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EFTA02406470 | EFTA02406484 This is in line wit= Hamas' gradual slide into a more pragmatic political posture over the p=st decade. During this time the movement has declared its willingness to a=cept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and coexistence with Israel, if the principles of the 2002 A=ab Peace Plan are adopted and the Palestine refugee issue is resolved equi=ably. Hamas has also signaled a willingness to abandon the armed struggle =n favor of nonviolent resistance against Israel, and to agree to a long-term truce with Israel under certai= conditions. At another level, H=mas' decision to leave Syria reflects ongoing internal divisions within =he movement. Islamist organizations, in the final analysis, experience the=same dynamics as any grouping of diverse people united by a common cause, but also divided over the many options th=y have to achieve their goals. We can see this in =he different tactical strands among Hamas officials vis-a-vis the reconc=liation with Fatah. The implications of these various views over issues su=h as negotiations with or recognition of Israel, power-sharing with Fatah, relations with Iran, or support for A=ab uprisings across the region — which range from hard-line absolutism t= a more accommodating pragmatism — are that groups like Hamas operate ac=ording to a domestic political calculus of survival that ultimately overrides other forces. This is also seen i= the quiet debate within llamas about whether to consolidate its power base=in Gaza and make do with a diminutive Palestinian statelet that makes litt=e sense to anyone other than Hamas operatives; or to rejoin and reconfigure Palestinian national institutions=such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, to continue the struggle na=ionally and regionally. This raises the thi=d level of analysis of Hamas' decision, which relates to the condition o= that grouping of states and movements called the Resistance and Deterrenc= Front — namely Syria, Hezbollah, Iran and Hamas. These four partners have always been fascinating for several re=sons, including their ability to transcend traditional divides in the Midd=e East, such as Sunni-Shiite, Arab-Iranian, and religious-secular divides.=/span> Hamas' decision t= turn against Damascus is a blow to the Front, but probably a minor one fo= now, in a volatile region. The Syrian government is under intense pressur= at home and abroad, and may not survive in its present form. The Iranian government faces its own vulnerabilities =t home and globally, and continues to be the major regional loser from the=Arab uprisings. Hezbollah in Lebano= — probably the strongest member of the front in the short term — must=be working overtime to calculate how it should respond to possible scenari=s on the horizon (the fall of the Assad regime, an attack on Iran, a revival of the Green Movement in Iran, an Ira=ian-Western nuclear agreement, and so on). Hamas and Syria are=the most vulnerable members of the Resistance and Deterrence Front these d=ys. How Hamas plays its cards in the months ahead probably will not have a=major impact on the region as a whole, because the movement has become a relatively minor and constrained actor i= its Gaze fiefdom. Syria's impact on the region would be much greater, s=ould the regime change, or only alter its policies. For now, we can only c=nclude two things: The Resistance and Deterrence Front, like any political construct, is vulnerable to chang=; and, Islamist movements such as Hamas will make political decisions base= on pragmatism and realism as much as on ideological purity and absolutism= The changes under w=y in the region are a logical step in the ongoing reconfiguration of power=relationships in the Middle East, following the first year of the Arab upr=sings. Hamas' reversal on Syria is an important example of how Islamist groups continue to make the transitio= from their previous world of abstract political opposition and often bloo=y and costly resistance, to the new environment in which they must grapple=more convincingly with real-world conditions and options, especially the spreading advent of populist legiti=acy and accountability in Arab countries. Two of the four mem=ers of the Resistance and Deterrence Front have been hit by the Arab upris=ngs. Others will follow in due course. 15 EFTA_R1_01448633 EFTA02406484
April 8, 2026 at 9:35 AM