#CerealNeuron
The main backdoor, #CerealNeuron, is a passive implant with no external C&C. It binds an HTTP listener to Exchange-like URI prefixes and passively parses inbound HTTPS requests, extracting RSA/AES-encrypted commands hidden in legitimate-looking Exchange traffic. 3/6
November 10, 2026 at 10:00 AM
cerealneuron registers web listeners on paths built to look like ordinary exchange traffic, including /owa/sdds/. a request carrying a valid rsa and aes envelope and passing an hmac check gets decrypted and executed. everything else gets a legitimate exchange error page.
November 12, 2026 at 6:05 AM
Turla's Cereal toolset lives in Exchange memory and needs no external C2 to steal gov email. https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-5635?utm_source=bluesky #ThreatIntel #CerealLoader #CerealNeuron #CerealHermit
November 10, 2026 at 10:23 AM
CerealNeuron waits for incoming web requests on the compromised Exchange server. Commands arrive there; results go back through that channel. ESET found no external control infrastructure. An outbound beacon hunt alone is a poor fit—not proof the traffic is invisible.
November 10, 2026 at 3:42 PM
Turla turned Exchange into both a mail-collection point and a place to receive commands. ESET reports CerealBox hijacks existing transport-agent handlers in memory without registering a new agent; CerealNeuron waits for requests on the compromised server.
November 10, 2026 at 3:42 PM