#NJECL
LightNews LightNews
tilt-tilburgu.bsky.social
📣An article by #TILTie Magdalena Brewczyńska on how the AML/CFT framework and the AI Act interact has just been published in the #NJECL! This is a very timely discussion as #AI is increasingly used for fighting financial crime.

🔗https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20322844251408680
Sage Journals: Discover world-class research
Subscription and open access journals from Sage, the world's leading independent academic publisher.
journals.sagepub.com
January 14, 2026 at 9:53 AM
epsteinweb.bsky.social
Parts 1-2/2 — EFTA00022217.jpg
#epsteinweb #efta00022217
https://epsteinweb.org
EFTA00022206 | EFTA00022217 (A.7.18] Chapter A7: Mutual Legal Assistance in Cases of Fraud was withdrawing from all such measures with effect from 1 December 2014. It then set out its intention to opt back into 35 selected measures. The measures included many mutual recognition instruments and a number ofother key instruments (eg legislation establishing Europol and Eurojust and legislation on joint investigation teams and criminal records). Twenty-nine measures, including Europol, Eurojust, and joint investigation teams were eventually re-joined. For a while, therefore, normality was resumed.' However, the UK's subsequent decision to withdraw from the EU leaves numerous issues pertaining to the future status of these instruments to be addressed within the exit negotiations.2 The UK Government has identified 'cooperating in the fight against crime and terrorism' as one of its twelve guiding principles in the 'Break negotiations? But there is no guarantee as yet that an effective legal framework for mutual recognition of judgments can be maintained, there being no precedents for many of the arrangements which need to be put in place. A significant potential stumblingblock is the role of the Court ofJustice of the EU (CJEU). As taking `control of our own laws' was a core motivator behind the decision to leave the EU, any CJEU jurisdiction in relation to UK cooperation arrangements will remain highly contentious.6 Possible alternative models of cooperation may potentially be found in the extradition agreement negotiated by Iceland and Norway with the EU.6 This requires the parties to 'keep under review' the development of the case law of the CJEU and the domestic courts of Iceland and Norway. Agreement on these issues is yet to be reached. 1 The whole episode also served to resolve the legal problems identified in Autry v Sure/lib Prosecution Authority [2012) 2 WLR 1275AC 471. pares 201-221: see above. n 9. 2 For general discussion on these issues. see V Mitsilegas, 'European Criminal Law without the United Kingdom? The Triple Paradox of Brexit' (2018) NJECL. 8(4). 437-38 and R Davidson, 'Brexit and Criminal Justice: The Future of the UK's Cooperation Relationship with the EU' [2017) Crim L R 5. 3 HM Government. `The United Kingdom's Exit From, and New Partnership with, the European Union (February 2017), Cm 9417. 4 See the House of Lords, European Union Committee. 'Brexir: Future UK—EU Security and Mice Cooperation'. 7th Report of Session 2016-17. HL Paper 77. pans 87. 5 See 'Theresa May's Brexit Speech in Full'. Mr Telegraph. 17 January 2017. 6 Council Decision 2014/835 of 27 November 2014 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic ofIceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway [20141 OJ L34311. A.7.18 The UK Government has noted that, following the UK's withdrawal from the EU, the UK will be a `third country' (external country) in its dealings with the Union. It has suggested: One option for haute EU—UK cooperation in this area would be to limit cooperation to those areas where a precedent for cooperation between the EU and third countries already exists. While this would be one possible approach, it would result in a limited patchwork of cooperation falling well short of current capabilities. It would also fall short of current channels used to assess the strategic threats facing European countries—threats that will still be shared after the UK withdraws from the EUA piecemeal approach to future UK—EU cooperation would therefore have more limited value, and would risk creating operational gaps for both the UK and for its European partners, increasing the risk for citizens across Europe.' A-7012 release 13/Jul 19 EFTA00022217
February 13, 2026 at 1:41 AM