Courage at the Crossroads: Hechtel, Belgium, 8–12 September 1944
**Introduction**
The relation between Christian Realism, which incorporates just-war theory, and the virtues is well known; but within this theological stance and ethical tradition some moral and intellectual traits are more to the fore than others. Temperance and humility, prudence and justice lie at the heart of Christian Realism, while courage—in general, the most popular of the four cardinal virtues—is less prominent. And yet courage (_fortitudo_) is worth thinking about because it is invariably required for the achievement of just ends. Soldiers must not only endure hardship and peril for the sake of the good; they must also actively defend the (relatively) innocent against armed aggressors.
Of course, courage never acts alone but is guided by practical judgment. Prudence is the regulator of all the virtues. In helping leaders to weigh the key elements in _jus ad bellum_ , for example, prudence considers proportionality, the likelihood of success, and last—or only next-to-last?—resort. Without prudence, courage can degenerate into reckless aggression or risky, foolish behavior. Thus courage, informed by prudence, is necessary in order to steel combatants and civilians for the fight on behalf of justice and peace.
But which form of courage in warfare should be judged noblest of all? For Saint Thomas Aquinas, steadfast resolve counted for more than aggressive initiative. In Question 123 of his _Summa Theologiae_ , he asserts that “the chief activity of courage is not so much attacking as enduring, or standing one’s ground amidst dangers.” Saint Thomas’s answer is not, however, the only one that has been given to this question about the relative merit of the expressions of bravery, as successive ages have evaluated the forms of courage differently. This issue has featured in historiographical debates about Allied combat operations in World War II: To what extent—historians have asked—was offensive dash in the British Army encouraged or thwarted by higher-ups, training, morale, command structure, and military doctrine?In other words, which kind of courage was most prized: endurance or daring?
The present essay examines various instances of the virtue of courage during the fight to liberate Hechtel, Belgium. Taking place in September 1944, after the Normandy breakout and before the launch of Operation Market Garden, this battle occurred at a geographic and temporal crossroads. This study considers courage from the perspective of contemporary witnesses, and it incorporates attention to civilians as well as soldiers. It offers, in particular, a fresh look at the death of the Anglican priest and combatant officer Hugh Lister, who achieved fame before the war as a trade-union leader in London’s East End.
What this article does not attempt is a full account of this small but important battle, about which highly detailed histories have been published. Instead, this essay takes its inspiration from John Keegan’s _The Face of Battle_ , which probes what it is like to be in a battle. Keegan makes it clear how valuations of courage have changed from one historical period to the next. For medieval warriors, the height of glory in martial valor was fighting in single combat, man to man. For British officers in 1815, however, receiving wounds, not inflicting death, demonstrated bravery. This steadfastness in the face of mortal danger, Keegan writes, was reflected in an officer’s “refusal to leave his post even when wounded” or by his insistence on returning to active duty as soon as his wounds had been treated.
The Second World War included, as Keegan points out, long stretches of positional warfare in which the fighting was just as “earthbound, snailpaced and softskinned a business as it had been for the two hundred preceding years.” But, as he also states, World War II armies were “organized for movement,” and they were especially well equipped for shorter journeys.
In the European theater, during the pursuit phase following the Normandy breakout, both British and American leaders placed a high premium on speed. The Guards Armoured Division, to cite a major example, advanced from the Seine River, across northern France, to northeast Belgium—250 miles—in just six days. During this period of rapid progress in August and early September of 1944, Allied commanders sought to exploit the German retreat to the maximum extent.
In these circumstances, military strategy supported the elevation of _active daring_ to the top rank of perceived heroism: prudent risk-taking represented the most honored expression of courage for officers and men. Fortitude in its most basic meaning as endurance and perseverance under the stress of combat or captivity continued to be prized, but boldness mixed with imagination was best. This interpretation by a twenty-first-century historian is not only in harmony with the attributes demanded by mobile warfare but also in accord with the evidence disclosed in the summaries of heroic deeds performed by recipients of awards for valor.
At the same time, officers and men knew that courage could be corrupted by carelessness; bold assertion could shade into rash conduct. The oft-used phrase “at any cost” did not mean recklessness, devoid of sense. Aggressive initiative tainted by imprudence is militarily and morally questionable because excessive confidence or haste can impair true courage and cause unnecessary hazards to both the principal actors and other soldiers.
An emphasis on courage affords observers a lens equipping them to make out features of this battle that warrant closer attention. The justification for this approach is indicated in Keegan’s assertion that what all battles have in common is the human factor. Soldiers in combat must fight not only against the enemy but also against their own instincts for self-preservation. Therefore, he notes, “the study of battle is … always a study of fear and usually of courage….”
Although focused on bravery in one battle, this article will remind readers of the larger debate about subordinate initiative in the British Army during World War II. The older historiography emphasized a conservative institutional culture and rigid command doctrine that favored firm direction of subordinates, overwhelming firepower, and casualty management, which limited junior officers’ freedom to improvise. More recent scholarship, by Jonathan Fennell and others, has affirmed that British Army doctrine in the war years fostered a more decentralized command-and-control system than previous studies had acknowledged; military doctrine encouraged junior and middle-ranking officers to employ sound professional judgment within their tactical areas and to exercise initiative in battle. Certainly from September 1944 in northwestern Europe, although the extent of decentralization varied among sectors and commanders, reports from the field reveal that individual enterprise was widely represented and valued. While unnecessary risk-taking was to be avoided in order to preserve dwindling manpower resources, at the battalion and company levels, and even more in the case of platoons and sections, tactical adaptation was common, and individual deeds of active—judicious—daring were respected. Notwithstanding deficiencies of training in minor tactical skills for both infantry and armor, thousands of British soldiers manifested exemplary spirit and drive. Even—perhaps especially—where operational strategy was clearly established and set forth, officers and men found room to display energy, demonstrate resolve, and exploit opportunities, as they did in the vicinity of Hechtel. The military imperative around the time of this battle underscored the priority of maintaining momentum by denying to the Germans the chance to establish a coherent defensive line. Delay was shunned: success required pushing through resistance and seizing critical towns, bridges, and canals. Thus, consistently from this period in the late summer of 1944, “courage” was primarily associated not with steadiness in the face of danger but with aggressive movement under fire.
What made the battle of Hechtel a particularly apt proving ground for courage-as-daring was its peculiar location in time and space. It occurred after the Normandy breakout, when supply problems, difficult terrain, and reinforced German defenses dramatically slowed Allied armies on their approaches to the German frontier. And this battle took place just before Operation Market Garden, which started only five days after Hechtel was finally taken. This contest was decided, therefore, at a temporal as well as a geographic crossroads: at the juncture between a time of rapid progress and a period of stiff resistance.
Only 22 miles—as the crow flies—west of Germany, Hechtel, which in 1944 comprised no more than 5,000 souls, was less than ten miles south of the town of Lommel and the Meuse-Escault (also called the Maas-Schelde or the Bocholt-Herentals) Canal, which were hard by the Belgian-Dutch border. Hechtel’s main road was a south-north axis linking Hasselt with North Brabant. The crossroads was formed by the highway between Bourg Leopold (Leopoldsburg) in the west and Peer to the east.
The German leaders’ grasp of the strategic value of this location on the direct route to Eindhoven sparked their opposition to further Allied incursions. Determined to hold this village as a blocking position to delay the British advance, they concentrated battle groups in Hechtel which were part of a larger force assembled to defend this area’s bridges and towns. What made this collection of formerly scattered units effective was that they were led by tough, experienced commanders and that their ranks incorporated hardened veterans. At a critical defensive strongpoint, this resilient amalgam presented a formidable obstacle despite its deficiencies in troop strength and materiel.
The commander of the 21st Army Group, Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, promoted to Field Marshal five days before the start of the battle for Hechtel, was equally focused on a strategic objective that would involve this otherwise unremarkable locale: seizing a bridgehead over the Lower Rhine, northwest of the industrial Ruhr. In relation to the Field Marshal’s plans, the battle of Hechtel occurred at the tail end of the planned airborne operation named Comet, which was originally scheduled to begin on 7 September. After several delays caused by poor weather and growing concerns about German resistance and force concentrations in the area, it was finally cancelled on the 10th. This operation—involving only British and Polish airborne troops—would have been a smaller-scale version of its more ambitious and better-known successor. On 10 September Eisenhower flew to confer with Monty and gave his approval for the Field Marshal’s daring new operation to seize the bridges at Nijmegen and Arnhem and to outflank the German defensive barrier in the north.
As an important part of this larger strategic initiative, the Guards Armoured Division was ordered to capture and hold the towns and villages in northeastern Belgium and to secure crossings over the intervening canals: the Albert and the Meuse-Escault. Control of the bridges and canal crossings was necessary in order to enable the Allies to push into the Netherlands and thence into Germany. This area around the Dutch-Belgian border would become the launch point for the ground thrust called Operation Garden, which would be spearheaded by the Guards Armoured Division. Montgomery’s maturing plans, therefore, would place even greater weight than usual on the need for both armor and infantry to assert themselves. As a result, this setting in and around Hechtel provided both the context and the impetus for acts of brave daring.
**Friday, 8 September: Lieutenant William Hugh Griffiths**
At 0830 hrs on 8 September, orders were handed down for an attack on Hechtel at 1430: the fight to liberate the village began with the approach of two companies, supported by a squadron of tanks. By this time, the Germans had been occupying this site for about 24 hours. The war diary of the 1st (infantry) Battalion of the Welsh Guards noted that “it soon became obvious that there was heavy opposition in the village.” By the morning of the ninth—this diary reports—it had become clear that “the [British] force in Hechtel was not sufficient.” Indeed, in the fights throughout this region, the Guards Armoured Division was—as General Brian Horrocks, commander of XXX Corps, later recalled—“in a … vulnerable position, isolated and dispersed,” the Germans offered “obstinate resistance” and seemed to be “in every wood,” and “the crossroads at Hechtel had become a veritable No-Man’s-Land.”
Opposing the British forces—which consisted, for the most part, of elements of the Guards Armoured Division, principally the Welsh Guards—were soldiers that came from Luftwaffe parachute troops, training/replacement units, and anti-tank battalions. These forces had supporting assets, including 88mm guns from a Luftwaffe heavy Flak unit, Schwere Flak-Abteilung 602 (Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battalion). These weapons were effective as both anti-aircraft and anti-tank/anti-personnel weapons. At Hechtel, the Germans presented resistance by way of small Kampfgruppen (battle groups) of 100 to 200 men, backed by tanks or tank destroyers. Smaller supporting forces, including parts of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 24 (FJR 24), fought nearby, but the most important opposition in Hechtel was offered by Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 20 (FJR 20), commanded by Major Franz Grassmel. This parachute infantry regiment was reinforced by elements of a replacement and training regiment (the Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz- und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring) and by heavy tank destroyers (the Schwere Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 559). Although outnumbered, these units proved to be stout resisters, making full use of both the defense-friendly ground—rolling terrain, sandy soil, thick woods, boggy land, and small streams—and their anti-tank weapons. An intelligence officer for the 32nd Guards Brigade mentioned how “annoying” it was that the German defense in Hechtel was so tenacious despite the enemy’s lack of mortars and artillery. “The 88mms, although quite capable of being used in an anti-tank role, are not self-propelled nor have they the penetrative power of the 88 Pak.” Moreover, because they were designed for anti-aircraft use, “they have no shields, which renders them vulnerable to artillery and mortars.”
As the battle for Hechtel got under way, British infantry and armor avoided the main road north from Helchteren. Instead, Prince of Wales Company (Welsh Guards) and X Company (Scots Guards), supported by No. 2 Squadron, attempted to approach the village from the west, along the road from Bourg Leopold. After making good progress, X Company (a temporary—”extra”—composite rifle company attached operationally where needed) was able to insert platoons on the north and northeast outskirts of Hechtel. After Prince of Wales Company neutralized one machine-gun post, they were stymied by several others. The Germans counterattacked and, while not fully successful, were able to maneuver into position between X Company’s forward and rear platoons, to penetrate No. 2 Squadron’s headquarters, and to kill Major J. O. Spencer, the No. 2 Squadron commander.
Throughout the battle of Hechtel, the west-to-east route along the Kamperbaan—the road running from Bourg Leopold to the center of the village of Hechtel—was a key axis of entry for the Welsh Guards. Here—just to the west of Hechtel, in the woods south of the Kamperbaan—Lieutenant William Hugh Griffiths, of the 2nd (armored reconnaissance) Battalion, performed a daring feat: he and his crew completed a skillful maneuver, set up an ambush, and attempted to lure a Jagdpanther into a position of vulnerability. Equipped with an 88mm Pak 43 gun, the Jagdpanther was Germany’s most balanced and effective tank destroyer.
On the afternoon of 8 September, Griffiths was in command of a Cromwell tank, a steady and reliable cruiser, armed with a 75mm main gun and capable of speeds of up to 40mph. He and his crew would encounter two Jagdpanthers (regulations required that they always work in pairs): in no. 1 was Major Erich Sattler, the commanding officer of Schwere Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 559, followed in no. 2 by his adjutant, Oberleutnant Erwin Seitz.
Learning—as he told an interviewer in 1997—that “very large tanks” were threatening Hechtel from the west, Griffiths, aware that the other tank squadrons were “fully committed,” decided that “it might be a good idea” to scout around and have a look for himself; so he made this request of his commanding officer, who gave his assent. Driving off in the direction the warning had come from, he came upon “a heavily wooded part of the country,” and then “I emerged from the wood onto a sort of open ground,” with the Kamperbaan ahead of him. There he spotted “German transport moving along that road, so we shot it up.” He and his crew then went up onto the road to investigate further, turning right toward the village, moving ahead with two other tanks and a platoon of infantry from the 1st Battalion of the Welsh Guards.
At this point, about a mile and a half west of the crossroads in Hechtel, his attention was drawn to a startling sight: “my wireless operator tapped me on the shoulder and pointed with his thumb to the rear.” Griffiths looked, “and there … coming down the road was just about the largest tank I’ve ever seen.” The Jagdpanther was about 250 yards behind them. “And as I looked round, he fired at us, and mercifully missed us.” In fact, the shot was a near miss; it grazed the turret and damaged his tank’s light machine gun. Griffiths ordered his driver to reverse quickly, but pulled back only a short distance, leading Sattler to assume he had departed the scene completely.
Griffiths assessed his situation. He noticed that this wood “had a number of rides”—dirt farm lanes—“cut through, giving access to the road, I suppose for shifting wood when they were foresting.” Griffiths and his men turned down the ride to the left, but that (north) side of the Kamperbaan was held by Germans. Then they spotted a ride opposite, “where our own troops were.” That side of the road was clearly the better option, but they hesitated to move because they still had the Jagdpanther to worry about. The German tank had stopped—“we could hear he wasn’t moving”—and was clearly waiting for Griffiths’s tank to pull out of the wood. “So what we did was we motored up to the edge of the ride,” figuring they would not be visible to the Germans until their Cromwell started to emerge from the trees, “and we pushed very slowly the muzzle of our gun out into the road so he could see it coming.” The enemy fired again—but missed.
At this moment, “we put our foot flat down before he could reload and shot across into the ride on the other side.” But, as Griffiths recalled, everyone in his squadron well knew that a 75mm gun could not pierce the front of a Jagdpanther because of its heavy armor. To disable it, the gunner had to hit it in the side or the rear. “So we decided our best plan was to move up the wood towards this tank and find the ride which gave access onto the road closer to him.”
They found such a suitable farm lane and patiently waited, “about fifty yards from the road, which we thought was close enough.” Then, “as a prudent measure,” they turned the tank around and “traversed our gun so that it was going to fire over the back of the tank, so that we could make a pretty swift move if things didn’t go according to plan.” They switched off, listened, and finally heard the German tank start up—about a hundred yards away—and begin to work toward them. When the Jagdpanther moved “squarely across the ride,” Griffiths ordered “Fire!”
The gunner, Troop Sergeant Ivor Wilcox, complied; but, regrettably, “he had not switched the gun control from the Besa, which is coaxially mounted with the 75.” They had just used the Besa, a light machine gun, when shooting up the soft transport. The result was that the German tank was hit not with an armor-piercing round but rather with a “harmless” spray of machine-gun bullets, which “alerted everyone to our presence.” Wilcox uttered “a very Welsh expletive,” pushed the control over to the preferred position, and fired again. This time, “fortunately, he hit it right on the side of the rear in the engine.” The Jagdpanther stopped immediately, its crew “started to scramble out,” and “we pumped three shells into the side.” Consequently, “we … became a close focus of attention of supporting German tanks, and bits of trees started to fall all round us.” As the enemy fire grew more intense, “it became exceedingly unhealthy, and we moved back.”
The Jagdpanther’s crew quickly extricated themselves from their smoking ruin. The last to bail out, Sattler caught his foot on part of his tank and was knocked unconscious when he hit the ground headfirst. When he regained consciousness, he noticed that Seitz and his crew had left when they saw that Sattler’s tank had been hit. The commander’s men were able to transport him back to Bourg Leopold, where he received first aid and upbraided Seitz for deserting him. For his part in this action, Lieutenant Griffiths—exemplar of offensive dash—was awarded the Military Cross.
**Saturday, 9 September: Major Hugh E. J. Lister, MC**
Throughout this period of the 8th and 9th, German reinforcements continued to arrive in Hechtel, turning this battle into a prolonged, frustrating, and deadly affair. The Welsh Guards persisted in their efforts to gain a foothold in the southern and western parts of the village.
On the morning of the ninth, No. 3 Company, under Captain P.M. Beckwith-Smith, attempted to advance toward the center of Hechtel, attacking from the west, together with Prince of Wales Company. But again their progress was halted by the enemy. It was during this effort that Major Hugh Evelyn Jackson Lister was killed. The Battalion Diary recorded a tribute: “his personality and example” were “an inspiration.” He is “irreplaceable because he was unique.” Those who “served with him will always remember in him a man who was truly great.”
_Figure 1: Major Hugh Lister, MC, courtesy of Lancing College Archives._
Indeed, Hugh Lister—a priest of the Church of England—was establishing a reputation for himself and his vocation well before the war started. In the 1930s in the East End, as senior curate at St. Mary of Eton (the Eton College Mission) in Hackney Wick, he presided at the altar; and—during the same typical week—as chairman of the local branch of the Transport and General Workers’ Union, he presided at meetings of factory workers. Through his efforts on behalf of labor, he became known to the theologians Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, and histories of Christianity in England have continued to mention his accomplishments. After his death, SCM Press brought out a book about him (Alice Cameron’s _In Pursuit of Justice_), the widely read journal _Theology_ published an article that discussed his life and work, and on more than one occasion the celebrated philosopher Austin Farrer—who had been a divinity student with Lister at Cuddesdon Theological College—referred to him as a saint. More recently, a battlefield guidebook passed along the apocryphal tale that “Lister was killed when trying to encourage some young SS soldiers to surrender.” The true story of his last moments is more complicated.
A temporary major in command of Support Company, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, Lister was in charge of four platoons: carrier, mortar, anti-tank, and pioneer. These platoons never fought together as a unit. Their task was to provide support to the four rifle companies when they went into battle. Once the various elements of his company were deployed, Lister had no role to play except back at headquarters to assist and to carry out redeployment when ordered. “So really in battle Hugh did not have an operational command”—commented Major-General Peter Leuchars, who fought in the battle of Hechtel as a lieutenant commanding an infantry platoon in No. 3 Company—“and this worried him, I know; he wanted to get cracking.” In the event, Lister would venture forward, “going up to find out what was happening and suggesting what people like me ought to be doing.” Often Lister would go off on his own to try to solve a problem.
In a Remembrance Day sermon preached in 1963, Farrer said that Lister was killed because “he would not let his men advance, until he had made his personal reconnaissance, to be sure there were no machine-gun posts left behind by the retreating enemy, and missed by Allied observation.” But this depiction of Lister’s death—almost certainly built up from a brief mention of the event in the Cameron biography—is more edifying than accurate; and Peter Leuchars, who was with Lister when he was shot, always rejected the historicity of Farrer’s account.
What actually happened was that Lister, having gone up to check on the progress that No. 3 Company was making in clearing houses during their effort to advance toward the main north-south axis in the village, determined that he could help to speed their progress by entering a lane leading to the main road. And so he moved out into the Rhijnweg, a small street just north of the Kamperbaan. Leuchars recalled that:
> We had been clearing houses all the way up. In the middle of Hechtel there’s a square with a church in it. We had just cleared that area and had gotten to a farmyard on the far side, and a lane which led straight down to the main Eindhoven road. Our task was to clear the houses on the left of that road as far as the main road. Anyway, Hugh arrived at that particular point and asked what we were doing, so I said well we’ve got as far as this and now we’re going to go clear the next houses. We’re a quarter of the way through the town at this point, halfway to the main road. And he said, “Well, come on, let’s do that,” and he walked straight out into the middle of this lane…. The best one can say is that he thought this was the quickest way of doing it, which it would have been if there hadn’t been anyone to fire.
The military—and biographical—problem is that Lister’s approach violated all the rules that soldiers were taught about clearing roads carefully by entering houses from the rear one by one and keeping away from the streets, which were often covered by enemy snipers or machine guns. Especially with no smoke or covering fire to help, he should have taken more heed and proceeded according to regular order, which is set forth—via both words and diagram—in the British Army’s infantry training manual. In 1998, Leuchars observed that strictly following the mandated house-clearing process, as No. 3 Company had been doing, was “dangerous enough, but far less dangerous than walking down the road.” The approach that Lister took “was against every principle.” Therefore, although what the major did was very brave, Leuchars commented, it was also terribly rash, for the lane down which he was attempting to proceed was “a very obvious enemy killing area.” Leuchars tried to dissuade his superior officer, “but he was determined to go.”
When he saw Lister go out into the Rhijnweg and start walking ahead, Leuchars felt that he ought to lend support, so he sent a section of Guardsmen and their commander, a noncommissioned officer, to accompany him and then decided that he’d better join them himself. After they had walked barely twenty yards, Leuchars recalled, an enemy machine gun, covering the Rhijnweg from a house at its far end, opened up. Clearly dressed as an officer with field glasses and a revolver, Lister was hit first and dropped like a stone. He was killed when he was between the Catholic church (Sint Lambertuskerk) and the Lommelsebaan, the thoroughfare heading north to Lommel.
Even though another member of the 1st Battalion, a Guardsman named Charles Murrell, regarded the major as “a lion-hearted man,” so incautious and unusual was Lister’s behavior that Murrell could not help wondering if the major had intended to commit suicide: “it seems he just walked off down the road to die.” Murrell asked himself “if such a suicide is morally or theologically wrong.” In the vicinity but not a direct observer of this tragic scene, he wrote these words in his diary on the evening of the same day on which Lister was killed. Hours after the major fell, his remains still could not be recovered because, Murrell noted, “the German parachutists in Hechtel have the road so thoroughly covered.”
Richard H. Mosse, a lieutenant commanding Support Company’s anti-tank platoon during the battle of Hechtel, recalled a technique that Lister employed which he called—at variance with the term’s usual meaning—“testing fire.” Normally, “testing fire” referred to probing fire carefully controlled by an officer and deliberately limited to short bursts of fire or single shots designed to provoke a reaction from enemies and in that way to locate their positions or to test their alertness. When testing fire was attempted by movement alone, it was done quickly, as by a scout or patrol member briefly showing movement at the edge of cover and then withdrawing.
But Lister had his own idiosyncratic interpretation and outlook. Mosse said that the major “had this extraordinary theory that if he just walked up the road, then the enemy would be so astonished that anybody shooting at him would miss with their first shots, which would enable him to get clear and us to identify the enemy position.” Testing fire in this manner “was very common for him. Nobody else would dare to do it.” He recalled that Lister would say, “well, let’s see if there are any enemy here.” His associates would “all be peering around the corner, looking over the wall or something.” Lister, however, would “walk right up the middle while we were sweating back there watching him.” Mosse thought that “it was [Hugh’s] absolute belief that if he was going to die, he was going to die.”
Leuchars remembered “[Hugh] saying to me once that he was quite unafraid of being killed as he had seen so much of this life and wanted to see what the next was like! I am sure he meant this.” The commander of the pioneer platoon in Lister’s company, Ronnie Hedley-Dent, recalled that Lister “was completely fearless and I think ‘maybe’ did not want to survive the war.”
Notwithstanding this suggestive testimony, it is unlikely that, in the moments before he was killed, Lister positively intended to commit suicide. Leuchars recalled that on the morning of the 9th the major was not at all “sick and tired” of existence but “absolutely as normal as he’d always been,” “full of life”—although it was possible, he conjectured, that Hugh “wanted to show he was as brave as anyone else,” not an ineffectual parson. And Richard Mosse said that he did not believe that Lister was “feeling ready to die or … suicidal.” Everyone was “tired after three months continuous fighting, but after 1st and 2nd Battalions’ liberation of Brussels … we were all very much on a high at that time. Besides Hugh was a Priest.” Lister’s faith, Mosse believed, was “a simple fact and way of life … that he would not have violated.” Rather than seeking his own demise, in Mosse’s view “Hugh ‘tested fire’ once too often and paid the price.”
In discussing the circumstances of the death of Hugh Lister, whom he much admired, Leuchars, like Mosse, underscored the negative impact of fatigue: “after a week’s hard fighting one was very tired and one did not think perhaps as clearly as one should.” Leuchars was speaking primarily of his own decisions that day—sending a section out to support the major and then choosing to go with them—but his words apply to his senior officer as well. Lister’s impetuous conduct, his foolhardy behavior under pressure, reflected not only courage but also imprudence—indiscretion no doubt aggravated by weariness. His precipitancy combined with his apparent bravery to prompt him to attempt an aggressive push forward. Hence the deep regret that Leuchars felt at the loss of his friend was almost overwhelmed by another thought: “God, you’re a bloody fool.” Lister’s death, he believed, was “totally unnecessary.”
In the moments before he was killed, Lister displayed an excess of confidence in relation to—in Aristotle’s phrase—“what really is fearful.” In the event, he discounted the danger, not only to himself but also—as he might have foreseen—to those who would not let him carry on alone. In Aristotle’s ethics, a brave man fears the right things (such as death in battle) in the right way (reasonably, so that fear does not immobilize him). Occupying a virtuous mean between two extremes, the vices of cowardice and rashness, courage enables a person to proceed with confidence without being foolhardy about it.
The prudence that bravery requires, including the judgment necessary for an infantry officer to calculate risk relative to reward, may be burdened by the stress of combat and by the urgency of meeting objectives. Lister’s actions were tactically unwise and morally problematic. His move was excessively risky: headlong, careless, and downright puzzling. He paid with his life, and the Welsh Guards lost one of their best officers and the Church of England one of her finest priests. Ordered into the lane to flank him, the section commander, clearly identifiable as an NCO because he was carrying a submachine gun, was severely wounded by the same machine-gun burst that killed the major.
Lest anyone be tempted to judge Lister’s rash endeavor too harshly, however, we should keep in mind that the modern battlefield complicates the philosopher’s theoretical categories. In fact, that is precisely what the military strategist Carl von Clausewitz affirms in his classic study _On War_. As bullets fly, shells explode, and soldiers witness their mates being mutilated and killed, perceptions alter: “the light of reason is refracted in a manner quite different from that which is normal in academic speculation.” Against this military backdrop, Hugh Lister’s conduct is more intelligible, if no less doubtful.
Before the close of day on the ninth, the Germans counterattacked, and intense fire compelled the forward elements of Prince of Wales and No. 3 companies to pull back; but splendid leadership by Major J. M. Miller helped them to regain their positions.
**Saturday and Sunday, 9–10 September: Guardsman Cecil George Lawrie**
In Major L. F. Ellis’s _Welsh Guards at War_ , the author cites the “heroic work” performed by the stretcher-bearers of the 2nd Battalion. And he quotes the medical officer, Captain C. G. Irwin, who noted that despite being sniped at again and again, they crossed and recrossed the deadly main road in Hechtel to rescue the wounded. One of the three stretcher-bearers that Ellis mentions, Guardsman Cecil George Lawrie, was awarded the Military Medal (MM) for his conduct during the night of 9–10 September.
At 2200 hrs on Saturday, Guardsman Lawrie reported to the command post of the 1st Battalion, which was located in the woods west of Hechtel, where he was told to evacuate casualties of the 1st Battalion from the crossroads of the village, as their stretcher-bearers were all casualties themselves. The wounded men were members of X Company, which was practically surrounded by the Germans, which meant that no one could drive straight into the village to retrieve them.
Guided by the stars through the woods, Lawrie found his way to X Company by a previously reconnoitered route. “In spite of intense fire”—the award recommendation reads—“he led his stretcher party to within 50 yards of the enemy and collected one wounded man, returning again for another.” Then he found his way back to the Regimental Aid Post in Helchteren, arriving at 0400 on Sunday. The recommendation cites Lawrie’s “determination and initiative,” and concludes: “I consider that due entirely to this man’s bravery and gallantry, the lives of two very seriously wounded men were saved.”
**Sunday, 10 September: Major David Arthur Peel**
By order of General Horrocks, the valuable structure over the Meuse-Escault Canal captured on 10 September was soon renamed “Joe’s Bridge,” after Lieutenant-Colonel J. O. E. Vandeleur, who led the Irish Guards battle group, comprising the 3rd (infantry) Battalion and the 2nd (armored) Battalion. But the man who was immediately in charge of the assault that took the bridge was Major David Peel, whom Vandeleur nominated for a Military Cross. His recommendation states that Peel, in command of No. 1 Squadron, was ordered to capture the bridge over the canal at De Groote Barrier, near Lommel. Prepared for demolition but believed to be still intact, this bridge was defended by Germans with anti-tank weapons—three 88mm guns—which opened fire as soon as the enemy spotted the first British tank. Peel directed the fire of his squadron onto the bridge “while he himself,” Vandeleur wrote, “went on foot to reconnoitre the German position.” Peel could make out both the guns and the large number of infantry defending the bridge. In response, he immediately “ordered a troop to charge the bridge at speed under the covering fire of the remainder of the Squadron,” and “he himself crossed the bridge with the leading troop.”
Vandeleur—like the Germans on the scene and historians ever since—attributed the success of this operation to “the speed and energy with which this attack was conducted.” The enemy meant to deny the bridge to the British “at all costs,” but it was captured intact. Vandeleur said that the success of this operation was owed “very largely” to Major Peel’s “courage and determination to close with the enemy.” His “complete disregard for his personal safety” was a leading factor in the achievement of this critical objective. In his brave conduct, Peel represented a “consistently high standard of leadership and gallantry.”
The history of this _coup de main_ includes one curious example of anti-heroic behavior, as well. An intelligence report noted that two “unhappy prisoners of War captured by No. 1 Squadron from the infantry platoon that was supposed to protect the 88s” acknowledged that the speed of the Irish Guards’ advance had taken the gun crews completely by surprise. The Irish Guards’ Sherman tanks had rained down a hail of fire on the bridge, which put its defenders off their aim, so they decided to remove themselves “to a safer if less heroic place.” To the garrison defending the bridge, the sergeant in charge of the demolition squad had made a stirring speech earlier in the day, insisting that “every man must fight to the last round” and that “the bridge must and will be blown.” But he was “one of the first to leave,” forgetting on his way out to “press the switch.” Their officer “had fled the day before—again after some bellicose words.”
Sadly, Major Peel was mortally wounded in the same sector when, in a German counterattack, he was hit by a high-explosive shell fired from a self-propelled gun. He died on 12 September. His Military Cross was awarded posthumously and officially announced in the _London Gazette_ on 1 March 1945.
**Sunday and Monday, 10–11 September: Lance-Corporal Thomas Kennedy**
Representing not active daring but sheer fortitude, Lance-Corporal Thomas Kennedy displayed steadiness of character and purpose all through the night of the 10th and 11th. After the enemy had once again reinforced Hechtel and penetrated British positions during the night, German soldiers managed to occupy houses on either side of another house—the one where Kennedy found himself in charge of ten German prisoners.
Completely on his own, isolated from the rest of the company, he managed to keep his prisoners quiet and obedient and to prevent the enemy from gaining entry. On the 11th, at 1000 hrs, the houses on either side of his were retaken by the Welsh Guards, as they were clearing the surrounding area. Kennedy emerged with all his prisoners accounted for and his duty fulfilled. His conduct displayed not only fortitude but also this virtue’s essential partners, patience and firm resolve.
Later that day, No. 4 Company attacked the village from the main road coming up from the south. Although working together with No. 3 Company, they were unable to make any real progress.
**Tuesday, 12 September: End of the battle**
The garrison in Hechtel continued to resist, although by Tuesday it was virtually surrounded by British forces, now strengthened by the arrival of the 11th Armoured Division. A 32nd Guards Brigade intelligence report written the previous day cited information provided by a captured soldier, who stated that all German troops in Hechtel were told that “it was vital to hold out to the last man and the last round.” The intelligence officer noted that these instructions were being absolutely obeyed, meaning that “it will be necessary to blast the enemy out house by house”—which is exactly what ensued.
British commanders decided to lay on a full-scale, two-battalion attack, thus—in the words of Peter Leuchars—“really getting a big battle going.” To avoid casualties from the artillery preparation, all companies were withdrawn during the night, giving up whatever hard-won gains they had achieved over the previous four days. For 45 minutes, starting at 0815 hrs on the 12th, a heavy concentration of mortars and medium artillery fire hit the beleaguered village. Then infantry and tanks of the Welsh Guards Group moved in. First, Nos 3 and 4 companies, supported by Nos 1 and 3 squadrons, slowly worked their way north alongside the main road, with the tanks blasting away at house after house, shooting up any point of resistance. Shortly after noon they reached the crossroads at the center of the village. At this time, Prince of Wales and X companies began their assault east astride the Kamperbaan.
_Figure 2: Hechtel crossroads, 12 September 1944, courtesy of Imperial War Museum, London._
By 1400 hrs, the Welsh Guards Group, having sustained “very few casualties” in this final push, had cleared the village. The operation had required them to search “every cellar and building” both for snipers and for their own wounded. That evening, after military equipment and fallen trees were moved off the streets, traffic was once again able to use this important road junction. On this last day of the battle of Hechtel, the War Diary of the 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment neatly summarized the German effort in this contest: “They fought very hard and took a lot of dislodging.”
**Friday through Thursday, 8–14 September: Civilians in Hechtel**
Among those who died in Hechtel were 35 local civilians. Within this number, 11 men—clerks, builders, tradesmen, masons, and the like—were intentionally killed by 20 or so German soldiers on Sunday, 10 September. As the soldiers led a group off to be executed, Gerard Wuyts, aged 14, saw his father, Hubert, a wholesaler, look back and smile at him: it “was the last image I had of him; he never returned, dead or alive.” These innocent citizens were lined up and shot together behind a pub—the Buitenlust Café—in the crossroads of the village. Their bodies, hidden under stones and straw in the garden of the pub, were discovered four days later, and then quickly buried. Belgian and British officials pursued investigations, but no one was ever caught and punished for this atrocity. These murders were part of a pattern of German war crimes committed against Belgian citizens in the first weeks of September.
After the battle, the many instances of local heroism came to be known. Gerarda Scrayen, for example, was a young, unmarried woman living with her parents near the Catholic church and just behind the Sisters of Mary girls’ convent school. She was a member of a resistance band. Starting on 8 September, she encountered British soldiers, including men who had been wounded. Soon she began to help them, tending them in the convent school’s basement, providing first-aid care, making sandwiches, and serving drinks. She washed wounds and applied bandages for men who, she later said, felt safe there. More injured soldiers arrived. An English captain told her and the other caregivers to make Red Cross flags and to hang them out of the windows, and to treat everyone, including the German soldiers. Gerarda admired the courage of the British, especially the Scots: “I recall … one of them came in with two of his fingers blown off. He let us treat him, and he drank some water, [and] then he picked up his gun, winked at me and went back to fight.” On Sunday the 10th, German soldiers stormed into the convent, demanding to know where the British were sheltering. The Sisters denied that any were in the building—which, at that moment, happened to be true.
During these days of peril in her village, Gerarda took serious risks. On Tuesday the 12th, she and other members of her family knelt down in the ruined Catholic church to thank God for their liberation. Many years after the war, during commemoration ceremonies in Hechtel, she was awarded a medal for her bravery and self-sacrifice.
**Conclusion**
This narrow slice of military history strengthens our grasp of the esteem awarded to aggressive initiative, although each example also reveals the customary involution of the virtues. Lieutenant Griffiths and Major Peel demonstrated active daring in almost pure form, but in their efforts prudence, too, was necessary to guide bold action. Gerarda Scrayen courageously ventured out, but her bravery was clearly motivated by compassion. Guardsman Lawrie took risks as well, and his long night of duty and daring reflected commendable perseverance. Lance-Corporal Kennedy was an outlier: steadily carrying out his task through a night not only long but also bereft of comradeship. In his endurance, he displayed not active daring but fortitude aided by patience. The brief glimpse of the wounded Scottish soldier calls to mind John Keegan’s analysis of British officers in 1815, who manifested bravery most of all by bearing wounds—and by rejoining the battle as soon as their wounds were treated. In Major Lister, we encounter a harder case: an officer who was unquestionably brave but whose daring was marred by rashness.
Together, these episodes deepen our appreciation of the human factor in combat, add to our understanding of the battle of Hechtel, and inspire us to pursue the question of whether, for the Allied armies, active daring was in fact the most respected form of courage. The story of this battle also reinforces our sense of the significance and complexity of bravery as a feature of Christian Realism.