28 Fake Call History Apps on Google Play with 7.3M+ Downloads Trick Users to Steal Payments
A new wave of fraudulent Android apps quietly racked up millions of downloads on Google Play before being taken down. These apps, now tracked under the name CallPhantom, promised users something irresistible: the ability to look up the call history of any phone number . What they actually delivered was nothing more than fake data and a very real financial loss.
The scheme worked by exploiting a simple but powerful hook. People are naturally curious about who has called a specific number, and these apps claimed to deliver that information instantly.
Users were shown what looked like partial results and then prompted to pay to unlock the full call history. That history was entirely fabricated right from the start.
Researchers at WeLiveSecurity identified and reported 28 such fraudulent applications on the Google Play Store.
Their analysis found the apps had been cumulatively downloaded over 7.3 million times before Google removed them following ESET’s disclosure in December 2025.
The apps primarily targeted Android users in India and the broader Asia-Pacific region. Many came with India’s country code pre-selected and supported UPI, a payment system widely used across India. A screenshot of the fabricated call history data was even included in the app’s Play Store listing, presented as proof the app actually worked.
Fake Call History Apps on Google Play
Despite looking different on the surface, all 28 apps shared the same core purpose: generate fake communication data and charge victims for access. Subscription packages ranged from weekly to yearly, with the highest price reaching up to $80.
The CallPhantom apps fell into two main clusters. The first group had hardcoded names, country codes, and call log templates embedded directly in their code. These were combined with randomly generated phone numbers and shown to users as partial results, pushing them to pay to see more.
The second cluster asked users to enter an email address, claiming the retrieved call history would be delivered there. No data was generated until after payment, and even then, nothing real was ever sent. The apps had no actual capability to access call logs, SMS records, or WhatsApp data from any device.
Hardcoded call log data used by the app (Source – Welivesecurity)
This shows how deeply the deception was built into the code, with fixed names and timestamps baked in before the app ever reached a user’s phone.
Three payment methods appeared across the apps. Some used Google Play’s official billing system. Others redirected users to third-party UPI apps , with payment details either hardcoded or fetched dynamically from a Firebase real-time database, letting operators swap receiving accounts at will.
A third method embedded payment card checkout forms directly inside the app, violating Google Play’s payments policy and making refunds significantly harder.
Bypassing Refunds and Staying Under the Radar
One of the most deliberate tactics used by CallPhantom was steering users toward payment channels Google could not reverse. When payments went through third-party UPI apps or direct card entry inside the app, Google had no ability to cancel transactions or issue refunds. Victims were left fully dependent on external payment providers or the scam developers themselves.
Google Play seemingly demonstrating the fraudulent app’s functionality (Source – Welivesecurity)
In at least one case, the app sent deceptive notifications styled as email alerts, falsely claiming call history results had arrived. Tapping the notification led straight to a subscription screen, keeping the pressure on even after users had exited without paying.
Anyone who subscribed through Google Play’s official billing system may be eligible for a refund , as existing subscriptions were canceled when the apps were removed. Requests must fall within Google’s allowed refund window. For purchases made outside Google Play, contacting the payment provider or card issuer directly to dispute the charge is the recommended step.
The most practical protection is verification before downloading. Checking developer credibility, reading user reviews carefully, and staying skeptical of apps claiming to access private data belonging to other people are all steps that help avoid traps like these.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):-
Type Indicator Description SHA-1 Hash 799AA5127CA54239D3D4A14367DB3B712012CF14 all.callhistory.detail.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 56A4FD71D1E4BBA2C5C240BE0D794DCFF709D9EB calldetaila.ndcallhisto.rytogetan.ynumber.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash EC5E470753E76614CD28ECF6A3591F08770B7215 callhistoryeditor.callhistory.numberdetails.calleridlocator.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 77C8B7BEC79E7D9AE0D0C02DEC4E9AC510429AD8 com.all_historydownload.anynumber.callhistorybackup.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 9484EFD4C19969F57AFB0C21E6E1A4249C209305 com.any.numbers.calls.history.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash CE97CA7FEECDCAFC6B8E9BD83A370DFA5C336C0A com.anycallinformation.datadetailswho.callinfo.numberfinder.xapk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash FC3BA2EDAC0BB9801F8535E36F0BCC49ADA5FA5A com.app.call.detail.history.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash B7B80FA34A41E3259E377C0D843643FF736803B8 com.basehistory.historydownloading.xapk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash F0A8EBD7C4179636BE752ECCFC6BD9E4CD5C7F2C com.call.detail.caller.history.xapk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash D021E7A0CF45EECC7EE8F57149138725DC77DC9A com.call.of.any.number.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 04D2221967FFC4312AFDC9B06A0B923BF3579E93 com.callapp.historyero.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash CB31ED027FADBFA3BFFDBC8A84EE1A48A0B7C11D com.calldetails.smshistory.callhistoryofanynumber.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash C840A85B5FBAF1ED3E0F18A10A6520B337A94D4C com.callhistory.anynumber.chapfvor.history.xapk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash BB6260CA856C37885BF9E952CA3D7E95398DDABF com.callhistory.calldetails.callerids…callhistorymanager.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 55D46813047E98879901FD2416A23ACF8D8828F5 com.callhistory.callhistoryany.call.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash E23D3905443CDBF4F1B9CA84A6FF250B6D89E093 com.callhistory.callhistoryyourgf.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 89ECEC01CCB15FCDD2F64E07D0E876A9E79DD3CE com.callinformative.instantcallhistory…callinfo.xapk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 8EC557302145B40FE0898105752FFF5E357D7AC9 com.cddhaduk.callerid.block.contact.xapk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 6F72FF58A67EF7AAA79CE2342012326C7B46429D com.easyranktools.callhistoryforanynumber.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 28D3F36BD43D48F02C5058EDD1509E4488112154 com.getanynumberofcallhistory…findcalldetailsofanynumber.xapk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 47CEE9DED41B953A84FC9F6ED556EC3AF5BD9345 com.chdev.callhistory.xapk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 9199A376B433F888AFE962C9BBD991622E8D39F9 com.name.factor.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 053A6A723FA2BFDA8A1B113E8A98DD04C6EEF72A com.pdf.maker.pdfreader.pdfscanner.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 4B537A7152179BBA19D63C9EF287F1AC366AB5CB com.phone.call.history.tracker.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 87F6B2DB155192692BAD1F26F6AEBB04DBF23AAD com.pixelxinnovation.manager.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 583D0E7113795C7D68686D37CE7A41535CF56960 com.rajni.callhistory.apk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 45D04E06D8B329A01E680539D798DD3AE68904DA com.sbpinfotech.findlocationofanynumber.xapk — Android/CallPhantom SHA-1 Hash 34393950A950F5651F3F7811B815B5A21F84A84B sc.call.ofany.mobiledetail.apk — Android/CallPhantom IP Address 34.120.160[.]131 Firebase-hosted C2 IP, Google LLC, first seen 2025 IP Address 34.120.206[.]254 Firebase-hosted C2 IP, Google LLC, first seen 2025 Domain call-history-7cda4-default-rtdb.firebaseio[.]com Firebase real-time database used for C2 communication Domain call-history-ecc1e-default-rtdb.firebaseio[.]com Firebase real-time database used for C2 communication Domain ch-ap-4-default-rtdb.firebaseio[.]com Firebase real-time database used for payment URL delivery Domain chh1-ac0a3-default-rtdb.firebaseio[.]com Firebase real-time database used for payment URL delivery
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.] ) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM .
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