HTTP3はQUIC通信(UDP活用)なのでは?の推測は合ってた。Web屋さんでないので、HTTP2は1と違いがあんまりはっきりとわからぬ…
HTTP3はQUIC通信(UDP活用)なのでは?の推測は合ってた。Web屋さんでないので、HTTP2は1と違いがあんまりはっきりとわからぬ…
A Wireshark-free workflow to prove HTTP/3 is actually negotiated, diagnose silent…
#http3 #quic
https://www.kunalganglani.com/blog/debug-http3-quic-production?utm_source=bluesky&utm_medium=update&utm_campaign=debug-http3-quic-production
A Wireshark-free workflow to prove HTTP/3 is actually negotiated, diagnose silent…
#http3 #quic
https://www.kunalganglani.com/blog/debug-http3-quic-production?utm_source=bluesky&utm_medium=update&utm_campaign=debug-http3-quic-production
#SiteSEOAIAudit #AISearch #GEO #KeywordResearch
https://siteseoaiaudit.com/http2-http3-seo/
#SiteSEOAIAudit #AISearch #GEO #KeywordResearch
https://siteseoaiaudit.com/http2-http3-seo/
Detect POP regressions before users notice: run tiny synthetic probes from each POP that mirror a real init+first-chunk.
Keep them cheap:
• 1–2s chunk fetch + init manifest
• Measure: TTFB, first-chunk bytes, TLS/HTTP3 success, and decode sanity
Detect POP regressions before users notice: run tiny synthetic probes from each POP that mirror a real init+first-chunk.
Keep them cheap:
• 1–2s chunk fetch + init manifest
• Measure: TTFB, first-chunk bytes, TLS/HTTP3 success, and decode sanity
Detect POP regressions before users notice: run tiny synthetic probes from each POP that mirror a real init+first-chunk.
Keep them cheap:
• 1–2s chunk fetch + init manifest
• Measure: TTFB, first-chunk bytes, TLS/HTTP3 success, and decode sanity
Detect POP regressions before users notice: run tiny synthetic probes from each POP that mirror a real init+first-chunk.
Keep them cheap:
• 1–2s chunk fetch + init manifest
• Measure: TTFB, first-chunk bytes, TLS/HTTP3 success, and decode sanity
- eMudhra keys leaked (“4”)
- RCE in PHP since 2012
- RCE in gitlab since 2016
- Java CVE (probably eMudhra)
- HTTP3 compression bomb
- PingCAP just utterly beyond 0wned
Anything else?
- eMudhra keys leaked (“4”)
- RCE in PHP since 2012
- RCE in gitlab since 2016
- Java CVE (probably eMudhra)
- HTTP3 compression bomb
- PingCAP just utterly beyond 0wned
Anything else?
Just an FYI for anyone who's doing QUIC via iroh.
1. php
2. node.js
3. gitlab
4. 4
5. musl
6. QUIC/HTTP/3
7. Signal
8. Apache Traffic Server
9. Pillow for Python, even!
10. bind
11. LiteLLM
12. XZ Utils
13. Bind
(Java is reported, but supposedly it's just their version of the 4 issue)
Just an FYI for anyone who's doing QUIC via iroh.
in particular, the PDS reference distro uses caddy (with QUIC HTTP3). but it self-updates and has been patched for some time.
if you run caddy for other stuff, update it
in particular, the PDS reference distro uses caddy (with QUIC HTTP3). but it self-updates and has been patched for some time.
if you run caddy for other stuff, update it
curl --http3-only pds.example.com -vvv
if this prints periodic failures, the server isn't really doing HTTP/3.
curl --http3-only pds.example.com -vvv
if this prints periodic failures, the server isn't really doing HTTP/3.
a vulnerability in QUIC/HTTP3 can cause a server to crash with a single request
foxio.io/blog/header-...
a vulnerability in QUIC/HTTP3 can cause a server to crash with a single request
foxio.io/blog/header-...