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chrisahuja.bsky.social
I wanna apologize to all the Greg Gutfeld fans out there—both of you. Man’s been doing comedy for years… and 90% of America still says Greg who?

#GregGutfeld #StillUnknown #AhujaCongress2026 #CD32 #ChrisAhuja
July 21, 2025 at 1:20 AM
laudelau.bsky.social
Me too, me too. #stillunknown
December 25, 2024 at 10:11 AM
epsteinweb.bsky.social
Parts 1-3/3 — EFTA02406482.jpg
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EFTA02406470 | EFTA02406482 the fr=ctious country. In contrast to Libya's unusable chemical stockpile, analys=s emphasize that Syrian chemical agents are weaponized and deliverable. In=urgents and terrorists with past or present connections to the military might feasibly be able to effectively =inseminate chemical agents over large populations. (The Global Security Newswire <http://www.nti.oregsn/article/us-watching-syrian-chemica=-arms-amid-fear-attack-diversionk recently asserted that "[tJhe Assad regime is thought to possess between 100 and 200 Scud missiles carrying wa=heads loaded with sarin nerve agent. The government is also believed to ha=e several hundred tons of sarin agent and mustard gas stockpiled that coul= be used in air-dropped bombs and artillery shells, according to information compiled by the James Martin Ce=ter.") Given its robust ch=mical weapons arsenal and its perceived need to deter Israel, Syria has lo=g been suspected of having an active biological weapons program. Despite s=gning the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention in 1972 (the treaty prohibits the development, production, and =tockpiling of biological and toxin weapons), Syria never ratified the=treaty. Some experts contend that any Syrian biological weapons program ha= not moved beyond the research and development phase. Still, Syria's biotechnical infrastructure undoubtedly has the capability <http://www.dni.gov/reports/2011_report_to_congress_wmd.pdf> to develop numerous biological weapon agents. After Israel destroyed a clandestine Sy=ian nuclear reactor in September 2007, Damascus may have accelerated its c=emical and biological weapons programs. It's hard to guard =MD when a government collapses. Although the United States and its allies =re reportedly monitoring Syria's chemical weapons, recent history warns th=t securing them from theft or transfer is an extraordinary challenge. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom= more than 330 metric tons of military-grade high explosives vanished from=Iraq's Al-Qaqaa military installation. Almost 200 tons of the most powerfu= of Iraq's high-explosives, HMX -- used by some states to detonate nuclear weapons -- was under Internatio=al Atomic Energy Agency seal. Many tons of AlQaqaa's sealed HMX reported'= went missing in the early days of the war in Iraq. Forensic tests later r=vealed that some of these military-grade explosives <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/fate-of-high-e=plosives-at-al-qaqaa-stillunknown-increasing-indications-th/tinotes> were subsequently employed against US and coalition forces. Even with a nationw=de presence of 200,000 coalition troops, several other sensitive military =ites were also looted, including Iraq's main nuclear complex, Tuwaitha. Sh=uld centralized authority crumble in Syria, it seems highly unlikely that the country's 50 chemical storage and=manufacturing facilities -- and, possibly, biological weapon repositories =can be secured. The US Defense Department recently estimated <http://www.nti.rsvpl.com/gsn/article/us-calculatesbig-mi=itary-footprint-may-be-needed-guard -syrian-chemical-arms/?mgh.http%3A%2F=2Fwww.nti.org&amp;mgf=1> that it would take more than 75,000 US military personnel to guard Syria's=chemical weapons. This is, of course, if they could arrive before any WMD =ere transferred or looted -- a highly unlikely prospect. Complicating any ef=orts to secure Syria's WMD, post-Assad, are its porous borders <http://tarpley.net/docs/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf> =span style="font-size:18.0pt">. With Syria's government distracted by in=ernal revolt and US forces now fully out of Iraq, it is plausible that stolen chemical or biological weapons could =ind their way across the Syrian border into Iraq. Similarly, Syrian WMD co=ld be smuggled into southern Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank, =srael, and, potentially, the United States and Europe. At least six formal=terrorist organizations have long maintained personnel within Syria. Three=of these groups <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170479.pdf> Hamas, Hizbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jiha= -- have already attempted to acquire or use chemical or biological agents, or both. Perhaps more troubling, Al Qae=a-affiliated fighters from Iraq have streamed into Syria <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0221/As-A=-Qaedamoves-fight-to-Syria-violence-in-lraq-drops-sharply> , acting, in part, on orders from Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. In the past, Al Qaeda-in=lraq fighters attempted to use chemical weapons, most notably attacks that=sought to release large clouds of chlorine gas. The entry of Al Qaeda and ot=er jihadist groups <http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/jabhah-al-nusrah=and-jihad-in-syriah into the Sy=ian crisis underscores its increasingly sectarian manifestation. Nearly 40 percent of Syria's population consists =f members of minority communities. Syria's ruling Alawite regime, a b=anch of Shia Islam, is considered heretical by many of Syria's majori=y 13 EFTA_R1_01448631 EFTA02406482
April 8, 2026 at 9:34 AM