#FDIR
LightNews LightNews
43081j.com
chalk -> picocolors
execa -> tinyexec
glob/globby/etc -> tinyglobby or fdir
lint-staged -> nano-staged

And you can find many more of these in the replacement docs
github.com/es-tooling/m...
December 7, 2024 at 8:39 PM
43081j.com
just to name a few examples (and downloads per week):
- tinyglobby (3M)
- picocolors (66M)
- tinyexec (5M)
- tinybench (6M)
- fdir (4.9M)
December 21, 2024 at 12:16 PM
barthecloclo.bsky.social
Italie #Histoire #Archéologie découverte : les #Etrusques ♥️
www.histoire-pour-tous.fr/civilisation...
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bnhe...
www.worldhistory.org/trans/fr/1-2...
www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOft...
www.dailymotion.com/video/x7bh92v
www.youtube.com/watch?v=fdIr...
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oexz...
September 22, 2026 at 8:11 PM
43081j.com
we've seen some great successes from the @e18e.dev community. here's a few. the growth of these has been incredible 🎉

- tinyexec 11M/week
- tinyglobby 17M/week
- fdir 20M/week
- knip 2.4M/week
- neotraverse 1.3M/week

you can use `eslint-plugin-depend` to suggest these & more in your repo
May 27, 2025 at 11:41 AM
sxzz.dev
When I said that, I had no idea what would happen next:

"I think we can use fdir and picomatch to create a new library for lightweight glob, enhancing maintainability."
43081j.com James @43081j.com · Nov 11
tinyglobby is a great success, and has shown us how much we can improve perf for everyone. here's some of the story!

big thanks to @superchupu.dev and @benmccann.com for putting so much work into this and the migrations/adoption. we're lucky to have both in the @e18e.dev community 💙
tinyglobby: a success story in modernization and performance
The story of tinyglobby, one of the e18e community's most successful projects
e18e.dev
November 12, 2025 at 4:29 PM
austinmermaid.bsky.social
“Demanding justice for Renee Good & letting them know that this will not stand. They can’t pretend to be a house of God while harboring someone who is directing ICE agents to wreak havoc upon our community.”

Activist disrupted church service of David Easterwood FDir of ICE in St. Paul, Minnesota.
January 18, 2026 at 8:18 PM
queenrayna1337.bsky.social
The fight scene between Bond and Patrice in Shanghai is so pretty
www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDiR...
September 14, 2026 at 2:20 AM
superchupu.dev
INTRODUCING THE TINYGLOBBY NETWORK UPDATE

Next version of tinyglobby, you'll be able to glob internet links as well, thanks to our new axios integration!! The library used to have two dependencies, but with this new functionality we consider it worth it to increase it to 28
tinyglobby's module graph after the net update. it contains three top-level dependencies: fdir, picomatch and axios fetch every online URL that ends with .com await glob("https://*.com") [ 'gitlab.com', 'archlinux.com', 'FREE MONEY.com', 'www.com' ]
April 1, 2026 at 9:12 PM
freefloof.bsky.social
Please perform an FMEA on your FDIR and to ensure FRACAS compliance log the issues in Jira using the IRF so the IRB can assign a CAPA for V&V and QA/QC
September 18, 2026 at 12:33 PM
wolf.observer
Jesus fucking christ. Commercial spaceflight was a mistake
Key Technical Anomalies 1. Service Module (SM) RCS Thruster Anomaly a. Five thrusters triggered fail off FDIR during ISS rendezvous resulting in a temporary loss of 6 Degrees of Freedom (6DOF) control. b. In-situ troubleshooting recovered four of five jets, enabling docking. c. Manual piloting did not specifically contribute to thrusters triggering their fail-off FDIR. d. Most probable proximate (direct) causes and contributing factors: i. Two-phase oxidizer flow (vaporization and cavitation) ii. Teflon poppet extrusion in oxidizer valves, restricting flow iii. Mechanical demand from GNC firing requests 2. Crew Module (CM) RCS Jet Failure a. A thruster failed to fire during descent, reducing the system to zero fault tolerance. b. Leading theory: i. Corrosion from carbazic acid formed by residual propellant and CO₂ 3. Helium Manifold Leaks a. Seven of eight SM helium manifolds leaked during the mission. b. Most probable proximate (direct) cause and contributing factor: i. Material incompatibility of seals with oxidizer, leading to degradation and leaks ii. O-ring sizing and poor gland fill/squeeze tolerances 4. Deorbit Capability Fault Tolerance a. The propulsion system lacked required two-fault tolerance for deorbit burns, which was a design flaw present since early development but not identified until CFT pre-launch Key Findings and Observations (Truncated Summary) • Inadequate Qualification Testing: The propulsion system lacked enveloping, missionrepresentative testing, and NASA accepted insufficient verification data in lieu of qualification. • Insufficient Flight Data: Low telemetry sample rates and lack of onboard data storage limited the ability to assess thruster performance and contributed to misdiagnosis of anomalies on Orbital Flight Test (OFT) 1 and OFT2. • Anomaly Resolution Discipline: Acceptance of unexplained anomalies (UAs) without root cause resolution allowed systemic issues to persist from OFT1 and OFT2 into CFT. • Oversight and Insight Limitations: NASA’s insight into subcontractor-level data was restricted, limiting its ability to independently verify system readiness. • Schedule Pressure: Persistent proximity to launch over several years created a high-stress environment, dictated a restrictive risk reduction initiative, and contributed to degraded trust with the workforce and overall fatigue. • Cultural and Contractual Misalignment: The shared accountability model was poorly understood and inconsistently applied, leading to muddling of roles, responsibilities, and risk ownership. • Hardware Longevity and Sparing Concerns: Starliner’s limited hardware spares and the impending retirement of the Atlas V launch vehicle raise concerns about the program's long-term viability. impending retirement of t Near-Real Time Cultural and Organizational Findings 1. Decision Authority • Overlapping roles between NASA’s CCP, ISSP, and Boeing led to unclear governance. 2. Erosion of Trust • Mistrust between NASA and Boeing was intensified by selective data sharing, perceived favoritism, and inconsistent transparency. • NASA teams outside CCP felt excluded from critical decisions, while CCP felt overwhelmed by external input. 3. Leadership Approach • CCP and Boeing leadership were perceived as overly risk-tolerant and dismissive of dissenting views. • A risk-acceptance posture created division and undermined confidence in the decisionmaking process. 4. Team Dynamics and Communication • The mission was marked by chaotic meeting schedules, unclear roles, and communication breakdowns. • Survey data shows low effectiveness ratings in team dynamics and organizational structure. 5. Cultural Divergence • NASA’s traditional culture of technical rigor clashed with the commercial model’s emphasis on provider autonomy. Root Causes (Organizational) While these root causes are specifically separated out to bulletize each, it is nearly impossible to consider one without the others. It is important to keep in mind, NASA created and implemented the contract structure; Boeing built the vehicle. Together the organizations agreed to fly. • NASA’s hands-off contract approach limited insight into the Starliner’s development. • Boeing’s inadequate systems engineering and reliance on subcontractors without sufficient oversight created gaps in hardware qualification. • NASA CCP’s culture prioritized provider success over technical rigor.
February 20, 2026 at 8:36 PM
satsearch.bsky.social
🎧 Designing space systems with integrated Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) strategies - the latest episode of The Space Industry podcast by satsearch is now live!

Find the episode now on any good podcast player as well as here on our blog: blog.satsearch.com/2025-12-15-d...
Designing space systems with integrated FDIR strategies - with Texas Instruments | satsearch blog
A podcast episode with Texas Instruments about designing space systems with integrated Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) strategies.
blog.satsearch.com
December 15, 2025 at 12:07 PM
l422y.com
npm-check dependency reduction · Issue #131 · es-tooling/ecosystem-cleanup
repo: https://github.com/dylang/npm-check there's a few dependencies we can replace to reduce footprint: chalk (with picocolors) execa (with tinyexec) globby (with fdir or tinyglobby) is-ci (with n...
github.com
November 18, 2024 at 7:51 AM
kurtraschke.com
I really want to see proper FDIR capabilities in consumer devices. You can’t push packets through a cellular link despite adequate signal strength? Power-cycle the modem _automatically_, and if that doesn’t fix it before reaching some pre-determined lockout, then _annunciate a fault_!
November 30, 2025 at 1:51 AM
genejm1017.bsky.social
Issues and Key Findings & Organizational issues from the #NASA Starliner Propulsion System Investigation Report -
1. Service Module (SM) RCS Thruster Anomaly a. Five thrusters triggered fail off FDIR during ISS rendezvous resulting in a temporary loss of 6 Degrees of Freedom (6DOF) control. b. c. d. In-situ troubleshooting recovered four of five jets, enabling docking. Manual piloting did not specifically contribute to thrusters triggering their fail-off FDIR. Most probable proximate (direct) causes and contributing factors: i. Two-phase oxidizer flow (vaporization and cavitation) ii. Teflon poppet extrusion in oxidizer valves, restricting flow iii. Mechanical demand from GNC firing requests Crew Module (CM) RCS Jet Failure a. A thruster failed to fire during descent, reducing the system to zero fault tolerance. b. Leading theory: i. Corrosion from carbazic acid formed by residual propellant and CO₂ 3. Helium Manifold Leaks a. b. Seven of eight SM helium manifolds leaked during the mission. Most probable proximate (direct) cause and contributing factor: i. Material incompatibility of seals with oxidizer, leading to degradation and leaks ii. O-ring sizing and poor gland fill/squeeze tolerances 4. Deorbit Capability Fault Tolerance a. The propulsion system lacked required two-fault tolerance for deorbit burns, which was a design flaw present since early development but not identified until CFT pre-launch. • Inadequate Qualification Testing: The propulsion system lacked enveloping, mission- representative testing, and NASA accepted insufficient verification data in lieu of qualification. • Insufficient Flight Data: Low telemetry sample rates and lack of onboard data storage limited the ability to assess thruster performance and contributed to misdiagnosis of anomalies on Orbital Flight Test (OFT) 1 and OFT2. • Anomaly Resolution Discipline: Acceptance of unexplained anomalies (UAs) without root cause resolution allowed systemic issues to persist from OFT1 and OFT2 into CFT. • Oversight and Insight Limitations: NASA’s insight into subcontractor-level data was restricted, limiting its ability to independently verify system readiness. • Schedule Pressure: Persistent proximity to launch over several years created a high-stress environment, dictated a restrictive risk reduction initiative, and contributed to degraded trust with the workforce and overall fatigue. • Cultural and Contractual Misalignment: The shared accountability model was poorly understood and inconsistently applied, leading to muddling of roles, responsibilities, and risk ownership. • Hardware Longevity and Sparing Concerns: Starliner’s limited hardware spares and the impending retirement of the Atlas V launch veicle raises concerns about the program's long-term viability. Near-Real Time Cultural and Organizational Findings 1. Decision Authority • Overlapping roles between NASA’s CCP, ISSP, and Boeing led to unclear governance. 2. Erosion of Trust • Mistrust between NASA and Boeing was intensified by selective data sharing, perceived favoritism, and inconsistent transparency. • NASA teams outside CCP felt excluded from critical decisions, while CCP felt overwhelmed by external input. 3. Leadership Approach • CCP and Boeing leadership were perceived as overly risk-tolerant and dismissive of dissenting views. • A risk-acceptance posture created division and undermined confidence in the decision- making process. 4. Team Dynamics and Communication • The mission was marked by chaotic meeting schedules, unclear roles, and communication breakdowns. • Survey data shows low effectiveness ratings in team dynamics and organizational structure. 5. Cultural Divergence • NASA’s traditional culture of technical rigor clashed with the commercial model’s emphasis on provider autonomy. All of the findings explained in this report led the team to determining the following as root causes for the anomalies that occurred over the CFT: Root Causes (Organizational) While these root causes are specifically separated out to bulletize each, it is nearly impossible to consider one without the others. It is important to keep in mind, NASA created and implemented the contract structure; Boeing built the vehicle. Together the organizations agreed to fly. • NASA’s hands-off contract approach limited insight into the Starliner’s development. • Boeing’s inadequate systems engineering and reliance on subcontractors without sufficient oversight created gaps in hardware qualification. • NASA CCP’s culture prioritized provider success over technical rigor.
February 19, 2026 at 9:07 PM
satsearch.bsky.social
📖 Designing Space Systems With Integrated FDIR - the latest spotlight article (and last for the year) is now live on our blog!

Find the article here: blog.satsearch.com/2025-12-19-s...
Spotlight: Designing Space Systems With Integrated FDIR - with Texas Instruments | satsearch blog
An article from Texas Instruments on the art of designing robust space systems with integrated FDIR strategies.
blog.satsearch.com
January 12, 2026 at 12:57 PM
techspatiales.bsky.social
Vaisseau Orion:
SM = Service Module
OSA = Orion Stage Adapter (Structure inter-étage entre Orion et le second étage de SLS)
SAJ = Spacecraft Adapter Jettisoned (Séparation de l'OSA)
FDIR = Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery
RCS = Reaction Control System
TPS = Thermal Protection System
September 13, 2023 at 9:02 PM
grixu.dev
Looking for a Library to Search File Structures?

fdir is a lightweight Node.js library (under 2kB!) for fast, recursive file searches with custom filters. It’s part of the e8e movement, prioritizing performance and minimal dependencies: https://buff.ly/3Cbo6UE

#javascript #nodejs
GitHub - thecodrr/fdir: ⚡ The fastest directory crawler & globbing library for NodeJS. Crawls 1m files in < 1s
⚡ The fastest directory crawler & globbing library for NodeJS. Crawls 1m files in < 1s - thecodrr/fdir
buff.ly
January 27, 2025 at 6:00 AM
thomasthefrench.eurosky.social
Si c'est des seuils de déclenchement d'erreur. Fault detection, isolation, recovery (FDIR) ils doivent être trop sensibles.
June 7, 2024 at 10:11 AM
bloodsuspiria.bsky.social
último comentário sobre hoje, mas evento hypadíssimo e é apenas ok, fdir consegue fazer melhores
September 15, 2024 at 3:15 AM
superchupu.dev
it looks like fdir 6.4.5 broke node 12 compatibility in tinyglobby. because of that we're considering updating the engines field to >=16.0.0. since this is not easy to do in a minor release i've opened this issue to avoid any problems that might occur. all comments welcome
github.com/SuperchupuDe...
considering upgrade of engines field to `16.0.0` - fdir 6.4.5 breaks compatibility with node 12 · Issue #134 · SuperchupuDev/tinyglobby
tinyglobby has always aimed to support node 12 ever since its initial release. A month ago fdir 6.4.5 was released, which started making use of AbortController. AbortController was added to node in...
github.com
June 22, 2025 at 2:32 PM
satsearch.bsky.social
🎯 FDIR as a complex, critical sequence in space system design: Since equipment in space cannot be manually repaired, systems must quickly and reliably detect faults, isolate the damaged unit (e.g., by switching it off), and recover mission operations, often by engaging a redundant unit.
December 15, 2025 at 12:07 PM
aslimu.bsky.social
YAGMASAM DA GURLUYORUM
KARSIMDA HAYAT
YAZMAK ZORUNDA OLDUGUM BIR HIKAYEM VAR
music.youtube.com/watch?v=fdir...
Hazine - YouTube Music
Provided to YouTube by Netd Müzik Video Dijital Platform A.Ş. Hazine · Funda Arar · Funda Arar · Şebnem Sungur · Gökhan Tepe Boşver ℗ Doğan Müzik Yapım R...
music.youtube.com
July 23, 2024 at 10:58 AM
notrealmidas.bsky.social
A secretaria da Fdir demora quase 1 mês pra se pronunciar sobre a greve (enquanto isso aula online para todos os alunos do direito)

Quando se pronuncia, os professores de civil se fazem de malucos fingindo que não tem deliberação PROIBINDO as aulas online

Simplesmente direito uerj
August 29, 2024 at 12:59 AM
thomasthefrench.eurosky.social
Résumé des petits problèmes du Starliner (mission qui est un succès pour le reste).

Il semblerait que des FDIR soient à revoir

spacenews.com/starliner-do...
Starliner docks with International Space Station on crewed test flight
Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner spacecraft docked with the space station on its first crewed flight June 6 after working through thruster problems.
spacenews.com
June 7, 2024 at 9:26 AM