Finding 1: simplification. BCSS programs explaining human and LRM rules tend to be simpler than the target rule. For LRMs, more reasoning effort means less simplification.
Finding 1: simplification. BCSS programs explaining human and LRM rules tend to be simpler than the target rule. For LRMs, more reasoning effort means less simplification.
Other faves are the Awesome, & Bushwhacker (RAC-5), and Crab, and been having fun with a modernized Mackie withb a shit ton of hot-loaded LRMs and clan medium+large lasers
Other faves are the Awesome, & Bushwhacker (RAC-5), and Crab, and been having fun with a modernized Mackie withb a shit ton of hot-loaded LRMs and clan medium+large lasers
Finding 4: people vs. machines. LRMs err on different tasks than people, and classifiers trained on program-level features can discriminate between them. The stronger the LRM, the more human-like, even though the best LRM outperforms people on average.
Finding 4: people vs. machines. LRMs err on different tasks than people, and classifiers trained on program-level features can discriminate between them. The stronger the LRM, the more human-like, even though the best LRM outperforms people on average.
What do these programs reveal? In both people and LRMs, inferred rules a) are oversimplified, b) only explain part of the evidence, and c) use incorrect feature dependencies. Further, we find that reasoning effort predicts the extent of simplification and partial explanation.
What do these programs reveal? In both people and LRMs, inferred rules a) are oversimplified, b) only explain part of the evidence, and c) use incorrect feature dependencies. Further, we find that reasoning effort predicts the extent of simplification and partial explanation.
Finding 3: wrong dependencies. We built a taxonomy of error types and labeled errors with an LLM judge conditioned on the program, task and response. Both people and LRMs mostly misinfer which problem features matter (attribute misselection errors). Weaker models produce more “ad-hoc” errors.
Finding 3: wrong dependencies. We built a taxonomy of error types and labeled errors with an LLM judge conditioned on the program, task and response. Both people and LRMs mostly misinfer which problem features matter (attribute misselection errors). Weaker models produce more “ad-hoc” errors.
CodeQuant2: Enhanced Outlier Mitigation and Adaptive Clustering for Low-Precision LRMs
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09868
CodeQuant2: Enhanced Outlier Mitigation and Adaptive Clustering for Low-Precision LRMs
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09868
ByteDance splits large recommendation models into one shared model that encodes long user histories once and exports a KV cache, plus vertical models that query it.
📝 arxiv.org/abs/2611.10356
ByteDance splits large recommendation models into one shared model that encodes long user histories once and exports a KV cache, plus vertical models that query it.
📝 arxiv.org/abs/2611.10356
Philipp Mondorf et al.
#arXiv #cs.AI #cs.LG
Philipp Mondorf et al.
#arXiv #cs.AI #cs.LG
new bind for firegroup 6 on Shift/nearby (LRMs, or 'sustained' weapons IE MG/flamer)
ERPPC on 1 and 2 (left/right click)
MPL on 3, chainfire (mouse forward)
SRM on 4 chainfire (mouse back)
peeking & heat ceiling expands.
in the opinion of this mind it is written.
new bind for firegroup 6 on Shift/nearby (LRMs, or 'sustained' weapons IE MG/flamer)
ERPPC on 1 and 2 (left/right click)
MPL on 3, chainfire (mouse forward)
SRM on 4 chainfire (mouse back)
peeking & heat ceiling expands.
in the opinion of this mind it is written.
Discussion | hackernews | Author: CGMthrowaway
#MachineLearning
Discussion | hackernews | Author: CGMthrowaway
#MachineLearning
"We nerfed lrms"
Oooohh you nerfed ghost heat? Chain fire turbo clicking active.
You opened the spread? Her name is Madness and she's got NINE LRM5S. Can't spread that enough to matter.
"We nerfed lrms"
Oooohh you nerfed ghost heat? Chain fire turbo clicking active.
You opened the spread? Her name is Madness and she's got NINE LRM5S. Can't spread that enough to matter.