Woensdagavond, voetbaltraining. We zijn met een oneven aantal. De ’kameleon’ wordt van stal gehaald: de speler die steeds bij de partij in balbezit hoort. Ik heb vandaag de twijfelachtige eer en vind het een verwarrende bezigheid.

Woensdagavond, voetbaltraining. We zijn met een oneven aantal. De ’kameleon’ wordt van stal gehaald: de speler die steeds bij de partij in balbezit hoort. Ik heb vandaag de twijfelachtige eer en vind het een verwarrende bezigheid.

YouTube video by Peter Jay

In het prentenboek voor de Actieweek christelijke kinderboeken komt een verlegen kameleon op het podium terecht. Auteur Bram Kasse laat juist ook het relatieve van glamour en glitter naar voren komen. Maar de podiumsetting die dat met zich meebrengt, ligt gevoelig bij een deel van de doelgroep.

Provocerend feestbeest, countrygirl, stonede hippie: professioneel kameleon Miley (Cyrus) is het allemaal geweest. Ook op haar tiende album laat de popster zich niet vangen. Hoe blijft ze het publiek boeien?

Hi all! The new beta is out! This release adds support for firmware 13.02, 13.04 and 13.50. Special thanks goes to ctn and Kameleon who, despite als...

MOZI HÍREK – A Pókember – Vadonatúj nap végül egy meglepő X-Men-karakterrel állította szembe Peter Parkert, de a kész filmhez vezető út tele volt elvetett gonosztevőkkel. Chris McKenna most elárulta, hogy a Folt, Kraven, a Kaméleon és az Árnyékkirály is szerepelt a korábbi elképzelések között.   FIGYELEM: a cikk spoilereket tartalmaz a Pókember – Vadonatúj nap történetéből. A Pókember – Vadonatúj nap mára a filmtörténet egyik legnagyobb kasszasikerévé vált. Tom Holland negyedszer kapott önálló főszerepet Peter Parkerként, a filmet pedig a kritikusok és a közönség is kifejezetten jól fogadta. A Marvel-moziuniverzumon belül csak a Bosszúállók: Végjáték teljesített nála jobban. A film egyik nagy húzása az lett, hogy olyan ellenfelet állított Pókember útjába, akire kevesen számítottak. Az első felvonásban Peter egy látszólag testből testbe ugró, embereket… Olvasd tovább... The post A Pókember – Vadonatúj nap majdnem teljesen más gonoszokat kapott – az író elárulta, kik estek ki appeared first on theGeek.hu.

  Kom werken en leren als pedagogisch professional Wil jij werken én leren in een omgeving waar je als pedagogisch professional echt kunt groeien? Bij Kind&co ludens kun je de beroepsbegeleidende leerweg (BBL) doen voor pedagogisch professional niveau 3 of 4, met begeleiding van ervaren pedagogisch professionals op locaties in Midden-Nederland. De opleiding start in... Bron

Emoties slaan op je stembanden, weet Art Rooijakkers uit ervaring, hij is dol op dagdutjes en omarmt zijn sproeten: ‘Het kenmerkt wie ik ben,’ zegt hij in deze rubriek Hemd van het lijf uit ons weeken...

De donkere dagen komen er weer aan, maar in Bedum is het deze week tot laat in de avond licht. De straten en tuinen hangen vol met lichtjes en herbergen zelfgemaakte kunstwerken. Het thema is Boeken en verhalen. Wie door Bedum loopt, treft figuren als Harry Potter, Alice in Wonderland en de tweeling van de Kameleon.

# Table of Contents * 1) Introduction * 2) D-Bus and Polkit Additions * 2.1) systemd v260.2 and v261 Reviews * 2.2) Polkit Rules File in upower * 2.3) New Polkit Action `aa-notify.from_file` in AppArmor * 2.4) New Polkit Actions in `fwupd` 2.1.4 * 2.5) Changes in Polkit Rules in gnome-initial-setup * 2.6) D-Bus and Varlink Services in `wall-broadcaster` * 2.7) Transactional Update Notifier D-Bus Service * 2.8) Plasma Kameleon RGB LED Helper * 2.9) Samba Helper in `kdenetwork-filesharing` * 2.10) GNOME Remote Desktop Race Condition in new `pcscd` API in 51.beta * 3) Review of File-Based Linux Capabilities * 3.1) After-the-Fact Review of Slipped Capabilities * 3.2) CAP_NET_RAW for `cacti-spine` * 3.3) CAP_PERFMON for `ksystemstats6` * 4) Revisit of Apptainer * 5) Restriction of Varlink Service Packaging * 6) pam-ssh-agent Module * 7) wireguard-tools: Update Logic for resolv.conf * 8) wicked: Command Injection via DHCP Options (CVE-2026-44932) * 9) Conclusion # 1) Introduction This edition of the spotlight series covers both spring and summer 2026, since we did not get around to publishing a dedicated spring article due to high workload in our team. Some of the highlights that kept us busy during that time were: * Incomplete privilege drop in cosmic-greeter when accessing files in user home directories. * Defense-in-depth issues in a D-Bus helper in plasma-login-manager. * Disk space exhaustion in the malcontent parental control system. * Various issues leading to privilege escalation in qSnapper, a GUI frontend for the `snapper` utility. * Local Denial-of-Service attack vectors in `seunshare`, a sandboxing program from SELinux userspace utilities. * Escalation of Network Manager and UDisks2 Privileges in PortProtonQt, a GUI application for launching Windows games on Linux. * Full remote system compromise in a network protocol in OpenRGB. * Authentication bypass in LACT, a GPU manager application for Linux. Apart from these dedicated publications, we want to shed some light on some less visible efforts in our team during these past months. Topics that we will cover this time are various changes to D-Bus service configuration and Polkit policies which we will cover in section 2). In section 3) we will look into a number of file-based Linux capability assignments in packages. In section 4) we will discuss a revisit of the `starter-suid` setuid-root binary in the Apptainer container runtime. In section 5) we will point out new whitelisting restrictions in SUSE distributions regarding the packaging of Varlink services. In section 6) we will examine the pam-ssh-agent module which was recently packaged for openSUSE. In section 7) we will discuss concerns about a script in `wg-quick` for setting up DNS for Wireguard VPN interfaces. Finally, in section 8) we will look at a shell command injection issue we found in the `wicked` network configuration framework, which can lead to remote root code execution in combination with `dracut`. # 2) D-Bus and Polkit Additions As usual, many of our reviews were concerned with D-Bus services and Polkit authentication. We look into packages containing D-Bus interfaces and Polkit policies, both when they are first introduced and if they are later modified. In the past months we dealt with a number of reviews of this type, discussed in the following sub-sections. ## 2.1) systemd v260.2 and v261 Reviews As we pointed out in previous spotlight editions, systemd is a heavy user of D-Bus and Polkit and also started backporting new features from the mainline development to existing release branches, resulting in an increased review effort on our end. This time we looked into the follow-up release v260.2, which introduced Polkit actions `org.freedesktop.machine1.inspect-machines` and `org.freedesktop.machine1.inspect-images` in the context of `systemd-machined`. Nothing problematic was found in these two additions. The new major release of systemd v261 also resulted in a review bug for us. Various Polkit actions were added to our systemd-experimental package, as well as a couple to `systemd-machined` and `systemd-resolved`. In this case we also had nothing to complain about and allowed the changes to enter openSUSE Tumbleweed. ## 2.2) Polkit Rules File in upower The energy management software upower triggered a review due to a Polkit rules file which appeared in the package. Polkit rules are JavaScript drop-in files which alter the outcome of Polkit authentication requests based on custom logic. In this case a strange rule was added to upower, allowing the `root` user to perform system power state changes like rebooting or entering suspend. Since the `root` user is by default allowed to perform any Polkit operation anyway, we asked our upower packager to investigate what the supposed purpose of the rules file might be. He was unable to find out, however, therefore we decided to simply drop this rule file from the package to avoid unnecessary administration efforts. It could be that the rules file is intended to be used on systems where even the `root` user has limited capabilities. ## 2.3) New Polkit Action `aa-notify.from_file` in AppArmor The AppArmor utility `aa-notify`, which allows system administrators to easily whitelist AppArmor violations, added an additional Polkit action `net.apparmor.pkexec.aa-notify.from_file`. This action allows to read in additional AppArmor commands from a file on disk. All the Polkit actions related to `aa-notify` require `auth_admin` authentication and are inherently risky, since they provide full system access via various angles. The defense-in-depth and separation of privileges is not ideal here, but we decided to accept the change, since there are no better alternatives available for managing AppArmor profiles. ## 2.4) New Polkit Actions in `fwupd` 2.1.4 The firmware update daemon is another heavy user of D-Bus and Polkit. We reviewed it many times in the past already as changes to the API appeared. Security-wise we rarely found tangible issues, but the interface is vast and only parts of it are actually authenticated, while the rest offers access to public information and similar code paths which are assumed to be uncritical. For the recent update of `fwupd` to 2.1.4 we reviewed a couple of additional Polkit actions, some of which adding authentication to previously unrestricted D-Bus methods. We couldn’t find any issues in the API changes, and accepted the new version into openSUSE Tumbleweed. ## 2.5) Changes in Polkit Rules in gnome-initial-setup gnome-initial-setup is a wizard intended for single-user systems to create a user account with administrator privileges after installation of Gnome-based systems. Its approach is to allow a special `gnome-initial-setup` user to obtain a range of root-like privileges to perform the necessary initial setup logic. The security boundary between the `gnome-initial-setup` user and `root` is very thin, but the approach is still better than running the setup wizard with full root privileges. A somewhat worrying aspect of the component is that the wizard automatically starts after system boot when there are “no user accounts present” in the system, which is a condition that might be possible to fake or force by way of other security issues in the system. We have reviewed the package a couple of times in the past. This time a change to the Polkit rules in the package appeared, which led us to looking into the code once again. The change allows `gnome-initial-setup` to invoke Polkit action `org.freedesktop.home1.passwd-home` without providing a password, for setting up a portable home directory managed by systemd. This does not change the general security concept of gnome-initial-setup, which is why we accepted the change into openSUSE. ## 2.6) D-Bus and Varlink Services in `wall-broadcaster` A while ago a new D-Bus and Varlink service called `wall-broadcaster` was added to openSUSE Tumbleweed. This service aims to replace the old-school `wall` setuid binary, which allows to write terminal messages to all users in the system. Messages processed by this service are also forwarded on D-Bus level e.g. to interested consumers in graphical desktop environments. We inspected the privileged components and protocols and could not find any security issues, which is why we accepted the new services. ## 2.7) Transactional Update Notifier D-Bus Service `txnupd` is a notifier for SUSE systems based on transactional-update. It sends out a D-Bus signal propagating the results of a transactional update process. The corresponding D-Bus service was recently renamed, which triggered a follow-up review. The privileged daemon which emits the D-Bus signal is only accessible by `root` and does not cross privilege boundaries, thus this is a rather worry-free case of a D-Bus service. Still we identified an issue during the review, namely that the same script was used in two different modes, in a privileged and an unprivileged context, mixing two different security domains, which could potentially lead to future issues when developers overlook this detail when making changes. We managed to improve the service in this regard by splitting the script into two different ones for better separation of security concerns. ## 2.8) Plasma Kameleon RGB LED Helper A new D-Bus service was added to kdeplasma6-addons which deals with the synchronization of RGB LED devices, like illuminated keyboards, with the color scheme of the KDE Plasma desktop. We looked into the privileged D-Bus helper for this feature and found the interface to be small and offer little attack surface, thus we accepted the new component into openSUSE. ## 2.9) Samba Helper in `kdenetwork-filesharing` A D-Bus service in the `kdenetwork-filesharing` package which interacts with Samba network shares saw changes in its D-Bus configuration and Polkit policy. The name of the helper binary was changed and additional Polkit actions for starting and stopping the Samba daemon were added. We could not identify newly introduced security issues and thus accepted the changes into openSUSE. ## 2.10) GNOME Remote Desktop Race Condition in new `pcscd` API in 51.beta Our GNOME packagers reached out to us regarding changes they ran into in the GNOME Remote Desktop beta release for version 51. The GNOME Remote Desktop component is constantly growing in complexity, by now amounting to about 75,000 lines of Glib-based C code. This time a new daemon called `grd-pcscd` was added, which offers an additional D-Bus API to deal with smart cards by interacting with the `pcscd` smart card management daemon. The approach of the D-Bus interface is a bit unusual: * there is a new `org.gnome.RemoteDesktop.Pcscd.Connect` D-Bus method which is accessible to arbitrary users without authorization checks. The method takes a file descriptor as sole argument, which is supposed to refer to a `pcscd` connection that `grd-pcscd` should use for further smart card operations. * the daemon runs a separate D-Bus session on this file descriptor via Glib’s `g_dbus_connection_new()`. * the session of the process calling `Pcscd.Connect` is looked up via the caller’s PID. Based on the session ID obtained this way, another D-Bus interface is then made available in the daemon under `/org/gnome/RemoteDesktop/Pcscd/<session-id>`, offering the `org.gnome.RemoteDesktop.Pcscd.Session` interface. All methods on this interface are protected by Polkit `auth_admin` actions and therefore offer no additional attack surface. We checked possible attack vectors resulting from crafted data sent on the file descriptor passed to the `Pcscd.Connect()` method. The Glib functions processing D-Bus messages on this file descriptor are pretty robust, however, and valid D-Bus messages will not reach any additional code paths as long as no further configuration takes place via the privileged `Pcscd.Session` API. We found the lookup of the caller’s session ID based on its PID problematic, however. This is a race condition that allows the caller to attempt to let the daemon see the session of another user in the system, by cycling PIDs. This allows a local unprivileged attacker to at least block other users’ smart card usage. Even worse, it allows to potentially spoof `pcscd` replies or intercept sensitive data like smart card PINs provided in other users’ sessions. We created a private upstream bug describing the problem. Since the issue only made it into the 51.beta release of GNOME, there was no necessity for coordinated disclosure and we also did not assign CVEs. We are happy that we helped to prevent this issue from reaching the final release of GNOME 51. # 3) Review of File-Based Linux Capabilities File-based capabilities work much the same as setuid-root binaries: special extended attributes are set on executable binary programs which tell the Linux kernel to automatically execute the program with additional Linux capabilities in effect. During the past months we looked into quite a number of Linux capability assignment requests, which we will discuss in detail in the following sub-sections. ## 3.1) After-the-Fact Review of Slipped Capabilities Special file-based permissions like setuid/setgid bits or Linux capabilities have been managed in SUSE distributions via the permissions package for a long time already. Packaging of such bits is restricted and requires mandatory reviews by our team. Recently it came to our attention that a loophole sneaked into our checkers, resulting in a couple of packages which use file-based capabilities reaching openSUSE Tumbleweed without us having looked into them. Historically the RPM packaging format did not support embedding of Linux capabilities into package metadata in the first place, thus there was no need to reject them on this level: only a warning was emitted by our `rpmlint` integration when capabilities appeared. With recent releases of the RPM package manager, this restriction is no longer present. Our RPM checkers recognized the capabilities which lacked a whitelisting but did not trigger fatal build errors. This allowed the affected packages to reach openSUSE Tumbleweed without going through the intended security review process. Once we noticed this, we quickly adjusted our checkers to prevent such cases in the future and looked into the packages that slipped into production without a review. The following paragraphs discuss the reviews we performed in this context. ### CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW for `ttl` The ttl package assigned `cap_net_admin` and `cap_net_raw` to the `ttl` binary for tracing network routes. During our review we identified that actually only `cap_net_raw` was necessary and we could successfully drop the broader `cap_net_admin` privilege. Otherwise we deemed the code paths for `cap_net_raw` safe and accepted the capability formally into our whitelistings. ### CAP_SYS_RESOURCE for `noisetorch` The noisetorch package provides a virtual microphone in Pulseaudio and assigns `cap_sys_resource` to the `noisetorch` binary for bypassing realtime scheduling limits. We looked into this a longer time ago already and rejected the capability, because the use case for the additional privilege was not very convincing. There exists a corner case in Pulseaudio that can cause it to exceed realtime scheduling limits when loading plugins. The noisetorch plugin seems to trigger this corner case in some situations, which is why it temporarily bypasses scheduling limits by modifying the Pulseaudio process based on the `cap_sys_resource` capability. Furthermore the `noisetorch` program attempts to modify its own executable by adding the `cap_sys_resource` capability via a privilege escalation dialog, should it be missing. This mixture of a capability being used to work around what looks like a bug in Pulseaudio and the fact that the program tries to apply its own policy regarding file-based capabilities is what led us to reject this request previously. After looking into the matter again we decided to accept the capability this time, provided that the package would be patched to disable the self-modification logic, which we deem unsuitable, since it bypasses our permissions profiles. A corresponding patch was implemented and we proceeded with a formal whitelisting of `cap_sys_resource` for `noisetorch`. ### CAP_NET_ADMIN for `cloud-hypervisor` The cloud-hypervisor package is a virtual machine manager and uses `cap_net_admin` to configure privileged virtual machine networking. During our review we focused on the code paths that deal with `cap_net_admin` only, because the project consists of 150,000 lines of Rust code, not counting vendored code. We could not find issues in the `cap_net_admin` usage and therefore formally accepted this use of capabilities as well. ## 3.2) CAP_NET_RAW for `cacti-spine` Cacti is a system and network monitoring tool, and `cacti-spine` is a C program used as a drop-in replacement for a PHP-based program in Cacti for polling network services. In this context it asks for cap_net_raw privileges to send out ICMP messages. According to upstream documentation the utility is even intended to be used with full setuid-root privileges: this is not a good idea at all, however, since it is not very careful in parsing and processing command line arguments, among other issues. Assigning `cap_net_raw` is acceptable, though; we could not find any tangible security issues in this configuration. ## 3.3) CAP_PERFMON for `ksystemstats6` The ksystemstats6 package contains the helper program `ksystemstats_intel_helper`, for which an openSUSE user requested the `cap_perfmon` capability. The helper utility needs it to calculate the GPU usage in the system. The rarely seen `cap_perfmon` allows programs to open otherwise privileged performance event counters. The utility is only 200 lines long; for prudence we requested to apply a patch with a hardening to the program which also made it into the upstream repository by now. After this patch arrived in the openSUSE package we granted the capability in openSUSE Tumbleweed. # 4) Revisit of Apptainer Apptainer is a container runtime (formerly called Singularity) which we already reviewed a couple of times in the past, since it contains a setuid-root binary `starter-suid`. The early reviews around the year 2019 uncovered a number of security issues in this area. A few years ago we dropped the `starter-suid` binary from our packaging, because upstream implemented new features which we believed made the extra privileges unnecessary. A SUSE customer recently ran into issues because of a specific Apptainer use case they had, which still relied on the `starter-suid` program being installed. For this reason we revisited the Apptainer code base to check the current situation of this sensitive helper binary. The logic executed by the `starter-suid` program is still highly complex and its execution paths hard to follow. We could not identify any new issues in the code this time, however, which is why we accepted the setuid-root binary back into SUSE distributions. Since we are still unhappy about the overall complexity of the program we are relying on an opt-in model: users need to become a member of the `apptainer` group to use it, which limits the attack surface. # 5) Restriction of Varlink Service Packaging With Varlink services becoming more widespread, we decided to introduce whitelisting restrictions for packages wanting to submit them to SUSE distributions. Contrary to D-Bus services, there is no central instance managing the Inter-Process-Communication of Varlink, and there are also no standard configuration files that every Varlink service ships. Varlink applications simply define a path where the Varlink UNIX domain socket will be placed and that is about all there is to it. A kind of standard pattern in systemd socket units for Varlink daemons is that they contain a `FileDescriptorName=varlink` directive. This is what we have decided to rely on to restrict the packaging of Varlink services. We looked into all existing socket units of this kind in openSUSE and did not find any tangible security issues in them. From now on, when packages contain new Varlink socket units, a mandatory review by our team will be required before they can be added to SUSE distributions. # 6) pam-ssh-agent Module Recently we received a request to allow the `pam-ssh-agent` module into openSUSE. The module performs PAM authentication based on SSH public keys: a random payload is requested to be signed by an SSH private key; the signature is then verified by the PAM module based on a list of configured trusted public keys. The PAM module is of moderate size, consisting of about 1,500 lines of Rust (not counting vendored sources). The code and documentation generally show security-consciousness, which is a good thing. We identified a few aspects in the PAM module that could be problematic, mostly as a result of bad configuration: * the PAM module can be configured to look for acceptable public keys in the to-be-authenticated user’s home directory, which allows to basically bypass local `sudo` authentication, for example. This is also documented in the upstream README. * an `authorized_keys_command` can be configured to call a program which produces authorized public keys. If an untrusted program is configured here then this would result in issues in local authentication scenarios. * the `authorized_keys_command` is by default run with the privileges of the to-be-authenticated user; an option allows to change this to be run as `root`, however, which could easily lead to security issues further down the chain. * a special authentication path in the PAM module inspects the `SSH_AUTH_INFO_0` environment variable, if the current PAM stack file is named “ssh”. Public keys found in this environment variable are implicitly trusted by the PAM module, assuming that `sshd` already took care of the authentication, verifying the public key(s). This is a bit of a heuristic, which could break in some (highly) unexpected scenarios. In spite of these uncertainties we are generally content with the quality and documentation of the PAM module and accepted it into openSUSE. It is up to system administrators to configure this PAM module carefully to avoid any security issues. # 7) wireguard-tools: Update Logic for resolv.conf An openSUSE user was concerned about the security of wg-quick, a script which is part of the wireguard-tools package, a collection of utilities for the Wireguard VPN solution. `wg-quick` is supposed to bring up a WireGuard VPN interface in a worry-free manner. A Linux-specific “DNS hatchet” is applied during build time of wireguard-tools on openSUSE. Hatchets are overrides of the script logic in `wg-quick`, a rather makeshift approach at customizing the logic towards specific operating systems. The openSUSE user approached us because he was worried about the mount logic that this “DNS hatchet” implements for `/etc/resolv.conf`. During the review we found the approach of the script a bit unexpected but not unsafe at all. The script is concerned with the safe update of name server configuration in `/etc/resolv.conf`, a resource which is difficult to manage in Linux, because there is no central mechanism for maintaining the consistency of the file when multiple programs want to modify it. VPN clients are a typical use case when this results in problems: the VPN client adds VPN-specific name servers, thereby overriding previously existing name servers from static configuration or provided by DHCP servers. When the configuration is blindly overwritten this results in the loss of the original DNS configuration; once the VPN connection is terminated, DNS is no longer working. To prevent this situation, the “DNS hatchet” performs a bind-mount of the new configuration file over the original one in `/etc/resolv.conf`. The resulting file will be read-only, preventing further modifications of the configuration until the VPN connection is terminated. When the VPN is shutdown, the bind-mounted file will be unmounted again and the original name server configuration reinstated. We have no security concerns about this logic, and explained the situation to the creator of the review bug accordingly. # 8) wicked: Command Injection via DHCP Options (CVE-2026-44932) `wicked` is the network configuration framework used in SUSE Linux Enterprise 15-SP7 and earlier. Its DHCP clients dump the settings of an acquired lease into files below `/run/wicked/leaseinfo.*`, which contain lines of the form `KEY='value'`. We found that the values of a number of DHCP options, among them `POSIXTZSTRING`, were written out verbatim, enclosed in single quotes but without any validation or escaping: fprintf(out, "%s='%s'\n", __ni_keyword_format (&key, prefix, name, index), val_to_print); A DHCP server can thus place a single quote in an option value and break out of the quoting. A `dnsmasq` configured with dhcp-option=100,'; chmod a+w /etc/shadow; /bin/true ' results in the following line in the leaseinfo file: POSIXTZSTRING='Hello_World'; chmod a+w /etc/shadow; /bin/true '' The interesting part about this issue is _who_ actually executes this. `wicked` itself never sources these files; it only passes them on to `netconfig modify`, which rejects any line whose value is not strictly single-quoted. There was, however, also no documentation stating how the leaseinfo files were intended to be consumed. Since their syntax looks exactly like shell variable assignments, third party code simply started to source them from shell scripts. We found several examples of this in our distributions and in the wild, among them dracut’s network-legacy module, the SUSE cloud-netconfig scripts and SystemImager. The `dracut` case is the nastiest one: `ifup.sh` sources the leaseinfo file as `root` in the initrd, turning the issue into unauthenticated code execution as `root` for an attacker on the local or adjacent network. The `network-legacy` module is not active by default, but it is pulled in by plausible setups such as remote unlocking via `dracut-sshd`, or systems that need NFS, iSCSI or NBD during early boot. We confirmed this end-to-end on SLE-15-SP7. We rated the issue `CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` (8.8 High) and `CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H` (5.8 Medium). This is a nice example of the improved precision of CVSS v4.0, which is able to express that the impact materializes in a _subsequent_ system rather than in `wicked` itself. The issue was handled under embargo and fixed by `wicked` upstream: single quotes are now rejected in all string options and discarded values are logged as warnings; should a suspect string still pass the input check, single quotes are additionally escaped in the leaseinfo output. The fix was released for all maintained SLE and openSUSE codestreams, including a rebuild of the initrd, which carries its own copy of `wicked`. # 9) Conclusion As can be seen from this edition of the spotlight series, maintaining the security of a complete Linux distribution is no small feat both in terms of volume and range of topics that have to be covered by our team. We continue to contribute to the overall security of the Linux ecosystem by reviewing code, publishing security reports and contributing back upstream to be able to provide our users and customers with a robust and secure Linux distribution that you can trust.

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Buurman en Buurman, Jan, Jans en de kinderen en de gebroeders van de Kameleon: ze staan deze week – letterlijk en figuurlijk – te schitteren tijdens de zevende editie van de Lichtweek Bedum.