#plugin4shell
Plugin4Shell Lets Repository Owners Swap Pinned Agents Across LLMS
Plugin4Shell Lets Repository Owners Swap Pinned Agents Across LLMS
Do/How you scan your AI Addons (Skills, Plugins, MCP, MODs, etc) in your day 2 day work? This kind of Plugin4Shell attack Im not sure if the top scanner (ciso, nvidia etc) would catch it submitted by /u/assentic [link] [comments]
dlvr.it
November 5, 2026 at 4:44 PM
I talk about this, #Plugin4Shell, least privilege, and why AI coding plugins are becoming part of our software supply chain in my latest video:

https://twp.ai/9OaKLA
5/5
youtu.be
Plugin4Shell: AI Coding Plugins Are Part of Your Software Supply Chain
twp.ai
October 23, 2026 at 11:15 PM
Three service accounts aren't three security boundaries if your AI coding agent can use all three of them. 😬

Imagine your coding agent can push code to your repository.

Great.

Then CI has a separate service account to build and test it.

Also great.
1/5
October 23, 2026 at 11:14 PM
Agreed, and two are on the list already: ClawHub's impersonated skills (Feb) and Plugin4Shell (Sep), a pinned plugin swapped with no prompt. Skills are text, so we hash the installed ones between sessions: if the file changed, the agent stops and asks before using it.
October 21, 2026 at 12:00 PM
Plugin4Shellを使えば、リポジトリの所有者はピン留めされたプラグインコードを4つのAIコーディングエージェント間で交換できます。

セキュリティ企業のAir Securityは木曜日、広く使われている4つのAIコーディングエージェントに欠陥があり、プラグインのコードリポジトリを制御する人物が、エージェントがインストールするプラグインを悪意のあるものに置き換えることができると発表した。これは、エージェントがプラグインを特定のレビュー済みバージョンに固定している場合でも同様である。

同社によると、AnthropicはClaude Code 2.1.179とOpenAIのCodex...
Plugin4Shell Lets Repository Owners Swap Pinned Plugin Code Across Four AI Coding Agents
Four AI coding agents let repository owners swap pinned plugin code; Claude Code and Codex are fixed, while Copilot and Gemini CLI remain unfixed.
thehackernews.com
October 17, 2026 at 3:24 AM
Plugin4ShellのゼロクリックRCEがClaude Code、Codex、Copilot、Gemini CLIを攻撃

Plugin4Shellと呼ばれる新たな脆弱性が明らかになり、主要なAIコーディングエージェントにおけるサプライチェーンの弱点が露呈した。この欠陥により、攻撃者は信頼できるSHAピン付きプラグインを悪意のあるコードに置き換えることが可能になり、ユーザーの操作なしにリモートでコードを実行できる。

研究者のOr Nevo、Dor Granat、およびNiv Hoffmanは、この問題がAnthropic Claude Code、OpenAI Codex、GitHu...
Plugin4Shell Zero-Click RCE Hits Claude Code, Codex, Copilot and Gemini CLI
A newly disclosed vulnerability known as Plugin4Shell reveals a supply chain weakness in major AI coding agents. This flaw allows attackers to replace trusted, SHA-pinned plugins with malicious code, ...
gbhackers.com
October 17, 2026 at 3:16 AM
Plugin4Shell : le pinning par SHA ne vérifiait rien dans quatre agents de code blog.gioria.org/fr/ai-securi... #SupplyChain
October 9, 2026 at 9:45 AM
🗓️ Weekly digest

Check out this week's most important AI news:

1. OpenAI agents hacked an Australian government website in…
2. Anthropics biolab made a discovery its comparing to Crispr
3. Plugin4Shell exposed a zero-click update-path weakness…

Find them and more at contextwindownews.com
#AI
This week's digest · Context Window
The week's most important AI stories.
contextwindownews.com
September 27, 2026 at 11:00 AM
Your agent says "Verified commit a3f9c2e1... OK" — and it's lying.

Plugin4Shell: attackers create a branch NAMED the SHA you pinned. Git resolves the branch first. Claude Code, Codex, Copilot, Gemini CLI all hit.

Fix: git rev-parse --verify "${SHA}^{commit}" before checkout. #InfoSec #DevTools
September 26, 2026 at 5:01 PM
New vulnerability lets attackers swap AI coding agent plugins for malicious ones despite version locks—supply chain risk for developers relying on Claude, Copilot, and OpenAI's…

https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/plugin4shell-lets-repository-owners.html

#cybersecurity #infosec
September 26, 2026 at 5:00 PM
A single git trick beat the safety lock on four AI coding agents thenextweb.com/news/plugin4...
Plugin4Shell: the safety lock that never checked itself
One flaw in Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot and Gemini CLI lets a repo owner swap a pinned plugin for malicious code, with no click needed.
thenextweb.com
September 26, 2026 at 2:12 AM
So your AI coding buddies pin plugins to a commit hash and then don't verify the checkout. Plugin4Shell. Swap the repo, zero-click RCE on Claude Code, Codex, Copilot, Gemini CLI. Two patched. One shrugged. One got deprecated as a security strategy. Schmeckles well spent. day269.005
September 25, 2026 at 8:35 PM
Three major AI agent vendors just got caught trusting the pin, not what's pinned. Plugin4Shell shows how attackers can swap malicious code into Copilot, Claude, and Gemini—a supply…

https://dev.to/humanbound_ai/three-ai-agents-one-trust-boundary-problem-14l

#appsec #DevSecOps
September 25, 2026 at 7:30 PM
Plugin4Shell: When Your AI Coding Agent Auto-Updates Straight Into RCE
Zero-click RCE. Four major AI coding agents. No user interaction required. Let's talk about Plugin4Shell. ## The Incident In September 2026, researchers disclosed a vulnerability class dubbed "Plugin4Shell" affecting Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, and Copilot. The flaw lives in how these agents verify SHA-pinned plugin commits pulled from marketplaces. Here's the setup: you install a plugin, the agent pins it to a specific commit SHA, and in theory that SHA is your guarantee that the code you approved is the code that runs, forever. That's the entire point of pinning. You audit once, trust persists. Except the verification was broken. Attackers could swap a benign plugin for malicious code _after_ the initial approval, or hijack the underlying repo the plugin points to. Because these agents auto-update plugins by default, the swap happens silently. No click, no prompt, no "are you sure." One day your agent's plugin is doing what it always did. The next, it's running attacker-supplied code with full access to whatever the agent can reach — your filesystem, your credentials, your CI pipeline, your cloud accounts. That's the "keys to the kingdom" framing in the original report, and it's not hyperbole. Agentic coding tools are increasingly given broad local and network permissions specifically because that's what makes them useful. Plugin4Shell turns that usefulness into blast radius. ## How This Actually Works (Mechanically) The core failure is a trust-verification gap, not a novel exploitation technique. SHA-pinning is supposed to be immutable: you pin to a commit hash, that hash's content doesn't change, full stop. If your agent's checkout process doesn't strictly enforce that the fetched content actually matches the pinned hash, or if it silently falls back to fetching "latest" under some auto-update condition, you've got a supply-chain hole disguised as a security feature. The attacker doesn't need to compromise your machine directly. They need to compromise or spoof the plugin source once, and then wait. Auto-update does the rest. This is the same category of problem as npm/PyPI supply-chain attacks, except the payload isn't traditional malware sitting in a `require()` statement, it's arbitrary code with agent-level tool execution privileges. Worse blast radius, same root cause: implicit trust in a dependency source that isn't being re-verified on every fetch. ## What Existing Defenses Missed SHA-pinning is a good control. It's also a control that everyone assumes "just works" once it's in place, which is exactly the assumption Plugin4Shell exploited. Nobody's watching the checkout step for anomalies because the checkout step is supposed to be a solved problem. Traditional endpoint security doesn't help much here either. From the OS's perspective, this is your legitimate, already-authorized AI coding agent making legitimate, already-authorized file and network operations. There's no malware signature to catch. There's no unusual process spawning something it shouldn't. The agent is doing exactly what it's designed to do: execute plugin code with the permissions you already granted it. The actual anomaly isn't in the payload, it's in the _behavior around the fetch_ : a plugin checkout that doesn't match its pinned commit, or a plugin that suddenly starts issuing tool calls it never issued before (reading credential files, hitting new network endpoints, writing to paths outside its normal scope). That's a tool-abuse signal, not a malware signature. ## Where Sentinel Fits: agentic_tool_abuse Sentinel doesn't verify git commit hashes, and it's not a replacement for fixing SHA-pinning verification upstream (that's a real fix the agent vendors need to ship). What Sentinel does is sit on the agentic proxy path and watch what the plugin's tool calls actually do once they start running, regardless of whether the underlying code was swapped legitimately or maliciously. This matters because Plugin4Shell's actual damage isn't the commit swap itself, it's what the newly-malicious plugin _does next_ with agent-level access: reading `.env` files, hitting exfiltration endpoints, writing to paths it has no business touching. That's tool-result and tool-call traffic flowing through the agentic proxy (`/v1/messages`, `/v1/grok`, `/v1/openai`, `/v1/gemini`), and Sentinel scans it on the way through. Two mechanisms from the reference architecture apply directly: **Secret & credential detection (Layer 5).** If a hijacked plugin's first move is to read local credential files, API keys, or tokens, and hand that content back through a tool result, Sentinel's secret detector redacts known key formats (Anthropic, OpenAI, AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack tokens, `Authorization: Bearer` headers, and env-var assignments with sensitive names) before that content ever reaches the model. This runs independently of the threat-scoring pipeline. Even in a scenario where the malicious plugin's exfiltration attempt doesn't trip the fast-path or deep-path scorer at all, a leaked `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` or `AKIA...` string gets caught and replaced with a placeholder before it reaches the agent's context. **Source-risk trust scoring on tool results.** The agentic proxy applies a provenance-aware trust multiplier to `Read`/`Grep`/`Glob`/`Bash` tool results. Critically, paths under known package-manager or plugin-install directories (`node_modules`, `site-packages`, `vendor`, `.venv`, and similar) never get the trust discount, even when nested under an otherwise-trusted developer directory. A compromised plugin living in a plugin-install path gets scanned at full sensitivity, not treated as trusted just because it sits inside your project tree. This closes exactly the gap Plugin4Shell relies on: an attacker banking on the fact that "installed and previously-approved" gets treated as "trusted forever." Neither of these requires knowing about Plugin4Shell specifically. They're generic controls on tool-call behavior and tool-result content, which is why they catch this class of attack even though the vulnerability itself is in a completely different layer (git commit verification) that Sentinel has no visibility into. ## Illustrative Example The following is an illustrative response shape, not an actual Plugin4Shell payload. It shows what a tool result carrying a leaked credential (from a compromised plugin reading local config) might look like coming back through the agentic proxy. { "request_id": "f3a9c112...", "security": { "action_taken": "flagged", "threat_score": 0.31, "secret_hits": 1, "secret_types": ["anthropic_key"] }, "safe_payload": "Plugin config loaded.\nANTHROPIC_API_KEY=[ANTHROPIC_KEY]\nPlugin initialized successfully." } And a config-side illustration of setting up trusted paths on the agentic proxy, so `node_modules`-style plugin directories never inherit trust just because they sit under your project root: # Illustrative: agentic proxy call with trusted-path header import anthropic client = anthropic.Anthropic( api_key="sk_live_...", base_url="https://api.sentinelaifirewall.com/v1", ) response = client.messages.create( model="claude-sonnet-4-6", max_tokens=1024, messages=[{"role": "user", "content": user_message}], extra_headers={ # Trusts /home/dev/myproject, but plugin-install subdirectories # (node_modules, site-packages, vendor, etc.) are never discounted # regardless of what's listed here. "X-Sentinel-Trusted-Paths": "/home/dev/myproject" }, ) ## Takeaway SHA-pinning tells you what code you approved. It doesn't tell you what that code is doing right now, especially once auto-update is in the mix. If your AI coding agent has plugin auto-update enabled (most do, by default), your actual attack surface isn't the plugin marketplace's approval process, it's every tool call that plugin makes for the lifetime of your session. Put something on that tool-call path that scans behavior and redacts secrets regardless of whether the code behind it was swapped last week or written yesterday. Check what plugins your agents have auto-update enabled for today. If you can't answer that in under a minute, that's the actual finding here. Want to see this kind of tool-result and tool-call scanning running on your own agentic stack? Check out Sentinel AI Firewall. ## Sources * AI coding agents' 0-click RCE flaw could hand attackers keys to the kingdom _AI-assisted draft or imaging, human-curated, reviewed and edited._
dev.to
September 24, 2026 at 11:46 PM
Plugin4Shell used branch names that resembled commit hashes to mislead AI coding agents about malicious plugin versions. Four major tools were exposed—and patch status still varies.

https://worldngayon.com/plugin4shell-ai-coding-agents-2026/
September 24, 2026 at 4:31 PM
Neue News-Folge 🎧

Opus 5.5 und GPT-6 Sol und Luna am selben Tag gelauncht, Jev von TypeSafe AI als System-1-Modell ohne Fließtext-Output, Plugin4Shell als Zero-Click-Lücke in Claude Code, Codex, Copilot und Gemini CLI, dazu JetBrains Air und Googlebook OS.

www.programmier.bar/podcast/news...
September 24, 2026 at 9:12 AM
𝗣𝗹𝘂𝗴𝗶𝗻𝟰𝗦𝗵𝗲𝗹𝗹 𝗟𝗲𝘁𝘀 𝗥𝗲𝗽𝗼𝘀𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆 𝗢𝘄𝗻𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗦𝘄𝗮𝗽 𝗣𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗲𝗱 𝗣𝗹𝘂𝗴𝗶𝗻 𝗖𝗼𝗱𝗲 𝗔𝗰𝗿𝗼𝘀𝘀 𝗙𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝗔𝗜 𝗖𝗼𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗔𝗴𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀
https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/plugin4shell-lets-repository-owners.html
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September 23, 2026 at 9:51 PM