#RAdmin
Can anyone tell me if this new Radmin/Hamachi/Parsec/etc alternative is slopcoded? It's called Porthole, and it's free on Steam. Seems suspicious to me, but it'd be a godsend if it works. If I'm understanding correctly, it kinda solves the issue of empty public lobbies for indie #fgc games, I […]
Original post on todon.eu
todon.eu
November 11, 2026 at 12:38 AM
LOLRMM angle: modified Radmin Server installed silently with rsetup64.exe /intsetup, later in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Radmin\ with FamItrfc.exe --runtimechk run every 3 hours by the \RadminComponentRuntime task.
November 2, 2026 at 11:04 PM
Prevention: with free MagicSword.io, add custom rules to prevent FamItrfc.exe, FamItrf2.exe, NitroPromotion.exe, Nitro_Scan2PDFApp.exe and an unapproved Radmin from running where they do not belong: magicsword.io
MagicSword | Threat-Driven Application Control
Stop malware-free attacks with agentless threat-driven application control. Block what attackers abuse before your EDR flags it. Free up to 100 endpoints.
www.magicsword.io
November 2, 2026 at 11:04 PM
💫 Спаренная эволюция в Spore: кооперативный мод после 20 лет ожидания

Фанаты выпустили кооперативный мод для Spore, позволяющий играть вдвоём-вчетвером начиная с клеток и заканчивая космическими цивилизациями.

• От 2 до 4 игроков на всех стадиях эволюции
• Работает через Hamachi, Radmin или PortH…
November 1, 2026 at 4:20 PM
hamachi or radmin vpn are options too, i think. they bypass that crap
October 22, 2026 at 9:42 PM
October 20, 2026 at 10:50 AM
@radmin@limepeeps.perchinup.top
We have a peertube if you want an acc there I can give you like 100gb quota
October 20, 2026 at 10:41 AM
[1/2] AOMEI Backupper: server di update manomessi per pochi minuti (28/05, 16 e 20/07), client ingannati a eseguire un backdoor (CROSSROAD → SHINYROAD via Radmin firmato). Nessuna CVE: config non verificata. Attore UNC7017 (GTIG). #infosec
October 20, 2026 at 7:07 AM
[2/2] Hunt aprile-luglio: task/Radmin anomali, traffico verso storage-data[.]com e 8.210.84[.]56. Il fix server non bonifica gli host infetti. Blocca SMB/WebDAV in uscita. www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/securit...
October 20, 2026 at 7:07 AM
during three short windows on may 28, july 16, and july 20, clients checking in during those minutes pulled the malicious files. those files fetched a downloader called crossroad, then a signed radmin install and the shinyroad backdoor, with an open-source command-and-control framework on some
October 20, 2026 at 7:14 AM
Bu akşam (Pazar) 20.00'de Kick'teyiz, seyircilerle beraber BFME 2 oynayacağız. Radmin VPN kurup, 1.09v3.1 patch'iyle siz de oyuncu olarak katılabilirsiniz.
October 18, 2026 at 12:04 PM
Look. @thehackernews.bsky.social / @mandiant.com: UNC7017 poisoned AOMEI Backupper updates for five-to-ten minutes, then restored clean files. Poll in the wrong window, install CROSSROAD and a Radmin-sideloaded backdoor. Your backup app became the breach. (burp) day290.022
October 17, 2026 at 1:32 PM
Radmin 3 Remote Control - 50-License Package 商業授權(下載版,單一序號,永久授權版,50部遠端電腦授權,ESD) - 最受信賴的遠端存取軟體產品之一!

目前最安全、最受信賴的遠端存取軟體產品之一。全球有超過 100,000 家公司都選擇使用 #Radmin 為雇員提供 #遠端技術支援。無論是 #政府、 #軍隊 ,還是 #技術專家 ,亦或是 #金融 #組織,都信賴 Radmin 的強大功能。Radmin 是每一位 IT 專業人士的必備工具。

www.cheerchain.com.tw/zh/product_2...
祺荃企業有限公司 您可以信賴的軟體供應商
祺荃企業有限公司 您可以信賴的軟體供應商 FB
www.cheerchain.com.tw
October 16, 2026 at 9:39 AM
🤖 AOMEI Backupper's update servers were tampered with 3x (May–Jul 2026), 5–10 min windows. Copies that polled then got a backdoor: CROSSROAD loader → signed Radmin + rogue DLL → SHINYROAD implant. UNC7017, 11 countries.
https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/attackers-tampered-with-aomei.html
October 16, 2026 at 5:47 PM
AOMEI Backupper Update Servers Served a Backdoor in Windows of Five to Ten Minutes
## TL;DR * **what:** The group GTIG tracks as UNC7017 changed AOMEI Backupper's unsigned update and notification files on AOMEI's own servers for minutes at a time, and any client that polled during those minutes downloaded and ran a backdoor. * **impact:** Affected machines got the CROSSROAD downloader, the SHINYROAD implant launched through signed Radmin with a planted DLL, and in some cases Adaptix C2. A July 20 change could also leak NetNTLMv2 hashes without running any program. * **fix:** AOMEI told Mandiant on July 29 that it had taken corrective action on its servers, but that does not remove the implant from machines already compromised, and neither report names which Backupper versions are affected. * **who:** Any organization running AOMEI Backupper, and possibly AnyViewer, which uses the same update flow, with confirmed victims in IT services, telecom and higher education across 11 countries. For three confirmed stretches of five to ten minutes between May and July 2026, AOMEI's own update servers handed out a backdoor. Any copy of AOMEI Backupper that checked for updates inside one of those windows downloaded and ran the attacker's package with the privileges of the AOMEI service. Copies that checked a minute before or a minute after got clean files. Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), Mandiant and ManageEngine's Threat Analysis Lab disclosed the campaign this week and attribute it to a cluster GTIG tracks as UNC7017. AOMEI says it has fixed its servers. That fix does not touch machines that were already compromised. ## Two Unsigned Text Files Were Enough AOMEI Backupper is Windows backup and disk-cloning software from AOMEI Technology, a vendor registered in Hong Kong. Like AOMEI's AnyViewer remote-desktop tool, it runs background services that poll AOMEI servers over HTTPS for updates and promotional pop-ups. Two files drive that process. down_html.ini names the update package and the checksum used to verify it. Notifycfg.ini tells the pop-up service what to display and what to run. Neither file is cryptographically signed. The checksum that is supposed to prove the download is genuine sits inside the same unsigned file that names the download, so whoever controls the file controls both. ManageEngine's lab stresses that nothing was exploited: no vulnerability, no user interaction, just an installed and running copy of Backupper. The attacker edited two text files, the client pulled the package into its own folder, and the notification file executed it. On the machines the lab examined, the inherited privileges were enough for system-wide installation, though the lab said that depends on how the AOMEI service is configured. > ⚠️ **Why point-in-time checks missed it** — GTIG called this the first supply chain compromise it has seen built on windows this short, "effectively evading traditional point-in-time triage and automated file scanning." A responder or scanner that fetched the update files outside a window saw only genuine content. ## Three Windows, Eleven Countries GTIG and Mandiant confirmed three tampering windows and said others likely occurred without being observed: * May 28, 2026: 10 minutes, 05:40 to 05:50 UTC * July 16, 2026: 6 minutes, 08:33 to 08:39 UTC * July 20, 2026: 5 minutes, 10:35 to 10:40 UTC GTIG describes the targeting as opportunistic: whoever polled during the window was hit. Its telemetry found affected organizations in IT services, telecommunications and higher education in Australia, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States. It gave no victim total and expects the real number to be higher. AnyViewer uses the same update mechanism, but every detection described involves Backupper. Neither report lists affected versions. ManageEngine examined version 8.3.0. GTIG names no country or known actor behind UNC7017. ## The Payload Chain: CROSSROAD to SHINYROAD to Adaptix The first stage, a downloader GTIG calls CROSSROAD, unpacks a bundle into a local Radmin folder, creates a scheduled task that runs every three hours, and deletes itself. The bundle contains a genuine, signed copy of Radmin, the commercial remote-administration tool. ManageEngine found Radmin staged but never activated: no listener, no configuration, no new account. Its purpose is to act as a trusted loader. The scheduled task launches signed Radmin, which side-loads an attacker-built DLL placed beside it, which loads the SHINYROAD implant. SHINYROAD provides a remote shell and can fetch and execute new code on command. It beacons to one hard-coded address with no fallback, so blocking that single address cuts the operator off. CROSSROAD is selective. It checks geolocation and exits on machines in China, and ManageEngine says it also exits when it detects specific security agents. On hosts that passed those checks, GTIG later saw a second stage pushed on top of SHINYROAD: the open-source Adaptix C2 framework, disguised as Nitro PDF software. ## July 20: Credential Theft With No Code Execution The July 20 window carried a second technique. The tampered Notifycfg.ini opened an invisible one-pixel pop-up pointing at a file on an attacker server over WebDAV. Rendering it can cause Windows to send the logged-in user's NetNTLMv2 authentication response to the attacker, who can crack it offline or attempt to relay it. Nothing appears on screen. Because no program has to run, a host where application control or EDR blocked the backdoor could still have leaked that hash. > **Two separate exposures** — A machine that polled on July 20 faces two questions: was the implant installed, and was a user's NetNTLMv2 response sent out? Blocking the first does not rule out the second. ## Disclosure Timeline ManageEngine's endpoint product first flagged the activity on May 28, when it recorded AOMEI Backupper installing Radmin at two unrelated customers in different countries. A customer escalated it on June 7, and the lab notified AOMEI the same day. AOMEI first said the content had been intercepted and modified in transit. The lab rejected that: both machines fetched the files over HTTPS from AOMEI's servers across different countries and networks, through the normal update path. In mid-July, ManageEngine's monitors caught a window as it happened, confirming the tampered content was being served from AOMEI's side. Mandiant notified AOMEI on July 17 and shared indicators. On July 29, AOMEI told Mandiant it had taken corrective action. The reports do not say how the servers were compromised, and the update design itself, unsigned config files carrying their own checksums, has not been described as changed. ## RedEye Assessment This campaign shows that software trust depends on how updates are verified, not only on code quality. Backupper had no exploitable bug. It had an update channel that trusted any server-side content, and that runs with elevated privileges on backup infrastructure, which usually touches every critical volume. UNC7017 needed fewer than 25 confirmed minutes of server access to reach organizations in 11 countries, and short windows defeated the retrospective scanning most teams rely on. The server-side fix closes the door going forward. It does nothing for hosts that polled during a window, which keep a scheduled task, a side-loaded DLL and a live implant until someone finds them. With no published version range and an admission that more windows probably occurred, the exposure period should be treated as May through late July 2026, not as three isolated windows. _Originally published on RedEye Threat Intelligence._
dev.to
October 16, 2026 at 8:15 PM
@radmin@limepeeps.perchinup.top
Yeah that's less necessary I don't use it
October 12, 2026 at 10:03 AM
@radmin@limepeeps.perchinup.top i never got a case for it (big mistake) dropped it on the concrete multiple times and now it has packing tape holding it up with electrical tape to prevent the corners from peeling up
October 11, 2026 at 11:46 PM
eu uso o TLauncherr, ta pra entrar com o Radmin
October 9, 2026 at 4:59 PM
Ennard

Эннард (англ. Ennard) — аниматроник-гибрид, собранный из Фантайм-аниматроников, цель которых состоит в побеге из подземного центра аренды.

#Модели #Minecraft #radmin
October 5, 2026 at 9:40 AM
@radmin dang, that's cute!

I really don't have much to add about gaming being better, but I definitely think it's changed so much
September 26, 2026 at 11:51 PM
And to correct another claim: I was already DONE with RA before I ever spoke to RAdmin the way I did. I've never hidden those messages or that I fought fire with fire when I thought people were treating others badly. Criticise my response if you want, but don't rewrite the timeline.
September 26, 2026 at 11:35 AM
@radmin@limepeeps.perchinup.top Nice. Did you watch end of evangelion? if not you should it's an amazing movie.
September 17, 2026 at 10:56 AM
i do like my tools section at least. it looks alright i guess
September 13, 2026 at 8:04 AM