#ModeloRAT
ConsentFix steals signed-in Microsoft tokens - no password, no MFA prompt. CrashFix pastes the malware for you. https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-5961?utm_source=bluesky #ThreatIntel #ModeloRAT #NexShield #KongTuke
November 13, 2026 at 12:26 PM
KongTuke's MLTBackdoor sideloads into a signed Defender binary and fakes Windows Update to reach its C2. https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2163 #ThreatIntel #BackdoorMistic #ModeloRAT #KongTuke
August 27, 2026 at 5:14 AM
Notícia da SecurityWeek

"Malicious Chrome Extension Crashes Browser in ClickFix Variant ‘CrashFix’" #bolhasec
Malicious Chrome Extension Crashes Browser in ClickFix Variant 'CrashFix'
ClickFix variant CrashFix relies on a malicious Chrome extension to crash the browser and trick victims into installing the ModeloRAT RAT.
www.securityweek.com
January 30, 2026 at 8:30 PM
ClickFix Attacks Abuses DNS Lookup Command to Deliver ModeloRAT: https://bit.ly/4rnyMDR by Elizabeth Montalbano
ClickFix Attacks Abuses DNS Lookup Command to Deliver ModeloRAT
ClickFix campaigns have adapted to the latest defenses with a new technique to trick users into infecting their own machines with malware.
bit.ly
February 17, 2026 at 11:03 PM
New ClickFix variant abuses DNS/nslookup to fetch and run PowerShell malware via DNS responses, evading detection and deploying ModeloRAT.

via @bleepingcomputer.com

www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/securit...

#hacking #infosec #cybersecurity
New ClickFix attack abuses nslookup to retrieve PowerShell payload via DNS
Threat actors are now abusing DNS queries as part of ClickFix social engineering attacks to deliver malware, making this the first known use of DNS as a channel in these campaigns.
www.bleepingcomputer.com
February 16, 2026 at 6:06 PM
📰 Peretas KongTuke Bajak Microsoft Teams untuk Serangan Jaringan Korporat dalam 5 Menit

👉 Baca artikel lengkap di sini: https://ahmandonk.com/2026/05/15/peretas-kongtuke-gunakan-microsoft-teams-sebar-modelorat-via-python/

#ahm
an#ahmandonkTechNewst#beritaTeknologii#initialAccessBrokera#keamananSibe
May 15, 2026 at 6:56 AM
Microsoft disclosed a DNS-based ClickFix variant using nslookup for malware staging.
Victims execute a command → DNS response delivers payload → ZIP + Python + VBScript → ModeloRAT.
Research from Bitdefender and Kaspersky highlights loader evolution...

#CyberSecurity #ClickFix #ThreatIntel #Malware
February 16, 2026 at 7:30 AM
CrashFix Chrome extension crashes browsers and lures users into installing the ModeloRAT RAT—be cautious of fake fixes and untrusted extensions.
sctocs.com/crashfix-chr...
CrashFix Chrome Extension Spreads ModeloRAT Using ClickFix Style Browser Crash Lures - SCtoCS
The CrashFix Chrome extension is delivering ModeloRAT by using ClickFix style browser crash lures to trick users into infection.
sctocs.com
January 19, 2026 at 6:20 PM
Extensão falsa do Chrome trava navegador e infecta mais de 5 mil usuários com vírus
Pesquisadores de cibersegurança da Huntress divulgaram detalhes de uma campanha sofisticada batizada de CrashFix, que usa uma extensão maliciosa do Google Chrome para travar deliberadamente o navegador e induzir vítimas a executar comandos que instalam um trojan de acesso remoto chamado ModeloRAT. A extensão falsa, disponibilizada na Chrome Web Store oficial com o nome "NexShield – Advanced Web Guardian", foi baixada pelo menos 5.000 vezes antes de ser removida. O malware se apresentava como um bloqueador de anúncios legítimo, prometendo proteger usuários contra rastreadores e conteúdo intrusivo. ## Clone perfeito de software legítimo De acordo com a Huntress, a extensão é um clone quase idêntico do uBlock Origin Lite versão 2025.1116.1841, um complemento legítimo de bloqueio de anúncios. A única diferença está no código malicioso escondido, projetado para exibir avisos de segurança falsos após travar o navegador propositalmente. A campanha faz parte da infraestrutura KongTuke, também rastreada como TAG-124, um sistema de distribuição de tráfego que cria perfis de vítimas antes de redirecioná-las para sites de entrega de malware. O acesso a sistemas comprometidos é depois vendido para outros criminosos, incluindo grupos de ransomware como Rhysida e Interlock. ## Ciclo vicioso que explora a frustração do usuário A extensão aguarda 60 minutos após a instalação antes de ativar seu comportamento malicioso. Depois disso, a cada 10 minutos, ela lança um ataque de negação de serviço (DoS) que cria um bilhão de iterações em loop infinito, abrindo novas conexões de porta que esgotam completamente a memória do computador. Quando o navegador trava e a vítima força o encerramento, um pop-up aparece ao reiniciar o Chrome alegando que o navegador "parou de forma anormal" e solicitando uma "verificação" para corrigir uma possível ameaça à segurança. O aviso falso, que se passa por alerta do Microsoft Edge, instrui o usuário a abrir a caixa de diálogo Executar do Windows e colar um comando já copiado automaticamente para a área de transferência. Pesquisadores da Huntress explicam que o pop-up só aparece na inicialização do navegador depois que ele deixa de responder. Antes da execução do DoS, um carimbo de data/hora é armazenado. Quando o usuário reinicia o navegador, o pop-up CrashFix é exibido. Se a extensão não for removida, o ataque é acionado novamente após 10 minutos, criando um loop interminável que força a vítima a ver o aviso falso repetidamente. O pop-up também desativa os menus de contexto e bloqueia atalhos de teclado para impedir a análise do código. ## Ferramenta legítima do Windows baixa o malware O comando CrashFix emprega o utilitário legítimo do Windows, finger.exe, para recuperar a carga maliciosa do servidor controlado pelos criminosos. O uso dessa ferramenta oficial da Microsoft ajuda a evitar detecção por antivírus, que geralmente confiam em programas nativos do sistema. A carga útil recebida é um comando PowerShell que, seguindo o manual do malware SocGholish, usa múltiplas camadas de codificação Base64 e operações XOR para ocultar o código da próxima etapa. O script descriptografado verifica a presença de mais de 50 ferramentas de análise e indicadores de máquina virtual, se encontrados, interrompe imediatamente a execução. O malware também verifica se o computador está conectado a um domínio corporativo ou é uma máquina doméstica, enviando essas informações junto com uma lista de antivírus instalados para o servidor dos criminosos. ## Empresas recebem trojan completo Se o sistema comprometido estiver marcado como associado a um domínio corporativo, a cadeia de ataque culmina com a implantação do ModeloRAT, um trojan para Windows baseado em Python com recursos completos. O malware usa criptografia RC4 para comunicações de comando e controle, configura persistência usando o Registro do Windows e permite executar binários, DLLs, scripts Python e comandos PowerShell. O ModeloRAT implementa um sistema inteligente de comunicação com três modos de operação: intervalo padrão de 5 minutos em operação normal, polling rápido de 150 milissegundos em modo ativo, e intervalo estendido de 15 minutos após falhas consecutivas para evitar detecção. O trojan também pode se auto-atualizar ou encerrar ao receber comandos específicos dos operadores. Já usuários em estações de trabalho independentes recebem apenas a mensagem "TEST PAYLOAD!!!!" do servidor, indicando que essa parte da campanha ainda pode estar em fase de testes. ## Como se proteger Especialistas em cibersegurança recomendam as seguintes medidas de proteção. * Desconfie mesmo de extensões na loja oficial: a presença na Chrome Web Store não garante legitimidade. Verifique reviews, número de downloads e data de criação da conta do desenvolvedor; * Nunca execute comandos sem entender: se um pop-up solicitar que você cole e execute comandos na caixa Executar do Windows, recuse. Empresas legítimas não resolvem problemas dessa forma; * Verifique extensões instaladas: acesse chrome://extensions e remova qualquer extensão que você não reconheça ou não tenha instalado intencionalmente; * Prefira desenvolvedores conhecidos: ao instalar bloqueadores de anúncios, opte por opções estabelecidas como uBlock Origin (não o Lite clonado), AdBlock ou similares com histórico comprovado; * Mantenha antivírus atualizado: soluções de segurança podem detectar comportamentos anormais mesmo de extensões aparentemente legítimas; * Se o navegador travar sem motivo aparente: não execute comandos sugeridos por pop-ups. Desinstale extensões recém-instaladas e faça uma varredura completa no sistema. Para mais notícias de segurança, acompanhe o TecMundo nas redes sociais. Inscreva-se em nosso canal do YouTube e na nossa newsletter.
www.tecmundo.com.br
April 11, 2026 at 11:15 AM
ClickFix Attacks Abuses DNS Lookup Command to Deliver ModeloRAT
ClickFix Attacks Abuses DNS Lookup Command to Deliver ModeloRAT
www.darkreading.com
March 2, 2026 at 1:37 AM
Backdoor.Mistic is a stealthy backdoor seen since April 2026, using DLL sideloading and in-memory execution in intrusions linked to Woodgnat, alongside ModeloRAT, across insurance, education, IT, and professional services. #BackdoorMistic #ModeloRAT
Backdoor.Mistic: New Backdoor May be Linked to Ransomware Access Broker
Backdoor.Mistic is a stealthy new backdoor used in cybercrime intrusions since April 2026, and it has appeared alongside ModeloRAT in activity linked to Woodgnat. The campaign relies on DLL sideloading, in-memory execution, and opportunistic targeting across sectors such as insurance, education, IT, and professional services. #BackdoorMistic #ModeloRAT #Woodgnat #Qilin
www.hendryadrian.com
June 25, 2026 at 12:45 AM
KongTuke has shifted from web lures to external Microsoft Teams chats, posing as help-desk staff to push a PowerShell command that installs ModeloRAT, with layered persistence and redundant C2. #KongTuke #ModeloRAT #MicrosoftTeams
Help-Desk Lures Drop KongTuke's Evolved ModeloRAT
KongTuke has shifted from web-only ClickFix lures to external Microsoft Teams chats, impersonating help-desk staff to push victims into running a PowerShell command that installs ModeloRAT. The campaign uses multiple Microsoft 365 tenants, redundant C2 paths, and layered persistence to survive disruption, while defenders are advised to restrict external Teams federation and hunt for portable Python in user AppData. #KongTuke #ModeloRAT #BlackBasta #MicrosoftTeams #WinPython
www.hendryadrian.com
May 15, 2026 at 9:45 AM
KongTuke is using Microsoft Teams to launch corporate breaches, tricking employees into running a malicious PowerShell command that installs ModeloRAT and enables rapid persistence. #KongTuke #MicrosoftTeams #ModeloRAT
KongTuke hackers now use Microsoft Teams for corporate breaches
KongTuke has shifted to Microsoft Teams to carry out social engineering attacks, tricking employees into running a malicious PowerShell command that installs ModeloRAT and can establish persistent access in under five minutes. ReliaQuest says the campaign uses rotating Microsoft 365 tenants, Unicode display-name tricks, and stronger persistence features, making it harder to block and remove. #KongTuke #MicrosoftTeams #ModeloRAT #ReliaQuest
www.hendryadrian.com
May 14, 2026 at 3:15 PM
New Mistic Backdoor Linked to KongTuke in ClickFix and ModeloRAT Campaigns
New Mistic Backdoor Linked to KongTuke in ClickFix and ModeloRAT Campaigns
thehackernews.com
June 25, 2026 at 9:58 AM
Hackers Hijack Microsoft Teams Accounts to Deliver ModeloRAT
Hackers Hijack Microsoft Teams Accounts to Deliver ModeloRAT
A new wave of cyberattacks is putting Microsoft Teams users on high alert across organizations worldwide. Hackers have been found hijacking Teams accounts to impersonate IT support staff and push a dangerous piece of malware called ModeloRAT directly into corporate environments, catching many organizations completely off guard and exposing serious gaps in how workplace communication tools are trusted by everyday users. This attack is part of a broader campaign tied to a threat cluster known as KongTuke, which was first publicly documented by Huntress in January of this year. The original activity involved CrashFix-style social engineering and delivered ModeloRAT through an archive hosted on Dropbox. The payload was then unpacked and executed using a bundled portable Python environment, a technique that helps the malware blend in with legitimate software activity on the infected system and avoid early detection. Analysts at Hexastrike recently investigated a new, undocumented version of this campaign and found that the attackers have significantly upgraded their approach. While the first stage of the attack follows the same general pattern seen in earlier incidents, the delivery method, execution flow, and persistence mechanisms have all changed in ways that make detection considerably harder than before. In this updated version, the threat actor contacts victims directly through fake or hijacked Microsoft Teams accounts while posing as internal IT helpdesk staff. The goal is to convince the target to run an obfuscated PowerShell command. Once executed, that command drops a ZIP archive into the system’s AppData folder, unpacks it locally, and launches the malware from a subdirectory called WPy64-31401. How ModeloRAT Evades Detection The archive that gets dropped contains a portable Python environment alongside malicious Python components. From there, the execution splits into two distinct parts: one focused on reconnaissance and the other on communicating with a remote command-and-control server. This two-part structure allows attackers to quietly gather system information while maintaining a persistent and stealthy connection back to their infrastructure, all without raising obvious red flags during normal endpoint monitoring. One of the most alarming aspects of this campaign is how effectively the malware avoids being caught. During the investigation, the samples collected had zero detections on VirusTotal, meaning the files were not flagged by any of the antivirus engines checked at the time of analysis. The malware also bypassed several major endpoint detection and response tools, which are typically a critical last line of defense in enterprise environments. Persistence is another area where this version stands apart from earlier variants. Beyond writing itself to a standard Windows startup registry key, the malware also creates a scheduled task using a randomly generated name. This makes it considerably harder for defenders to spot the malicious task among legitimate ones, and ensures the malware restarts automatically even if the registry entry gets removed. Together, these techniques show a clear and deliberate effort to stay hidden and keep running as long as possible on compromised systems. Protecting Your Organization Organizations can take several practical steps to significantly reduce the risk posed by this type of attack. One of the most straightforward moves is to review Microsoft Teams external access settings and restrict or disable messages from unknown or unverified external tenants. Since the attackers rely on reaching victims directly through Teams, limiting who can contact employees is a strong and immediate first line of defense that requires no additional tools. Security teams should also set up alerts for Dropbox downloads on corporate devices , particularly where there is no clear business need for that kind of external file access. Monitoring for ZIP file extraction inside AppData directories is another useful and practical detection approach. Since the malware relies on a portable Python environment to execute, tracking unusual instances of pythonw.exe running from user-writable paths like AppData can help surface suspicious activity early. Regularly reviewing new scheduled task registrations and registry run key changes can help catch persistence attempts before they quietly take hold. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):- Type Indicator Description IP Address 45.61.136.94 Observed ModeloRAT C2 server IP Address 64.95.10.14 Observed ModeloRAT C2 server IP Address 64.95.12.238 Observed ModeloRAT C2 server IP Address 64.95.13.76 Observed ModeloRAT C2 server IP Address 162.33.179.149 Observed ModeloRAT C2 server File Path %APPDATA%\WPy64-31401 Malware execution directory containing portable Python environment Process pythonw.exe Portable Python used to execute malicious components from AppData Note:   IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g.,  [.] ) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM . Follow us on  Google News ,  LinkedIn , and  X  to Get More Instant Updates ,  Set CSN as a Preferred Source in  Google . The post Hackers Hijack Microsoft Teams Accounts to Deliver ModeloRAT appeared first on Cyber Security News .
cybersecuritynews.com
May 12, 2026 at 3:36 PM
ClickFix Attacks Abuses DNS Lookup Command to Deliver ModeloRAT
ClickFix Attacks Abuses DNS Lookup Command to Deliver ModeloRAT
ClickFix campaigns have adapted to the latest defenses with a new technique to trick users into infecting their own machines with malware.
www.darkreading.com
February 17, 2026 at 9:45 PM
CrashFix Chrome Extension Delivers ModeloRAT Using ClickFix-Style Browser Crash Lures
CrashFix Chrome Extension Delivers ModeloRAT Using ClickFix-Style Browser Crash Lures
thehackernews.com
January 19, 2026 at 10:47 AM
New 'CrashFix' attack uses a fake ad blocker extension to crash Chrome, then tricks users into running a PowerShell command to install the 'ModeloRAT' malware. ⚠️ A clever mix of DoS and social engineering! #Malware #Chrome #SocialEngineering
Fake Ad Blocker Crashes Chrome, Tricks Users into Installing
A new malware campaign called
cyber.netsecops.io
January 20, 2026 at 5:06 PM
ClickFix Attacks Abuses DNS Lookup Command to Deliver ModeloRAT
www.darkreading.com/endpoint-sec...
ClickFix Attacks Abuses DNS Lookup Command to Deliver ModeloRAT
ClickFix campaigns have adapted to the latest defenses with a new technique to trick users into infecting their own machines with malware.
www.darkreading.com
February 17, 2026 at 8:39 PM
Be on the lookout for Mistic, a new backdoor used by ransomware broker
Researchers have identified a new backdoor program that has been used in enterprise intrusions since April and appears to be linked to an initial access broker that sells network footholds to ransomware gangs. Dubbed Mistic by researchers from Symantec, the malware program has been deployed on networks belonging to organizations from multiple sectors, including insurance, education, IT, and professional services. In some cases it has been used alongside ModeloRAT, a piece of malware written in Python that’s associated with threat actor Woodgnat, also known as KongTuke. “Woodgnat reportedly functions primarily as an IAB [initial access broker],” the Symantec researchers said in their report. “Its goal is not to deliver the final payload, but to establish highly durable remote access within an enterprise and sell this high-level access to ransomware affiliates and other attackers for a fee. The Symantec Threat Hunter Team has observed ModeloRAT being used in attacks delivering the Qilin ransomware.” Woodgnat has been operating since at least May 2024 and has served multiple ransomware gangs over the past two years, including Interlock, Rhysida, Akira, 8Base, and Black Basta. Its attacks are largely opportunistic by routing web visitors through a variety of ClickFix social engineering campaigns. ## A backdoor with credential stealing capabilities The Mistic backdoor is launched through a technique called DLL sideloading, where a legitimate executable belonging to another program is executed first and searches for a DLL of a particular name to load into memory. This is a very popular technique for avoiding detection, as many legitimate programs perform dynamic DLL searches across multiple folders and are vulnerable to DLL poisoning. Ironically in this case the attackers deliver and execute a file called MpExtMs.exe, which is digitally signed and belongs to Microsoft Defender. This file searches for a DLL called version.dll, which in turn searchers for and loads another one called EndpointDlp.dll. The attackers have named their backdoor EndpointDlp.dll so it gets loaded directly in memory. The backdoor itself reaches out to a command-and-control (C2) server and can execute code delivered from it directly in memory, without saving any file on disk. Other features include the ability to write, delete, and move files on the victim machine and to download and upload files to the C2 server. The researchers have also observed a credential-stealing .NET DLL being downloaded and executed on victims’ networks, in addition to ModeloRAT. Common system tools used by the attackers include curl, reg.exe, net.exe, PowerShell, certutil.exe, and the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMIC). “The fact that Mistic executes in memory and also has a kill switch built in means that it is very stealthy, potentially allowing for long-term, stealthy access for attackers,” the researchers said. ## ClickFix infection chains The Woodgnat group’s attack campaigns often involved tricking users into executing malicious PowerShell commands on their computers using a variety of social engineering tricks that include displaying fake CAPTCHA tests on websites and crashing the user’s browser and asking them to paste commands to fix the crash. Since April the attackers have also started messaging victims on Microsoft Teams impersonating IT support staff and guiding them through a series of malicious paste-and-run steps. “While the initial compromise may be opportunistic, the attackers profile the machines for potential interest to determine their value and if they can sell access to them,” the researchers said. The Mistic backdoor is the latest example of initial access brokers and ransomware gangs returning to the use of custom malware tools they developed in-house instead of solely relying on living-off-the-land and dual-use system administration tools. The Symantec report includes a list of indicators of compromise for this new backdoor and other malicious files and IP addresses used in the recent Woodgnat attacks.
www.csoonline.com
June 25, 2026 at 5:25 AM
Help-Desk Lures Drop KongTuke's Evolved ModeloRAT
Help-Desk Lures Drop KongTuke's Evolved ModeloRAT
reliaquest.com
May 16, 2026 at 4:54 PM