert access while minimizing detection risk while continuing its emphasis on blending malicious activity with legitimate network traffic. All of these findings reinforce that organizations operating in geopolitical environments characterized by high levels of risk, particularly those within the government and defense sectors, need to recalibrate their defensive posture. There is a need for security teams to adopt behavior-driven monitoring as an alternative to traditional signature-based detection models to identify anomalous processes, in-memory payload delivery, and misuse of legitimate cloud services.  In addition to stricter controls on macro execution and file provenance, it is essential to scrutinize document-based attack vectors, particularly those exploiting known vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-21509.  Meanwhile, the increasing use of trusted cloud platforms for command-and-control activities underscores the significance of maintaining visibility into outbound network traffic and implementing zero-trust principles to restrict lateral movement. A coordinated threat hunt in conjunction with timely intelligence sharing among national and international cybersecurity bodies will be essential in combating such campaigns. With adversaries continuing to combine legacy techniques with modern infrastructure to refine their toolchains, resilience will depend on defenders' abilities to anticipate and adapt to an environment that is becoming increasingly covert and persistent.
dlvr.it
March 20, 2026 at 3:05 PM
Russian APT28 Targets Ukraine Using Signal to Deliver New Malware Families #cyberattack #CyberAttacks #cybersecuritynews
Russian APT28 Targets Ukraine Using Signal to Deliver New Malware Families
 The Russian state-sponsored threat group APT28, also known as UAC-0001, has been linked to a fresh wave of cyberattacks against Ukrainian government targets, using Signal messenger chats to distribute two previously undocumented malware strains—BeardShell and SlimAgent.  While the Signal platform itself remains uncompromised, its rising adoption among government personnel has made it a popular delivery vector for phishing attacks. Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) initially discovered these attacks in March 2024, though critical infection vector details only surfaced after ESET notified the agency in May 2025 of unauthorised access to a “gov.ua” email account.  Investigations revealed that APT28 used Signal to send a macro-laced Microsoft Word document titled "Акт.doc." Once opened, it initiates a macro that drops two payloads—a malicious DLL file (“ctec.dll”) and a disguised PNG file (“windows.png”)—while modifying the Windows Registry to enable persistence via COM-hijacking.  These payloads execute a memory-resident malware framework named Covenant, which subsequently deploys BeardShell. BeardShell, written in C++, is capable of downloading and executing encrypted PowerShell scripts, with execution results exfiltrated via the Icedrive API. The malware maintains stealth by encrypting communications using the ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm.  Alongside BeardShell, CERT-UA identified another tool dubbed SlimAgent. This lightweight screenshot grabber captures images using multiple Windows API calls, then encrypts them with a combination of AES and RSA before local storage. These are presumed to be extracted later by an auxiliary tool.  APT28’s involvement was further corroborated through their exploitation of vulnerabilities in Roundcube and other webmail software, using phishing emails mimicking Ukrainian news publications to exploit flaws like CVE-2020-35730, CVE-2021-44026, and CVE-2020-12641. These emails injected malicious JavaScript files—q.js, e.js, and c.js—to hijack inboxes, redirect emails, and extract credentials from over 40 Ukrainian entities. CERT-UA recommends organisations monitor traffic linked to suspicious domains such as “app.koofr.net” and “api.icedrive.net” to detect any signs of compromise.
dlvr.it
July 1, 2025 at 1:42 PM
马尼亚和玻利维亚,目标组织包括国防部(40%)、运输/物流运营商(35%)和外交机构(25%)。攻击者利用尚未修复的漏洞安装了两种新后门程序 BeardShell 或 NotDoor。BeardShell 主要用于侦察,运行在内存中不会在硬盘上留下痕迹,NotDoor 则是监控电子邮件文件夹的 VBA 宏。
February 5, 2026 at 9:00 AM
APT28 Использует Signal для Распространения Мальвари BEARDSHELL и Оперативного Фреймворка COVENANT в Украине

https://kripta.biz/posts/6ABB5FB6-4344-4935-93B6-69FAF5EC5211
September 19, 2025 at 3:30 AM
Detailed analysis of Sednit’s modern toolkits is available at www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-rese... 5/5
Sednit reloaded: Back in the trenches
ESET researchers document how the Sednit APT group has reemerged with a modern toolkit centered on two paired implants – BeardShell and Covenant.
www.welivesecurity.com
March 10, 2026 at 2:28 PM
Across 2025–2026, Sednit paired BeardShell with Covenant, the final block of its modern toolkit – a heavily reworked open-source implant built for long‑term espionage with a new protocol riding on another legitimate cloud provider. 4/5
March 10, 2026 at 2:28 PM
Sednit also deployed BeardShell, an implant that executes PowerShell commands via a legitimate cloud service and uses a distinctive obfuscation technique also found in Xtunnel, Sednit’s network pivoting tool from the 2010s. 3/5
March 10, 2026 at 2:28 PM
#ESETresearch has analyzed the resurgence of Sednit – one of the most long‑running Russia‑aligned APT groups – now using a modern toolkit built around paired implants, BeardShell and Covenant, each using a different cloud provider for resilience. www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-rese... 1/5
Sednit reloaded: Back in the trenches
ESET researchers document how the Sednit APT group has reemerged with a modern toolkit centered on two paired implants – BeardShell and Covenant.
www.welivesecurity.com
March 10, 2026 at 2:28 PM
APT28 hackers use Signal chats to launch new malware attacks on Ukraine🔥

The Russian state-sponsored threat group APT28 is using #Signal chats to target government targets in #Ukraine with two undocumented malware families named #BeardShell and #SlimAgent🕵️‍♂️

www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/securit...
APT28 hackers use Signal chats to launch new malware attacks on Ukraine
The Russian state-sponsored threat group APT28 is using Signal chats to target government targets in Ukraine with two previously undocumented malware families named BeardShell and SlimAgent.
www.bleepingcomputer.com
June 24, 2025 at 8:16 AM
APT28 used BEARDSHELL and COVENANT to spy on Ukrainian military personnel
APT28 used BEARDSHELL and COVENANT to spy on Ukrainian military personnel - Cyberwarzone
ESET says the Russian state-sponsored group APT28 has used two implants called BEARDSHELL and COVENANT since April 2024 to conduct long-term surveillance of Ukrainian military personnel.
cyberwarzone.com
March 16, 2026 at 6:33 AM
APT28 conducts long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces using custom malware
APT28 conducts long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces using custom malware
APT28 used BEARDSHELL and COVENANT malware to spy on Ukrainian military personnel, enabling long-term surveillance since April 2024.
securityaffairs.com
March 10, 2026 at 3:47 PM
APT28 Uses BEARDSHELL and COVENANT Malware to Spy on Ukrainian Military
APT28 Uses BEARDSHELL and COVENANT Malware to Spy on Ukrainian Military
thehackernews.com
March 10, 2026 at 12:24 PM
APT28 Weaponizes Office Flaw to Spy on NATO & Military
APT28 Weaponizes Office Flaw to Spy on NATO & Military
APT28 (Fancy Bear) weaponized CVE-2026-21509 in 24 hours to target NATO. New "BeardShell" and "NotDoor" malware steals emails. Patch Office now.
securityonline.info
February 9, 2026 at 4:09 AM
APT28 With Weaponized Office Documents Delivers BeardShell and Covenant Modules
APT28 With Weaponized Office Documents Delivers BeardShell and Covenant Modules
cybersecuritynews.com
October 17, 2025 at 12:38 PM
New APT28 Attack Via Signal Messenger Delivers BeardShell and Covenant Malware
New APT28 Attack Via Signal Messenger Delivers BeardShell and Covenant Malware
cybersecuritynews.com
September 16, 2025 at 1:12 PM
APT28 Uses Signal Chat to Deploy BEARDSHELL Malware and COVENANT in Ukraine
APT28 Uses Signal Chat to Deploy BEARDSHELL Malware and COVENANT in Ukraine
thehackernews.com
June 24, 2025 at 9:50 AM
APT28 hackers use Signal chats to launch new malware attacks on Ukraine
APT28 hackers use Signal chats to launch new malware attacks on Ukraine
The Russian state-sponsored threat group APT28 is using Signal chats to target government targets in Ukraine with two previously undocumented malware families named BeardShell and SlimAgent.
www.bleepingcomputer.com
June 23, 2025 at 10:50 PM