#QUBES
If you told a systems security person that the top tier of desktop security is roughly Qubes ≈ macOS w/ lockdown mode ≈ Win11 enterprise with all the hardening enabled >> all the alternatives, they would be unsurprised but if you told the average person let alone the average techie they'd be shocked
November 21, 2026 at 2:03 AM
I'm moving towards refusing to use any non-apple/chromeOS/qubes/graphene devices for any endpoint
November 21, 2026 at 1:45 AM
BCEENET presents "Introduction to Reading Primary Scientific Papers," a newly published QUBES resource designed to help students develop essential scientific literacy skills!

Access and download this resource here: qubeshub.org/publications...

#BCEENET #UndergraduateResearch #STEMEducation
November 20, 2026 at 2:08 PM
QSB-124: Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 124: Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. ## Qubes Security Bulletin 124 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 124 ]===--- 2026-11-13 Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2 User action ------------ Continue to update normally via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents [1] in order to apply the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. Summary -------- Split-gpg2 filters incoming gpg-agent commands by parsing them and then reconstructing allowed commands, in some cases by removing or replacing some of their parts. Due to a bug, it is possible for lines to be sent that exceed the line length limit of the protocol. Combined with GnuPG's handling of such overlong lines, this allows commands to be injected that split-gpg2's filtering would normally not allow. Impact ------- In the supported split-gpg2 configuration, a malicious qube can cause the gpg-agent to display a password prompt with arbitrary text and receive the response that the user enters. Such a prompt would have the window borders of the backend (for example, vault) qube, so an attacker could use this to try to trick the user into entering a passphrase. However, if the user's PGP key does not have a passphrase, then such a request might not make sense (e.g., the user might be confused about the passphrase being requested and may not have one to provide). Moreover, in the supported configuration, the vulnerability under discussion does not allow for extracting or manipulating secret keys, since split-gpg2 uses an "extra" gpg-agent socket that has limited capabilities. Therefore, even if the user's PGP key does have a passphrase, and even if the attacker manages to steal that passphrase, the passphrase should be useless to the attacker without the secret key. In theory, this vulnerability could also be used to exploit some further hypothetical GnuPG vulnerability that normally would have been prevented by split-gpg2's filtering. Affected systems ----------------- All supported Qubes OS releases are affected. Only users of split-gpg2 (i.e., the `split-gpg2` package) are affected. All recent versions of split-gpg2 are affected. Note: split-gpg2 is a distinct component from split-gpg1 (i.e., the `qubes-gpg-split` package). Technical details ------------------ When checking incoming "D" commands in response to an "INQUIRY" from the gpg-agent, split-gpg2 allows unescaped "%" characters. When sending these to the gpg-agent, split-gpg2 correctly escapes them ("%25") as required by the protocol. This increases the lengths of lines containing such characters. Therefore, split-gpg2 can send lines that exceed the line length limit (which it correctly checks on incoming lines). When receiving overlong lines, the behavior of GnuPG's gpg-agent implementation depends on the context. For normal commands, they are treated as fatal errors. However, for "INQUIRY" responses, the command that initiated the "INQUIRY" is simply aborted with an error response. The part of the line exceeding the limit is then treated as a new line that is parsed normally as a command. While the vulnerability under discussion does not allow an attacker to extract secret keys in the supported configuration, it is possible for the user to manually set up an unsupported configuration that does allow an attacker to extract secret keys. In particular, the user can enable the `allow_keygen` option in the split-gpg2 config, as documented in the README [5]: ## Allow key generation By setting `allow_keygen = yes` in `qubes-split-gpg2.conf` you can allow the client to generate new keys. Normal usage should not need this. **Warning**: This feature is new and not much tested. Therefore it's not security supported! Again, as stated in the quoted text above, this configuration is not security supported. It is mentionned here only for the sake of completeness. Patching --------- The following packages contain security updates that address the vulnerabilities described in this bulletin: For Qubes 4.3, in templates used for split-gpg2: - split-gpg2 package, version 1.1.16 These packages will migrate from the security-testing repositories to the current (stable) repositories after being tested by the community. This testing period is intended to catch bugs affecting Qubes OS stability before the packages reach the broader userbase. By default, the security-testing repositories are disabled in both dom0 and templates. If you wish to receive security updates faster at the risk of encountering more bugs, you can enable the security-testing repositories either temporarily (for a single update) or permanently. [2] Dom0, templates, and standalones each have their own security-testing repositories, which can be enabled independently of one another. [3][4] If you do not have the relevant security-testing repositories enabled while security updates are in security-testing, you must wait until they migrate to the current (stable) repositories, which generally takes one to two weeks but may be expedited in urgent cases. Once the packages are available to your Qubes OS system, you should install them as described in the "User action" section above. After you have installed the packages listed above, you must shut down the relevant templates and restart all split-gpg2 backend qubes. Credits -------- This issue was reported by Atrate. References ----------- [1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html [2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html#updates [3] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/advanced-topics/how-to-install-software-in-dom0.html#testing-repositories [4] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-install-software.html#testing-repositories [5] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-app-linux-split-gpg2/blob/main/README.md -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/ **Source:** qsb-124-2026.txt ## Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmr3JqkACgkQ1lWk8hgw 4GoU2A/9EBa2FEZyDuQSjtCB4/7JkxlgeuLFz6HHQEr/PzmpooLruG/M3MThyhgC JDCThbLJ0OWWM56H3738vOSow5zAd+6ePLKi7/K+5AMP5KBv84SxbedKr2a3DpaD eGlrU2P6kY5TY5A5wFieM55yd+8AWI9eCWz8B9PkkvUMW0yESxJOKsoEIP/TCkU+ H7ywa8MAtBIZgRz4T8qE28i/Z78ixtWSJRA3K5ss/x5SN1+mnBlycc/vnupV0zU2 JXZUzwWRg9Jz6aqZTyGo6dnNuyT1ZMcEiMwkp3dF8zTVgcovofQXvs77wdthNQW9 IcqoKnx9tPWgkeyI73rAOfemZpzPIDLu8S7BfiI7hQTh15xeV3NPf5HqPpi7m44A xTDe1H8X0GzVGUkO7Vhfh6CBmYKPpdRu79E6Z2H28ki03BYX75Cn1u0d0e42WNWu dqpdNF3YeNHkPrlb/mTbvhURlb95bs05cVJgb9Ec8KCJNfvt7bJUFJMxxtAwUs7M L+SwA4xuRl0y4eiozjkMkmUGaR4NkUEXhFnZytoGa9mpMvqwqe5aIHCwLsNsCefc OUhzTG3Wq7t/tfHSEP5GuoeSr8QZ1iH67zcovG9Wvxs8yaIMW6b8yPZxlSiV7LW7 g2wdyIyU6jMz/ISQqs2HztU/Lvukt4I0UESjSpie+Nv25mkyaos= =QjNH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **Source:** qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.marmarek ## Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmr3KJEACgkQSsGN4REu FJDxgQ//ZPSxOO3Nrb/X2apDsAHJDi2JdPd25NzIk1VCBgcO0iYbbhWlDZEY5MqY XJBrZTGdTwSHvQAjDf8mbJc0FOrUhrDA93SnhT77F0F9DBdQ+bcznnNXQfVOe7fp Zs5AUnlq5oU0eJJz48vlmbWQ3mtZcJIWDWfwojB6YnVWEEQ4kv4AIHfiv0lAvAca dMzIGWOfSwL2Vfr4RYvmVcHvT0msMOzS6UohsEvniijaU2WIRHz++XwksQD32UdQ wEFS56Eupz2yYs5bqqgrj0S0RG9ub041qfaHNbuWwsXHiwIvNkRAs7qioTIYlbaD tkdcTyOobjf+r42dEXS0mei/acHnpg4Dhd06Z55dF2bVC4YqnUPHsLkRsV8G0Uh3 FkX04NqkuUgmimWG/Ivh4TJTI6qB+y+Res1vuMe6A/mKCQ8QmwefpMbFzAeJtaT9 7coJ4FtUX3QXQztr41rCq41jeVvid+I+kWiJIYMbA1pQIBbgXZZcYnzWQSaOIFoc yt8e/nk8asi181xOSrBEH9TBguC9h9uTly2zIZKqaQJLDSCxZTtEOGtrNWPFFtfV dbt0y7OXu0IkhKJiy2N3LISkpO/OH/5Kq0SE7PORmrYH889X+rsNqDPm03re7XhQ SY42aAYOTM6/ADcWKBpEArgfT3OOeKQDzgGsHmbD1oVyTYEc7hk= =gBjb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **Source:** qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.simon ## What is the purpose of this announcement? The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published. ## What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)? A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. ## Why should I care about QSBs? QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs. ## What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs? A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures. ## Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic? A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project. ## How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB? The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with `git` and `gpg` installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.) 1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.: $ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc' gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 (For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.) 2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: `gpg>` indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.) $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494 gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key gpg> fpr pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 3. **Important:** At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you _must_ authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. **Do not skip this step!** The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from _multiple independent sources in several different ways_ and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key. **Tip:** After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future. 4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with `q`. gpg> trust pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.) 1 = I don't know or won't say 2 = I do NOT trust 3 = I trust marginally 4 = I trust fully 5 = I trust ultimately m = back to the main menu Your decision? 5 Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct unless you restart the program. gpg> q 5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo. $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'... remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done. remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done. remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done. remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591 Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done. Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done. 6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.) $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/* gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported gpg: Total number processed: 17 gpg: imported: 16 gpg: unchanged: 1 gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u 7. Verify signed Git tags. $ cd qubes-secpack/ $ git tag -v `git describe` object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 type commit tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6 tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100 Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. The `[full]` indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK. 8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.: $ cd QSBs/ $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] $ cd ../canaries/ $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each `gpg --verify` command should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. For this announcement (QSB-124), the commands are: $ gpg --verify qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-124-2026.txt $ gpg --verify qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-124-2026.txt You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-124 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
www.qubes-os.org
November 14, 2026 at 10:31 PM
I am now getting back into INFOSEC!

I will be uploading my Qubes Rootkit Collection to github.

github.com/loneicewolf/...

#github #rootkit #qubes #qubes-os #qubesos #infosec #cybersec #information-security #security

Take care everyone!
(its empty now, but ill upload!)
GitHub - loneicewolf/QUBES-ROOTKIT: My Rootkit Collection for Qubes [4.3.2]
My Rootkit Collection for Qubes [4.3.2]. Contribute to loneicewolf/QUBES-ROOTKIT development by creating an account on GitHub.
github.com
November 8, 2026 at 8:22 AM
Oh wow!
what distro? :D

(i use fedora/qubes myself! just went from debian)
November 9, 2026 at 5:10 PM
XSAs released on 2026-11-10
The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS **is affected**. ## XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs **do affect** the security of Qubes OS: * XSA-524: See QSB-123. * XSA-525: See QSB-123. ## XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs **do not affect** the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: * XSA-529: Qubes OS does not use XAPI. * XSA-530: Qubes OS does not use XAPI. * XSA-531: Denial of service only. ## XSAs that are still under investigation The Qubes security team is still analyzing the security implications of the following XSA: * XSA-532 Once the status of this XSA has been determined, we will update this announcement and the XSA tracker. ## About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only _positive_ confirmation that certain XSAs _do_ affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide _negative_ confirmation that other XSAs do _not_ affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
www.qubes-os.org
November 11, 2026 at 10:31 PM
QSB-123: AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525)
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 123: AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. ## Qubes Security Bulletin 123 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 123 ]===--- 2026-11-10 AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525) User action ------------ Continue to update normally via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents [1] in order to apply the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. Summary -------- On 2026-11-10, the Xen Project published the security advisories below. XSA-524 [5] "AMD IOMMU Out-of-Bounds Device Table Read": | With AMD IOMMUs, the OS or Hypervisor chooses the position and size of | the Device Table, which holds the main configuration information for | devices. | | AMD have disclosed a vulnerability in some IOMMUs, whereby under | specific circumstances they read beyond the size chosen by the OS or | Hypervisor. This gets interpreted as valid configuration data for | certain devices. | | For more information, see: | https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3060.html XSA-525 [6] "x86: Transient Scheduler Attacks (update)": | AMD have discovered further properties of Transient Scheduler Attacks. | | The previously published XSA-471 dealt with two TSA variants, TSA-SQ | and TSA-L1 on Zen3 and Zen4 CPUs. For details, see XSA-471. | | AMD had previously said that Zen5 CPUs were not vulnerable to TSA-SQ and | TSA-L1. This statement has been corrected, and is being tracked as | AMD-SB-7073 using the existing CVE-2024-36350 and CVE-2024-36357. | | AMD have also disclosed a new TSA variant, TSA-Fill, which is being | tracked as AMD-SB-3031 and CVE-2026-0004. | | For more information, see: | https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-471.html | https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/resources/bulletin/technical-guidance-for-mitigating-transient-scheduler-attacks.pdf | https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7073.html | https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3031.html Impact ------- XSA-524: On affected systems, a malicious qube may be able to compromise Qubes OS by writing to arbitrary memory pages. XSA-525: On affected systems, a malicious qube may be able to leak data from other qubes in the system. Affected systems ----------------- XSA-524: Some AMD EPYC CPUs are affected (see AMD-SB-3060 [7] for details). Only systems with a specific device configuration are affected (see XSA-524 [5] for details). XSA-525: AMD Zen 5 CPUs are affected. In both cases, Intel CPUs are not affected. Patching --------- The following packages contain security updates that address the vulnerabilities described in this bulletin: For Qubes 4.3, in dom0: - Xen packages, 4.19.6-4 These packages will migrate from the security-testing repositories to the current (stable) repositories after being tested by the community. This testing period is intended to catch bugs affecting Qubes OS stability before the packages reach the broader userbase. By default, the security-testing repositories are disabled in both dom0 and templates. If you wish to receive security updates faster at the risk of encountering more bugs, you can enable the security-testing repositories either temporarily (for a single update) or permanently. [2] Dom0, templates, and standalones each have their own security-testing repositories, which can be enabled independently of one another. [3][4] If you do not have the relevant security-testing repositories enabled while security updates are in security-testing, you must wait until they migrate to the current (stable) repositories, which generally takes one to two weeks but may be expedited in urgent cases. Once the packages are available to your Qubes OS system, you should install them as described in the "User action" section above. After you have installed the packages listed above, you must restart dom0 in order for the security updates to take effect. If you use Anti Evil Maid, you must reseal your secret passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 changes when Xen binaries are updated. Credits -------- See the original Xen Security Advisories. [5][6] References ----------- [1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html [2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html#updates [3] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/advanced-topics/how-to-install-software-in-dom0.html#testing-repositories [4] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-install-software.html#testing-repositories [5] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-524.html [6] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-525.html [7] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3060.html -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/ **Source:** qsb-123-2026.txt ## Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmrzl3MACgkQ1lWk8hgw 4GqYnQ//Yo6uC1GLCd2Ae0psbahg6r3hxSYbOFu8IV6+UbdCkDc1PMNPSqA9f+/s n+O8HqQDZH1cFwfBs6OmIXlWTM+vxeh4wYCUfyIxzpOvDqHtxWWbHn0JctBng8+L KmJrTqeofRulvSOffK5DjNel/IbaaqbJ/ZY44P2+9wxTAUJqueGO8LhAeacwAPLW F9NR3+pez0FeHZvCEq/DnLlGbpyXv66jO65vXR5w5WkOiscMZV1f1mr88nj/muAj xu46I5eGj+SB3Ta8JwSnr6LMngkYlj+0a++vAn9Iz2upegr0q4suKUV1HevZphct ba6gahhXVxTs6OeKJjZxEdT9gPIxDIirCaog4fQnuHsWto0y03d+BtnMb3koKgSC Ymvaap1DADHoEyxUn642JLTJJjVl2N2IavYls7BrnM54k9xHxrcfXAf8LXxMd9qC CuLMV+pWUCr57sYTbgAPUOXKx5XosdVd3Q05w2Z6j0aTW4Wedjt/ezMIMCeckaL1 rR73/VPApjlauTlrwYDk2OnZa2V9Lo+1EKUSfrToIZBEWxWvLZbTVmMjGHD2R9gp Zkd8DjEzTGv/1Nfpk7DLPoJKkj/69CyZdgsp36rPh/sewLVBs+EzDdaVK9Ot9vCd vvNnBjIhWBA8M5Y4Wjzik7QBBkf/B6konHEjAmL+QVzBLz43Ss4= =SJ9n -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **Source:** qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.marmarek ## Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmrzkPAACgkQSsGN4REu FJCdsA/+Ltt4KzSh/h2veyqoAmjg06B73NA9Ebi7yfSrSgBBc4kb6j+/xdUD2hMv HwjVsGACi31mljopXL/Ghtj+m2lBtVzXn3rTlg312PhnswvNnRZufsRaWAS0QMso WCGclqyDhY9NvZaKrsfRysz/SxHwwPUOAVW4h+W5YUxhSzQZqwK1glc8zdD2971f zNuU+JM/VW0B0TplMq3vuzhkUuFav6vYsnzu4h+kH1ngHapsbYHkYcYXU753E0AU 5JpcI7hBtvt8/sBFHl/ZXQ01MiGlC7sb2JAN94rNTEEFBU2EDioLwgaEBn63Gwn2 kP068YENGRMfDDmwzL0pz+Xxb5zJGC+PwyMCQGzXN6kCKKcZ5oMGX7tNRY8gPQp2 O2HEjEZ03wOzN9WxLao+076l8HhtbMSVPTsUys1spERcXm0xvQhVigClCDm298iY BniTngYX7Zo9kESRzaOEKGjTrMYfZ7ZbeyQ3S6JtPydamhLiuyJBBCnw2th4P4Bd 97of5mo6PbyowaVGh++ZMPYJkwGllvBFTinBdEzctuC826BpoJ9qME2W2eEFDm4T /utp0j9PXg/+UuZsV0EImgUPTlrNya+6WuEbtflFefbarQuMPfSPE5P4lPxAFCBQ qvjbC+I4gSj6OwPrZNq5i4nLeW4Q7AOwn0Ze+7s0KFp8ftLVtro= =w665 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **Source:** qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.simon ## What is the purpose of this announcement? The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published. ## What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)? A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. ## Why should I care about QSBs? QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs. ## What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs? A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures. ## Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic? A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project. ## How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB? The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with `git` and `gpg` installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.) 1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.: $ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc' gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 (For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.) 2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: `gpg>` indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.) $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494 gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key gpg> fpr pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 3. **Important:** At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you _must_ authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. **Do not skip this step!** The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from _multiple independent sources in several different ways_ and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key. **Tip:** After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future. 4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with `q`. gpg> trust pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.) 1 = I don't know or won't say 2 = I do NOT trust 3 = I trust marginally 4 = I trust fully 5 = I trust ultimately m = back to the main menu Your decision? 5 Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct unless you restart the program. gpg> q 5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo. $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'... remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done. remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done. remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done. remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591 Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done. Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done. 6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.) $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/* gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported gpg: Total number processed: 17 gpg: imported: 16 gpg: unchanged: 1 gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u 7. Verify signed Git tags. $ cd qubes-secpack/ $ git tag -v `git describe` object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 type commit tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6 tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100 Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. The `[full]` indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK. 8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.: $ cd QSBs/ $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] $ cd ../canaries/ $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each `gpg --verify` command should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. For this announcement (QSB-123), the commands are: $ gpg --verify qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-123-2026.txt $ gpg --verify qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-123-2026.txt You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-123 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
www.qubes-os.org
November 11, 2026 at 10:31 PM
Your Whonix Updates Finished. Is Your Monero Wallet Updated Too?

Check Whonix Gateway, Workstation, Qubes templates, and separately installed Monero wallets. Learn which updater applies and where each command runs.

https://monero.love/guides/whonix-updates-monero-wallet/

#Monero #XMR #Whonix
Your Whonix Updates Finished. Is Your Monero Wallet Updated Too?
Check Whonix Gateway, Workstation, Qubes templates, and separately installed Monero wallets. Learn which updater applies and where each command runs.
monero.love
November 10, 2026 at 9:19 AM
SSD 1 : qubes os. I write from this now.
SSD 2 : AI ONLY SYSTEM.

SSD 2 will be a "ONLY AI WORKBENCH" like..I will have a *entire* OS for AI Art. And testing stuff. Without any browsers logged in and stuff.

So IF - IFF we say a malware compromises that OS..? Well..its hopefully kept there. >:D 😍
November 11, 2026 at 1:06 PM
XSAs released on 2026-11-06
The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is **not** affected. ## XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs **do affect** the security of Qubes OS: * (none) ## XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs **do not affect** the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: * XSA-526: Denial of service only. * XSA-527: Denial of service only. * XSA-528: Denial of service only. ## About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only _positive_ confirmation that certain XSAs _do_ affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide _negative_ confirmation that other XSAs do _not_ affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
www.qubes-os.org
November 8, 2026 at 10:31 PM
The patch list is the real inventory test. Xen 4.6 onward is affected, but fixes depend on XCP-ng, Qubes, Debian, and other downstreams. A vendor saying Xen is patched doesn't prove your host is. Reboots and downstream package versions matter.
November 8, 2026 at 7:15 PM
Everyone running qubes os on usb stick is masochist. Attempt 12 to install without unexpected error, always different phase error on full reinstall...

Yes, sha is ok, used dd, ... the crap is just not stable for stick or something

Fuck it i quess
November 7, 2026 at 10:34 AM
im on a sacred mission to teach trans people about qubes os
November 5, 2026 at 12:11 AM
QSB-122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)
We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. ## Qubes Security Bulletin 122 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 122 ]===--- 2026-11-06 Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1) User action ------------ If you update Qubes OS using the Qubes Update tool, continue to update normally in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. If you update Qubes OS using command-line tools instead of the Qubes Update tool, you must first update dom0 by itself (without any other qubes) via `qubes-dom0-update` in a dom0 terminal. Only after dom0 has been successfully updated should you update all Debian and Whonix templates and standalones via `qubes-vm-update` in a dom0 terminal. (The Qubes Update tool automatically handles updating in the correct order.) Do not attempt to update any qube using the `apt` command directly, as this bypasses built-in Qubes OS update security measures. Use only the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents in the order described above. [1] After updating dom0 and all Debian and Whonix templates and standalones, we recommend restarting all Debian and Whonix qubes to ensure the updates take effect. Summary -------- On 2026-11-04, the Debian security team published DSA 6607-1, "apt security update" (CVE-2026-109518) [3]: | Max Justicz discovered a vulnerability in the APT package manager. APT | can merge two different package downloads after an HTTP redirect gives | them the same URI. Improper file handling when resuming an HTTP | download allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to replace a package | after verification, resulting in the execution of arbitrary code as | root. Also see "APT-2026-11-01 security update." [4] Impact ------- An attacker who controls an update mirror or who can modify network traffic can attempt to exploit this vulnerability in order to compromise Debian and Whonix qubes. Affected systems ----------------- Qubes OS systems containing Debian and Whonix qubes are affected. Qubes OS systems containing only Fedora (or other non-APT-based) qubes are not affected. Discussion ----------- By default, the Advanced Package Tool (APT) verifies downloaded packages via signed repository metadata. This allows for using package repositories without having to trust the server hosting them or the transport method used to download them. The vulnerability under discussion breaks this mechanism. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can manipulate the packages that APT downloads and installs, potentially leading to complete compromise of the affected qube. A successful attack requires one or more of the following: - The attacker controls the server on which the repository is hosted (e.g., a third-party mirror). - The transport mechanism is not authenticated (e.g., plain HTTP), and the attacker can tamper with the connection to the server. - An independent vulnerability allows the attacker to achieve one of the above (e.g., exploiting a bug in the server or compromising a trusted certificate authority (CA) or a digital certificate issued by such an authority). In Qubes OS, Debian and Whonix qubes use HTTPS for APT repositories by default, which eliminates the second (man-in-the-middle) attack vector. (Users who have manually changed their configurations to use plain HTTP for any repositories are still affected. Users who have manually installed unofficial APT-based qubes besides Debian and Whonix are also affected.) Normally, we do not release Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) to address vulnerabilities that affect qubes only internally without affecting the rest of Qubes OS, since such vulnerabilities do not undermine the Qubes security model. (On the contrary, the security model is built on the assumption that such vulnerabilities are inevitable.) However, the vulnerability under discussion is somewhat special. While it affects qubes only internally, it could allow an attacker to compromise templates, which are used as a basis for creating other qubes, such as app and service qubes. If a template is compromised, then all the qubes based on that template will also be compromised. App qubes operate directly on user data, and service qubes can affect user privacy (e.g., Whonix and VPN proxy qubes). In Qubes OS, we take special precautions to make templates difficult to compromise. For example, we block all network connections to and from templates, with one exception: We allow templates to connect to an "update proxy" that allows the template to retrieve updates while protecting users from accidentally using templates to perform risky activities, such as browsing the web. Since the vulnerability under discussion has the potential to subvert these defenses, and since we can address it via the Qubes update system, we've decided to issue this QSB and its attendant security updates. Patching --------- The packages below contain security updates to the Qubes update tools that address the vulnerability described in this bulletin. After these updates are applied, the Qubes update tools will update APT in a safe way. For Qubes 4.3, in dom0: - qubes-core-dom0-linux 4.3.25 - qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-update 4.3.4 These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed as described in the "User action" section above. Credits -------- See the Debian and APT security advisories. [3][4] References ----------- [1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html [2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html [3] https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2026/msg00526.html [4] https://lists.debian.org/deity/2026/11/msg00005.html -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/ **Source:** qsb-122-2026.txt ## Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmrtJOsACgkQ1lWk8hgw 4Gr4dA/+J3brLV8sxzHtTP/6YxiNXEaLLcq1QLQ8NMuRpo2+zzHT+L16sHYoSiv9 gPiDRJmrQhZEo4WJrjgYSn/VGqcuG4GvZduuNLQJfEw5CZ1jBzE5mmUgI92wth9M gY2UpzKMp95k+dZEMWl7RZwhs6aT5Sld9O4D4qSlpZpl06iZ6+kX7g0LpCa+Dh/P 8ACo3cjwkiRi3oQos6AIe+oM0ET2iB8cycTwArqn6xgj31HtpF8dhlSK5UiePgfV 4JoWaNthMsu3DTvGmee91jMUXYlEPbChTt8wYlRZEwO6fyYYzGooEbj265W9nB32 w8W2KNWY0ydNOwOgSNqljk8bJymZqMjErzZJJtND5M5eeIzKQJnRtEjgyNKzN5jN +ooLUOYnFDtOThC0AEflngWPbcWmFbOdWwgbL/qHM8ijhT8TS4MPkukw38R6Skb3 1/xS2hFqUgT5BFlYmnpfBudH0R4KrnG86RetA2gzX9FfCI7l/k8frGkK0NvxsBAE 8G0WbtRBtX9htCsDVVYcDIfaIol7Xvx56mQVEf65MCAFoprJX9NUihFx5QH1uV5i Pxea8r7jXEKJ6DPnHZpPAUN4Xil7ypfGamYEhayjtUBWWgB8xtzQhnuqNKF6HlSH MGp/o/wdnRuSpTFoXCNQTPHpFwX0rAzo/qm0cc8hHP8YPgI4Okg= =mtb+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **Source:** qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.marmarek ## Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmrtL5oACgkQSsGN4REu FJBKhA//YYHZVnYZG1e3mDBIrr6E8gtKC3b3snZxDoVuikpQbvB5eWaGXfnabOKi hoJnC9whJ3iqHwcM74cZz3S63ech+uywNYQxpjR40OHwNXUSwtlRMFlmXQVhHG4L ejn5xUO373IZGzqFzmlTpYqvHYLE6XqkQRhFTXNBK2w2KeqofkYcU2EI61FWXqaw N12ojrfqYmWGpjndGguA4eax3Ss+zOjiyVKrMMh6A8hAeRNSXuV70hzcEEmPeS4B IFLIUqanVD6mp+69wwh0JGlB57FinQ3QrIWX8iWYhOWEqJ5wpB47f/vzJIMDSsk5 wnnuY0zac0AbqMkByscrzp3eF+cnrzyTZ3BPwhu+xi+6uY3VVaTB6m7b5UMnl8z3 ov/3MnsdUKKUbGgvz+TjW8q1opdAnH1WifjbqIQcMkbdoz3NLnVhJjaitnoma5eW 2CMQsvp5V8OVHYVE2frzNZlmV9xs/Q5V9WxdGyk+L2paZYykHNOGIY35wFomIwQC iQlFa4dDsHQaqosXz19rM6hwFqdmOmJDfwv9r1tddnqPKQjr9YVhX6/cLd18NTAq cYLO2b3I6KXifKXLD3oWqgNxN9b/XAAwTQRKthSNBQ/rYUK/0jwDMTcPdWGpVeWc VCcJ3Rtvn46qs8o0+7Ih6Gi0UsYMUkE1RjtPqKlatGb8YIxM5x8= =w6BW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **Source:** qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.simon ## What is the purpose of this announcement? The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published. ## What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)? A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. ## Why should I care about QSBs? QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs. ## What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs? A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures. ## Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic? A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project. ## How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB? The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with `git` and `gpg` installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.) 1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.: $ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc' gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 (For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.) 2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: `gpg>` indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.) $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494 gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key gpg> fpr pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 3. **Important:** At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you _must_ authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. **Do not skip this step!** The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from _multiple independent sources in several different ways_ and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key. **Tip:** After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future. 4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with `q`. gpg> trust pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.) 1 = I don't know or won't say 2 = I do NOT trust 3 = I trust marginally 4 = I trust fully 5 = I trust ultimately m = back to the main menu Your decision? 5 Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct unless you restart the program. gpg> q 5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo. $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'... remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done. remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done. remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done. remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591 Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done. Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done. 6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.) $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/* gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported gpg: Total number processed: 17 gpg: imported: 16 gpg: unchanged: 1 gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u 7. Verify signed Git tags. $ cd qubes-secpack/ $ git tag -v `git describe` object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 type commit tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6 tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100 Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. The `[full]` indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK. 8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.: $ cd QSBs/ $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] $ cd ../canaries/ $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each `gpg --verify` command should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. For this announcement (QSB-122), the commands are: $ gpg --verify qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-122-2026.txt $ gpg --verify qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-122-2026.txt You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-122 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.
www.qubes-os.org
November 6, 2026 at 10:32 PM
Is there any reason I shouldn't update all the way and switch to Qubes?
November 3, 2026 at 9:07 PM
well, Qubes is a giant pain in the ass, so there's that
November 3, 2026 at 11:01 PM
7 Linux distros built for hacking and defense. Offensive: Kali, Parrot Security, BlackArch. Privacy: Tails. Blue team: Security Onion. Malware analysis: REMnux. Security by isolation: Qubes OS. Only test systems you own or are authorized to test.
November 5, 2026 at 9:02 PM
November 2, 2026 at 5:52 PM
🐧 **Fedora and Red Hat: Qubes OS Summit 2026, Slop, and Ansible**

mostly redhat.com

📰 Source: Tux Machines
🔗 Link: https://tuxmachines.org/n/2026/10/31/Fedora_and_Red_Hat_Qubes_OS_Summit_2026_Slop_and_Ansible.shtml
Tux Machines — Fedora and Red Hat: Qubes OS Summit 2026, Slop, and Ansible
news.tuxmachines.org
November 2, 2026 at 7:17 PM
[注意]Xen に欠陥2件(XSA-523)、悪意ある VM が他の VM のメモリを読み書き
Xen ハイパーバイザーの grant copy の欠陥(CVE-2026-102703、CVE-2026-102704)。Xen 4.6 以降のすべての版が対象で、勧告によると知られている回避策はない。XCP-ng と Qubes OS は修正版を出した。
https://chuiho.net/posts/xen-xsa-523-grant-copy-guest-escape/ #Xen #仮想化
Xen に欠陥2件(XSA-523)、悪意ある VM が他の VM のメモリを読み書き
Xen ハイパーバイザーの grant copy の欠陥(CVE-2026-102703、CVE-2026-102704)。Xen 4.6 以降のすべての版が対象で、勧告によると知られている回避策はない。XCP-ng と Qubes OS は修正版を出した。
chuiho.net
November 4, 2026 at 3:32 PM
and i think i will install..
#qubes on this one? because..Why not? I am getting Into #Infosec anyway soo...

Well!

take care everyone!
November 2, 2026 at 5:45 PM
XSAs released on 2026-11-03
The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS **is affected**. ## XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs **do affect** the security of Qubes OS: * XSA-523: See QSB-121. ## XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs **do not affect** the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: * (none) ## About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only _positive_ confirmation that certain XSAs _do_ affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide _negative_ confirmation that other XSAs do _not_ affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.
www.qubes-os.org
November 3, 2026 at 10:30 PM
Dear Qubes OS Berlin users!

Let us meet up once again this *Thursday*, *5.11*, from 6-8pm at @xHain_hackspace with exciting Qubes OS (summit) topics!

Laptop 💻️️️ (to try out Qubes OS) and snacks 🍪 are provided!

All creatures welcome! <3
#berlin
#meetup
#qubesos
November 2, 2026 at 8:00 PM