#linuxbackdoor
cPGuard Update Channel Hijacked to Deploy Linux Backdoor and Steal Server Credentials #apitokens #LinuxBackdoor #malware
cPGuard Update Channel Hijacked to Deploy Linux Backdoor and Steal Server Credentials
  A cyberattack targeting OPSSHIELD's software distribution infrastructure allowed an unidentified attacker to compromise cPGuard updates and deploy a malicious script across customers' Linux servers, harvesting password hashes, SSH keys, database credentials, and other sensitive information. The incident began on November 2, 2026, when the attacker exploited compromised credentials to access OPSSHIELD's update distribution infrastructure. According to the company's investigation, approximately 2,950 customer servers executed the malicious update, while nearly 7,900 billing portal account records were also exposed. cPGuard, OPSSHIELD's Linux server security solution, provides malware scanning, firewall management, and attack protection for web hosting environments, including servers running cPanel, DirectAdmin, and Plesk. Compromised Update Infrastructure Delivered Malicious Script OPSSHIELD's investigation traced the intrusion to its billing and licensing application. The attacker initially registered a customer account under a false identity on November 1 and requested a free cPGuard trial to examine communications between the software and its licensing infrastructure. After probing the billing portal and submitting specially crafted requests, the attacker obtained command execution on the company's billing and licensing server. This access enabled the theft of credentials used to distribute software updates. Between 02:04 and 02:09 UTC on November 2, the attacker uploaded a malicious update using a stolen access key. The compromised versions, ranging from 5.88.12 through 5.88.19, were distributed for approximately 70 minutes and executed with root privileges on servers checking for updates during that period. OPSSHIELD detected the compromise within 12 hours and subsequently revoked the stolen update key. Password Hashes and SSH Credentials Targeted The malicious script collected sensitive system information and transferred it to OPSSHIELD's licensing infrastructure through a compromised account, allowing the attacker to retrieve the uploaded data. The targeted files included "/etc/shadow" and "/etc/passwd", root's MariaDB/MySQL configuration ("my.cnf"), shell history, and SSH authorization and known-hosts files. The script also accessed root's SSH private keys and cloud storage credentials on some systems. The "/etc/shadow" file contains password hashes rather than plaintext credentials. However, attackers can attempt offline password cracking against these hashes, particularly when passwords are weak, commonly used, or previously exposed. Database configurations and shell histories may contain credentials and API tokens that are immediately usable without requiring password cracking. OPSSHIELD initially confirmed that attackers retrieved 32 collected files, each associated with a different customer server. Its subsequent disclosure estimated approximately 2,950 servers executed the malicious update. The attackers also copied approximately 7,900 billing portal records containing customer names, company information, postal addresses, email addresses, and bcrypt-hashed passwords. OPSSHIELD Releases Security Updates The malicious script left several identifiable artifacts, including "cpguard-v58812-i91511.sh", a hidden root shell at "/var/tmp/.cpg91511_sh", and a collection directory at "/var/tmp/.cpg91511", containing the staged archive "loot.tgz". OPSSHIELD's corrective updates remove the known backdoor and associated malicious files. However, removing these artifacts does not establish that a server was never compromised. The company initially recommended updating to version 5.88.25 or later. Its subsequent disclosure identified version 5.88.26 as the clean release, which also addresses additional persistence mechanisms. Administrators should run "cpgcli update --start" and verify the installed version using "cpgcli --version". For potentially affected systems, OPSSHIELD recommends resetting local account passwords, rotating database credentials, S3 access keys, DigitalOcean tokens, and other exposed secrets. Administrators must also replace root SSH private keys and remove corresponding public keys from systems that previously trusted them. Customers should additionally reset their OPSSHIELD billing portal passwords and enable two-factor authentication. OPSSHIELD has also begun revoking its previously deployed support-access keys and rebuilding compromised internal infrastructure. Although the company initially did not recommend routine operating system reinstalls, its updated disclosure confirms that affected customer servers are being rebuilt where necessary.
dlvr.it
November 4, 2026 at 4:08 PM
Ebury torna in azione: 333 nodi di uscita di Tor trasformati in trappole per le password SSH
il blog: insicurezzadigitale.com/ebury-torna-...

#cybersecurity #backdoor #darkweb #ebury #infosec #linux #linuxbackdoor #ssh #tor
💬 Il forum: internet-forum.it/t/stanza-sec...
October 22, 2026 at 3:58 PM
Over 300 Tor Exit Relays Hijacked to Intercept SSH Connections #Authentication #CyberSecurity #LinuxBackdoor
Over 300 Tor Exit Relays Hijacked to Intercept SSH Connections
  Attackers hijacked 333 Tor exit relays in early October 2026, redirecting Secure Shell (SSH) connections through 12 interception servers to steal passwords and potentially deploy malware. Researcher kaba discovered the operation on October 2, while separate analysis identified 377 relays operated by 59 operators that had adopted the attackers' exit policy. The malicious configuration represented 7.46% of Tor's exit capacity at its October 4 peak. Attackers Modified Relay Configurations Tor exit relays forward traffic to destinations outside the network. Attackers modified the relays' "torrc" configuration files to permit connections over port 22, enabling SSH on 342 relays that previously blocked it and converting another 24 non-exit relays into exits. The changes also blocked encrypted email ports while permitting plaintext-capable IMAP and POP3 connections on most affected relays. This potentially exposed unencrypted email retrieval, although investigators have not established whether attackers successfully captured messages. Kaba discovered the campaign after an SSH connection through Tor triggered a warning that the remote host's identity had changed. Using exitmap, the researcher tested approximately 3,000 exit relays by routing SSH connections between controlled servers. The investigation identified 333 relays redirecting connections to the same 12 interception servers. Around a dozen presented fraudulent host keys directly, while the others redirected traffic without altering the key themselves. The interception servers presented their own SSH host keys before connecting to the legitimate destinations. Users who accepted unfamiliar keys and entered passwords exposed their credentials. Attackers could then observe commands, check administrative privileges and attempt to install a Base64-encoded Perl payload. Public-key authentication could not be transparently relayed in the same way because SSH authentication signatures are tied to individual sessions. However, users who accepted a malicious key could still be deceived into interacting with an attacker-controlled shell. Ebury Backdoor Reveals an Earlier Intrusion The Tor Project's Network Health team warned relay operators on October 5 that attackers appeared to be compromising Linux hosts and changing their configurations. In an October 7 post-mortem, operator Zimmer confirmed Ebury version 1.8.3 on two Quetzalcoatl relay-family servers. The attacker had accessed a management server on August 28 using the operator's password, obtained root privileges within five minutes and installed Ebury. Approximately an hour later, the attacker compromised a second server, Switzerland2. Zimmer attributed the initial intrusion to password reuse across SSH, "sudo" and backup encryption, with the password also stored in plaintext. SSH password authentication remained enabled on the internet-facing management server. Ebury is a Linux backdoor and credential stealer associated with OpenSSH compromises since 2009. ESET estimated in 2024 that it had infected approximately 400,000 servers, with more than 100,000 still infected in late 2023. The implant masqueraded as "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libkeyutils.so.1.10.2", with "libkeyutils.so.1" pointing to the malicious file. Because the packaged library remained untouched, conventional integrity checks such as "dpkg -V" and "debsums" could miss it. ESET researcher Marc-Etienne Léveillé subsequently confirmed that version 1.8.3 had existed since at least June 2026 and published an updated detection script. Investigation Leaves Unresolved Questions On October 4, Tor directory authorities began applying BadExit and MiddleOnly flags to affected relays. BadExit prevents clients from selecting a relay to exit the network. By 17:00 UTC on October 5, no relay carrying the malicious policy remained in the consensus used by Tor clients. A scripted restart subsequently affected 55 Quetzalcoatl hosts, but authorities rejected affected relays attempting to rejoin. Tor Metrics recorded approximately 370 fewer exit-flagged relays between October 3 and 5. Investigators have not established how attackers accessed the other 58 operators' systems. Directory analysis found that 71 of 101 affected relays hosted by FranTech Solutions, associated with BuyVM, adopted the malicious policy, compared with 13 of 9,054 hosted elsewhere. This concentration raises questions about hosting-level access but does not prove the provider was compromised. The campaign's attribution, the number of infected hosts and the number of exposed users remain unknown. Indicators and Remediation Operators should inspect "torrc" and included files for unauthorized changes to "ExitRelay", "ExitPolicy", "ContactInfo", "MyFamily" and "Nickname". Other indicators include unfamiliar listening processes, outbound connections, NAT rules redirecting port 22, unauthorized SSH keys, unexpected scheduled tasks and suspicious system services. Additional Ebury indicators include the abstract UNIX socket "@event-0YsOG9WSOE", a disguised "/sbin/rsyslogd" process and the IP address "185.225.226[.]62", associated with the initial intrusion into Zimmer's management server. Anyone who accepted an unfamiliar SSH host key and entered a password through Tor between October 1 and October 5 should treat that credential as compromised, change it and investigate the destination server. Suspected infected hosts should be taken offline, forensic evidence preserved and systems reinstalled rather than merely cleaned. Operators should replace exposed credentials, generate new relay identities and report findings to the Tor Project's bad-relays mailing list. The incident demonstrates that Tor's traffic-routing protections cannot guarantee the authenticity of a destination connection when a malicious exit intercepts it. Verifying SSH host keys, disabling password authentication where practical and maintaining unique credentials are essential defenses.
dlvr.it
October 23, 2026 at 4:39 PM
crond, sshd, polkitd: la backdoor nordcoreana Ted infetta i demoni Linux nascosta dentro HAProxy
il blog: insicurezzadigitale.com/crond-sshd-p...

#cybersecurity #apt #apt37 #backdoor #coreadelnord #coreadelsud #infosec #lazarusgroup #linux #linuxbackdoor
September 8, 2026 at 11:53 AM
Trojanized npm Packages Distribute RedC2 4.0 Linux Backdoor Across Systems #AIAssistedC2 #Cybersecurity #LinuxBackdoor
Trojanized npm Packages Distribute RedC2 4.0 Linux Backdoor Across Systems
In an investigation uncovered by cybersecurity researchers, 14 trojanized NPM packages have been masquerading as legitimate calendar modules and utility modules while secretly delivering a Linux backdoor powered by artificial intelligence (AI) known as RedC2 4.0.  Upon importation of the malicious packages, TrendAI, Trend Micro's enterprise cybersecurity company, explains that they execute the payload bundled with the module without any installation hooks required. In the code, the embedded binary is located, permissions are changed to make it executable, and it is then launched as a detached background process.  As a result, even a transitive dependency can trigger the backdoor when a compromised package is loaded. It is concealed under filenames such as math-core.bin and calc-math.dat that the malicious payload is concealed in order to prevent raising suspicion. Through the embedded Linux beacon, attackers are able to communicate with remote infrastructure and gain access to affected systems to conduct further malicious activities.  RedC2 4.0 has been actively developed with capabilities extending beyond basic remote access. Along with interactive shell access and system reconnaissance, its Linux component facilitates data collection, including the theft of sensitive information such as SSH keys, through its Linux component. The comprehensive framework also encompasses file transfer, network visualization, host-to-host tunneling, and in-memory payload execution, highlighting the growing threat posed by malicious software packages.  Malicious Packages Retain Legitimate Functionality In spite of the fact that the compromised packages do not appear to be obviously malicious, they continue to provide the calendar and date-related functions described in their package descriptions. The malicious code, however, is concealed within the package structure, in which files such as math-core.bin, math-calc.bin, calc-math.dat, calc-cache.bin, calc.bin and calc-mapping.bin are listed as native components.  There are two types of files stored within the dist/ directory: either directly under the dist/ directory or in dist/internal/ directory. Even though the names of these packages differ, they contain the RedShell Linux beacon that is associated with RedC2 4.0. The package entry file, dist/index.mjs, serves as a loader. It re-exports the valid date utilities while simultaneously initiating the embedded implant. By doing so, the malicious component does not require an installation hook or specific function call to execute.  RedShell Gives Attackers Remote Access RedShell beacons establish communication with remote command-and-control servers once they become active and register compromised systems. Prior to entering a command-processing LO, they collect basic information about the host.  Through /bin/sh, the Linux beacon provides an interactive shell and allows for a wide range of system operations, including system discovery, file management, collection of data, and execution of commands. This implant also has the capability of searching for sensitive information, including SSH keys and browser credentials. In addition to persistence and in-memory ELF execution, it also supports SOCKS5 proxying.  The network pivoting capabilities further enable an attacker to use compromised systems as an entry point into other environments. This version of RedC2 4.0 also provides similar features across macOS and Windows. The framework provides file operations, host and network reconnaissance, enumeration of users, and data collection.  The Windows component also offers capabilities such as bypassing UAC, tampering with security tools, and lateral movement.  RedC2 Framework Adds AI Assisted Operations For Windows, Linux, and Mac OS, RedC2 4.0 is presented as a cross-platform command-and-control framework. As of August 2025, the framework has been actively developing, with version 3.0 appearing in January 2026 and version 4.0 released in June. In addition to the RedShell Linux beacon, the latest version offers a comprehensive set of post-exploitation functionality.  There are several features in this framework, including access to terminals, file transfers, staged payload delivery, multi-beacon management, network visualisation, host-to-host tunnelling, and execution of BOFs, .NET assemblies and shellcode in memory.  As an important addition, Red Agent is an artificial intelligence-assisted component with a large language model. It allows operators to describe tasks in natural language and have these instructions translated into beacon commands by the framework. By incorporating this feature, operations such as network reconnaissance and credential collection can be simplified. Moreover, it decreases the technical knowledge required to operate more complex framework functions.  Supply Chain Risks Extend Beyond npm A wider pattern of attacks is being observed against software ecosystems as a result of the incident. In recent years, development teams have increasingly relied on third-party packages, which often include binaries and transitive dependencies that are not visible to developers.  A package can appear useful and maintain normal behavior while carrying a separate native payload even though it has legitimate functionality present, making it particularly difficult to detect such attacks during routine code reviews. As part of the RedC2 campaign, three legitimate Rust crates were also subjected to a recent supply chain attack. These packages have been modified in order to include a malicious dependency capable of executing malware during cargo builds.  In addition to targeting multiple development ecosystems rather than focusing exclusively on NPM, the incidents reinforced the need for tighter dependency controls for development and infrastructure teams. When possible, it is recommended that package versions be pinned and dependencies and embedded binaries be reviewed before entering production environments.  It is possible to detect suspicious activity by monitoring unexpected process creation and outbound network connections from build systems. As the number of malicious packages carrying backdoors continues to increase, software supply chains continue to be an important entry point for malicious entities. By including AI-assisted functionality to frameworks such as RedC2, operational capabilities are further improved following an initial compromise.
dlvr.it
August 23, 2026 at 4:33 PM
Showboat e JFMBackdoor: il gruppo cinese Calypso spia le telecomunicazioni del Medio Oriente con malware Linux e Windows
il blog: insicurezzadigitale.com/showboat-e-j...

#cybersecurity #apt #backdoor #calypsogroup #cina #cyberwar #linuxbackdoor #malware #telecomunicazioni
May 23, 2026 at 11:32 AM
U.S. export controls forced Anthropic to restrict Fable 5 and Mythos 5 access for foreign nationals, while Chinese-linked actors and Arch Linux AUR hijacks fueled stealthy auth theft and rootkits. #Anthropic #China #Linux
Cybersecurity News | Daily Recap [13 Jun 2026]
Daily Recap, U.S. export controls compelled Anthropic to take Fable 5 and Mythos 5 offline for foreign nationals, underscoring tighter access to advanced AI models. Elsewhere, Chinese-linked actors showed long-running stealth in an authentication hijack and Linux backdoor campaigns, while Arch Linux AUR package hijacking pushed an infostealer and eBPF rootkit. #Anthropic #Fable5 #Mythos5 #Fable5 #Mythos5 #AuthHijack #LinuxBackdoor #ArchLinuxAUR #eBPF #Conti #ShinyHunters #OraclePeopleSoft #Coupang #23andMe #phpBB #FISA #DeepfakePornSite
www.hendryadrian.com
June 14, 2026 at 6:45 PM
Harvester has deployed a Linux GoGra backdoor using Microsoft Graph API to poll an Outlook folder named "Zomato Pizza" for Base64 commands. Targeted regions include India and Afghanistan. #HarvesterThreat #LinuxBackdoor #India
Harvester Deploys Linux GoGra Backdoor in South Asia Using Microsoft Graph API
Harvester has deployed a new Linux variant of its GoGra backdoor that leverages the Microsoft Graph API and Outlook mailboxes as a covert C2 channel. Symantec and Carbon Black tied artifacts to India and Afghanistan and noted the implant polls an Outlook folder named "Zomato Pizza" for Base64-encoded commands before executing...
www.hendryadrian.com
April 22, 2026 at 7:45 PM
BlackTech APT deploys BlueShell Linux backdoor in Japan, enhancing cyberespionage tactics and evading detection. #CyberSecurity #APT #LinuxBackdoor #BlackTech #BlueShell #Japan thedailytechfeed.com/blacktech-ap...
July 31, 2026 at 12:15 PM
Alert: React2Shell vulnerability (CVE-2025-55182) is being actively exploited to deploy Linux backdoors like KSwapDoor and ZnDoor. Update your systems immediately! #CyberSecurity #React2Shell #LinuxBackdoor Link: thedailytechfeed.com/react2shell-...
December 17, 2025 at 4:20 PM