LunarHawk74: > I’m running `monerod` and Feather in Whonix. Is the transaction-broadcasting process basically: “Feather → `127.0.0.1:18081` → `monerod` → `monerod` waits for a random delay and broadcasts the transaction to everyone” ? Assuming you are using `--tx-proxy` on your local node, its feather —ssl—> 127.0.0.1:18081/monerod —tor/i2p—> monerod (waiting for delay) —clearnet p2p—> many monerod. > If I want to avoid having my source node analyzed by using **“Using public nodes as tx relay”** , what’s the correct way to do it? Should I normally use the `127.0.0.1:18081` node and manually switch to a public node whenever I send a transaction? > Or does Tor already provide enough protection that I don’t need to worry about this? The best is using `--tx-proxy` with Tor/I2P on your own local node. Maybe toggle `disable_noise` if you have bandwidth limits or don’t want slight delays (see `--help` on `--tx-proxy`). > Suppose a KYC exchange gives me 10 KYC UTXOs, and I transfer them separately to another address. I would then have 10 non-KYC UTXOs (stealth addresses). If I later spend those 10 outputs in a single transaction, together with another UTXO A. > Can the KYC exchange detect that this transaction happened? You’ll have to internalize how EAE attack works and determine this yourself. It’s certainly possible. -> What are the odds that 10.65656 XMR went to 10 outputs, cycled to another set of 10 outputs, and then that same amount minus fees (which are public) ended up at the same location? Blockchain systems will always have amounts in transactions, which help analysis. Encrypting the amounts (like XMR/ZEC) partially helps privacy, but is not a panacea as sender/receiver know the unencrypted amounts of outputs. This is also why XMR is against transparent pools (as in ZEC) - the user is more likely to “foot gun” themselves and devolve into the madness that is BTC privacy. > Most importantly, is what I’m doing in my example actually unnecessary? I could actually just spend the 10 KYC UTXOs together with UTXO A in one transaction, and my privacy would already be sufficiently protected? You’re likely best not using Monero at all, or just using it without complications. As an example, this 10 separate UXTO thing is likely creating more problems than its solving. I run into this general problem with privacy too sometimes. I want it to be absolutely perfect, but ultimately this isn’t realistic at the present moment. And most of the time, it just needs to be better than “I’m just handing over a boatload of information to the surveillance capitalism beast”.

> Using public nodes as tx relay, or allowing incoming Tor/I2P connections on your private node helps with obfuscating related transactions. I misspoke earlier, and I think it warrants a re-post. If you use `--tx-proxy`to enable outgoing transactions over Tor/I2P, this makes it much hard to identify related transactions. Enabling inbound Tor/I2P connections doesn’t really help the user running the node, however, it helps _other_ people needing privacy.

> Is the first hop when broadcasting a transaction handled by the local `monerod` node? Yes, the first hop is handled by the local node. Or more specifically, the node your wallet is connected to. If using LWS (light-wallets), this refers to the node the LWS server is connected to. Each wallet (or LWS server) is only connected to a single node; there is nothing like Electrum wallet in the Monero ecosystem (at least not yet). > If a transaction is broadcast through Tor/I2P, is Dandelion++ not needed? When the first hop is over Tor/I2P, the receiving (hidden service) node broadcasts to all its peers after randomized delay (i.e. does not run Dandelion++). There’s an ongoing discussion on whether this receiving node should run Dandelion++, but no conclusive decision has been decided. > Could analyzing the source node make it possible to link multiple transactions to the same source? Yes, aggressive monitoring of the source (first hop) node could leak that two transactions are related. Specifically ISP spying is the most problematic as Monero has not yet deployed TLS on its (non Tor/I2P) P2P connections. P2P spying - where the spy tries to make lots of connections to determine the source - is mitigated by Tor/I2P and Dandelion++ already. > When churning, should there be a random delay between transactions? What would be a reasonable interval? Despite what I’ve said, you probably don’t want to churn. If you deem it useful for some reason, there are scripts you can find that do it for you, but I am unable to vouch for any of them. My advice is just read the linked answer (i.e. consider not churning). > (Before FCMP++ is introduced) since 1-input transactions can be considered completely safe, does that mean KYC UTXOs can be spent directly in 1-input transactions without any churning? Just use Monero like everyone else (no churning). Pick a wallet and a strategy to prevent stolen XMR, then focus on public vs. private node, then just use XMR when you find an opportunity. As you’ve noticed, once you’ve decided that churning is necessary, it just adds more complications into how. Since I am unable to provide you with specifics for every possible scenario, your choices are (1) don’t worry about it or (2) chase every rabbit hole in the breaking Monero series, starting with the one I linked. Since this probably came off as aggressive, I’ll just mention that the EAE situation is not dependent on the number of inputs, which you can see in the graphic in the linked video. The one positive thing about Monero - most of its cheerleaders are honest about where it lacks. You’ll find that the breaking Monero series covers everything advanced users would want to know. > And for multi-input transactions, would simply sending each received UTXO separately to another address of mine complete all the churning? Because the UTXOs have already been isolated through 1-input transactions, would no further action be needed, just let the wallet automatically select UTXOs for multi-input transactions? Spending multiple UTXOs in 1 transaction links them via inclusion in the ring signature. It doesn’t matter how much churning or addresses you use, they are linked. When I say linked, I do not mean that some third party can immediately determine which outputs in the ring were spent. I just mean that the tracking statistics change when using multiple-input transactions; a good statistician **knows** that 1 output was spent in each ring, and **knows** that those two “real” outputs were from the same source. This is why the Monero Research Lab has determined that FCMP++ is the best path forward - an input can be _any_ previous output on the chain, so the anonymity set foreach input is the maximum possible.

Thank you very much! Is the first hop when broadcasting a transaction handled by the local `monerod` node? If a transaction is broadcast through Tor/I2P, is Dandelion++ not needed? Could analyzing the source node make it possible to link multiple transactions to the same source? When churning, should there be a random delay between transactions? What would be a reasonable interval? (Before FCMP++ is introduced) since 1-input transactions can be considered completely safe, does that mean KYC UTXOs can be spent directly in 1-input transactions without any churning? And for multi-input transactions, would simply sending each received UTXO separately to another address of mine complete all the churning? Because the UTXOs have already been isolated through 1-input transactions, would no further action be needed, just let the wallet automatically select UTXOs for multi-input transactions?

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Police believe Tasia Fortune’s hanging was staged as new details revealed in court

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