#MDOC
I think they’re holding hands…?

#murderdrones #SerialDesignationJ #J #MDOC #oc #Yumeship #Yuri #wlw #art
November 15, 2026 at 5:52 PM
Fanart SD - V
I thought about it for a long time, but I decided to do it anyway
I place my hand on cyber-futurism

#art 𐊊 #murderdrones 𐊊 #SerialDesignationV 𐊊 #V 𐊊 #MDOC 𐊊 #oc
November 15, 2026 at 8:55 PM
I think they’re holding hands… Wip

#murderdrones #SerialDesignationJ #J #MDOC #oc #Yumeship #Yuri #wlw #art
November 13, 2026 at 9:43 PM
MDOC receives $1M grant to boost job training for inmates
MDOC receives $1M grant to boost job training for inmates
JACKSON, Miss. (WJTV) – The Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) received a $1 million grant to expand workforce development and expand job training, reducing the number of people ret…
www.wjtv.com
November 17, 2026 at 11:00 PM
The MOOC became the MDOC - Massive Distributed Online Course.
But seriously, one suspicion that I have about students checking out and just using generative AI in online asynchronous courses is that they see professors checking out and just autograding students' work.
November 13, 2026 at 3:43 PM
🟠 CVE-2026-75522 - High (7.5)

OpenID4VP is an open-source credential parsing library for SD-JWT VC and mDOC/mDL formats. Prior ...

https://www.thehackerwire.com/vulnerability/CVE-2026-75522/

#infosec #cybersecurity #CVE #vulnerability #security #patchstack
November 18, 2026 at 10:01 PM
🚨 EUVD-2026-129293
📊 7.5/10
🏢 openeudi

📝 OpenID4VP is an open-source credential parsing library for SD-JWT VC and mDOC/mDL formats. Prior to 0.8.1, src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts ChainBuilder.tryBu...

🔗 https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-129293

#cybersecurity #infosec #cve #euvd
November 18, 2026 at 10:05 PM
Here’s a silly doodle of Kiyarā and J

#murderdrones #SerialDesignationJ #J #MDOC #oc #Yumeship #Yuri #wlw #art
November 7, 2026 at 6:23 PM
DCHP: One CBOR Request for mdoc and SD-JWT VC, In Person and Online
A wallet that holds a mobile driving licence today speaks two protocols for the same credential. At a shop counter it answers an ISO/IEC 18013-5 `DeviceRequest` over BLE. On a website it answers an OpenID4VP Authorization Request, through the browser's Digital Credentials API. Different request languages, different session binding, different response containers. The OpenID Foundation's Digital Credentials Harmonized Presentation (DCHP) Working Group is writing one protocol to cover both, jointly with ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17 WG 10. One CBOR request, one CBOR response, for ISO mdoc and SD-JWT VC, in person and online. I read the Editor's Copy at the head of `main` and encoded a request from it. The first thing I hit: the prose table puts `dc_api_origin` at integer key 8 and the CDDL puts it at key 7. That one key changes the transcript hash, which is the KB-JWT `nonce`. Two implementations that each follow "the spec" will reject each other. My full notes, with every open PR and issue tracked, are at identity-deep-dive: openid/dchp. ## What you are reading Everything below is from openid/dchp at commit `4ddd238` (9 November 2026), which was still the head of `main` when I checked on 15 November 2026. The Document History says `-00`. The README says the Editor's Copy "is not an approved Working Group Draft". The Introduction says the text started as an initial contribution that "was accepted as a starting point, but it doesn't yet constitute consensus on its full content". Every core clause opens with the same note: Clause | Consensus issue | State on 15 Nov 2026 ---|---|--- Credential Request | #24 | open, one comment (F2F notes, 31 Aug) Response Encryption | #25 | open, no comments Reader Authentication | #26 | open, no comments Transaction Transcript | #27 | open, no comments Credential Response | #28 | open, no comments If you implement any of it, pin the commit. One more thing before the CDDL. Every message is a CBOR map with small integer keys. `credential_types` and `ScenarioSets` are labels in the document, not bytes on the wire. The working group said this directly when it classed the casing PR #83 as "editorial PR only since map keys are ints, i.e., field names are not normative". The integers are the protocol. ## The flow Red boxes are where the text is incomplete or contradicts itself. That is three of the nine steps. Three ideas carry the design: 1. The request is a set of queries plus a small boolean language over them, independent of credential format. Format specifics live in annexes that plug into CDDL sockets. 2. Neither side sends a transcript. Both build it independently from the request bytes and from what each observed about the channel (QR code, NFC handover, OpenID4VP `client_id`, web origin). If they disagree, signatures and decryption fail. 3. That same transcript is fed into everything: the reader's signature, the HPKE response encryption, and the credential's own holder binding. ## The request From the "Request CDDL" section: CredentialRequest = { payload: 1 => bstr, ; CBOR-encoded RequestPayload ? reader_auth: 2 => COSE_Sign, ; Optional reader authentication (detached payload) * int => any ; RFU extensions } RequestPayload = { ScenarioSets: 1 => { + ScenarioRef => ScenarioSet }, CredentialQueries: 2 => { + CredentialRef => CredentialQuery }, ? encryption_context: 3 => EncryptionContext, ? additional_encryption_contexts: 4 => { + int => EncryptionContext }, * int => any ; RFU extensions } ScenarioSet = { mandatory: 1 => bool, combinations: 2 => [ + CredentialCombination ], purpose_id: 3 => [ controlled_id: tstr, + int ], ? extensions: 4 => { * int / tstr => any }, * int => any } CredentialCombination = [ + CredentialRef ] CredentialQuery = { credential_format: 1 => tstr, credential_types: 2 => [ + tstr ], elements_dict: 3 => { + ElementRef => DataElementDef }, requested_elements: 4 => ElementLogic, ? general_extensions: 5 => generalExtensions, ? format_extensions: 6 => $formatExtensions, ; Socket ? encryption_ref: 7 => int, * int => any } DataElementDef = { path: 1 => [ + tstr ], ? value_match: 2 => any, intent_to_retain: 3 => bool, * int => any } ; Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF): AND of OR of AND ElementLogic = [ + OrGroup ] OrGroup = [ + AndGroup ] AndGroup = [ + ElementRef ] The payload travels as a byte string, not a nested map. That is deliberate: the verifier signs and hashes exactly those bytes, and the wallet hashes what it received without re-encoding. Here is the request I encoded for the hands-on below: "family name and (age over 18 or birth date) from an mDL, or age over 18 from an SD-JWT VC". Two levels of logic, and they compose differently: * Across credentials, a `ScenarioSet` is OR of AND. `combinations: [[1], [2]]` means "query 1 alone, or query 2 alone". `[[1, 3]]` would mean "both 1 and 3". The wallet satisfies one combination per scenario. * Inside a credential, `requested_elements` is AND of OR of AND. `[[[1]], [[2],[3]]]` reads: element 1, and (element 2 or element 3). The spec's own second example, `[Street address] AND ([Full name] OR ([Given name] AND [Family name]))`, is why the innermost level exists. `credential_types` became an array in PR #61 (4 November 2026). It is defined as pure sugar. A query with n types "shall be processed as equivalent to" n single-type queries, and every combination that references it is copied n times, one per instance. The rationale in the text is size: one query for v1 and v2 of the same credential type. If you implement it, implement the expansion literally. A combination `[[1, 2]]` where query 1 has two types becomes two combinations. `general_extensions` carries the cross-format knobs: `issuer_identifiers` (key 1, today only `x509_ref`, an array of Authority Key Identifiers), `allow_multiple` (2), `credential_auth_data` (3) and `support_no_cryptographic_binding` (4). `encryption_ref` routes a credential's response to an entry in `additional_encryption_contexts`. The text's example is an identity credential encrypted to one backend and a payment credential to another, inside one response. ## What the format annexes pin down Since PR #57 (9 November 2026) the core says nothing about mdoc or SD-JWT. It lists ten things a "credential format definition" must specify, and two annexes do that: | `mso_mdoc` | `dc+sd-jwt` ---|---|--- `credential_types` entry | mdoc `DocType`, case-sensitive | `vct`, case-sensitive; inheritance undecided (#53) `path` | exactly `[NameSpace, DataElementIdentifier]` | "To be completed" (#52) `x509_ref` matches | AKI `keyIdentifier` of a cert in `IssuerAuth` `x5chain` | AKI `keyIdentifier` of a cert in the `x5c` header `format_extensions` | `issuer_alg_values`, `device_alg_values` (COSE ints) | `sd-jwt_alg_values`, `kb-jwt_alg_values` (JWS strings) Holder binding | `DeviceAuth` | KB-JWT No binding allowed when | `support_no_cryptographic_binding` is `true` (non-key-bound mdoc) | same flag; otherwise a KB-JWT "shall" be present `data` in response | `bstr .cbor Document` | `tstr`, compact `<JWT>~<Disclosure>~...~<KB-JWT>` Transcript binding | inside `SessionTranscript`, derivation open (#10) | KB-JWT `nonce` = SHA-256(WalletTransactionTranscript), encoding and `aud` open (#10) Value matching, transaction data | open (#9, #4) | open (#9, #4) Two mdoc rules are worth reading closely. The wallet, not the verifier, decides whether an element comes back issuer-signed or device-signed, within the MSO's `KeyAuthorizations`. And a wallet may answer a request for an element with a substitute where that element's definition allows it, which is how `age_over_NN` works in 18013-5. Both `issuer_identifiers` and the non-key-bound mdoc text carry editor's notes tying them to the second edition of ISO/IEC 18013-5, the latter "to be checked against the published text" (#56). The SD-JWT `path` is `[ + tstr ]`, which cannot index an array. On 5 November the working group had "no objection" to widening it to `[ + tstr / int / null / bool / bstr ]`. On 15 November no PR for it was open. ## The transcript ReaderTransactionTranscript = { request_hash: 1 => bstr, ; SHA-256 of CBOR-encoded RequestPayload bytes channel_binding: 2 => ChannelBinding, * int / tstr => any } WalletTransactionTranscript = { request_hash: 1 => bstr, channel_binding: 2 => ChannelBinding, ? encryption_context: 3 => int, ; the encryption_ref from CredentialQuery * int / tstr => any } 18013-5's `SessionTranscript` is a fixed-order array. DCHP makes it a map and relies on deterministic CBOR (RFC 8949 Section 4.2) for a unique encoding. The text says that is "the key difference" from 18013-5. It also means both sides must pick the same deterministic rule. RFC 8949 has two: Section 4.2.1 sorts map keys bytewise, and Section 4.2.3 describes the older length-first ordering from RFC 7049. They coincide for small integer keys and diverge once keys differ in encoded length. Open PR #64 pins 4.2.1 and adds that transcripts "are never transmitted". `ChannelBinding` is where the transport shows up: at most one engagement field (how the session started: QR, reverse QR, NFC handover, OpenID4VP `request_uri` or `client_id`, DC API origin) and at most one transmission field (BLE, NFC, Wi-Fi Aware). This is the anti-replay mechanism. A request relayed from `https://evil.example` produces a different `dc_api_origin`, so a different transcript, so the KB-JWT nonce the verifier expects never matches. The problem is that `main` has two numberings for it: Issue #75 reports the engagement mismatch, and open PR #76 renumbers the CDDL to the prose (adding `cce_handover` at 5 and renaming `oidc4vp_*` to `openid4vp_*`). Neither touches the transmission rows. In the prose, key 10 is `ble_gatt` and key 11 is a bare `uint` PSM. In the CDDL, key 10 is `ble_uuid` and key 11 is a map `{1 uuid, 2 psm}`, and keys 12 to 15 exist only in the CDDL. For an in-person BLE L2CAP session, the two documents still produce different bytes after #76. ### Where the transcript is used Reader authentication is a `COSE_Sign` over a detached payload: "the raw CBOR-encoded `RequestPayload` together with the transaction transcript". How the two are combined is not specified, and neither is how the reader's key reaches the wallet. Open PR #65 puts an X.509 `x5chain` (RFC 9360) in the protected header of the `COSE_Signature`. Response encryption has two answers in the same document. The bullet list under "Transaction Transcript" says the `ReaderTransactionTranscript` is "used in reader authentication and response encryption". The "Use in Protocol Operations" table says the `WalletTransactionTranscript` for that credential is "supplied as info parameter for HPKE". The CDDL comments claim response encryption for both. The wallet variant differs only by `encryption_context`, so the bytes differ whenever a credential uses `encryption_ref`, and only then. That kind of disagreement passes a single-backend test and breaks in multi-key routing. Response encryption itself is conditional: mandatory when there is no session-layer encryption ("DC API, scheme-based"), not applicable over 18013-5 BLE/NFC sessions. HPKE is mandated for non-post-quantum use, "potentially based on draft-ietf-cose-hpke". ## The response CredentialResponse = { ? unencrypted: 1 => Envelope, ? encrypted: 2 => [ + COSE_Encrypt ], ; Each item decrypts to bytes .cbor Envelope * int => any } Envelope = { credentials: 1 => { + CredentialRef => CredentialItem }, scenarios: 2 => { + ScenarioRef => [ + CredentialRef ] }, * int => any } CredentialItem = { credential_format: 1 => tstr, data: 2 => $CredentialData, ; Socket * int => any } Each envelope is self-contained. A credential needed in two envelopes (because two queries route to two keys) is duplicated. `credentials` is keyed by the same `CredentialRef` integers as the request, so the verifier maps answers back to queries with no extra lookup. That keying has a flaw: a map key is unique, so one query can return only one credential, which contradicts `allow_multiple`. And one credential answering two queries must be copied. Open PR #77 changes `credentials` to `[ + CredentialItem ]`, adds `query_refs: 3 => [ + QueryRef ]` to each item, and renames `CredentialRef` to `QueryRef`. If it merges, every response parser written against `main` breaks: the first bytes of the envelope go from `a2 01 a1 ...` (map) to `a2 01 81 ...` (array). ## Hands-on: encoding it I wrote the request above in Python with `cbor2` (6.3.0, `canonical=True`), computed both transcripts for a DC API session from `https://verifier.example`, and compared the two `ChannelBinding` numberings. No signing or encryption, the keys are placeholders, and the HPKE algorithm id is a placeholder too. The point is the bytes both sides must agree on. Script and `run.sh` are in articles/assets/dchp-digital-credentials-harmonized-presentation/. $ ./run.sh RequestPayload: 400 bytes, CredentialRequest: 405 bytes request_hash: 68bcbd1618d152da4387a26ad0fe5d499988cb4e7a5b9e6e835ff353f023438a CDDL on main (dc_api_origin = 7) ReaderTransactionTranscript: a2015820 68bcbd16...f023438a 02a107 7818 68747470733a2f2f... KB-JWT nonce, hex : 4f75d175bea2d3a3fd3ed287c86ebd11ed35385e830d4aedf40aee47ca21e88c KB-JWT nonce, base64url: T3XRdb6i06P9PtKHyG69Ee01OF6DDUrt9AruR8oh6Iw prose table / PR #76 (dc_api_origin = 8) ReaderTransactionTranscript: a2015820 68bcbd16...f023438a 02a108 7818 68747470733a2f2f... KB-JWT nonce, hex : 2e6e9cd458b28759c3580ddd89ff802f601c3afabce1c6a6ab6581a1f792d6d5 KB-JWT nonce, base64url: Lm6c1Fiyh1nDWA3dif-AL2AcOvq84camq2WBofeS1tU Envelope on main : a201a102a2016964632b73642d6a777402787065794a6862 ... Envelope under #77: a20181a3016964632b73642d6a777402787065794a686247 ... payload match: True (I split and shortened the transcript hex by hand to show the fields; the script prints it whole.) The transcripts differ in one byte, `07` vs `08`, and the nonces share nothing. The request is 405 bytes for two queries with four elements, small enough for a QR-initiated BLE exchange or a DC API call. `payload match: True` is the check that `cbor2`'s canonical mode is the encoding I think it is. `check_encoding.py` re-encodes the same payload with a separate 30-line encoder that sorts map keys bytewise per RFC 8949 Section 4.2.1, and the bytes match. In this payload every key is one byte long, so length-first ordering would give the same result. That is exactly why a test like this can pass between two libraries that disagree in general. Also note the two nonce encodings. The spec says the nonce is the SHA-256 of the transcript, but a JWT claim is a string, and whether that string is hex, base64url or something else is open (#10). Pick one and you have implemented a guess. ## What is still open * Transcript mapping into mdoc `SessionTranscript`, the KB-JWT `nonce` encoding and `aud`: issue #10. The chairs proposed a dedicated transcript call for 16 November 2026, 14:00 UTC. Until this closes, neither format's holder binding can be implemented end to end. * Prose vs CDDL keys: #75 / PR #76 for engagement fields; nothing filed for the BLE transmission fields as far as I can see. * Deterministic CBOR rule: PR #64. * Reader key conveyance: PR #65. * Response shape: PR #77. * `reader` to `verifier` naming, including `reader_auth` to `verifier_auth`: PR #81. Names only, keys unchanged. * SD-JWT `path`, `vct` inheritance, non-X.509 SD-JWT issuers, value matching, transaction data: #52, #53, an editor's note, #9, #4. * Security Considerations: absent. PR #85 adds a "To be completed" placeholder so that a WG Draft can be published. * Publication: a WG Draft -00 (#72) was deferred on 4 November by "approx. 1-2 months". On the ISO side the route is a Publicly Available Specification or a PSDO publication (#13). The `Internet-Draft` header in the source is toolchain scaffolding, and a comment in the file says it is "NOT a claim that this is an IETF document". ## If you are building a wallet or verifier now The request model is the part I would prototype against: scenarios over queries, CNF over elements, the `credential_types` expansion, per-query encryption routing. It is small and the annexes make the mdoc side concrete. I would not ship anything that hashes a transcript yet. The `ChannelBinding` keys, the HPKE info input, the deterministic encoding rule and the nonce string all have two or more readings on `main`, and each one silently changes bytes that the other side computes independently. Record the commit you implement, put both numberings behind a flag, and watch #10 and #76.
dev.to
November 14, 2026 at 10:42 PM
On Foojay, Jérôme LELEU explains how to add EUDI wallet authentication to a Java Spring Boot app with pac4j. Two examples: browser and wallet on the same phone, and a computer browser linked to a phone wallet by QR code.

foojay.io/today/eudi-w...

#Java #SpringBoot
EUDI wallets with OpenID4VP and pac4j: same device and another device
Authenticate Java Spring Boot users with EUDI wallets and pac4j: SD-JWT VC on the same phone, or an mdoc PID via QR code on another device.
foojay.io
November 12, 2026 at 8:32 AM
Inmate caught after attempted escape from Mississippi prison
Inmate caught after attempted escape from Mississippi prison
PEARL, Miss. (WJTV) – The Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) is investigating an attempted escape at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility (CMCF) in Rankin County that occur…
www.wjtv.com
November 10, 2026 at 10:31 PM
Macomb County's community corrections faces a budget crunch, risking vital recovery programs as the MDOC grant falls short by nearly $130,000.

Get the details!

#MacombCounty #MI #CitizenPortal #SubstanceAbuse #MentalHealth
Macomb County community corrections sees smaller MDOC award; opioid-settlement request rises
Community corrections told commissioners it requested $2,056,000 from MDOC but has an unofficial award of $1,922,000, forcing cuts to contract services and likely shelving a planned recovery-focused employment program; the department also asked for $3.377 million in opioid-settlement spending to add jail-based screening staff and a co-responder deputy.
citizenportal.ai
November 9, 2026 at 6:23 AM
Also, here’s my Murder Drones OC

His name’s Erwin :3
#murderdrones #murderdronesoc #oc #mdoc
November 6, 2026 at 6:15 PM
Michigan Prisons to Deploy AI System for Inmate Risk Classification
Michigan Prisons to Deploy AI System for Inmate Risk Classification
(NaturalNews) The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) is preparing to launch a pilot program that uses artificial intelligence (AI) software from the nonprofi...
dlvr.it
November 4, 2026 at 3:05 PM
Recidiviz's reaction and the generally vague statements point to a company that wants to have its cake and eat it too — AI is everywhere when it's time to pitch state procurement agents and bid on contracts, but not so much when media comes knocking
November 4, 2026 at 7:52 PM
Mičiganas cietumos ieviesīs MI sistēmu potenciālās vardarbības prognozēšanai
Mičiganas cietumos ieviesīs MI sistēmu potenciālās vardarbības prognozēšanai
Mičiganas Ieslodzījuma vietu departaments (MDOC) paziņojis par plāniem no 2026. gada decembra atsevišķos vīriešu cietumos uzsākt pilotprojektu, kurā tiks izmantota jauna, uz MI balstīta drošības klas…
kursors.lv
November 4, 2026 at 9:30 AM
Naohiro Fujie, Shigeya Suzuki: A Security Analysis of Verifiable Credential Verification Pipelines: Attack Surface Arising from JSON-LD/RDFC Canonicalization Compared with SD-JWT VC and mdoc https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04461 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.04461 https://arxiv.org/html/2611.04461
November 4, 2026 at 6:39 AM
October 31, 2026 at 12:55 PM
John Engler refused the terms and moved the prisons to St Louis and Baldwin respectively. The one in Baldwin is currently used by ICE as a for profit detention facility while the other is MDOC.
October 30, 2026 at 8:01 PM
Stargazing Wip

Also happy 5th anniversary to murder drones! (YIPPIEEE!!)

#murderdrones #SerialDesignationJ #J #MDOC #oc #Yumeship #Yuri #wlw #art
October 29, 2026 at 11:30 AM
DOC donates 116,455 pounds of fresh produce in 2025

https://www.allforgardening.com/1947523/doc-donates-116455-pounds-of-fresh-produce-in-2025/

Nineteen Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) facilities maintain and harvest gardens, which provided 116,455 pounds of fresh produce to food …
DOC donates 116,455 pounds of fresh produce in 2025 - All For Gardening
Nineteen Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) facilities maintain and harvest gardens, which provided 116,455 pounds of fresh produce to food pantries,
www.allforgardening.com
October 29, 2026 at 7:20 PM
It's the third incident in seven months at the same Michigan #prison in which a man is suspected of killing his cellmate www.freep.com/story/news/l... #migov
State police investigate third homicide at Ionia prison in 7 months
The MDOC in September announced plans to add 870 high-security beds. Osborn said most of those beds won't be ready for years and action is needed now.
www.freep.com
October 28, 2026 at 10:22 AM
Whoops, hyperfixation got me. This is where 90% of my personal work has gone. AND THIS ISN'T EVEN ALL OF IT. 😅
The purple gremlin belongs to @jayjayfex.bsky.social, the blondie cutie belongs to @asawarts.bsky.social, and the bat drones are all mine.

#digitalart #OCart #MurderDrones #MDOC #MDsona
October 29, 2026 at 7:16 PM
TODAY IS THE GENERAL'S BIRFDAY AHHHHHHH

HE'S GONNA TURN 14 YRSO REEEEEEEEEE...
CONGRATS @amber-astro.bsky.social

#birthday #birfday #mdoc #mdsona
October 25, 2026 at 8:33 PM