#CNCmachineRMS
SmartApeSG ClickFix now ends in CNCMachineRMS, a RAT side-loaded via a signed IBM SPSS binary. https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-5909?utm_source=bluesky #ThreatIntel #CNCMachineRMS #SmartApeSG #Babadeda
November 13, 2026 at 1:03 AM
#cncmachinerms C2 server: 87.199.205.61:443
November 13, 2026 at 4:22 PM
2026-11-12: SmartApeSG ClickFix campaign pushes CNCmachineRMS RAT

This article heavily relies on linking specific file hashes and URLs to allege malicious activity, but it does not provide independent forensic validation of the malware or command-and-control infrastru…

via Malware Traffic Analysis
huntaegis.com
November 13, 2026 at 5:32 PM
2026-11-12 (Thursday): #SmartApeSG #ClickFix campaign pushes #CNCmachineRMS #RAT

A #pcap of the infection traffic, malware samples, and indicators are available at www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2026/11/12/i...
November 13, 2026 at 12:59 AM
A fake Marvell RAID MSI uses renamed Microsoft-signed MSBuild and a tampered .NET library to decrypt and run a payload in memory, then downloads five DLL-sideloading kits. Researchers link its C2 to CNCMachineRMS by behavior, but have no code-level match.
Fake Marvell RAID Utility Uses Signed MSBuild to Load Malware
A fake Marvell RAID MSI uses renamed Microsoft-signed MSBuild and a tampered .NET library to decrypt and run a payload in memory, then downloads five…
cyber.hendryadrian.com
November 4, 2026 at 5:36 PM
Analysis of a fake Teams MSI found an EV-signed installer that deploys a DLL-side-loading chain through genuine calibre, waits 62 seconds, and unpacks BabaDeda and a CNCMachineRMS RAT. Offline testing did not confirm persistence or C2 activity.
Analysis Finds Fake Teams MSI Hiding BabaDeda Loader and CNCMachineRMS RAT
Analysis of a fake Teams MSI found an EV-signed installer that deploys a DLL-side-loading chain through genuine calibre, waits 62 seconds, and unpacks…
cyber.hendryadrian.com
October 24, 2026 at 7:48 AM
2026-09-30: SmartApeSG ClickFix pushes CNCmachineRMS RAT

This article relies heavily on the apparent severity of a RAT infection without providing context on how this specific tool is being weaponized beyond typical threat actor activity. Given the highly technical na…

via Malware Traffic Analysis
huntaegis.com
October 4, 2026 at 6:15 PM
2026-09-21 (Monday): IOCs for #SmartApeSG #ClickFix activity pushing #CNCMachineRMS RAT: github.com/malware-traf...
September 21, 2026 at 9:32 PM
~Malpedia~
CNCMachineRMS is a RAT using unencrypted TCP/443 C2 and DoH for stealth.
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IOCs: 89[.]110[.]110[.]119, 85[.]158[.]110[.]78, notepadreleased[.]com
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#Malware #RAT #ThreatIntel
CNCMachineRMS C2 Protocol
malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de
August 29, 2026 at 1:10 PM
CNCMachineRMS: The Undocumented RAT At the End of a BabaDeda Chain www.levelblue.com/blogs/spider...
CNCMachineRMS: The Undocumented RAT At the End of a BabaDeda Chain
This post is the result of an investigation into a case we worked on, in which we traced a loader chain that ended where we didn't expect.
www.levelblue.com
August 23, 2026 at 1:44 PM
New blog post: #cncmachinerms C2 Protocol
We analyze the malware’s binary C2 protocol, DoH usage, related infrastructure and network detection opportunities.
https://netresec.com/?b=268ee19
CNCMachineRMS C2 Protocol
This post describes the binary command-and-control (C2) protocol used by CNCMachineRMS, a recently identified remote access trojan (RAT). We cover how the protocol was discovered, how its infrastructure was identified, and how network defenders can detect it. Background We have been tracking a previ[...]
www.netresec.com
August 21, 2026 at 2:59 PM
ClickFix abuse drops a BabaDeda chain via signed IBM SPSS IDE and decoy DLLs, ending in CNCMachineRMS: a stealthy RAT with shell access, file control, screen capture, persistence, and local backdoor features. #ClickFix #BabaDeda #IBMSPSSIDE
CNCMachineRMS: The Undocumented RAT At the End of a BabaDeda Chain
A loader chain starting from a ClickFix lure abuses signed IBM SPSS IDE, decoy DLLs, and EnumTimeFormatsEx to deliver the BabaDeda stage and the CNCMachineRMS remote administration implant. CNCMachineRMS uses custom scripting, a unified config/C2 container, and multiple stealth features to provide shell access, file management, screen capture, persistence, and local account backdoor capabilities. #ClickFix #IBMSPSSIDE #WinWrapIDE #BabaDeda #CNCMachineRMS
www.hendryadrian.com
August 11, 2026 at 12:15 AM
ClickFix Attack Abuses Signed IBM SPSS IDE to Deploy New CNCMachineRMS RAT
ClickFix Attack Abuses Signed IBM SPSS IDE to Deploy New CNCMachineRMS RAT
ClickFix campaigns are once again turning an ordinary user action into the opening move of a serious intrusion. A newly documented chain uses a fake fix prompt to lead victims toward CNCMachineRMS, a previously undocumented remote access trojan that gives an attacker lasting control of a Windows device. The campaign stands out because it hides behind software that is both legitimate and signed. After the ClickFix lure, attackers launch IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE and steer its scripting function toward malicious files, allowing the activity to blend in with trusted software rather than an obviously hostile program. LevelBlue said in a report shared with Cyber Security News (CSN) that the chain also uses four decoy DLLs and a normal Windows date-formatting feature to start its shellcode. That combination makes the early stages harder to spot and delays the moment when the final payload becomes visible. The final result is not a simple downloader. CNCMachineRMS can give an operator a command shell, file browsing, screenshots, new local accounts, persistence, and the ability to bring in more tools. A detection should therefore be treated as possible hands-on access, not merely as a single malware alert. ClickFix Attack Abuses Signed IBM SPSS IDE The infection begins with a ClickFix lure, a tactic that persuades someone to run a command presented as a routine solution. Similar campaigns have used a fake prompt to install an MSI package, showing how one pasted command can quickly develop into a wider compromise.  The loader attack chain from the ClickFix lure to the final implant (Source – LevelBlue) Hackers use ClickFix prompts  provides a useful example of that familiar social-engineering path. In this case, WinWrapIDE.exe is clean and legitimately signed. The attackers exploit its ability to activate a scripting engine through COM, directing it to a dropped DLL. The decoy DLLs then load through normal import handling, avoiding the unusual application calls that many security products watch most closely. The last decoy fills a buffer with random data, places shellcode inside it, and makes the memory executable. It passes the shellcode through EnumTimeFormatsEx, a harmless Windows date-formatting interface, so Windows itself calls the code. This technique resembles the wider move toward native tools seen when  ClickFix chains avoid PowerShell , reducing obvious warning signs. Part 2 loader attack chain from the ClickFix lure to the final implant (Source – LevelBlue) The BabaDeda shellcode does little by itself. It needs a separate configuration file, HelperStandardizationApplication.bin, which contains an obscured configuration tree, a script, and the embedded 1.14 MB CNCMachineRMS payload. That dependency can make a partial sample look harmless during quick automated analysis. RAT Capabilities Raise Incident Stakes CNCMachineRMS is designed for flexible remote administration rather than one fixed theft task. Its built-in functions include an interactive shell, file manager, screen capture, local account backdoor, seven persistence methods, and 20 typed commands for retrieving and running further payloads. That breadth lets an operator adapt after reaching a host. On first contact, the RAT takes a screenshot and gathers details including the domain, SID, privilege status, motherboard and BIOS serials, and installed antivirus products. It then beacons every 600 seconds. Its custom scripting language also lets the attacker change behavior without rebuilding the implant. Part 3 loader attack chain from the ClickFix lure to the final implant (Source – LevelBlue) One script can re-establish registry persistence every 150 seconds, while local state and command traffic use the same custom container. The state file is padded with random data and changes regularly, which means hash-only hunting may miss it. The pattern echoes other RATs where  persistence supports silent access  through registry entries and scheduled tasks. Defenders should investigate an affected machine as a potential second-stage incident. Hunt for the listed network and host traces, review creation of local accounts and privileged-group changes, and check scheduled tasks or Run keys masquerading as IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE. Monitoring outbound traffic, including DNS-over-HTTPS use, can help expose activity that bypasses internal DNS logs. Teams should isolate suspect hosts, preserve volatile evidence, reset exposed credentials, and search neighboring systems before removing files, because follow-on payloads can carry the real damage. Containment must come before routine cleanup or reimaging. Indicators of compromise (IoCs):- Type Indicator Description Domain notepadreleased[.]com CNCMachineRMS command-and-control host over TCP/443 IP address 85[.]158[.]110[.]78 CNCMachineRMS command-and-control host over TCP/443 Domain dns.google DNS-over-HTTPS resolver used by the malware Domain cloudflare-dns[.]com DNS-over-HTTPS resolver used by the malware Domain dns.quad9[.]net DNS-over-HTTPS resolver used by the malware File path %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\*\task_payload.bin Staged task payload location File path %LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin Random-sized local state database Registry Run key or scheduled task IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE Persistence name used by the malware Directory C:\Intel Empty directory that disables the virtual-machine check Windows event IDs 4720 ,  4732 Potential evidence of local account creation and privileged-group changes Scheduled-task command /SC ONLOGON /RU SYSTEM /F /RL HIGHEST Task creation parameters associated with persistence SHA-256 0562c588997fa9961d55c6ab1db2656344324bca8db9ea7b64fe309132b2399f WinWrapIDE.exe , signed IBM SPSS IDE binary abused in the chain SHA-256 5b71b49bad415643ff3e291ee3ba550e5edfd584eb913859dadb81634450e7e7 wwide9.dll SHA-256 3d4e7187f74de912f9d52f5ba6a95bd41868348b16583d72957d732c0ed8f0e7 ClLoca.dll SHA-256 b804b9dd2726e69fb4f496a6872f90edf9146ad8044c6d3a592040ce1074a5d0 Xceed.Wpf.DataGrid.dll SHA-256 3466c3524f13cb3b7c87819e619bdb482ec9034a57bcdbe0240af6a9a530b02a ComPDFKit.Viewer.dll SHA-256 3b9b86feb3b789dda9cdfe5425ccb7e1feae9fde2cc158ff962991218a98f53f model.dat SHA-256 2922837a8d049bf0b51f0f9b27340a377b27dd1912675e2cd82056db83ec7a19 HelperStandardizationApplication.bin SHA-256 744b8165b6161cbd1d5ecc423ecfdb8306485afdc80262000ab3c6908881ef9e BabaDeda stage extracted from  model.dat , memory-only SHA-256 bb81786286be437b3ec6d562055767097c9277054e1d09172caa96376451481c CNCMachineRMS payload, memory-only Note:   IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g.,  [.] ) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM . Stop new phishing & malware before they compromise your business.  Integrate live intel from 15K SOCs around the world The post ClickFix Attack Abuses Signed IBM SPSS IDE to Deploy New CNCMachineRMS RAT appeared first on Cyber Security News .
cybersecuritynews.com
August 12, 2026 at 8:36 AM
CNCMachineRMS: A Stealthy Windows RAT Hides Behind Legitimate Software and Multi-Stage Evasion + Video

A New Generation of Malware Is Winning by Looking Ordinary Modern malware does not always need to look dangerous to be dangerous. Some of the most difficult threats to detect are built around…
CNCMachineRMS: A Stealthy Windows RAT Hides Behind Legitimate Software and Multi-Stage Evasion + Video
A New Generation of Malware Is Winning by Looking Ordinary Modern malware does not always need to look dangerous to be dangerous. Some of the most difficult threats to detect are built around legitimate software, ordinary Windows functionality, encrypted configuration files, and execution techniques that make malicious behavior difficult to recognize until the attack is already underway. That is the warning behind the discovery of CNCMachineRMS, a compact 1.14 MB x64 remote access trojan hidden at the end of a sophisticated BabaDeda-based infection chain.
undercodenews.com
August 12, 2026 at 6:44 AM
August 12, 2026 at 8:19 AM
CNCMachineRMSはランタイムハッシュ化でWindows APIを隠蔽、インポートテーブルなしで動作

セキュリティ研究者らは、BabaDedaを基盤とした感染チェーンの末端で配布される1.14MBのx64リモートアクセス型トロイの木馬(RAT)「CNCMachineRMS」を発見しました。 このマルウェアは、インポートテーブルを持たずに動作し、実行時にハッシュ値からWindows APIを解決し、文字列も必要になった...
CNCMachineRMSはランタイムハッシュ化でWindows APIを隠蔽、インポートテーブルなしで動作
セキュリティ研究者らは、BabaDedaを基盤とした感染チェーンの末端で配布される1.14MBのx64リモートアクセス型トロイの木馬(RAT)「CNCMachineRMS」を発見しました。 このマルウェアは、インポートテーブルを持たずに動作し、実行時にハッシュ値からWindows APIを解決し、文字列も必要になった
blackhatnews.tokyo
August 12, 2026 at 6:29 AM
ワンクリックのClickFix詐欺で、攻撃者に永続的なリモートシェルを与える新種RAT「CNCMachineRMS」

ClickFixのプロンプトが、最終的にリモートアクセスの足がかりを与えてしまうケースがあります。CNCMachineRMSは、BabaDedaローダーのチェーンの最後に展開される未報告のx64版RATで、ユーザー操作によって実行されたイベントを永続的なハンズオンキーボードアクセスへと変える働きをします。 1.14M...
ワンクリックのClickFix詐欺で、攻撃者に永続的なリモートシェルを与える新種RAT「CNCMachineRMS」
ClickFixのプロンプトが、最終的にリモートアクセスの足がかりを与えてしまうケースがあります。CNCMachineRMSは、BabaDedaローダーのチェーンの最後に展開される未報告のx64版RATで、ユーザー操作によって実行されたイベントを永続的なハンズオンキーボードアクセスへと変える働きをします。 1.14M
blackhatnews.tokyo
August 12, 2026 at 5:11 AM
~Spiderlabs~
Undocumented x64 RAT with interactive shell, persistence, and backdoor capabilities delivered via ClickFix lure and BabaDeda loader chain.
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IOCs: Notepadreleased[.]com, 85[.]158[.]110[.]78
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#Malware #RAT #ThreatIntel
CNCMachineRMS: Undocumented RAT via BabaDeda Chain
www.levelblue.com
August 10, 2026 at 4:40 PM
New blog post: #CNCMachineRMS C2 Protocol
We analyze the malware’s binary C2 protocol, DoH usage, related infrastructure and network detection opportunities.
netresec.com?b=268ee19
CNCMachineRMS C2 Protocol
This post describes the binary command-and-control (C2) protocol used by CNCMachineRMS, a recently identified remote access trojan (RAT). We cover how the protocol was discovered, how its infrastructu...
netresec.com
August 21, 2026 at 3:01 PM