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EFTA01295633 | EFTA01295691 Page 58 785 F.3d 895, *; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7739, ea; 126 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1793; 99 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P45,306 Similarly, other courts have rejected statistical evidence even though the evidence met the two-standard-deviation threshold. See, e.g., r*100] Carpenter, 456 F.3d at 1201 (7.95 and 38.03 standard deviations); Lopez v. Laborers Intl Union Local No. 18, 987 F. 2d 1210, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1993) (3.26 and 3.01 standard deviations); Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991) (2.68 standard deviations); EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 300 (7th Cir. 1991) (20.1 standard deviations); Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 1982) (2.45 standard deviations). In short, "there is nothing magical about two or three standard deviations." Ramona L. Paetzold & Steve L. Willborn, The Statistics of Discrimination § 4:13 (2014). 3. Instead of assuming "that any particular number of 'standard deviations"' establishes a discriminatory policy, courts must evaluate statistical evidence on a "case-by-case basis." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 101 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1977) . Neither "courts [n]or defendants [are] obliged to assume that plaintiffs' statistical evidence is reliable." Watson, 487 U.S. at 996. And we must always keep in mind that we are looking for reliable indications of "gross" or "substantial" disparities that amount to "significant proof." Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551, 2553; p936] Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08. The duty to test the relevant statistical evidence attaches at the class certification stage, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433, as "reliance on unverifiable evidence is hardly better than relying on bare allegations," Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2005) . District courts must probe the validity of statistical evidence, as "any method of measurement" would otherwise become "acceptable so long as it c[ouldj be applied classwide, no matter how arbitrary the measurements may r101] be." Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433; accord Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d at 254; Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2010). In this case, the district court evaluated Plaintiffs' statistical evidence, reasonably found it wanting, and explained in detail why that was so. It should not then be said that the district court clearly erred by refusing to give weight to unconvincing evidence. And when one takes a closer look, Plaintiffs' statistical evidence truly is fundamentally unconvincing, not just -- as the majority calls it — "less precise." Maj. op. at 18. 4. "[Tjrial judges may evaluate the data offered to support an expert's bottom-line opinions to determine if that data provides adequate support to mark the expert's testimony as reliable." Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2011). And in any case involving expert testimony, "a court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997). Plaintiffs' own experts conceded that they used problematic data. In support of a motion to compel, one of Plaintiffs' experts affirmed under oath that the information he had received For internal use only SDNY_GM_00056854 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QC;IN(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0019678 EFTA_00 167424 EFTA01295691
February 16, 2026 at 6:39 PM