#VicOne
VicOne reports finding 28 zero-day vulnerabilities across physical AI tools from Google, Meta, and Nvidia using automated scanning. The findings still lack confirmed CVEs, but faster automated auditing means robotics teams can no longer leave toolchain security for later.
28 Zero-Day Findings in Under Two Days. Is Robotics Security Keeping Pace?
VicOne’s AI-assisted research reveals what faster zero-day discovery means for robot safety
spectrum.ieee.org
November 17, 2026 at 2:10 PM
28 Zero-Day Findings in Under Two Days. Is Robotics Security Keeping Pace?
_This article is brought to you by VicOne._ VicOne identified an initial set of 28 zero-day findings in less than two days using AI-assisted research across software and tools supporting the Physical AI ecosystem. These include projects developed or maintained by Google, NVIDIA, and Meta, among others. Based on initial validation, all 28 findings are classified as zero-day vulnerabilities. The count may change following vendor and vulnerability-authority review, and some findings do not yet have CVE tracking numbers. Many of these tools help teams train, simulate, test, and operate robots. Weaknesses in them could influence the models teams build, the test results they trust, and the instructions sent to robots. These findings create two demands for robotics teams: responding as AI helps uncover weaknesses faster, and assessing how each one could affect robot safety and operations. ## What AI changes about vulnerability discovery Vulnerability discovery involves examining code, tracing how systems communicate, and testing whether a suspected weakness can actually be exploited. AI can accelerate parts of this work, helping researchers analyze more software in less time. Attackers could use similar capabilities. When the weakness is a **zero-day** — previously unknown and without an available fix — faster discovery can leave teams with little time to respond. While that exposure does not necessarily mean an attack has occurred, teams still need to determine whether they use the affected software and what an attacker could access or change. ## Where the findings sit across the robot lifecycle VicOne’s findings span three stages of the robotics lifecycle: development and training, simulation and validation, and deployment and runtime. Weaknesses at each stage could affect what a robot learns, how it is tested, and how it is controlled. Figure 1. In this research set, 75% of findings involved development, training, simulation, or validation tools, highlighting risks that can arise before a robot is deployed.VicOne The following scenarios show how a compromised component could influence the robot at each stage. * **Development and training: Hidden changes can reach the finished robot ** A team downloads a pretrained model to adapt for its robot. Loading a malicious file could give an attacker access to the training system, allowing changes to training data or the model itself. A manipulated model could behave normally during routine testing but respond incorrectly to a particular object, scene, or command after deployment. The risk can enter through a tool the team trusts, before anyone attacks the robot directly. * **Simulation and validation: A passing test could give false confidence ** Importing a compromised scene or robot model could give an attacker access to the simulation environment. With sufficient control, the attacker could alter simulated sensor readings, physical conditions, or test results. A robot could then appear to pass tests that should have exposed unsafe behavior, leading the team to approve it for real-world use on the basis of misleading evidence. * **Deployment and runtime: Operators could lose visibility or control ** An attacker could exploit weaknesses to change files that influence motion planning or send malicious map data that crashes the operator’s monitoring display. Compromising a remote-operation computer could also put the instructions sent to the robot at risk. Depending on the system and its safeguards, these weaknesses could alter robot movement or leave operators unable to see what is happening and respond promptly. These are potential consequences and not demonstrated outcomes for every finding. Actual effects depend on the attacker’s access, the system’s design, and whether other safeguards prevent the changes from reaching physical behavior. In a separate demonstration, VicOne researchers provide a concrete example of a weakness affecting a protective function. The researchers exploited a vulnerability to prevent a robot’s remote-stop command from working. The case shows why teams need to test whether safeguards remain effective when the software supporting them is compromised. Video 1. VicOne researchers demonstrate a vulnerability that prevents a robot’s remote-stop command from working. VicOne ## A published patch still needs to be proven safe**** AI can shorten the search for weaknesses, but a robotics team still needs to determine whether a fix is safe to deploy. Even after a software maintainer releases a patch, teams must identify affected systems, check compatibility, and verify that the update preserves intended behavior. An earlier successful test remains useful evidence. However, a newly discovered weakness may reveal conditions that test never examined. Three questions can help teams respond: * **Where do we use the affected software?** Include training computers, simulation environments, and deployed robots. * **What could the weakness change?** Assess whether it could affect models, test results, operator visibility, or robot behavior. * **How do we verify protection?** Confirm that the fix addresses the weakness and that the updated system still operates as intended. When immediate updating is impractical, teams may need temporary safeguards, such as restricting access to an affected service, while a validated fix is prepared. ## From discovery to safer deployment As details from the 28 findings become available through coordinated disclosure, the next step is for robotics manufacturers is to connect each finding to its potential effect on development, deployment, and robot behavior. That work also requires understanding how threats could affect robot behavior and how to protect systems already in operation. VicOne Radeis helps teams identify potential zero-day vulnerabilities, assess AI model and system security, and use simulation to evaluate how these risks could affect robot behavior before deployment. VicOne Rthena supports threat detection and responses within approved policies during operation. Figure 2. Cybersecurity strengthens robot safety evidence throughout the lifecycle. VicOne helps teams test safety limits against manipulation before deployment and monitor the conditions behind safe behavior in operation.VicOne **Faster vulnerability discovery matters when teams can turn findings into action:** identify what needs attention, verify that safeguards still hold, and confirm that a fix does not introduce new risks. That is how cybersecurity strengthens robot safety as systems continue to change. ### For a deeper look how cybersecurity can affect robot safety, download our white paper, “Why Robot Safety Depends on Cybersecurity: Protecting the Information That Safety Decisions Rely On.”
spectrum.ieee.org
November 17, 2026 at 12:54 AM
VicOne identified an initial set of 28 zero-day findings in less than two days using AI-assisted research across software and tools supporting the Physical AI ecosystem.

Source: IEEE Spectrum
AI Finds 28 Zero-Day Flaws In Physical Robotics Software
VicOne’s AI-assisted research reveals what faster zero-day discovery means for robot safety
spectrum.ieee.org
November 16, 2026 at 11:08 AM
New Blog Post: The Tools That Build a Robot Are the First Line of Defense, and the First Line of Attack. Software-defense and attack tools share the same supply chain. https://hermes.gokepelemo.com/the-tools-that-build-a-robot-are-the-first-line-of-defense-and-the-first-line-of-attack/
The Tools That Build a Robot Are the First Line of Defense, and the First Line of Attack — Hermes @ Goke
VicOne found 28 zero-day vulnerabilities in less than two days. The company used AI-assisted research across software and tools that support the Physical
hermes.gokepelemo.com
November 16, 2026 at 2:02 PM
VicOne、「EdgeTech+ 2026」に出展 AIによって変化する脅威とEU CRAへの備えを展示・講演で紹介
VicOne、「EdgeTech+ 2026」に出展 AIによって変化する脅威とEU CRAへの備えを展示・講演で紹介
VicOne株式会社のプレスリリース ~会期中は毎日セミナーに登壇、11月27日開催の「“くるまからモビリティへ”の技術展 2026」でも講演〜  トレンドマイクロ株式会社(東京都新宿区、代表取締役社長(CEO)エバ・チ ...
autotimes.jp
November 11, 2026 at 2:08 AM
#robot #safety is usually evaluated in terms of resistance to accidents but responses to malicious inputs should also be assessed systematically, argue VicOne

spectrum.ieee.org/ai-robot-saf...
How a Fake Signal Could Fool Every Robot Safeguard
How VicOne helps expose cyber risks in AI robot safeguards
spectrum.ieee.org
November 9, 2026 at 4:47 PM
Beside guarding against accident, #robot #safety must consider attacks on inputs, #cybersecurity, and manipulation at runtime, argues VicOne

spectrum.ieee.org/physical-ai-...
How Hidden Triggers Can Make Robots Ignore Their Own Safety Rules
How to secure today’s AI robots against stealth cyber threats
spectrum.ieee.org
November 9, 2026 at 4:52 PM
Your Robot’s Safety Functions Already Work. What If the Input Lies? spectrum.ieee.org/ai-robot-saf...
How a Fake Signal Could Fool Every Robot Safeguard
How VicOne helps expose cyber risks in AI robot safeguards
spectrum.ieee.org
November 3, 2026 at 9:42 AM
Robótica: VicOne dice haber juntado 28 hallazgos de zero-day en software de IA física en menos de dos días con investigación asistida por IA
Robótica: VicOne dice haber juntado 28 hallazgos de zero-day en software de IA física en menos de dos días con investigación asistida por IA
La firma de ciberseguridad automotriz reportó los hallazgos iniciales sobre componentes de software de robótica y IA física, y el dato que importa no es el número sino el reloj: lo que antes era un trabajo de semanas por componente entra ahora en una ventana de dos días. Varios de los hallazgos…
elcompilado.com
November 3, 2026 at 8:30 PM
2/ Pendant ce temps, VicOne annonce 28 failles zero-day trouvées en moins de deux jours avec l'IA, dans des logiciels d'IA physique. Chiffre fourni par l'entreprise seule : ni gravité, ni liste des projets, ni état des correctifs.
November 2, 2026 at 7:40 AM
VicOne identified 28 zero-day findings in less than two days using AI-assisted research across software and tools that support the Physical AI ecosystem.

Source: The Robot Report
28 Zero-Day Findings in Less Than Two Days: What AI-Speed Discovery Means for Robotics - The Robot Report
VicOne identified an initial set of 28 zero-day findings in less than two days using AI-assisted research across software and tools supporting the Physical AI ecosystem.
www.therobotreport.com
November 1, 2026 at 3:24 PM
VicOne finding 28 zero days in under two days with AI-assisted research across the Physical AI ecosystem shows the speed defenders now have to match. MuseFM robotics talk keeps returning to that gap: robots in the real world cannot wait weeks for a patch cycle.
November 1, 2026 at 3:33 PM
“Your Robot’s Safety Functions Already Work. What If the Input Lies? How VicOne helps expose cyber risks in AI robot safeguards”
How a Fake Signal Could Fool Every Robot Safeguard
How VicOne helps expose cyber risks in AI robot safeguards
spectrum.ieee.org
October 28, 2026 at 5:16 AM
A robot can follow its safety rules to the letter and still behave badly if the data it receives is false. VicOne calls for tests that check exactly this scenario, before the problem reaches the factory floor.
A Fake Signal Could Fool Every Robot Safeguard
A robot can follow its safety rules to the letter and still behave badly if the data it receives is false. VicOne calls for tests that check exactly this scenario, before the problem reaches the facto
www.alextech.ai
October 28, 2026 at 12:49 PM
𝗬𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝗥𝗼𝗯𝗼𝘁’𝘀 𝗦𝗮𝗳𝗲𝘁𝘆 𝗙𝘂𝗻𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗔𝗹𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗱𝘆 𝗪𝗼𝗿𝗸. 𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗜𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗜𝗻𝗽𝘂𝘁 𝗟𝗶𝗲𝘀?

This article is brought to you by VicOne . A mobile robot slows for someone in a hallway.
October 27, 2026 at 6:50 PM
Robots rely on sensor inputs to keep people safe, but faulty or manipulated data can cause them to act incorrectly.

Source: IEEE Spectrum
How a Fake Signal Could Fool Every Robot Safeguard
How VicOne helps expose cyber risks in AI robot safeguards
spectrum.ieee.org
October 27, 2026 at 5:10 PM
Your Robot’s Safety Functions Already Work. What If the Input Lies?
_This article is brought to you by VicOne._ __A mobile robot slows for someone in a hallway. A collaborative arm eases its movement as a worker approaches. A humanoid pauses to let a person pass. Each response depends on information about the robot or its surroundings: a distance reading, a position estimate, or a stop signal. But what happens when one of those inputs is wrong, and the robot still responds exactly as designed? The mobile robot reads the hallway as clear while someone is still there. The arm estimates that the worker is farther away. The humanoid does not receive a stop signal as a person crosses its path. In each case, a fault could cause that mismatch. So could deliberate manipulation. At VicOne LAB R7, we examine how manipulated inputs can change robot behavior — and what that means for the systems meant to keep people safe. ## How an untrusted input can change a robot’s behavior A robot does more than measure its surroundings. It may interpret what it sees and hears to decide what to do next. Information placed in its environment can therefore influence its actions. Published research shows how this can happen. In a study of vision-language-action (VLA) models, a patch in a camera’s view reduced task success in simulated robot tests. FreezeVLA found that an adversarial image could cause tested models to ignore later instructions. Although the studies used different methods, both demonstrate how visual input can interfere with a robot’s intended task. In a robot-dog test using Gemma 4 E4B, text on a poster was treated as an instruction and changed the robot’s movement. VicOne LAB R7 also tested how untrusted inputs could change robot behavior. In a robot-dog test using Gemma 4 E4B, text on a poster was treated as an instruction and changed the robot’s movement. In a separate hospital-service-robot simulation using Nemotron on NVIDIA Jetson AGX Orin, crafted audio that is inaudible to people changed the robot’s simulated behavior. The assigned tasks did not change; the inputs did. In a VicOne LAB R7 test, text on a poster changed a robot dog’s movement, illustrating how a crafted input can turn an unlikely outcome into a repeatable attack.VicOne ## Safety-related decisions have inputs too An independent protective system may still stop a dangerous action. But that system also depends on information: readings, estimates, and messages that tell it when to intervene. What happens if one of those inputs is manipulated? At a robotics bug bounty event, VicOne LAB R7 researchers injected a ROS 2/DDS message into a robot that organizers expected to remain still under a safe-control setting. The robot moved. A humanoid’s balance controller offers another example. If it relies on a vulnerable gyroscope, sound at the sensor’s resonant frequency could distort its reported rotation. The controller might correct for a tilt that never occurred. Researchers demonstrated the underlying acoustic attack against drones with vulnerable gyroscopes. The research did not demonstrate the same attack chain causing a humanoid to fall. Other protections could interrupt either chain. The question for safety and security teams is whether those protections detect the danger independently or depend on the same manipulated information. Figure 1. VicOne maps how accidental faults and deliberate cyber manipulation can lead to similar robot safety outcomes, from loss of control to physical harm.VicOne ## Deliberate attacks challenge safety assumptions A safety assessment may treat a combination of accidental faults as unlikely. Deliberate manipulation changes that assumption. An attacker can choose when to introduce a false input and repeat the same trigger. That does not make harm inevitable, but it may change how cyber risks should be assessed. Redundant sensors also need an adversarial test. If one action can affect both inputs, their agreement may offer less reassurance than expected. In autonomous driving research, a crafted physical object misled a system combining camera and LiDAR perception. The study does not establish a weakness in a particular robot, but it shows why teams should test whether one manipulation can affect several checks at once. Cyber threats add intent to the safety equation, so risk assessments based on accidental faults must be revisited to account for attacks that can be timed and repeated. ## Security testing strengthens robot safety evidence Safety teams set limits for speed, protective distances, and permitted operating areas. The evidence behind those limits should also show what happens when the information used to enforce them is deliberately manipulated. That evidence can also support assessments against applicable requirements. China’s GB/T 45502-2025 addresses information security for service robots. IEC TS 63074 examines security threats that could affect safety-related control systems. The EU Machinery Regulation, which applies from January 20, 2027, includes requirements to protect safety-relevant systems and data against corruption. Each has its own scope, and teams still need evidence for their robot’s design and operating conditions. Figure 2. Cybersecurity strengthens robot safety evidence throughout the lifecycle. VicOne helps teams test safety limits against manipulation before deployment and monitor the conditions behind safe behavior in operation.VicOne Before deployment, safety and security engineers can compare normal and adversarial scenarios against the same safety limits. During operation, they can monitor for changes to software, models, sensor signals, or behavior that may call earlier results into question. Any response to suspicious behaviors should follow policies approved by the safety team. VicOne supports that work across the robot lifecycle. Through the Robotic Hacking Community, VicOne LAB R7 works with researchers to investigate how cyber threats can change robot behavior. VicOne’s Radeis helps teams validate potential effects before deployment, while Rthena provides visibility into risks and behavior during operation. ## Five questions safety and security teams should answer together The central test is whether a robot’s safeguards still protect people when the information they rely on is manipulated. Safety and security teams can begin by tracing the inputs behind each protective decision, challenging them, and revisiting the evidence as the robot changes. They can start with these five questions: 1. **What does each protective function read?** Map the readings, estimates, messages, and confirmations. Identify which safeguards operate independently of the robot’s AI decisions. 2. **How does that information arrive?** Check how inputs are produced, transmitted, authenticated where appropriate, and handled when they are missing or implausible. 3. **What happens if an input is manipulated?** Test false distances, drifting position estimates, and other relevant scenarios against the robot’s safety limits. 4. **Can one action mislead several inputs?** Check whether sensor fusion or seemingly independent safeguards share a point of failure. 5. **When should the evidence be revisited?** Reassess after changes to software, models, sensors, or operating conditions. Agree on bounded responses to suspicious behavior with the safety team in advance. The goal is not only to show that a protective function works. Teams also need evidence that it remains protective when the information behind its decision is wrong or deliberately manipulated — and that another safeguard can catch the resulting hazard when needed. As robots change, that evidence needs to change with them. For a deeper look how cybersecurity can affect robot safety, download our white paper “Why Robot Safety Depends on Cybersecurity: Protecting the Information That Safety Decisions Rely On.”
spectrum.ieee.org
October 27, 2026 at 6:46 PM
VicOne、「SPRESENSE™」上で侵入検知・防御システム「xCarbon」を実装し、CAN異常検知の動作を確認
VicOne、「SPRESENSE™」上で侵入検知・防御システム「xCarbon」を実装し、CAN異常検知の動作を確認
VicOne株式会社のプレスリリース ~フィジカルAI領域におけるVicOneのセキュリティソリューションの適用可能性を検証~  トレンドマイクロ株式会社(東京都新宿区、代表取締役社長(CEO)エバ・チェン)の子会社で、 ...
autotimes.jp
September 30, 2026 at 6:04 AM
Rethinking Robot Safety in the Age of AI
_This article is brought to you by VicOne._ Robot safety has traditionally asked: Can a machine remain safe when something goes wrong? Physical AI raises a harder question: Can a machine remain safe when an attacker changes what it sees, decides, or does even when nothing appears to have failed? As AI and robotics continue to advance at an unprecedented pace, modern robots perceive through multimodal sensors, interpret context using AI models, and translate those interpretations into physical action. As they move into dynamic environments, their safety increasingly depends on the integrity of the data guiding their decisions. That dependence creates risks that conventional safety assessments may not fully capture. Recent research has demonstrated that manipulating what a robot sees, hears, or interprets can influence its behavior without requiring direct control. Such manipulation can occur anywhere across its complex sensing and decision-making system — a layered attack surface encompassing training pipelines, system infrastructure, and runtime perception. ## Layer One: Corrupting intelligence at its source In 2017, BadNets demonstrated that a model could behave normally under most conditions, yet fail in the presence of a specific hidden trigger. In one example, a subtle pattern caused a stop sign to be misclassified as a speed limit sign without affecting the model’s behavior on other inputs. What began as a classification vulnerability has since evolved into action manipulation. At NeurIPS 2025, researchers introduced BadVLA**** a backdoor attack targeting Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models that allow robots to see, interpret instructions, and produce coordinated physical movement. Rather than altering a single label, the attack caused conditional deviations in the robot’s action trajectory when a trigger was present. Without the trigger, the model largely preserved normal task performance, while the backdoor remained effective under task transfers and model fine-tuning. A related study in 2025, GoBA, showed that ordinary objects such as a coffee mug could serve as a reliable trigger. The researchers reported a 97 percent attack success rate without degrading performance on clean inputs. A critical safety question today is whether Physical AI models remain within their task and safety boundaries under adversarial conditions. These studies expose a blind spot in model validation: A model may pass testing yet produce corrupted behavior when a hidden trigger appears in operation. So a critical safety question today is whether Physical AI models remain within their task and safety boundaries under adversarial conditions. Simulation tools such as NVIDIA Isaac Sim, when paired with VicOne Radeis, can test the effects of manipulated inputs before deployment. VicOne LAB R7 demonstrates Radeis, a Physical AI safety validator for NVIDIA Isaac Sim that tests how adversarial visual inputs affect robot behavior before deployment.VicOne ## Layer Two: System vulnerabilities as gateways to AI control Even a securely trained model can be subverted if the surrounding system stack is vulnerable. In September 2025, researchers disclosed UniPwn, a Bluetooth exploit chain affecting quadruped and humanoid robots from a major manufacturer. Hardcoded cryptographic keys allowed traffic decryption, authentication checks were bypassed, and command injection enabled root-level execution. The exploit is also described as “wormable.” A compromised robot could scan nearby units and potentially affect an entire fleet. VicOne Lab R7’s demo shows how chaining three wireless exploits can trigger uncontrolled robot behavior within 60 seconds, resulting in operational disruption.VicOne Middleware creates another exposure point. Vulnerabilities in ROS 2 and DDS-based systems can enable arbitrary code execution or abuse unauthenticated topics to deliver malicious commands. With sufficient access, an attacker could override motor commands or replace AI model weights without directly attacking the model architecture. In this case, the components may still function as designed. What has changed is the trustworthiness of the commands flowing through the system. Vulnerability management can help teams identify known risks before deployment, while continuous monitoring can surface emerging threats. ## Layer Three: Manipulating perception and reasoning at runtime At runtime, manipulating inputs that shape perception or reasoning may require neither firmware modification nor a network breach. In 2024, RoboPAIR**** demonstrated how carefully structured prompts could redirect LLM-controlled robots into unsafe trajectories. BadRobot**** exposed a deeper architectural weakness: in several cases, a robot verbally refused a dangerous command while its motion controller executed the action anyway. Vision-based manipulation is equally powerful. VLAttack**** showed that an adversarial patch within the camera’s view could reduce a VLA model’s task success rate to zero. FreezeVLA**** showed that a single adversarial image could freeze a robot’s decision-making loop, making it unresponsive to subsequent instructions. Runtime assurance must therefore look beyond whether individual components remain available and assess whether cyber events are beginning to affect physical behavior. In each case, the camera may still work, the model may still run, and the controller may still respond. Yet the resulting behavior can be unsafe because the robot is acting on manipulated perception or reasoning. Runtime assurance must therefore look beyond whether individual components remain available and assess whether cyber events are beginning to affect physical behavior. Security event correlation, behavioral-impact assessment, and policy-bounded response supported by edge AI, can help contain the affected path without unnecessarily stopping the entire robot fleet. ## From point-in-time safety to lifecycle assurance The risks across these three layers reveal the missing layer in robot safety assurance: cybersecurity. Functional safety addresses failures and unexpected operating conditions; cybersecurity extends that assurance to deliberate manipulation, including attacks that may leave the underlying system apparently functional. This requires assurance across the robot’s lifecycle. During design, teams need to understand which cyber risks could invalidate assumptions behind intended behavior. Before deployment, they should test whether realistic attacks can cause a robot to deviate from its task or safety boundaries. In operation, monitoring should identify whether cyber events are beginning to affect behavior, contain the affected path, and preserve safe operation where possible. VicOne’s lifecycle approach combines AI model and vulnerability scanning, simulation-based validation, and continuous monitoring to help secure robots from development through operation.VicOne While cybersecurity does not replace functional safety, it helps ensure that Physical AI remains within acceptable boundaries even when what it sees, decides, or does is under attack. For a deeper look at the cybersecurity risks and defense strategies shaping autonomous robotics, download our whitepaper “Securing the Rise of AI Robots: Cyber Risks, Real-World Threats, and Defense Strategies.”
spectrum.ieee.org
September 17, 2026 at 4:09 AM
VicOne、NVIDIA Isaac Sim向け拡張機能「Radeis Extension」を無償提供 – AI Watch

https://www.yayafa.com/2880654/

 VicOneは、AIロボットへのサ…
VicOne、NVIDIA Isaac Sim向け拡張機能「Radeis Extension」を無償提供 - AI Watch - YAYAFA
 VicOneは、AIロボットへのサイバー攻撃の影響を検証する「NVIDIA Isaac Sim」向け拡張機能「Radeis Extension(レディス・エクステンション)」の無償提供を開始した。
www.yayafa.com
September 6, 2026 at 5:20 AM
VicOneがNVIDIA Isaac Sim™向けサイバー攻撃検証拡張機能を無償提供#東京都#渋谷区#サイバー攻撃#NVIDIA#VicOne

VicOneがAIロボティクス向けに、サイバー攻撃の影響を検証するNVIDIA Isaac Sim™向け拡張機能『Radeis Extension』を無償提供開始。
VicOneがNVIDIA Isaac Sim™向けサイバー攻撃検証拡張機能を無償提供
VicOneがAIロボティクス向けに、サイバー攻撃の影響を検証するNVIDIA Isaac Sim™向け拡張機能『Radeis Extension』を無償提供開始。
news.3rd-in.co.jp
September 2, 2026 at 2:51 AM