By Manuel Nau, Lead Editor at IoT Business News. Kigen has got it GSMA eUICC Security Assurance Certification to support automotive eSIM SGP.32 v1.3combines remote connectivity management with a security architecture designed for connected vehicles that can remain operational for more than ten years. Connected vehicles create a particularly difficult lifecycle problem for mobile IoT. The telematics architecture chosen during vehicle development still needs to support network changes, new connectivity providers and evolving security requirements years after the vehicle leaves the factory.

By Manuel Nau, Lead Editor at IoT Business News. Kigen has got it GSMA eUICC Security Assurance Certification to support automotive eSIM SGP.32 v1.3combines remote connectivity management with a security architecture designed for connected vehicles that can remain operational for more than ten years. Connected vehicles create a particularly difficult lifecycle problem for mobile IoT. The telematics architecture chosen during vehicle development still needs to support network changes, new connectivity providers and evolving security requirements years after the vehicle leaves the factory.

By Manuel Nau, Lead Editor at IoT Business News. Kigen has got it GSMA eUICC Security Assurance Certification to support automotive eSIM SGP.32 v1.3combines remote connectivity management with a security architecture designed for connected vehicles that can remain operational for more than ten years. Connected vehicles create a particularly difficult lifecycle problem for mobile IoT. The telematics architecture chosen during vehicle development still needs to support network changes, new connectivity providers and evolving security requirements years after the vehicle leaves the factory.

By Manuel Nau, Lead Editor at IoT Business News. Kigen has got it GSMA eUICC Security Assurance Certification to support automotive eSIM SGP.32 v1.3combines remote connectivity management with a security architecture designed for connected vehicles that can remain operational for more than ten years. Connected vehicles create a particularly difficult lifecycle problem for mobile IoT. The telematics architecture chosen during vehicle development still needs to support network changes, new connectivity providers and evolving security requirements years after the vehicle leaves the factory.

By Manuel Nau, Lead Editor at IoT Business News. Kigen has got it GSMA eUICC Security Assurance Certification to support automotive eSIM SGP.32 v1.3combines remote connectivity management with a security architecture designed for connected vehicles that can remain operational for more than ten years. Connected vehicles create a particularly difficult lifecycle problem for mobile IoT. The telematics architecture chosen during vehicle development still needs to support network changes, new connectivity providers and evolving security requirements years after the vehicle leaves the factory.

Exactly — the MEP distinction is important. With SGP.22 MEP, the virtual-eUICC separation means the profiles can coexist without the AID namespace being treated as one flat profile namespace, despite sharing the physical chip/UART. The ISD-R ↔ ISD-P case is different, and the ARA-M collision is the interesting edge case: those applications can end up in the same effective AID namespace despite belonging to different security-domain branches. That makes it a platform/GlobalPlatform application-selection issue rather than JavaCard Shareable-interface firewalling. So I’d separate the cases as: **SD-to-SD within one profile → Shareable governed by JavaCard context/AID policy.** **ISD-P-to-ISD-P under MEP → virtual-eUICC isolation.** **ISD-R/SSD ↔ ISD-P → AID collision can still occur.**

Exactly — the MEP distinction is important. With SGP.22 MEP, the virtual-eUICC separation means the profiles can coexist without the AID namespace being treated as one flat profile namespace, despite sharing the physical chip/UART. The ISD-R ↔ ISD-P case is different, and the ARA-M collision is the interesting edge case: those applications can end up in the same effective AID namespace despite belonging to different security-domain branches. That makes it a platform/GlobalPlatform application-selection issue rather than JavaCard Shareable-interface firewalling. So I’d separate the cases as: **SD-to-SD within one profile → Shareable governed by JavaCard context/AID policy.** **ISD-P-to-ISD-P under MEP → virtual-eUICC isolation.** **ISD-R/SSD ↔ ISD-P → AID collision can still occur.**

AFAICT China uses the same eSIM protocols / specs like everyone else. All they do is to use some additional CI/CA certificates, see Certificate Issuers (CIs) | eUICC and eSIM Developer Manual You can find chinese silicon eUICCs in the market, including those with SAS-UP accreditation, for example some that use a THD89 controller

AFAICT China uses the same eSIM protocols / specs like everyone else. All they do is to use some additional CI/CA certificates, see Certificate Issuers (CIs) | eUICC and eSIM Developer Manual You can find chinese silicon eUICCs in the market, including those with SAS-UP accreditation, for example some that use a THD89 controller

AFAICT China uses the same eSIM protocols / specs like everyone else. All they do is to use some additional CI/CA certificates, see Certificate Issuers (CIs) | eUICC and eSIM Developer Manual You can find chinese silicon eUICCs in the market, including those with SAS-UP accreditation, for example some that use a THD89 controller

GSMA's SGP.32 IoT eSIM architecture is designed for devices that may be network-constrained, user-interface constrained or both. Instead of relying on the consumer flow where a user drives profile installation, the architecture separates device-side functions into an IoT Profile Assistant and moves remote lifecycle control into an eSIM IoT Remote Manager. The result is an eUICC provisioning system that can support remote Profile download, enable, disable and delete operations across individual devices or fleets.

SCP02/SCP03 to the ISD-P is fully expressible in SAIP, and if that path is ever blocked you can fall back to RAM over SCP80/81 to the same ISD-P, as long as the keysets are in the profile. Yes, you can use the C2T the same way as the SJA5 for applet iteration, with one setup difference. On the SJA5 you talk SCP02 straight to the card ISD. On the eUICC the card ISD-R permits only SCP03 and is not your applet target anyway. Your applet target is the ISD-P of an enabled profile, and you establish the secure channel to that profile SD using the profile’s own SD key material, not the eUICC keys. Which PE holds the key material: the SecurityDomain ProfileElement of the profile. In pySim SAIP terms that is ProfileElementSD for the profile ISD/MNO-SD, or ProfileElementSSD for a supplementary SD. The keys sit in that PE’s keyList as SecurityDomainKey entries indexed by KVN and KID, and the permitted secure channels are declared in the SD install params via add_scp, for example add_scp(0x02, 0x55) for SCP02 add_scp(0x03, 0x70) for SCP03 That same PE is where you would add the SCP80/81 OTA keyset if you want RAM. The eUICC-level ISD-R and ECASD SCP03 keys are separate, personalised per EID and looked up by EID in pySim, and are not the applet-install target, so don’t conflate them with the profile SD keys. Do you need to rebuild SAIP each iteration: no. Build the SAIP once with a profile whose SD carries an SCP02 or SCP03 keyset and the Authorized Management privilege, download and enable it once, and from then the ISD-P behaves as an ordinary GP security domain. You establish SCP02/03 to it and do LOAD then INSTALL of your CAP every iteration, exactly like the SJA5 ISD flow. You only rebuild and redownload the SAIP when you need to change the SD keyset or its privileges, not for each applet build. Two caveats before you burn a card. The stock TS.48 test profiles from the sysmocom test SM-DP+ are minimal and are not guaranteed to ship an AM-privileged SCP02/03 keyset on their ISD-P for arbitrary applet loading, so plan on building one custom SAIP that adds that keyset plus the privilege and iterating against it, rather than expecting the default TS.48 profile to accept applet installs out of the box. And JC 3.0.5 features like oneshot are a platform capability, independent of the install path. Whether the eUICC OS exposes the JC 3.0.5 API on your specific C2T build is worth confirming against the sysmoEUICC platform/COS version before you design tests around 3.0.5-only APIs, rather than assuming parity with the SJA5.

SCP02/SCP03 to the ISD-P is fully expressible in SAIP, and if that path is ever blocked you can fall back to RAM over SCP80/81 to the same ISD-P, as long as the keysets are in the profile. Yes, you can use the C2T the same way as the SJA5 for applet iteration, with one setup difference. On the SJA5 you talk SCP02 straight to the card ISD. On the eUICC the card ISD-R permits only SCP03 and is not your applet target anyway. Your applet target is the ISD-P of an enabled profile, and you establish the secure channel to that profile SD using the profile’s own SD key material, not the eUICC keys. Which PE holds the key material: the SecurityDomain ProfileElement of the profile. In pySim SAIP terms that is ProfileElementSD for the profile ISD/MNO-SD, or ProfileElementSSD for a supplementary SD. The keys sit in that PE’s keyList as SecurityDomainKey entries indexed by KVN and KID, and the permitted secure channels are declared in the SD install params via add_scp, for example add_scp(0x02, 0x55) for SCP02 add_scp(0x03, 0x70) for SCP03 That same PE is where you would add the SCP80/81 OTA keyset if you want RAM. The eUICC-level ISD-R and ECASD SCP03 keys are separate, personalised per EID and looked up by EID in pySim, and are not the applet-install target, so don’t conflate them with the profile SD keys. Do you need to rebuild SAIP each iteration: no. Build the SAIP once with a profile whose SD carries an SCP02 or SCP03 keyset and the Authorized Management privilege, download and enable it once, and from then the ISD-P behaves as an ordinary GP security domain. You establish SCP02/03 to it and do LOAD then INSTALL of your CAP every iteration, exactly like the SJA5 ISD flow. You only rebuild and redownload the SAIP when you need to change the SD keyset or its privileges, not for each applet build. Two caveats before you burn a card. The stock TS.48 test profiles from the sysmocom test SM-DP+ are minimal and are not guaranteed to ship an AM-privileged SCP02/03 keyset on their ISD-P for arbitrary applet loading, so plan on building one custom SAIP that adds that keyset plus the privilege and iterating against it, rather than expecting the default TS.48 profile to accept applet installs out of the box. And JC 3.0.5 features like oneshot are a platform capability, independent of the install path. Whether the eUICC OS exposes the JC 3.0.5 API on your specific C2T build is worth confirming against the sysmoEUICC platform/COS version before you design tests around 3.0.5-only APIs, rather than assuming parity with the SJA5.

SCP02/SCP03 to the ISD-P is fully expressible in SAIP, and if that path is ever blocked you can fall back to RAM over SCP80/81 to the same ISD-P, as long as the keysets are in the profile. Yes, you can use the C2T the same way as the SJA5 for applet iteration, with one setup difference. On the SJA5 you talk SCP02 straight to the card ISD. On the eUICC the card ISD-R permits only SCP03 and is not your applet target anyway. Your applet target is the ISD-P of an enabled profile, and you establish the secure channel to that profile SD using the profile’s own SD key material, not the eUICC keys. Which PE holds the key material: the SecurityDomain ProfileElement of the profile. In pySim SAIP terms that is ProfileElementSD for the profile ISD/MNO-SD, or ProfileElementSSD for a supplementary SD. The keys sit in that PE’s keyList as SecurityDomainKey entries indexed by KVN and KID, and the permitted secure channels are declared in the SD install params via add_scp, for example add_scp(0x02, 0x55) for SCP02 add_scp(0x03, 0x70) for SCP03 That same PE is where you would add the SCP80/81 OTA keyset if you want RAM. The eUICC-level ISD-R and ECASD SCP03 keys are separate, personalised per EID and looked up by EID in pySim, and are not the applet-install target, so don’t conflate them with the profile SD keys. Do you need to rebuild SAIP each iteration: no. Build the SAIP once with a profile whose SD carries an SCP02 or SCP03 keyset and the Authorized Management privilege, download and enable it once, and from then the ISD-P behaves as an ordinary GP security domain. You establish SCP02/03 to it and do LOAD then INSTALL of your CAP every iteration, exactly like the SJA5 ISD flow. You only rebuild and redownload the SAIP when you need to change the SD keyset or its privileges, not for each applet build. Two caveats before you burn a card. The stock TS.48 test profiles from the sysmocom test SM-DP+ are minimal and are not guaranteed to ship an AM-privileged SCP02/03 keyset on their ISD-P for arbitrary applet loading, so plan on building one custom SAIP that adds that keyset plus the privilege and iterating against it, rather than expecting the default TS.48 profile to accept applet installs out of the box. And JC 3.0.5 features like oneshot are a platform capability, independent of the install path. Whether the eUICC OS exposes the JC 3.0.5 API on your specific C2T build is worth confirming against the sysmoEUICC platform/COS version before you design tests around 3.0.5-only APIs, rather than assuming parity with the SJA5.

SCP02/SCP03 to the ISD-P is fully expressible in SAIP, and if that path is ever blocked you can fall back to RAM over SCP80/81 to the same ISD-P, as long as the keysets are in the profile. Yes, you can use the C2T the same way as the SJA5 for applet iteration, with one setup difference. On the SJA5 you talk SCP02 straight to the card ISD. On the eUICC the card ISD-R permits only SCP03 and is not your applet target anyway. Your applet target is the ISD-P of an enabled profile, and you establish the secure channel to that profile SD using the profile’s own SD key material, not the eUICC keys. Which PE holds the key material: the SecurityDomain ProfileElement of the profile. In pySim SAIP terms that is ProfileElementSD for the profile ISD/MNO-SD, or ProfileElementSSD for a supplementary SD. The keys sit in that PE’s keyList as SecurityDomainKey entries indexed by KVN and KID, and the permitted secure channels are declared in the SD install params via add_scp, for example add_scp(0x02, 0x55) for SCP02 add_scp(0x03, 0x70) for SCP03 That same PE is where you would add the SCP80/81 OTA keyset if you want RAM. The eUICC-level ISD-R and ECASD SCP03 keys are separate, personalised per EID and looked up by EID in pySim, and are not the applet-install target, so don’t conflate them with the profile SD keys. Do you need to rebuild SAIP each iteration: no. Build the SAIP once with a profile whose SD carries an SCP02 or SCP03 keyset and the Authorized Management privilege, download and enable it once, and from then the ISD-P behaves as an ordinary GP security domain. You establish SCP02/03 to it and do LOAD then INSTALL of your CAP every iteration, exactly like the SJA5 ISD flow. You only rebuild and redownload the SAIP when you need to change the SD keyset or its privileges, not for each applet build. Two caveats before you burn a card. The stock TS.48 test profiles from the sysmocom test SM-DP+ are minimal and are not guaranteed to ship an AM-privileged SCP02/03 keyset on their ISD-P for arbitrary applet loading, so plan on building one custom SAIP that adds that keyset plus the privilege and iterating against it, rather than expecting the default TS.48 profile to accept applet installs out of the box. And JC 3.0.5 features like oneshot are a platform capability, independent of the install path. Whether the eUICC OS exposes the JC 3.0.5 API on your specific C2T build is worth confirming against the sysmoEUICC platform/COS version before you design tests around 3.0.5-only APIs, rather than assuming parity with the SJA5.

SCP02/SCP03 to the ISD-P is fully expressible in SAIP, and if that path is ever blocked you can fall back to RAM over SCP80/81 to the same ISD-P, as long as the keysets are in the profile. Yes, you can use the C2T the same way as the SJA5 for applet iteration, with one setup difference. On the SJA5 you talk SCP02 straight to the card ISD. On the eUICC the card ISD-R permits only SCP03 and is not your applet target anyway. Your applet target is the ISD-P of an enabled profile, and you establish the secure channel to that profile SD using the profile’s own SD key material, not the eUICC keys. Which PE holds the key material: the SecurityDomain ProfileElement of the profile. In pySim SAIP terms that is ProfileElementSD for the profile ISD/MNO-SD, or ProfileElementSSD for a supplementary SD. The keys sit in that PE’s keyList as SecurityDomainKey entries indexed by KVN and KID, and the permitted secure channels are declared in the SD install params via add_scp, for example add_scp(0x02, 0x55) for SCP02 add_scp(0x03, 0x70) for SCP03 That same PE is where you would add the SCP80/81 OTA keyset if you want RAM. The eUICC-level ISD-R and ECASD SCP03 keys are separate, personalised per EID and looked up by EID in pySim, and are not the applet-install target, so don’t conflate them with the profile SD keys. Do you need to rebuild SAIP each iteration: no. Build the SAIP once with a profile whose SD carries an SCP02 or SCP03 keyset and the Authorized Management privilege, download and enable it once, and from then the ISD-P behaves as an ordinary GP security domain. You establish SCP02/03 to it and do LOAD then INSTALL of your CAP every iteration, exactly like the SJA5 ISD flow. You only rebuild and redownload the SAIP when you need to change the SD keyset or its privileges, not for each applet build. Two caveats before you burn a card. The stock TS.48 test profiles from the sysmocom test SM-DP+ are minimal and are not guaranteed to ship an AM-privileged SCP02/03 keyset on their ISD-P for arbitrary applet loading, so plan on building one custom SAIP that adds that keyset plus the privilege and iterating against it, rather than expecting the default TS.48 profile to accept applet installs out of the box. And JC 3.0.5 features like oneshot are a platform capability, independent of the install path. Whether the eUICC OS exposes the JC 3.0.5 API on your specific C2T build is worth confirming against the sysmoEUICC platform/COS version before you design tests around 3.0.5-only APIs, rather than assuming parity with the SJA5.