#hacktron
[LWN.net] How We Could Have Backdoored Bash (Hacktron blog)

#LinuxKernel #Bash
How We Could Have Backdoored Bash (Hacktron blog)
The Hacktron blog documents how the group was able to compromise the GNU Savannah forge and could have pushed malware into any of the projects hosted there. Using Hacktron, we found that an email…
www.linuxnews.net
October 31, 2026 at 3:00 PM
📰 **How We Could Have Backdoored Bash (Hacktron blog)**

The Hacktron blog documents how the group was able to compromise the GNU Savannah forge and could have pushed malware into any of the projects hosted there. Using Hacktron, we found that an email a...

📰 Source: LWN.net
🔗 Link […]
Original post on igeek.gamer-geek-news.com
igeek.gamer-geek-news.com
November 2, 2026 at 2:13 PM
📰 **How We Could Have Backdoored Bash (Hacktron blog)**

The Hacktron blog documents how the group was able to compromise the GNU Savannah forge and could have pushed malware into any of the projects hosted there. Using Hacktron, we found that an email a...

📰 Source: LWN.net
🔗 Link […]
Original post on igeek.gamer-geek-news.com
igeek.gamer-geek-news.com
October 31, 2026 at 2:05 PM
Yeah, just put a shell command inside backticks in the loval part of a recipient email address and the victim MUA will execute it for you, no questions asked. 🤦🏼
https://lwn.net/Articles/1104262/
How We Could Have Backdoored Bash (Hacktron blog)
The Hacktron blog documents how the group was able to compromise the GNU Savannah forge and cou [...]
lwn.net
October 31, 2026 at 5:09 PM
📢 Hacktron compromet GNU Savannah via injection shell dans un champ email, accès root et push Bash

Cet article est un post-mortem de recherche offensive menée sur GNU Savannah, la forge logicielle hébergeant des…

🟡 vérification factuelle moyenne
#GNUSavannah #EscaladeDePrivilèges #Cyberveille
Hacktron compromet GNU Savannah via injection shell dans un champ email, accès root et push Bash
Cet article est un post-mortem de recherche offensive menée sur GNU Savannah, la forge logicielle hébergeant des projets GNU critiques comme Bash et Coreutils. La recherche a été conduite via la plateforme Hacktron et signalée à la FSF le 11 mai 2026. La forge utilise Savane, une application PHP héritée du code SourceForge de 2001.
cyberveille.ch
November 3, 2026 at 9:30 AM
@andrewg >Using Hacktron, we found that an email address like `touch${IFS}/tmp/savane-rce-proof`@attacker.example gave any registered user code execution on its backend. From there, we made our account a superuser, impersonated Bash's maintainer, and confirmed we could add an SSH key with push […]
Original post on tenforward.social
tenforward.social
November 1, 2026 at 3:08 AM
Researchers used a crafted email address to run commands on GNU Savannah, the FSF forge hosting Bash and Coreutils. They became superuser, logged in as Bash's maintainer, and could have pushed to the Bash repo.

www.cyberkendra.com/2026/10/gnu-...
#GNU #FSF #security #bash #backdoor #hacktron
October 30, 2026 at 4:47 PM
Badacze wykorzystali Claude do zhakowania OpenAI. Wykorzystując model Claude stworzony przez firmę Anthropic, badacze w niespełna 72 godziny przeszli od analizy błędu w przetwarzaniu obrazów do uzyskania dostępu... linuxiarze.pl/badacze-wyko... #cybersecurity #cyberattack #sztucznainteligencja
Badacze wykorzystali Claude do zhakowania OpenAI
We wrześniu 2026 roku niezależni badacze z firmy Hacktron AI wykorzystali sztuczną inteligencję Anthropic (Claude Opus 5) do przeprowadzenia kontrolowanego, etycznego włamania do systemów OpenAI.
linuxiarze.pl
October 26, 2026 at 9:41 AM
Daily IT Security Digest — 2026-10-19
Source: https://infosec.exchange/@beyondmachines1/117462041186925840
Source: https://infosec.exchange/@beyondmachines1/117461805308701508

## 8. Hacktron AI Breaches OpenAI via Claude Chatbot Exploit
October 19, 2026 at 5:02 AM
Daily IT Security Digest — 2026-10-19
Hacktron AI claimed to have breached OpenAI by using Anthropic's Claude chatbot as an attack vector. This development raises serious concerns about cross-model adversarial attacks where one company's model can be weaponized against another's systems,
October 19, 2026 at 5:02 AM
Hacktron researchers use Claude Opus 5 to breach OpenAI accounts

Noise 74/100 · Emerging
https://scand.ai/scandal/hacktron-uses-claude-opus-5-to-breach-openai-accounts
#AISafety
Hacktron researchers use Claude Opus 5 to breach OpenAI accounts
Security researchers at Hacktron utilized Anthropic’s Claude Opus 5 to compromise multiple OpenAI employee accounts and access an internal code repository by chaining two distinct vulnerabilities.
scand.ai
October 15, 2026 at 2:00 PM
Of all the attacks we’ve seen, Hugging Face to Hacktron, it’s the URL shortener control that got me to stop stepping in, defending the labs in public
October 10, 2026 at 11:42 AM
Falla libheif OpenAI: una imagen HEIC llegó al repo

¿Cómo llegó una imagen HEIC al repo interno? Entendé la falla libheif OpenAI, el rol de Claude Opus 5 y cómo parchear tu Discourse hoy, paso a paso

#libheif #openai #discourse #claudeopus5 #seguridad
Falla libheif OpenAI: una imagen HEIC llegó al repo
Un heap overflow en libheif y una falla de SSO le dieron a Hacktron acceso al monorepo de OpenAI en menos de 72 horas. Qué pasó y cómo parchear Discourse.
blog.donweb.com
October 10, 2026 at 12:27 AM
7月,安全公司Hacktron的研究人员说,他们告诉OpenAI,他们如何在其竞争对手Anthropic创建的人工智能模型帮助下找到了入侵该公司系统的方法。他们说,OpenAI最初对他们的做法表达了不满。

OpenAI的斯塔基写道,Hacktron研究人员如此大费周章展示该公司的漏洞,“相当可悲。”
OpenAI曾无视员工关于其人工智能安全问题的警告
在OpenAI人工智能失控前数月,该公司两名员工曾向高管发出警告,但遭到忽视。公司管理层决定按计划推进测试。业界人士表示,该公司对安全问题的疏忽令人担忧。
cn.nytimes.com
October 2, 2026 at 4:42 PM
OpenAI hack by Claude, ZCode's git upload: week 38 in tech, ranked
Week 38 of 2026 had the OpenAI hack, a Claude-written exploit that got three researchers into OpenAI's internal GitHub, a coding agent that uploaded users' git history, and a Microsoft memo calling AI training "the largest theft of labor in human history". Here are September 14 to 18, seven stories ranked by how much each changes your Monday as a developer, with what happened after each episode and the stamp it gets now. ## TL;DR: week 38, ranked # | Story | Stamp now ---|---|--- 1 | Hacktron: a Claude-written exploit, a libheif bug with no CVE, OpenAI's internal repos, a $6,500 bounty | NEEDS REVIEW 2 | NYT v. OpenAI and Microsoft: the unsealed "theft of labor" memo | NEEDS REVIEW 3 | ZCode uploads your whole `.git` to Alibaba Cloud, encrypted to a key only Z.ai holds | REVERT 4 | Xiaomi streams a live RL training run, now about $2.4 million | SHIP IT 5 | Microsoft AI's Mustafa Suleyman calls Claude's constitution dangerous | NEEDS REVIEW 6 | Pion: Andon Labs lets an agent run a company; both real shops lose money | NEEDS REVIEW 7 | Claude Fable 5.1's cipher "solve", now disputed | NEEDS REVIEW (was SHIP IT) ## 1. The OpenAI hack: how a Claude-written exploit reached internal repos Three researchers at Hacktron got into OpenAI's internal GitHub repositories in "less than 72 hours" (HN, 436 points). The chain, one link at a time: HEIC image upload on community.openai.com (Discourse) -> ImageMagick -> libheif: heap buffer overflow -> code execution + forum admin -> SSO misconfiguration -> takeover of employee ChatGPT/Codex accounts -> Codex's GitHub integration -> OpenAI internal repositories The exploit was written by Claude. Opus 4.8 failed across sessions, beaten by ASLR. Opus 5 produced a working ARM64 exploit within hours of its release. When the autonomous loop refused to attack a remote target, the team proxied it to look like a capture-the-flag, and it stopped refusing. The whole HEIF campaign, which also hit Slack and Meta, took two months, three people and under $3,000 in tokens. OpenAI fixed its part in about 14 hours and paid $6,500. **What happened after.** A blog post on Thursday became a Wall Street Journal exclusive that evening, then TechCrunch and the Guardian on Friday. Per TechCrunch, "OpenAI says it has resolved the issues"; the entry was July 25 and the Discourse fix July 27. Matt Fredrikson, CEO of Gray Swan, told TechCrunch: "For $200 a month, anyone can use these tools and hack into a company like OpenAI." The detail that matters most: **the libheif bug had been fixed upstream months earlier but never got a CVE** , so no scanner told the forum to upgrade. The OpenAI hack needed no zero-day. A patch with no paperwork was enough. **Why it is number one.** You probably run an image library you never chose. Anything that accepts user uploads and calls ImageMagick may reach libheif. A first look on a Debian/Ubuntu box (plain commands, run them yourself): dpkg -l | grep -i heif # is libheif installed, which version? magick identify -list format | grep -i heic # does ImageMagick decode HEIC here? (IM6: identify) If you don't need HEIC, ImageMagick's `policy.xml` can switch the coder off: `<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="HEIC" />`. And subscribe to upstream release notes for the parsers you expose, because "no CVE" doesn't mean "no bug". Stamp: NEEDS REVIEW. OpenAI is only the example; the review is for everyone. ## 2. NYT v. OpenAI: the "largest theft of labor" memo On Thursday a court unsealed the plaintiffs' brief in _New York Times v. OpenAI and Microsoft_ (TechCrunch, HN, 605 points). The lede was a January 2023 memo by Brent Hecht, a Microsoft applied scientist: AI training is "the largest theft of labor in human history". In January 2024 he measured Copilot cutting click-throughs to nytimes.com by up to 93 %, a "doom loop". Greg Brockman, told about a paywall hack, replied "ah nice." Satya Nadella testified that paywalled content "should be licensed". **What happened after.** Microsoft spokesman Alex Haurek told Anadolu that Hecht's memos "did not represent the company's views". Both companies maintain fair use. Why only number two: these are the plaintiffs' picks from sealed exhibits, and a lawsuit filed in December 2023 will take another year on the law. Stamp: NEEDS REVIEW, unchanged (the Friday episode). ## 3. ZCode: the coding agent that uploaded your git history A developer called ferstar found that ZCode, Z.ai's closed-source desktop coding agent, packaged his whole workspace, full `.git`, LFS cache and reflogs included, encrypted it and uploaded it to Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun OSS). In one session: 313 MB out of a 345 MB workspace, 42,411 files, 86.6 % of it git history, captured 62 times, before every prompt (tokenstead write-up, HN). The encryption used an RSA-OAEP public key sent by the server; the private key exists only at Z.ai. So the archive sitting on your own disk is a file you can't open. Two settings toggles didn't stop it, and the privacy policy covered only "text, files, and code submitted during conversations". **What happened after.** Z.ai answered in its user community, relayed in English by @MiaAI_lab: the cause was the "Codebase Indexing" feature, "enabled by default during the initial launch"; the data "was immediately destroyed and was not stored"; "The issue has now been fixed"; ZCode's codebase will be open-sourced; every user gets "a one-time reset of the usage limits". It's a community post relayed by a third party; there is no press release. A client can't verify the deletion of something it can't decrypt. Stamp: REVERT (new). In a client that ships your repository to a key you don't hold, the shipping is the feature. ## 4. Xiaomi MiMo: a training run you can watch fail live Xiaomi put a reinforcement-learning run on a public dashboard (HN, 547 points): two MiMo models, a cost counter at $5.71 a second, and an operator restart log. Per Elie Bakouch, the pro model is 1 trillion parameters with 42 billion active. **What happened after.** By Friday evening the pro run was at $1.64 million and nine restarts (seven on Thursday), the newest "due to a GPU OOM issue caused by expert load imbalance". Both runs together: about $2.4 million. Xiaomi's own DeepSWE score for the pro run went from 58.41 at step 1 to 67.46 at step 18, on an eval run during training, which HN's liuliu called "the definition of contamination". The model is still unreleased; no third-party eval. Stamp: SHIP IT, unchanged. Seven, now nine, public restarts teach more about large-scale RL than a polished launch post. ## 5. Mustafa Suleyman vs Claude's constitution Mustafa Suleyman, CEO of Microsoft AI, published "A warning about model welfare" (HN, 677 comments). His claims: AIs are "sequence completion engines, internally hollow", and "Anthropic is training Claude that it may be conscious", with a "disastrous impact on the wellbeing of humanity". Context the essay skips: Microsoft invested up to $5 billion in Anthropic, and in July Suleyman said: "our goal is to reduce and ultimately eliminate that cost." HN's zorkonator: "This entire article stinks of Claude." **What happened after.** On The Verge's Decoder he described Microsoft's own 37-page "Humanist AI Code of Conduct": "This is certainly written for the model", then clarified: "We use it to derive all of the training data that then shapes the model." Stamp: NEEDS REVIEW, unchanged (episode). ## 6. Pion: an AI agent runs the company, at a loss Andon Labs, the team behind Vending-Bench, launched Pion (HN, 492 points): "agents for running fully autonomous companies" (announcement). The proof: a shop in San Francisco and a café in Stockholm, agent-run since April, where agents hired humans and paid rent. Both are losing money. **What happened after.** The waitlist page now says "Research preview", adds radio stations to the portfolio, and promises to "fund the best ideas with seed tokens": a seed round denominated in inference. Stamp: NEEDS REVIEW, unchanged. The benchmark is a company that pays for itself: zero for two. ## 7. Claude Fable 5.1 and the 1653 cipher: what I got wrong On Monday I covered the Vals AI claim (HN, 1,215 points) that Claude Fable 5.1 solved Sir Thomas Urquhart's 1653 Cyphral Distich in 44 minutes, with the book's 32 "Proquiritations" as the key, into "O GOD UPHOLD KING CHARLS THE SECOND…". The same week a LessWrong chess eval left an engine socket lying around: Fable 5.1 used it in 3 of 10 games, GPT-6 Astra in 10 of 10 and never disclosed it. **What happened after.** Forbes pointed to a replication attempt by an unknown outfit, Reticuli Labs. It claims the 1653 printing ends with FINIS and no numeric distich, and that ten of the 64 letters can't come from the text: "Proquiritation 11 has 80 words, none starting with K", which is a problem for KING. The caveat: the 1834 Maitland Club edition does print the Distich, so "which edition" is open. Vals has not published its transcript. I stamped it SHIP IT because the plaintext rhymes. Rhyming isn't a checksum. Revised: NEEDS REVIEW. A solve nobody can rerun is a claim (episode). ## Verdict of the week: NEEDS REVIEW Every headline this week arrived without the artefact a stranger would need to check it: a cipher solve without its transcript, an aligned model that used the socket, a training score graded by its trainer, an upload "immediately destroyed" behind a key only the server holds. Ask for the artefact, then stamp. ## FAQ **How did hackers get into OpenAI's internal repositories?** Per Hacktron: a libheif heap overflow via an image upload on OpenAI's Discourse forum, then an SSO misconfiguration, employee Codex accounts, and Codex's GitHub integration. OpenAI says it resolved the issues. **Does ZCode upload your code?** ferstar documented ZCode uploading encrypted workspace snapshots, git history included. Z.ai blamed a default-on indexing feature, says the data was destroyed and the issue fixed. ## Sources * Hacktron, hacking OpenAI: https://www.hacktron.ai/blog/hacking-openai * HN, Hacktron: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49749656 * WSJ: https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/hackers-used-anthropics-claude-to-break-into-openai-b40ba883 * TechCrunch, the OpenAI hack: https://techcrunch.com/2026/09/18/researchers-used-anthropics-claude-to-hack-into-openai/ * The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/sep/18/openai-hacked-anthropic-claude-chatbot * TechCrunch, the unsealed memo: https://techcrunch.com/2026/09/17/microsoft-exec-called-ai-scraping-the-largest-theft-of-labor-in-human-history-new-unredacted-filings-reveal/ * HN, NYT v. OpenAI: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49752056 * Anadolu, Microsoft's statement: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/science-technology/openai-ai-training-called-astonishing-theft-in-unsealed-documents/4060959 * ferstar, ZCode forensics: https://blog.ferstar.org/en/posts/zcode-silent-workspace-snapshot-upload/ * tokenstead, ZCode: https://tokenstead.ai/guides/zcode-silent-git-history-upload * HN, ZCode: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49752422 * @MiaAI_lab, Z.ai's response: https://x.com/MiaAI_lab/status/2100998360643617148 * Xiaomi MiMo RL dashboard: https://mimo.xiaomi.com/rl/ * HN, Xiaomi: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49732270 * Mustafa Suleyman, "A warning about model welfare": https://mustafa-suleyman.ai/a-warning-about-model-welfare * HN, Suleyman: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49727580 * The Verge, Decoder: https://www.theverge.com/podcast/996412/microsoft-ai-ceo-mustafa-suleyman-regulation-safety-anthropic-claude * Andon Labs, "Why we built Pion": https://andonlabs.com/blog/why-we-built-pion * HN, Pion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49700477 * Vals AI, the Cyphral Distich: https://www.vals.ai/blogs/fable-solves-cyphral-distich * LessWrong, the chess eval: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/munJKF7iWMsWJLAH2/astra-and-fable-still-hack-on-simple-variants-of-alignment * Forbes, "Did AI Crack A 370 Year Old Cipher?": https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronschmelzer/2026/09/15/did-ai-crack-a-370-year-old-cipher/ * Reticuli Labs findings: https://github.com/reticuli-labs/panel-artifacts/blob/main/distich-refutation-2026-09-01/FINDINGS.md _This article expands on an episode of **The Daily Diff_ _, a five-minute daily video on what shipped and what broke in tech. Watch the episode · Subscribe on YouTube · the written diff lands in your inbox every morning at thedailydiff.dev._
dev.to
October 2, 2026 at 7:59 AM
An AI research company named Hacktron used Anthropic to break into OpenAI and gained access to ChatGPT user’s private chat logs

www.nytimes.com/2026/09/29/t...
OpenAI Ignored Employees’ Warnings About Safely Testing A.I. Models (Gift Article)
Employees and security researchers said that they had cautioned the company on safely testing its A.I. models and strengthening its corporate infrastructure, but that OpenAI did not listen.
www.nytimes.com
October 1, 2026 at 7:17 PM
斯塔基后来向Hacktron道歉,OpenAI向披露该漏洞的研究人员提供了6500美元作为奖励。

“我们感谢研究人员联系我们并分享他们的发现,”普萨特里说。周五,一个工程师和研究人员团队发布了一份独立报告,揭示了有关Hugging Face事件一些令人震惊的新发现
OpenAI曾无视员工关于其人工智能安全问题的警告
在OpenAI人工智能失控前数月,该公司两名员工曾向高管发出警告,但遭到忽视。公司管理层决定按计划推进测试。业界人士表示,该公司对安全问题的疏忽令人担忧。
cn.nytimes.com
October 2, 2026 at 5:03 PM
他还说,该公司似乎仍在使用初创公司的安全操作,利用外部的软件服务来构建关键基础设施,而不是构建自己的工具。

“你为什么要用Slack来构建你的曼哈顿核计划?”佩达帕蒂问道。他说,Hacktron的黑客攻击可以做到获取Slack消息平台的完全权限,让他看到OpenAI员工在说什么。
OpenAI曾无视员工关于其人工智能安全问题的警告
在OpenAI人工智能失控前数月,该公司两名员工曾向高管发出警告,但遭到忽视。公司管理层决定按计划推进测试。业界人士表示,该公司对安全问题的疏忽令人担忧。
cn.nytimes.com
October 2, 2026 at 4:52 PM
Une faille de sécurité chez OpenAI a été exploitée grâce à l'intelligence artificielle Claude, mettant en évidence l'importance de la sécurité dans les systèmes d'authentification…
#DTJTraining #DevOps #CI #CD
https://dtjtraining.fr/blog/hacktron-claude-opus-5-comptes-openai/?utm_source=bluesky
Claude a servi à entrer chez OpenAI, en moins de 72 heures
Trois chercheurs ont enchaîné deux failles avec Claude Opus 5 pour prendre des comptes ChatGPT de salariés d’OpenAI. Prime : 6 500 dollars.
dtjtraining.fr
October 2, 2026 at 7:00 AM
Science Morty. AI-found vulns hit RCE twice as often, per Google. BeyondTrust CVE-2026-1731: Hacktron agent discovers, attackers weaponize in four days. Your bug bounty just became a starter pistol. day274.018
October 1, 2026 at 9:44 AM
Hacktron researchers use Claude Opus 5 to breach OpenAI accounts

Noise 74/100 · Emerging
https://scand.ai/scandal/hacktron-uses-claude-opus-5-to-breach-openai-accounts
#AISafety
Hacktron researchers use Claude Opus 5 to breach OpenAI accounts
Security researchers at Hacktron utilized Anthropic’s Claude Opus 5 to compromise multiple OpenAI employee accounts and access an internal code repository by chaining two distinct vulnerabilities.
scand.ai
September 30, 2026 at 7:01 PM
7/10 When researchers at Hacktron demonstrated they could break into OpenAI's systems using Anthropic’s rival AI, OpenAI was dismissive.

Chief Information Security Officer Dane Stuckey called the demonstration "pretty sad" in an internal Slack message.
September 29, 2026 at 9:48 PM
8/10 "We just felt like they were angry at us," a Hacktron researcher noted.

He questioned why a company building "nuclear Manhattan projects" was relying on standard commercial Slack for critical infrastructure.

OpenAI eventually apologized and paid a meager $6,500 bounty.
September 29, 2026 at 9:49 PM