#CRLSets
Chromes Response to Recent ccTLD Registry Hijacks
Oct 06, 2026
Following recent .gh, .sl, and .as ccTLD domain hijacks, Chrome immediately blocked unauthorized HTTPS certificates via CRLSets to protect users automatically.
blog.google/security/chr...
Chrome's Response to Recent ccTLD Registry Hijacks
Following recent third-party domain hijacks affecting the .gh, .sl, and .as country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs), Chrome immediately blocked unauthorized HTTPS certif…
blog.google
October 7, 2026 at 6:19 AM
📢 Détournements de ccTLD .gh, .sl et .as : Chrome bloque les certificats HTTPS non autorisés

Cet article décrit la réponse de Chrome à une série de détournements de registres ccTLD affectant les extensions nationales .gh…

🟡 vérification factuelle moyenne
#CRLSets #DNSHijacking #Cyberveille
Détournements de ccTLD .gh, .sl et .as : Chrome bloque les certificats HTTPS non autorisés
Cet article décrit la réponse de Chrome à une série de détournements de registres ccTLD affectant les extensions nationales .gh (Ghana), .sl (Sierra Leone) et .as (Samoa américaines).
cyberveille.ch
October 7, 2026 at 9:30 PM
Brave vs Trivalent Security
I don’t like Brave, and I also don’t like that it connects to all these domains without my permission: > go-updater.brave.com > > brave.com > > account.brave.com > > accounts.brave.com > > ads-admin.brave.com > > ads-help.brave.com > > ads-serve.brave.com > > ads.brave.com > > analytics.brave.com > > api.rewards.brave.com > > assets.brave.com > > blog.brave.com > > brave-core-ext.s3.brave.com > > ci.brave.com > > code.brave.com > > community.brave.com > > componentupdater.brave.com > > crlsets.brave.com > > dl.brave.com > > feedback.brave.com > > grant.rewards.brave.com > > laptop-updates.brave.com > > location.brave.com > > mainnet-beta-solana.brave.com > > mainnet-infura-api.brave.com > > mainnet-infura.brave.com > > mainnet-polygon.brave.com > > matomo.brave.com > > metrics.brave.com > > mobile-data.s3.brave.com > > mumbai-polygon.brave.com > > mywallet.ads.brave.com > > newsletter.brave.com > > offers.brave.com > > p2a-origin.brave.com > > p2a.brave.com > > p3a-json.brave.com > > p3a.brave.com > > payment.rewards.brave.com > > pcdn-origin.brave.com > > pcdn.brave.com > > prometheus.brave.com > > promo-services-staging.brave.com > > promo-services.brave.com > > proxy.aws-internal.brave.com > > proxy.brave.com > > publishers-staging.brave.com > > publishers.brave.com > > ratios.rewards.brave.com > > redirector.brave.com > > redis.promo-services-staging.brave.com > > redis.promo-services.brave.com > > referrals.brave.com > > repsys.rewards.brave.com > > reputation.rewards.brave.com > > rewards.brave.com > > rewards.grant.aws-internal.brave.com > > rinkeby-infura-api.brave.com > > ropsten-infura-api.brave.com > > ropsten-infura.brave.com > > rust-pkg-brave-core.s3.brave.com > > safebrowsing.brave.com > > safebrowsing2.brave.com > > sb-ssl.brave.com > > search-dev.brave.com > > search.anonymous.ads.brave.com > > search.brave.com > > staging.brave.com > > star-randsrv.bsg.brave.com > > static.ads.brave.com > > static.brave.com > > static1.brave.com > > stats.brave.com > > status.brave.com > > store.brave.com > > support.brave.com > > survey.brave.com > > sync-v2.brave.com > > tiles-alb.search.brave.com > > tiles.search.brave.com > > together.brave.com > > translate.brave.com > > updates-alb.brave.com > > updates-cdn.brave.com > > updates-panel.brave.com > > updates.brave.com > > upload-support.brave.com > > usage-ping.brave.com > > variations.brave.com > > vpn-internal.brave.com > > vpn.brave.com > > wallet-docs.brave.com > > webcompat.brave.com And this is just a small sample of domains it connects to, but there are many more. I read somewhere that their servers are compromised with spyware. Maybe it’s true, I don’t know.
discuss.privacyguides.net
November 2, 2025 at 12:48 PM
后 OCSP 时代,浏览器如何应对证书吊销新挑战 2023 年 8 月,CA/Browser Forum 通过了一项投票——不再强制要求 Let’s Encrypt 等公开信任的 CA 设立 OCSP Server...

#SSL #Firefox #Web #PKI #OCSP #CRLSets #CRLite

Origin | Interest | Match
后 OCSP 时代,浏览器如何应对证书吊销新挑战
2023 年 8 月,CA/Browser Forum 通过了一项投票——不再强制要求 Let’s Encrypt 等公开信任的 CA 设立 OCSP Server 2024 年 7 月,Let’s Encrypt 发布博客,披露其计划关闭 OCSP Server 同年 12 月,Let’s Encrypt 发布其关闭 OCSP Server 的时间计划表,大致情况如下: 2025 年 1 月
zhul.in
October 16, 2025 at 3:54 PM
In a blog post about cert revocation, I'll cover:
OCSP (stapling, must-staple, the never-adopted expect-staple, discontinuation from BoringSSL and Let's Encrypt)
CRLs, CRLite, and CRLSets.
Short-lived certs (ACME-STAR, Delegated Credentials, and notAfter)
Anything else I should cover?
#WebPKI #TLS
August 31, 2024 at 7:28 PM
OCSP is going away. Let's Encrypt shut down its responder and browsers moved revocation into CRLSets and CRLite. The lever that matters now is short lifetimes: a cert that rotates every few weeks limits exposure better than a revocation check that failed open ever did.
July 1, 2026 at 1:49 PM