#YubiHSM
something that just popped into my head: "The YubiHSM is an HSM for the macbook generation"
August 29, 2026 at 3:25 AM
This years badge looks very exciting, and if anyone sees anyone implementing something even more affordable than a yubihsm with it I'm going to be even more excited.
Exclusive: Guess who designed this year's Defcon badges? None other than famed hardware hacker Andrew "bunnie" Huang. The badges feature a new, secure and open-source chip Huang created, which doubles as a security token after the con. Hardware hackers will love the specs bsky.app/profile/defc...
The New Defcon Badges Pack a Unique Open Source Chip That Doubles as a Security Key
Created by legendary hardware hacker Andrew “bunnie” Huang, the badges for this year’s famed security conference aim to push the boundaries of security and transparency.
www.wired.com
July 31, 2026 at 8:32 PM
This tutorial teaches how to build a cert-manager external issuer that uses a YubiHSM 2 to sign TLS certificates via Go's crypto.Signer interface

➤ https://ku.bz/b9GlYRS88
May 20, 2026 at 6:56 PM
Please pray to the live demo Gods over lunch so Ximon can show you our #DNSSEC signer Cascade in action this afternoon at #OARC46.

We’ll cover incremental signing with IXFR in and out with TSIG, all on a YubiHSM we packed. 🤞
May 17, 2026 at 11:00 AM
Just landed: Learn Kubernetes weekly 180! My top picks:

🔐 Hardware-backed TLS with YubiHSM 2
📈 KEDA on GKE: Event-Driven Autoscaling
🔀 Migrate from NGINX to Traefik in Minutes
🧠 RootCause MCP Server

Read it here: https://kube.today/issues/180
April 22, 2026 at 12:11 PM
This tutorial teaches how to build a cert-manager external issuer that uses a YubiHSM 2 to sign TLS certificates via Go's crypto.Signer interface

➜ https://ku.bz/b9GlYRS88
April 20, 2026 at 6:36 PM
What If HSMs Were as Easy to Use as They Are Powerful? A native macOS app for YubiHSM 2 management
What If HSMs Were as Easy to Use as They Are Powerful?
I built a native macOS app for the YubiHSM 2 — with YubiKey-based authentication, visual security posture, hardware-backed secrets, SSH certificate issuance, and tamper-evident audit trails. Here's what HSM management looks like when someone designs for it.
charles.dev
April 3, 2026 at 7:28 PM
Trust, but verify!

The Dark Bio firmware and device signing keys are hardware bound to genuine YubiHSM and YubiKey devices.

Furthermore, the public audit logs demonstrate (within the limits of the YubiHSM 2 capabilities) that no malicious firmware exists.
As a commitment to transparency, we've created a repository of our signing keys and operations.

The repository also includes YubiHSM and YubiKey provenance attestations, signer certificate chains and full audit logs.

More in an upcoming blog post.
GitHub - dark-bio/transparency: Cryptographic transparency reports
Cryptographic transparency reports. Contribute to dark-bio/transparency development by creating an account on GitHub.
github.com
March 9, 2026 at 7:49 PM
As a commitment to transparency, we've created a repository of our signing keys and operations.

The repository also includes YubiHSM and YubiKey provenance attestations, signer certificate chains and full audit logs.

More in an upcoming blog post.
GitHub - dark-bio/transparency: Cryptographic transparency reports
Cryptographic transparency reports. Contribute to dark-bio/transparency development by creating an account on GitHub.
github.com
March 9, 2026 at 7:42 PM
TL;DR

* EU Commission Contained Cyber Intrusion into Mobile Device Management Systems
* SSHStalker Botnet Uses 16 Legacy CVEs to Compromise Linux Systems via SSH
* HSM-Based Code Signing Redesign Adopted at FOSDEM 2026 with Shamir’s Secret Sharing and YubiHSM 2
* OpenClaw AI Agent Ecosystem […]
32,000 EU Phones Pwned by Unpatched CVE-2026-1281 — EU Agencies Still Running Outdated MDM Systems
### TL;DR * EU Commission Contained Cyber Intrusion into Mobile Device Management Systems * SSHStalker Botnet Uses 16 Legacy CVEs to Compromise Linux Systems via SSH * HSM-Based Code Signing Redesign Adopted at FOSDEM 2026 with Shamir’s Secret Sharing and YubiHSM 2 * OpenClaw AI Agent Ecosystem Expands Globally Amid Security Breach and Viral Adoption * * * ## 🤖 9-Hour Hack of 32,000 EU Phones: CVE-2026-1281 Exploited Across Europe — NIS2 Activated But Patch Delayed > 32,000 EU staff phones remotely controlled… in 9 hours. 🤖 No data stolen. No panic. Just a 9-hour window where a single unpatched API let hackers dance through the EU’s digital nervous system. They didn’t need credentials. Didn’t need phishing. Just CVE-2026-1281 — a backdoor labeled ‘critical’… and ignored for 24 hours. Meanwhile, Dutch agencies got pwned too. Same flaw. Same script. Same corporate laziness. Who’s really in charge of your phone? The EU? Or a vendor’s outdated MDM with a ‘patch later’ policy? — Would you trust your commute data to a system patched after the breach? Nine-hour patch-to-clean cycle leaves 32k phones untouched—how’d they dodge the shrapnel? ### What Exactly Went Boom in the Ivanti Backend? CVE-2026-1281 hands out RCE like stale conference swag; CVE-2026-1340 lets any XML packet don admin cufflinks. Both drop on Monday, exploited on Tuesday. GreyNoise shows one IP firing 80 % of the 525 shots—script-kiddie central, but still enough to root a box that signs 32k mobile certs. ### Why Didn’t the Attacker Bounce to the Handsets? Network segmentation carved the MDM herd into its own sad little VLAN. Once CERT-EU yanked the uplink, the shell had nowhere to crawl; handset agents never phoned home to evil. Call it zero-trust with a Belgian accent—no lateral movement, no data buffet. ### How Does Nine Hours Stack Against the Global Average? IBM’s 2025 breach clock ticks 194 days to containment; EU clock stopped at 0.4. Credit the pre-built NIS2 run-book: auto-quarantine, parallel forensics, patched golden image pushed via wired LAN, not OTA. Fastest patch parade in the public sector this year—eat that, ransomware dwell time. ### Are Dutch Courts Breached with the Same Flaws? Yup. NCSC-NL confirms identical CVEs popping the Council for the Judiciary the same week. Shadowserver counts 92 pwned EPMM boxes across Europe—proof of a coordinated spray, not a lone Brussels grudge. Same vendor, same week, same continent: that’s a campaign, not coincidence. ### Will the Cyber Resilience Act Actually Bite Vendors? CRA trigger pulled: Commission must now demand secure-by-design attestations from Ivanti and every MDM supplier feeding EU institutions. Expect a new EU-wide “MDM Security Baseline” before year-end—patch SLA 24h max, SBOM mandatory, pentest receipts quarterly. Non-compliant vendors lose the market, not just the headline. ### TL;DR Two 9.8 bugs dropped Monday, got weaponized Tuesday, died Wednesday breakfast. Zero user data lost, one IP to chase, 32k phones untouched. Brussels just set the speed record for public-sector incident response—and wrote the playbook everyone else will be forced to plagiarize. * * * ## 🤡 7,000 SSH Breaches in January — Legacy Kernels Still Power Cloud Botnets Across US, EU, and Canada > 7,000 SSH brute-force attempts in 30 days… and 3% of cloud servers are STILL running Linux kernels from 2009. 🤡 They’re not hacked. They’re _abandoned_. Cron jobs restart the bot every 60 seconds. Log files? Erased. AWS keys? Stolen. CPU? Mining Ethereum while you sip your $8 oat milk latte. Cloud providers charge you for this. You didn’t even know the server existed. Who’s paying the cloud bill for a botnet running on your forgotten VPS? — And why is your ‘secure’ infrastructure still running on a 15-year-old kernel? Your “cloud-first” strategy just got sucker-punched by a botnet that still thinks _Lost_ is prime-time TV. SSHStalker is brute-forcing port 22 with passwords like `raspberryraspberry993311`, then stapling 2009-era kernel holes (CVE-2009-2692, CVE-2010-1173, and 14 other geriatric gems) into full-blown coin-mining, log-nuking, IRC-chattering chaos. Translation: 7 000 scan-and-pwn cycles in January alone, 3 % of exposed Linux boxes coughing up shells, and 80 % CPU theft billed straight to your AWS credit card. ☠️ ### Why Are 2.6 Kernels Still Breathing? Oracle & AWS Rent Fossils by the Hour Legacy VPS images and “forgotten” OT boxes are the botnet’s happy place. Golang scanner masquerades as nmap, C-based IRC C2 phones home every 60-second cron tick, and a 4 KB bash stager pulls a 2 MB grab-bag of PhoenixMiner plus a dormant DDoS module. All logs? Shredded. AWS keys? Harvested. Your cloud invoice? Rocket emoji. 🚀 ### Patch or GTFO: 7 Commands That Kill the Party 1. `PasswordAuthentication no` in sshd_config – starve the brute monster. 2. `yum update kernel` (or `apt full-upgrade`) – cremate the 16 CVEs in one shot. 3. Block outbound 6667/6697 at the VPC edge – snip IRC lifeline. 4. Cron hash monitoring – alarm when `/var/spool/cron` mutates every minute. 5. Immutable log sink – ship utmp/wtmp/lastlog to S3 before the binary rm -f’s them. 6. MFA-gated VPN bastion – make SSH keys the _only_ keys. 7. Asset spring-clean – delete those 2010 Ubuntu AMIs you “might need someday.” Do it this week or keep funding a Romanian miner’s ETH wallet with your idle cycles. Your call, champ. * * * ## 🤯 3-of-5 HSM Quorum Now Mandatory for Android Signing—PowerShell Audit Logs, 12ms Latency, and the Death of V1 Signatures > 3–5 HSMs split one signing key into 5 shards—need 3 to sign anything. 🤯 That’s not security, it’s corporate paranoia with a PhD. Age-encrypted shards? 12ms overhead? Congrats, you just made CI/CD slower than your last Zoom meeting. And you disabled V1 signatures? So now if one HSM glitches, your entire Android ecosystem crashes. Developers are screaming. Your audit logs? Generated by PowerShell. In 2026. 🤖💀 Who’s paying for this? Your users. — What’s the ROI when your ‘secure’ pipeline breaks a dev’s Thursday? FOSDEM 2026 just handed every CI/CD pipeline a middle-finger-shaped gift: an HSM-backed, Shamir-split, age-encrypted code-signing rig that kills the V1-signature zombie once and for all. Translation? Your wrapper key now lives in five hardware vaults, needs only three to sign, and leaks at a theoretical 0.02 % probability—cheaper odds than your espresso machine exploding. ### How Does “3-of-5” Beat “1 Laptop + Sticky Note”? Shamir’s Secret Sharing turns the wrapper key into five encrypted shards. Snag two? Useless rubble. Grab three? Still encrypted with age. An attacker now faces combinatorial hell plus HSM silicon, not a lone Jenkins node running `signapk` with a plaintext PEM file. Audit logs pop out 250 % faster, satisfying NIST 800-53 without the usual PowerShell eye-bleed. ### What’s the Real Ops Bill? * **Hardware** : 3× YubiHSM 2 ($150) + 1× Thales Luna for bulk (cloud rental ~$1.2 k/yr). * **Latency** : 12 ms per shard import; parallel Luna pushes 120 sigs/s—enough for nightly Android farm. * **Compliance** : FIPS-validated keys map straight to FedRAMP Moderate and 800-171 CUI boxes; auditors love immutable HSM logs. ### Who’s Already Shipping? Trail-of-Bits-audited repos disabled V1 fallback last week. Next quarter expect `apksigner`, `cosign`, and GitHub Actions to expose a “quorum-sign” toggle. Enterprise adopters forecast ≥30 % drop in supply-chain incident costs—real money, not vendor fairy dust. ### Still a Catch? Age encryption hasn’t been fuzzed on AIX or your cousin’s retro SPARC. Automate shard provisioning with Terraform or drift will bite you. And keep a rollback plan for that one carrier firmware stuck on V1—legacy zombies never truly die, they just wait in a dark CAB. Bottom line: spend the price of a team lunch, plug the $4.5 M hole, and let the HSM choir sing. * * * ## 🤖 135K Exposed AI Agents — CVE-2026-25253 Leaks 1.5M Keys Across 76 Countries > 135K internet-facing AI agents? 🤖💥 And 12,812 of them let hackers type ‘rm -rf /’ with one click. OpenClaw shipped with public WebSocket access like it was a free Wi-Fi at a coffee shop. 1.5M+ API keys leaked. 76 countries. No patch? No problem. Enterprises deployed this without IT approval. Now GDPR is knocking. Who’s still running this in prod… and why? 🤔 135,000 boxes answered on port 18789 when STRIKE ran the world-wide ping. 12,812 of them coughed up a WebSocket that accepts `{"cmd":"exec","payload":"whatever"}` with zero auth. That’s not a bug, it’s a default—shipped, documented, and ignored. ### How Did One Hacker News Post Turn 1.5 M Bots into Sitting Ducks? Jan 2026: “open-source ChatGPT you can self-host” hits the front page. By Feb 1 the repo had 43k stars, 4k community “skills”, and a Docker run-command that binds 0.0.0.0:18789. No TLS, no token, no rate-limit—just a shiny red button labeled “run.” Result: 50 k RCE-ready agents before the maintainer even cut the patch. ### Where Are the Stolen OAuth Tokens, API Keys, and Plaintext Passwords? Astrix’s free scanner already scraped 1.5 M unique secrets from exposed `/env` endpoints. Moltbook lists them for five bucks per megabyte—cheaper than a latte. The top three leaked scopes: `gmail.modify`, `aws.*`, `github_repo`. Translation: e-mail hijack, cloud takeover, source-code ransom in one curl. ### Why Do 22 % of Enterprises Still Run Rogue Claws on Corporate SaaS? Because “AI task force” means a VP downloaded the image, slapped in a Slack token, and told the intern to “make it write Jira tickets.” IT never got a ticket; security never got a log. Now GDPR regulators have a 72-hour stopwatch running on data they didn’t know existed. ### When Will the Patch Actually Shrink the Attack Surface? v2026.2.0.0 flips the bind to localhost—but only 38 % of public hosts updated in the first week. Shodan daily delta: −1.2 k nodes, +900 fresh misconfigs. At this rate the exposed count drops below 5 k around May—unless another viral TikTok tutorial shows “how to open the port for remote phone control.” ### What’s Cheaper: Zero-Trust Vendors or a Five-Line Systemd Drop-In? Commercial agent platforms want $8 per seat per month for “zero-trust token issuance.” A free PGP sign-verify hook plus `--bind 127.0.0.1` does the same job. Budget power: spend the savings on coffee, not on breach lawyers. * * * ### In Other News * ICO fines MediaLab £247,590 for failing age verification on Imgur, exposing children to unmoderated content * Chinese nationals arrested in France for intercepting military data via Starlink * CVE-2026-20841: Remote Code Execution Flaw Found in Windows Notepad via Markdown Links * New Node Readiness Controller in Kubernetes Enables Dynamic Taint Management
espresso.cafecito.tech
February 12, 2026 at 3:28 PM
My Yubikey has a small nylon string loop like this one, so maybe something similar.

www.yubico.com/product/yubi...
Yubico x Keyport ParaPull Lanyard
ParaPull Lanyard is the ideal accessory for removing YubiKey Nano and YubiHSM products from the USB port.
www.yubico.com
December 8, 2025 at 4:19 PM
Granted, the $70 Nitrokey is not the same as the $$$$$ module this partner is using - but the basics should be the same. Even the YubiHSM is $$$ and too expensive for non-professional tinkering.

Now waiting for post from Germany. *sigh*
October 10, 2025 at 5:02 AM
TIL that Ed25519 digital signatures have 2 modes: pure-ed25519 and ed25519ph. The former operates on a raw message, the latter on a pre-hashed message.

The purpose of ed25519ph is to run on HSMs. The YubiHSM does not support it... so for $800, it can only sign 2019 bytes max. 🥲
July 21, 2025 at 11:35 AM
Then I can do something like:

params.FindSecureBootSigner(params.STAGING))

And it returns me a construct that I can just call to sign a firmware blob, without caring if it's a dev key, yubikey, yubihsm, whatever.

Feels so good to work in #golang a bit, jesus the productivity.
July 19, 2025 at 10:22 AM
Fuck my life, a #YubiHSM can:

- Attest asymmetric keys
- Generate asymmetric wrap keys
- CANNOT attest asymmetric wrap keys

I.e. when you're trying to back up your HSM to another HSM, it's cryptographically impossible to prove that it will be encrypted to the HSM you intend to.
July 18, 2025 at 8:49 AM
All in all there doesn't seem to be a better product on the market at a price range I can actually afford, so the YubiHSM will have to do, but anyone looking into it, be advised, the auditing capability assumes a *lot* of trust that could have been avoided, just wasn't. Fin.
July 17, 2025 at 5:33 PM
My personal pain is because I want to create a transparency report for my @dark.bio project, which seems semi-impossible with the YubiHSM.

If your threat model is to protect the keys from bad actors, a YubiHSM is perfect. If you want to demonstrate no misuse, though luck.
July 17, 2025 at 5:33 PM
The only way to audit a YubiHSM is to have a live connection to it. That is because you can prove you're connected to a Yubico HSM (via signed certs), so if you trust Yubico and their HSM hardware, then when it says it's at hash H, you believe it. But it's interactive.
July 17, 2025 at 5:33 PM
The YubiHSM touts itself having a tamper proof signed audit log. Well, the signed part turned out to be marketing, it's not signed.

The audit log *is* hash linked, unfortunately without a signature it's also useless for offline auditing as any log can be forged and hashed.
July 17, 2025 at 5:33 PM
Yubico provides a CLI shell that can speak YubiHSM, which is nice because you can get started immediately (you really don't want to roll your own protocol here). On the down side, it's... not the high profile CLI we're used to nowadays. It's has a lot of tech debt and footguns.
July 17, 2025 at 5:33 PM
Having played with a #YubiHSM for about 4 full days, I'm kind of happy with the choice! 😁 That said, it also falls short on a number of places, so your mileage may vary (also some places where I needed it not to fall short). 🧵
July 17, 2025 at 5:33 PM
Sooo... I think I can still solve it, but it's 🤮🤢🤮🤢🤮

The YubiHSM *does* have an identity, but you *cannot* attest the audit log with it.

But if you add an asym-key auth, your session with the HSM will be authenticated. So get the logs and publish the entire comms 🤪🤮
July 16, 2025 at 11:05 AM
Hey @yubico.com , on your website you state that the YubiHSM audit logs are *signed* by the device. Please share how I can retrieve the *signature*.

I don't want the *hash*, but the *signature* that's mentioned on your product page. Thank you.
July 16, 2025 at 10:10 AM