#CFSP
Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2572 of 15 December 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-conten...
eur-lex.europa.eu
November 12, 2026 at 3:11 AM
... continuing and lasting threat to international peace and security posed by chemical weapons, the Council decided that the application of Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 should be extended until 30 October 2031.
The Council also decided that the measures set out in Articles 2 and 3 of that ...
November 11, 2026 at 5:36 AM
🆕 Joint statement by the co-chairs of the 29th Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP), held in Dublin 🇮🇪 on 4-6 November 2026.

📜 Full text 👉 tinyurl.com/ybat68k6
November 6, 2026 at 2:18 PM
The IPC for the CFSP/CSDP is underway. Organised by The Houses of the Oireachtasthe Conference brings together MPs from across the EU MS and the EP to discuss matters relating to the Union’s common foreign and security policy.
📺https://buff.ly/8twM9Ax
🗎 buff.ly/MEfiz4u
#ipexeu
#ParlEU2026ie
November 5, 2026 at 12:38 PM
オランダのマーストリヒト駅

マーストリヒト条約(正式名称:欧州連合条約)は、1993年11月1日に発効し、欧州連合(EU)の創設を定めた歴史的な基本条約です。オランダのマーストリヒトで合意・調印されました。
主な内容と骨子

• EUの設立: それまでの欧州共同体(EC)を発展的に解消・統合し、欧州連合(EU)を創設しました。
• 経済・通貨同盟(EMU)の推進: 共通通貨ユーロの導入に向けた道筋と、欧州中央銀行(ECB)の設置を定めました。
• 「三つの柱」構造の導入:
1. 従来の欧州共同体(EC)などの共同体法分野
2. 共通外交・安全保障政策(CFSP)
3. 警察・刑事司法協力
November 7, 2026 at 8:24 AM
Next week
📝Commissioner Marta Kos presents Commission’s 2026 Enlargement Package to Foreign Affairs Committee
📝MEPs discuss results of 🇪🇺🇨🇦summit
📝Dialogue on Western Balkans, 🇲🇩 & 🇺🇦 facilities
📝MEPs travel to Dublin for Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pres...
Committee on Foreign Affairs: Highlights of the week 2-8 November | News | European Parliament
Meeting on Tuesday 3 November, Wednesday 4 November and Thursday 5 November, Brussels and a mission on Wednesday - Friday 4-6 November, Dublin
www.europarl.europa.eu
October 30, 2026 at 9:39 AM
Ayer tuvimos una bonita sesión de formación en el CFSP de Castilla y León en Soria, en un impresionante y funcional edificio conocido como la Catedral de la Educación. Esta vez sobre Escuelas Saludables. ¡¡Gracias!!
October 29, 2026 at 9:41 AM
Richt je pijlen dan alvast maar naar Duitsland want:

"European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decisions require unanimity by all member states in the Council of the European Union,"

Elke sanctie wordt geblokkeerd.
October 28, 2026 at 8:09 AM
Classified Document and Information Management Assistant, FGIII. European External Action Service, Brussels. Open until 26 October 2026

WE ARE The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the European Union’s diplomatic service. Since 2011, the EEAS carries out the EU’s Common Foreign and…
Classified Document and Information Management Assistant, FGIII. European External Action Service, Brussels. Open until 26 October 2026
WE ARE The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the European Union’s diplomatic service. Since 2011, the EEAS carries out the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to promote peace, prosperity, security, and the interests of the EU across the globe. It brings together European civil servants, diplomats from EU Member States, national experts and local staff worldwide. The EEAS supports the High Representative in the exercise of her mandate to steer the Union’s CFSP, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to represent the EU on issues relating to the CFSP and to chair the Foreign Affairs Council.
goinginternationalinarchives.wordpress.com
October 24, 2026 at 1:57 AM
there is no such thing as a 3rd pillar EEA.

The EUs 3rd pillar does exist and it's to do with policing / judiciary..nothing to do with trade.
October 20, 2026 at 7:36 AM
🇪🇺 How can the EU overcome vetoes in foreign policy? In his new #IEPPolicyPaper, @danielhegedus.bsky.social proposes authorising enhanced cooperation by qualified majority – a potential safety belt for the EU’s capacity to act.
#CFSP #EUReform

📖 iep-berlin.de/en/projects/...
A Safety Belt for the EU’s Capacity to Act | IEP
How can the EU safeguard its foreign policy capacity to act despite national vetoes? In his new IEP Policy Paper, Daniel Hegedüs explores how qualified majority voting could enable enhanced cooperatio...
iep-berlin.de
October 12, 2026 at 1:33 PM


Luxembourg, 9 October 2026

Key points

* The Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/2243 on 9 October, published in the Official Journal on 12 October: EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, due to end on 31 March 2027, now ends on 31 March 2029
* A new paragraph says the operation "shall […]
EU Extends Operation IRINI to March 2029 and Tasks It With Constraining Russia's Shadow Fleet — Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2243
Luxembourg, 9 October 2026 ### Key points * The Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/2243 on 9 October, published in the Official Journal on 12 October: EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, due to end on 31 March 2027, now ends on 31 March 2029 * A new paragraph says the operation "shall contribute to constraining Russia's 'shadow fleet'", as defined by IMO Assembly Resolution A.1192(33), "in compliance with" the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, "through a whole-of-route approach" * Further new tasks: maritime domain awareness, and protection of critical maritime infrastructure, "including through trials and pilot deployments of technological solutions" * Common costs for April 2027 to March 2029 are set at EUR 16.88 million The EU's Mediterranean naval operation now has Russia's shadow fleet among its tasks, and the decision that gives it the task also sets its limits. The decision rewrites IRINI's mandate around three roles: protecting Union interests in the Mediterranean, supporting UN measures on Libya, and partnership and training. Its recitals record that UN Security Council Resolution 2292, which authorised states to inspect vessels off Libya on the high seas for embargoed arms, expired on 25 May 2026. The Libya article now speaks of "reporting on and deterring" arms trafficking. For every task, the operation reports to the Political and Security Committee on "actions, such as inspections or visits to verify the flag", and the committee "may consider any subsequent measure". Signal No. 169 carried the renewal from press reports without a decision date; the text was in the Official Journal four days earlier. **The shadow-fleet task brings no inspection power of its own: reporting, and flag checks the law of the sea already permits.** Under UNCLOS a warship may visit a ship suspected of having no nationality, which is how the false-flagged part of the fleet is reached. Boardings with a detention behind them have so far been national: Britain's Smyrtos in the Channel and France's Tagor off Brittany. Until a committee measure names a vessel, the paragraph gives an existing monitoring operation a new target, not a new tool. Related · Shadow-fleet interdiction * Britain Boards a Russian Shadow-Fleet Tanker as the EU Adds 81 Sanctions Listings * French Naval Commandos Board the Shadow-Fleet Tanker Tagor off Brittany * Estonia Ceases Shadow-Fleet Interdiction in the Baltic; Navy Commander Vark: "Risk of Military Escalation Too High" Sources:Council of the EU · Official Journal of the EU · EUNAVFOR MED IRINI
www.grosswald.org
October 19, 2026 at 5:29 PM
3.
This limited reform could be introduced through the application of the CFSP passerelle clause (Article 31(3) TEU), or the general passerelle clause as a fallback, within the available political window.
October 8, 2026 at 2:13 PM
2.
In my new paper, I argue that authorising enhanced cooperation in CFSP by qualified majority could provide a strategic safeguard against disruptive vetoes while potentially enjoying broader political support than a general extension of QMV in CFSP.
iep-berlin.de/en/projects/...
A Safety Belt for the EU’s Capacity to Act | IEP
How can the EU safeguard its foreign policy capacity to act despite national vetoes? In his new IEP Policy Paper, Daniel Hegedüs explores how qualified majority voting could enable enhanced cooperatio...
iep-berlin.de
October 8, 2026 at 2:13 PM
Second Sunday Bird Walk

🗓️ Sun, 11 Oct · 6:30 AM – 9:30 AM
📍 Rassba Farm, Near Animal Quarantine and Certification Services
🎟️ Free
🏠 By BlrBirders – The Birdwatchers’ Field Club of Bangalore
Second Sunday Bird Walk
WhereHesaraghatta Grasslands, we meet at ‘Rassba Farms’, near the Animal Quarantine And Certification Services Hessarghatta Office , where we will park our vehicles and use their facilities. We start the walk from there and cross over to the grasslands. Nearest Bus Stop: CFSP Farm Stop, 2.6 Km/30 m…
blrbirders.com
October 8, 2026 at 8:05 AM
" #Serbia will have to deliver more. We will see the seriousness of their government after the elections, whether they not only talk about wanting to be a member, but also work specifically on it, especially in terms of strategic alignment with the CFSP."
europeanwesternbalkans.com/2026/10/07/k...
Marta Kos: Serbia will have to deliver more on its EU path - European Western Balkans
BELGRADE – European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos said today that Serbia will have to do more in the process of joining the European Union and that it remains to be seen how the future govern...
europeanwesternbalkans.com
October 7, 2026 at 2:29 PM
On Thursday in the Committee on Foreign Affairs:
CFSP, EU-Norway relations 🇪🇺-🇳🇴 , Strait of Hormuz, candidates for 2026 Sakharov Prize
Please note that the vote on EU-Syria relations has been postponed.
👉 europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pres... Live 🎥 multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstream...
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) | News | European Parliament
Next week’s highlights
europarl.europa.eu
September 30, 2026 at 4:51 PM
THIRD COUNTRIES ALIGN WITH LATEST EU SANCTIONS RE UKRAINE

On 25 September, the EU advised Albania, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, and Ukraine had aligned with the latest Council Decision
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pre...
Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrit...
Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1333 of 15 June 2026 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP ...
www.consilium.europa.eu
September 25, 2026 at 2:04 PM
Regulatory & Start Up Specialist 2, cFSP - Mexico City, Mexico Job educativ.net/jobs/job/65898...
September 24, 2026 at 9:58 PM
Regulatory & Start Up Specialist 2, cFSP - Mexico City, Mexico Job educativ.net/jobs/job/65898...
September 24, 2026 at 10:11 PM
EU counterpart directives: Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1641, Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/262).
September 10, 2026 at 7:22 PM
#EUGeneralCourt dismisses Hungary’s action against the allocation of proceeds from frozen Russian assets to support the Ukrainian armed forces #CFSP #Ukraine 👉 curia.europa.eu/site/upload/...
https://curia.europa.eu/site/upload/docs/application/pdf/2026-09/cp260123en.pdf
curia.europa.eu
September 9, 2026 at 7:45 AM
Application of the KS/KD 'political questions' test leads the General Court to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to examine the legality of the decision #CFSP
#EUGeneralCourt dismisses Hungary’s action against the allocation of proceeds from frozen Russian assets to support the Ukrainian armed forces #CFSP #Ukraine 👉 curia.europa.eu/site/upload/...
https://curia.europa.eu/site/upload/docs/application/pdf/2026-09/cp260123en.pdf
curia.europa.eu
September 9, 2026 at 9:49 AM
CFSP: the veto may disappear, the asymmetry will not eualive.net/cfsp-the-vet... Op-ed by Jan Muś
CFSP: the veto may disappear, the asymmetry will not
The problem with the EU’s foreign-policy decision making process is real, but the veto is ...
eualive.net
September 7, 2026 at 9:16 AM
CFSP: the veto may disappear, the asymmetry will not
CFSP: the veto may disappear, the asymmetry will not
The problem with the EU’s foreign-policy decision making process is real, but the veto is a symptom of a deeper problem. The EU has integrated its member states politically without eliminating the structural asymmetries that shape their foreign-policy interests and bargaining power. Replacing unanimity with flexibility may make decisions faster, but it does not necessarily make European foreign policy more genuinely common, writes Jan Muś. Jan Muś is the author of the Political Risk Monitor and an analyst specialising in Central and South-Eastern Europe and European integration. The latest call by eleven EU member states to reduce the ability of individual governments to block Common Foreign and Security Policy decisions has once again brought the issue of unanimity to the centre of the European debate. The argument is a familiar one: in a more dangerous international environment, Europe cannot afford to spend weeks negotiating a common position, only to discover that one government can prevent the EU from acting. The deeper problem is that the European Union is not a politically or economically homogeneous space. Various member states occupy different structural positions within the European political economy system. Some holds the high-tech and high-value end of the stick while some others provide cheap components and equally cheap labour.  These positions produce different social and political balances, different economic dependencies and therefore different foreign policy preferences. Removing unanimity may increase efficiency, but it cannot eliminate conflicts generated by asymmetric integration. In other words, European states do not enter the foreign-policy bargaining process from the same structural position. But easier decision-making is not necessarily the same as greater strategic cohesion. The governments that disagree with a particular policy would simply have to find other ways of defending their interests: building coalitions, influencing negotiations before a vote, shaping the agenda or seeking concessions elsewhere. And this is where the political economy of European integration becomes important. Some European economies control significant amounts of capital and technology and occupy high positions in European and global production networks. Others remain more dependent on foreign investment, external markets, particular energy suppliers or foreign-owned production. A country’s economic structure does not tell us automatically whether its government will support or oppose a particular EU position. But economic structures change the costs of foreign-policy choices. A government whose economy is highly exposed to a particular external market may face different domestic consequences from sanctions than a government with a more diversified economy. A country dependent on particular energy supplies may calculate the risks of confrontation differently from one with greater energy autonomy. A state with substantial domestic technological and financial resources has greater room to absorb economic retaliation than a smaller economy heavily integrated into foreign-owned production networks. The same logic deserves to be applied to foreign policy. From veto power to structural power This leads to an important distinction that is largely missing from the current debate: the difference between veto power and structural power. Veto power is easy to see. A government either can or cannot prevent a decision. Structural power is more subtle. It concerns the ability to influence what is discussed, which alternatives are considered realistic, which coalitions emerge and what compromises governments are willing to accept. Unanimity gives smaller states an unusually powerful form of formal protection: one government can stop the entire Union. But once the veto is weakened, the importance of structural power increases. A country that cannot block a decision independently must build coalitions. It must persuade other governments. It needs diplomatic capacity, political networks and the ability to offer or demand concessions. Not all member states possess these resources to the same degree. This creates a paradox. Moving from unanimity to greater flexibility may make the EU more capable of taking decisions while simultaneously making differences in political influence more important. The question is therefore not simply whether Europe should abandon the veto. It is what kind of power structure would replace it. Flexibility can be part of the solution – but not the whole solution The current geopolitical environment makes a more flexible EU foreign-policy system increasingly necessary. The Union needs to be capable of acting when a common strategic objective has already been established but one government is unwilling to participate. Constructive abstention can be useful here. So can carefully designed forms of qualified majority voting and coalitions of willing member states. But flexibility should not be confused with equality. If the EU moves towards more flexible decision-making, it should also pay greater attention to the unequal capacities of its member states to participate in that process. Energy security, industrial capacity, technological dependence, control over capital and the position of national economies in European value chains all affect the ability of governments to pursue independent strategic choices. Caption: Informal meeting of European Affairs Ministers – 4 September 2026 [Council Newsroom]
eualive.net
September 7, 2026 at 9:24 AM