#TOmayor
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sababausa.bsky.social
fiery dissent from Roberts
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES LEOPARDS V. FACES, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY [OCTOBER TERM, 2026] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SO-TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dis-senting. The President ordered a leopard to eat my face to make way for a new, privately funded face. Eating of the face has proceeded apace for the better part of a year. That face-eating is likely unlawful. Pursuant to its ple-nary constitutional authority over the District of Columbia, Congress has explicitly prohibited the eating of any “judge or justice’s face” in the District by an enumerated list of large predators, which includes leopards. See Pub. L. No. 108–191. The leopard is a Panthera pardus which is sink-ing its teeth into my greasy face at this very instant. Yet Congress has not passed any law resembling express au-thority for the leopard to eat my face. The Government points to two statutory provisions in support of eating my face. The first authorizes Congress to appropriate funds for “the care, maintenance, repair, alter-ation, refurnishing, improvement, air-conditioning, heat-ing, and lighting” of my face. This fiscal year, Congress ap-propriated
August 31, 2026 at 9:17 PM
conniewinch.bsky.social
Ruin a band with a Supreme Court Justice.

Collective Soul-tomayor
chrissteller.bsky.social Chris Steller @chrissteller.bsky.social · Sep 24
Ruin a band with a Supreme Court Justice

Kagans N' Roses
jel1975.bsky.social JoEbLo Portmanteau @jel1975.bsky.social · Sep 24
Ruin a band with a Supreme Court Justice

Rehnquisted Sister
September 24, 2025 at 2:32 AM
percivalpenman.bsky.social
So I see. And not a Sonia Sole-tomayor, sadly smh
July 1, 2025 at 11:25 PM
authorpcollins.bsky.social
#BradBradford #BradfordForMayor #BradBradfordForMayor #MayorBradford #FutureMayor #Bradford26 #TorontoElection #TorontoMayor #TOpoli #TorontoPolitics #CityHall #TOmayor www.youtube.com/shorts/23hGI...
September 3, 2026 at 5:25 PM
theubiquitousj-man.bsky.social
Brad Bradford flip flops more than Doug Ford!
🙄

"Chow challenger Bradford wants to remove Toronto's Bloor St. bike lane that he voted for"...

www.nationalobserver.com/2026/08/12/n...

#ToPoli
#ToMayor
#TorontoMayor🗳️
#BradBradfordIsLyingToYou🤥
#NeverBradford🚫
Chow challenger wants to remove Toronto's Bloor St. bike lane
Mayoral hopeful Brad Bradford said he would remove bike lanes along Bloor Street West between South Kingsway and Resurrection Road and replace them with vehicle lanes.
www.nationalobserver.com
August 12, 2026 at 2:48 PM
mikesacks.bsky.social
What
Trump’s DACA rescission https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-587_5ifl.pdf ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV. GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and So-TOMAYOR, J., joined as to all but Part IV. SoTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part. THoMAs, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which ALITO and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. ALITo, J., and KAVANAUGH, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Trump 1.0’s census citizenship question https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-966_bq7c.pdf ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III, IV-B, and IV-C, in which THoMAs, ALiro, GORSUCH, and KAV-ANAUGH, JJ., joined; with respect to Part IV-A, in which THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined; and with respect to Part V, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GoRSUCH and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG, SoTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Biden’s clean power plan https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. GoRsucH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SoTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. Biden’s student loan forgiveness https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITo, GoRsucH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J.. filed a concurring opinion. KagAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JacksoN, JJ., joined
November 16, 2025 at 3:52 PM
alt-text.bsky.social
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15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:36 AM
hippy56.bsky.social
June 30, 2025 Teen girls shot outside historic Stonewall Inn after NYC's Pride March
The shooting occurred Sunday night in the Greenwich Village neighborhood. An LGBTQ+ Pride parade ended in gunfire near New York City's historic Stonewall Inn onSunday night, according toMayor Eric Adams.
Pride
June 30, 2025 at 10:01 PM
alt-text.bsky.social
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15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:37 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:37 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:36 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:36 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court” agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:35 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:35 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:35 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:34 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:34 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:34 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:33 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:33 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:32 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
Alt text retrieved
15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:32 AM
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15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:32 AM
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15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:31 AM
alt-text.bsky.social
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15 of 20 Cite as: 601 U. S. (2024) SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 23-719 DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO JUSTICE TOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and USTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, the it is necessary not to decide mer Dobbs v. Jackson Wome 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen- tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized "to say what the law is” only because "[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid- ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo- rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation's federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though "[a]ll nine Members of the Court" agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,
March 5, 2024 at 1:31 AM