#ESORICS
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cosic.bsky.social
Paper "0-RTT Integrated in SPDM for Large-Scale AI Super-Clusters" presented at #ESORICS 2026 in Rome.
sites.google.com/di.uniroma1....
31st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security - Accepted Papers
Winter Cycle
sites.google.com
September 23, 2026 at 12:05 PM
pq-next.bsky.social
PQ-NEXT is travelling to 🇮🇹 Rome for ESORICS 2026!
Our project partners from AGH University of Krakow will be presenting their paper today at MIST 2026 – Workshop on Mobile and IoT Security Technologies, co-located with ESORICS 2026.

Learn more 👉 www.linkedin.com/feed/update/...

#PQNEXT #HorizonEU
#postquantum #pqnext #horizoneu #event #quantum | PQ-NEXT
PQ-NEXT is travelling to 🇮🇹 Rome for ESORICS 2026! The paper ✍ “Lightweight Feature-Based Power Side-Channel Analysis of ML-KEM on Embedded Platforms”, by Daniel Karcz and Marcin Niemiec, our projec...
www.linkedin.com
September 18, 2026 at 7:35 AM
snee.la
I have a blog write up here (there's a logo of a cat wearing a business tie - no AI): snee.la/posts/amd-qo...

You can read the paper at: snee.la/pdf/pubs/amd...

If you're at ESORICS 2026 in Rome, Italy later this year in September 2026, it'd be awesome to meet up :D

#esorics #security
A Cat with an MBA: How AMD QoS Features Enable Side Channels on SEV-SNP
Foreword This blog post is a summarized and introductory write up of our paper recently accepted at ESORICS 2026 to be presented in Rome, Italy between September 14-16, 2026: “A Systematic Look at Qua...
snee.la
July 27, 2026 at 3:59 PM
snee.la
I'm happy to announce our work has been accepted at ESORICS 2026:

"A Systematic Look at Quality-of-Service Feature Effects on Side Channels in AMD SEV-SNP"

Thanks to Carina Fiedler, @rayiizzz.bsky.social, @supersingular.bsky.social, @misc0110.bsky.social, and @gruss.cc for a fun collaboration!
July 27, 2026 at 3:55 PM
guillaumehiet.bsky.social
Still working on your paper? There’s still time!

📣 The submission deadline for HS3 2026 (Workshop on Hardware-Supported Software Security, co-located with ESORICS) has been extended to June 29 (AoE).

Work-in-progress and early-stage results are welcome.

🔗 hs3-workshop.github.io/2026.html
HS3 2026: 2nd Workshop on Hardware-Supported Software Security
A workshop at ESORICS 2026, 17th of September 2026 in Rome, Italy.
hs3-workshop.github.io
June 23, 2026 at 10:24 AM
guillaumehiet.bsky.social
Our #SUSHI team organizes #HS3Workshop 2026: the 2nd Workshop on Hardware-Supported Software Security, co-located with #ESORICS on 2025-09-14 in Roma, Italy.

Submission deadline: 2025-06-19 AoE.

More info: hs3-workshop.github.io/2026.html
@irisa-lab.bsky.social @centralesupelec.bsky.social
HS3 2026: 2nd Workshop on Hardware-Supported Software Security
A workshop at ESORICS 2026, 14th of September 2026 in Rome, Italy.
hs3-workshop.github.io
May 7, 2026 at 1:19 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Round-Optimal Privacy Preserving Authenticated Key Exchange Even for Incomplete Sessions (Xavier Bultel, Khouredia Cisse) ia.cr/2026/745
Abstract. Several modern applications, such as Signal or WireGuard, use efficient Noise-like implicit authentication key exchanges that require only a small number of exponentiations and two interactions. These protocols have been proven to be secure under the ‘strong Diffie–Hellman’ (SDH) assumption in the random oracle model (ROM). At ESORICS 2021, Ramacher, Slamanig and Weninger presented an extension to the implicit authenticated key exchange security model, which enables strong privacy properties to be captured in addition to key-secrecy, including man-in-the-middle privacy (ensuring privacy even if a session is interrupted) and forward privacy. They also proposed a protocol to instantiate their model. In this paper, we present an efficient Noise-like protocol that achieve privacy in this model. Our protocol is as efficient as Noise-like protocols that do not guarantee privacy in terms of exponentiations. Moreover, our protocol requires three interactions, which is optimal for this privacy model. It is also more efficient than the ESORICS 2021 protocol in terms of both exponentiations and interactions. Finally, we propose another round-optimal protocol, slightly less efficient in terms of exponentiations, but secure under the CDH assumption in the ROM. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
April 21, 2026 at 9:01 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Do not Mix Models: Revisiting Generic Transforms for Committing Authenticated Encryption (Kazuhiko Minematsu, Akiko Inoue) ia.cr/2026/240
Abstract. Committing security for authenticated encryption (AE) captures the difficulty of constructing a distinct input tuple, including the key, that yields the same ciphertext. This notion is relatively new but has attracted significant attention due to its practical relevance. A promising direction is to design generic transforms that convert any AE scheme into a committing one. A common approach to generic transforms, initiated by the CTX transform (Chan and Rogaway, ESORICS 2022), is to add a hash function that uses part of the AE input/output, assuming the hash is ideal, i.e., a random oracle. Because the baseline AE is assumed to be secure in the standard model, this approach inherently mixes standard-model and idealized-model assumptions. We revisit this approach. We show that a number of state-of-the-art generic transforms relying on a mixed model (Chen and Karadžić, Eurocrypt 2025, and Bhattacharjee et al., ePrint 2024), proposed after CTX, are vulnerable once the hash function is instantiated, by presenting practical attacks against them. Our attacks exploit the fact that the baseline AE may depend on the instantiation of the generic transform, whereas the opposite is not true for the principle of the generic transform. In most cases, the attacks are effective with any instantiation, and the baseline AEs in the attacks have a natural structure, such as Enc-then-MAC with a counter mode encryption. We also demonstrate how to rectify these broken transforms with minimal algorithmic modifications, relying solely on the standard-model assumptions. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
February 16, 2026 at 11:30 AM
callforpaper.org
📢 New CFP Alert
STMUS 2025 : International Workshop on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Unlearning Systems (co-located with ESORICS)
Call For Paper Date: September 25-26, 2025
STMUS 2025 : International Workshop on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Unlearning Systems (co-located with ESORICS)
Join the International Workshop on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Unlearning Systems (STMUS 2025) for a comprehensive examination of machine unlearning technolo...
callforpaper.org
December 26, 2025 at 4:41 PM
callforpaper.org
📢 New CFP Alert
ESORICS 2025 : 30th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security [2nd round, update]
Call For Paper Date: September 22-26, 2025
ESORICS 2025 : 30th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security [2nd round, update]
Submit Your Paper to the 30th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS) 2025 - Call for Papers. The symposium will be held from September 22...
callforpaper.org
December 13, 2025 at 4:41 AM
callforpaper.org
📢 New CFP Alert
MIST 2025 : Workshop on Mobile and IoT Security Technologies at ESORICS 2025
Call For Paper Date: September 22-26, 2025
MIST 2025 : Workshop on Mobile and IoT Security Technologies at ESORICS 2025
MIST 2025: Workshop on Mobile and IoT Security Technologies, co-located with ESORICS 2025, explores the latest advancements in IoT and mobile security, focusing...
callforpaper.org
December 7, 2025 at 10:41 PM
csateth.bsky.social
Professor Adrian Perrig, who leads the Network Security Group (ETH Zurich) at D-INFK, has been awarded the prestigious ESORICS 2025 Outstanding Research Award. 🎉

Congratulations on this fantastic achievement! 👏

Read more: lnkd.in/dXyxJ53A
November 21, 2025 at 9:26 AM
callforpaper.org
📢 New CFP Alert
ESORICS 2025 : European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (round 2)
Call For Paper Date: September 22-26, 2025
ESORICS 2025 : European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (round 2)
The European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2025) is a premier conference seeking submissions of novel and previously unreleased research papers in various areas related to computer security.
callforpaper.org
November 5, 2025 at 7:41 PM
labnews.bsky.social
Datenschutzlücken in Gesundheits-Apps: Bremer Forscher enthüllen Widersprüche zwischen Versprechen und Praxis

Bremen/Toulouse, 22. Oktober 2025 – Forscher der Universität Bremen haben in einer umfassenden Untersuchung erhebliche Abweichungen zwischen den Datenschutzversprechen und dem realen…
Datenschutzlücken in Gesundheits-Apps: Bremer Forscher enthüllen Widersprüche zwischen Versprechen und Praxis
Bremen/Toulouse, 22. Oktober 2025 – Forscher der Universität Bremen haben in einer umfassenden Untersuchung erhebliche Abweichungen zwischen den Datenschutzversprechen und dem realen Verhalten mobiler Gesundheitsanwendungen festgestellt. Viele dieser Apps übermitteln personenbezogene Daten bereits, bevor die Nutzer ihre Einwilligung erteilt haben. Die Studie, die auf der renommierten internationalen Konferenz für Computersicherheit ESORICS 2025 in Toulouse präsentiert wurde, unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit strengerer Regulierungen und transparenterer Designs in diesem sensiblen Bereich.
labnews.io
October 22, 2025 at 9:10 AM
labo-loria.bsky.social
🎉 Bravo à Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry et Alexandre Debant, chercheurs dans les équipes Pesto et Caramba du Loria, pour leur Best Paper Award à ESORICS 2025 !

www.loria.fr/fr/2025/10/u...

@univlorraine.bsky.social @cnrsinformatics.bsky.social
@nancycryptoteam.bsky.social
October 17, 2025 at 12:02 PM
horizonenfield.bsky.social
🎤 Aida Akbarzadeh, Research Scientist at @NTNU, recently presented ENFIELD at the CyberICPS 2025 Workshop, the 11th Workshop on the Security of Industrial Control Systems & Cyber-Physical Systems, held in Toulouse, France, in conjunction with the ESORICS 2025 Conference. l1nq.com/9VuDD
Exploring Cybersecurity Innovations at CyberICPS 2025 with ENFIELD - enfield-project
Aida’s presentation covered a paper partly funded by the ENFIELD Project, along with additional information about the project. In recent weeks, the CyberICPS 2025 Workshop in Toulouse, France, served ...
enfield-project.eu
October 15, 2025 at 9:05 AM
ingprivuva.bsky.social
📱La métrica #PIM permite cuantificar cómo afectan los permisos de las #apps a la #privacidad, comparar aplicaciones y anticipar riesgos.
ℹ️ Más info y vídeo 👉https://ingpriv.uva.es/esorics-2025/ @incibe.bsky.social #AppPI #Privacy #mobileapps #NextGenerationEU #ProyectosCiber
October 2, 2025 at 10:14 AM
ingprivuva.bsky.social
🔐Mañana en #ESORICS2025 Amador Aparicio y Alejandro Pérez presentan en el workshop #MIST la métrica #PIM (Privacy Impact Metric).Un trabajo junto a @mercedesinfor.bsky.social y Pablo Abel Criado. Más info mist-workshop.github.io/program/ @incibe.bsky.social #ProyectosCiber #NextGenerationEU #AppPI
Program
MIST Workshop at ESORICS 2025
mist-workshop.github.io
September 25, 2025 at 11:19 AM
dl7jp.bsky.social
cu Thursday at www.ntu.edu.sg/dtc/esorics-... !
ESORICS Workshop
www.ntu.edu.sg
September 23, 2025 at 7:16 PM
dl7jp.bsky.social
ohai Toulouse ... did I already mention that it's ESORICS time again?
September 23, 2025 at 7:14 PM
guillaumehiet.bsky.social
Interested in hardware support for security?
Don’t forget to register for HS3@ESORICS, 25 Sept 2025, Toulouse

We have a great program, including a talk by Robert Norton on CHERIoT hs3-workshop.github.io/2025.html
!

Registration: esorics2025.sciencesconf.org/resource/pag...

Hope to see you there!
ESORICS 2025 - 30th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security - Sciencesconf.org
esorics2025.sciencesconf.org
September 17, 2025 at 12:07 PM
eprint.ing.bot
On the (strong) linkability of Linkable Ring Signatures (Danai Balla, Pyrros Chaidos) ia.cr/2025/1375
Abstract. We demonstrate that the LLRing linkable ring signature scheme of Hui and Chau (ESORICS 2024) has a unlinkability vulnerability, meaning an adversary can create more unlinkable signatures than the number of secret keys they own, contradicting its security guarantees. We also find that a similar attack applies to the Threshold Ring Referral scheme of Ta, Hui, and Chau (Security and Privacy 2025). We show how to restore linkability by constructing modifications to the Bulletproofs and Dory protocols.
July 30, 2025 at 7:34 AM
eprint.ing.bot
Improved Matrix Inversion with Packed Ciphertexts using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (Seunghu Kim, Seongbong Choi, Hyung Tae Lee) ia.cr/2025/1274
Abstract. Matrix inversion is a fundamental operation, but performing it over encrypted matrices remains a significant challenge. This is mainly due to the fact that conventional inversion algorithms—such as Gaussian elimination—depend heavily on comparison and division operations, which are computationally expensive to perform under homomorphic encryption. To mitigate this, Ahn et al. (ESORICS 2023) introduced an inversion method based on iterative matrix multiplications. However, their approach encrypts matrices entry-wise, leading to poor scalability. A key limitation of prior work stems from the absence of an efficient matrix multiplication technique for matrix-packed ciphertexts, particularly one with low multiplicative depth. In this paper, we present a novel homomorphic matrix multiplication algorithm optimized for matrix-packed ciphertexts, requiring only a multiplicative depth of two. Building on this foundation, we propose an efficient algorithm for homomorphic matrix inversion. Experimental results show that our method outperforms the state-of-the-art: for 8 × 8 matrices, it achieves a 6.8× speedup over the method by Ahn et al., and enables inversion of larger matrices that were previously infeasible. We further compare our homomorphic matrix multiplication technique against existing matrix-packed homomorphic matrix multiplication algorithms. When used for iterative inversion, our method consistently outperforms prior approaches. In particular, for 16 × 16 and 32 × 32 matrices, it achieves 1.88× and 1.43× speedups, respectively, over the algorithm by Aikata and Roy. Finally, we demonstrate the practical benefits of our method by applying it to privacy-preserving linear regression. For a dataset of 64 samples with 8 features, our approach achieves a 1.13× speedup in training time compared to the state-of-the-art homomorphic matrix inversion solution. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
July 11, 2025 at 11:16 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Efficient Constant-Size Linkable Ring Signatures for Ad-Hoc Rings via Pairing-Based Set Membership Arguments (Min Xie, Zhengzhou Tu, Man Ho Au, Junbin Fang, Xuan Wang, Zoe Lin Jiang) ia.cr/2025/1174
Abstract. Linkable Ring Signatures (LRS) allow users to anonymously sign messages on behalf of ad-hoc rings, while ensuring that multiple signatures from the same user can be linked. This feature makes LRS widely used in privacy-preserving applications like e-voting and e-cash. To scale to systems with large user groups, efficient schemes with short signatures and fast verification are essential. Recent works, such as DualDory (ESORICS’22) and LLRing (ESORICS’24), improve verification efficiency through offline precomputations but rely on static rings, limiting their applicability in ad-hoc ring scenarios. Similarly, constant-size ring signature schemes based on accumulators face the same limitation. In this paper, we propose a framework for constructing constant-size LRS suitable for large ad-hoc rings. We introduce a novel pairing-based Set Membership Argument (SMA) with a proof size of only three group elements. By leveraging KZG polynomial commitments, we optimize the verification to require only constant group exponentiations and pairings, as well as linear field multiplications. Utilizing the SMA, our framework achieves constant-size signatures with verification dominated by linear field operations, outperforming existing schemes that require linear group exponentiations in ad-hoc ring settings. Moreover, it exhibits strong scalability: (i) compatibility with any PKI-based cryptosystem and (ii) scoped linkability, enabling flexible definitions of linking scope. We instantiate our framework using a discrete logarithm public key structure. On the BN254 curve, our signature size is fixed at 687 bytes, which to our best knowledge is the shortest LRS for ring sizes larger than 32. For a ring size of 1024, our verification cost is only 10.4 ms, achieving 48.6×, 2.6×–467×, 7.9×–13.2×, and 2.2×–102.5× improvements over Omniring (CCS’19), DualDory (with and without precomputation), LLRing-DL (with and without precomputation), and LLRing-P (with and without precomputation), respectively. Moreover, this performance gap continues to grow as the ring size increases. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
June 23, 2025 at 2:59 AM