Researchers have discovered 13 npm packages carrying a previously undocumented JavaScript information stealer called WeaselBiscuit, introducing yet another malicious threat to the npm package ecosystem. In addition to linking the packages together via shared indicators, OpenSourceMalware found several similarities between BeaverTail and OtterCookie, two North Korean malware families.  A number of packages are included, including @biz44/id10-client, @biz44/id12-client, @biz44/id44-client, @biz44/id79-client, @biz44/id95-client, @biz44/id99-client, @biz44/process-runtime-utils, @biz44/runtime-utils, @biz44/engin1, id79-client, process-lhpm, process-mite, and process-tailwind. Many were first observed between September 12 and September 16, 2026, with some versions still available on NPM at the time of analysis.  In comparison to BeaverTail and OtterCookie, WeaselBiscuit appears much smaller. In addition to remote access and cryptocurrency theft functions, the malware focuses on profiling hosts and collecting data collected by Chrome extensions rather than carrying a broad range of remote access functions. Malware loaders are launched when a compromised package is imported, causing detached Node.js processes to begin execution. After retrieving an encoded payload from an Npoint URL, the loader executes the decoded code directly in memory. Following execution, the malware obtains its command-and-control configuration from another Npoint endpoint before connecting to 103.170.217.184:8787. Among the data collected are hostnames, usernames, operating systems, CPUs, and memory, as well as local and public IP addresses.  Chrome profiles are also searched for extension storage on Windows, Mac OS, and Linux platforms. Chrome's Local Extension Settings directory may contain information associated with browser extensions, including cryptocurrency wallet extensions, which makes this collection especially significant.  Instead of relying on a specific list of wallet extensions, OpenSourceMalware reported the stealer uploads readable, non-empty files from these locations. C2 servers can also provide commands for monitoring the clipboard and logging Windows keystrokes.  Despite these capabilities, the recovered malware does not include direct wallet draining functionality, browser password decryption, seed phrase searching, screenshots, or a remote shell access. Additionally, some BeaverTail and OtterCookie activities have a Python-based InvisibleFerret stage that is not present in any other activity.  Possible Links to DPRK Malware WeaselBiscuit has been compared to malware associated with the DPRK-linked Contagious Interview campaign, but the attribution has yet to be confirmed. OpenSourceMalware did not find conclusive evidence that the attack was originated by North Korea based on operational infrastructure, victimology, campaign metadata or other identifying materials.  WeaselBiscuit employs the dead-drop technique of Npoint.io as a dead-drop service, a technique previously observed in Contagious Interview campaigns. Some of its technical indicators, however, overlap with earlier campaigns. Additionally, its code performs public IP and geolocation checks using IPify.org and IP-API.com, while parts of its command-and-control design are similar to OtterCookie's.  Among the numeric identifiers found in the malware are 10, 12, 44, 79, 95, and 99. These identifiers are similar to campaign markers associated with PolinRider activity, however their exact purpose in WeaselBiscuit is unclear. In terms of capability, BeaverTail and OtterCookie are more closely related.  Several features are retained in WhistlerBiscuit, including system profiling, Chrome extension data collection, clipboard monitoring, and keylogging, all of which are common to those malware families. However, several of their heavier features are removed, including remote access functions, wallet draining capabilities, screenshots, and secondary payload delivery.  Researchers at Cisco Talos observed a similar overlap in October 2025, when they discovered that the node-nvm-ssh package contained characteristics related to both BeaverTail and OtterCookie. The findings suggest that code and techniques from these malware families have been found in a variety of combinations within npm-based malicious code.  The WeaselBiscuit stealer should be viewed for the time being as a distinctive lightweight stealer with distinct technical similarities to DPRK-related tooling rather than a new DPRK malware family confirmed by the DPRK. For a more conclusive attribution, further evidence from infrastructure, campaigns, or code levels would be required. With the discovery of WeaselBiscuit, security risks are highlighted within the npm ecosystem, particularly for developers utilizing third-party packages. In addition to the ability to collect Chrome extension data and similarity to BeaverTail and OtterCookie, it warrants continued investigation as researchers investigate its origins and wider activities.

  North Korea–linked threat actors behind the long-running Contagious Interview campaign have been seen leveraging weaponized Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) projects to trick victims into installing a backdoor on their systems. According to Jamf Threat Labs, this activity reflects a steady refinement of a technique that first came to light in December 2025. The attackers continue to adapt their methods to blend seamlessly into legitimate developer workflows. "This activity involved the deployment of a backdoor implant that provides remote code execution capabilities on the victim system," security researcher Thijs Xhaflaire said in a report shared with The Hacker News. Initially revealed by OpenSourceMalware last month, the attack relies on social engineering job seekers. Targets are instructed to clone a repository hosted on platforms such as GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket and open it in VS Code as part of an alleged hiring assessment. Once opened, the malicious repository abuses VS Code task configuration files to run harmful payloads hosted on Vercel infrastructure, with execution tailored to the victim’s operating system. By configuring tasks with the "runOn: folderOpen" option, the malware automatically runs whenever the project or any file within it is opened in VS Code. This process ultimately results in the deployment of BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret. Later versions of the campaign have introduced more complex, multi-stage droppers concealed within task configuration files. These droppers masquerade as benign spell-check dictionaries, serving as a fallback if the malware cannot retrieve its payload from the Vercel-hosted domain. As with earlier iterations, the obfuscated JavaScript embedded in these files executes immediately when the project is opened in the integrated development environment (IDE). It connects to a remote server ("ip-regions-check.vercel[.]app") and runs any JavaScript code sent back. The final payload stage consists of yet another heavily obfuscated JavaScript component. Jamf also identified a newly observed infection method that had not been documented previously. While the initial lure remains the same—cloning and opening a malicious Git repository in VS Code—the execution path changes once the repository is trusted. "When the project is opened, Visual Studio Code prompts the user to trust the repository author," Xhaflaire explained. "If that trust is granted, the application automatically processes the repository's tasks.json configuration file, which can result in embedded arbitrary commands being executed on the system.""On macOS systems, this results in the execution of a background shell command that uses nohup bash -c in combination with curl -s to retrieve a JavaScript payload remotely and pipe it directly into the Node.js runtime. This allows execution to continue independently if the Visual Studio Code process is terminated, while suppressing all command output." The JavaScript payload, delivered from Vercel, contains the core backdoor logic. It establishes persistence, gathers basic system information, and maintains communication with a command-and-control server to enable remote code execution and system profiling. In at least one observed incident, Jamf noted additional JavaScript being executed approximately eight minutes after the initial compromise. This secondary payload beacons to the server every five seconds, executes further JavaScript instructions, and can delete traces of its activity upon command. Researchers suspect the code may have been generated with the help of artificial intelligence (AI), based on the language and inline comments found in the source. Actors linked to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are known to aggressively target software developers, especially those working in cryptocurrency, blockchain, and fintech environments. These individuals often possess elevated access to financial systems, wallets, and proprietary infrastructure. By compromising developer accounts and machines, attackers could gain access to sensitive source code, internal platforms, intellectual property, and digital assets. The frequent tactical changes observed in this campaign suggest an effort to improve success rates and further the regime’s cyber espionage and revenue-generation objectives. The disclosure coincides with findings from Red Asgard, which investigated a malicious repository abusing VS Code tasks to install a full-featured backdoor known as Tsunami (also called TsunamiKit), along with the XMRig cryptocurrency miner. Separately, Security Alliance reported on a similar attack where a victim was contacted on LinkedIn by actors posing as the CTO of a project named Meta2140. The attackers shared a Notion[.]so page containing a technical test and a Bitbucket link hosting the malicious code. Notably, the attack framework includes multiple fallback mechanisms. These include installing a rogue npm package called "grayavatar" or executing JavaScript that downloads an advanced Node.js controller. This controller runs five modules designed to log keystrokes, capture screenshots, scan the home directory for sensitive data, replace clipboard wallet addresses, steal browser credentials, and maintain persistent communication with a remote server. The malware further establishes a parallel Python environment using a stager script that supports data exfiltration, cryptocurrency mining via XMRig, keylogging, and the installation of AnyDesk for remote access. The Node.js and Python components are tracked as BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret, respectively. Collectively, these observations show that the state-sponsored group is testing several delivery mechanisms simultaneously to maximize the chances of successful compromise. "While monitoring, we've seen the malware that is being delivered change very quickly over a short amount of time," Jaron Bradley, director of Jamf Threat Labs, told The Hacker News. It's worth noting that the payload we observed for macOS was written purely in JavaScript and had many signs of being AI assisted. It's difficult to know exactly how quickly attackers are changing their workflows, but this particular threat actor has a reputation for adapting quickly." To reduce exposure, developers are urged to remain cautious when handling third-party repositories—particularly those shared during hiring exercises—carefully review source code before opening it in VS Code, and limit npm installations to trusted, well-vetted packages. "This activity highlights the continued evolution of DPRK-linked threat actors, who consistently adapt their tooling and delivery mechanisms to integrate with legitimate developer workflows," Jamf said. "The abuse of Visual Studio Code task configuration files and Node.js execution demonstrates how these techniques continue to evolve alongside commonly used development tools."

FCCCall and FreeConference read more about DPRK Hackers Use ClickFix to Deliver BeaverTail Malware in Crypto Job Scams