#Keystore
November 6, 2026 at 10:12 PM
While I'm waiting for an important fix to the VM library behind firebrick, I'm pushing out a few other changes:

Better support for the Java keystore, so that you don't get pesky errors with the network policy enabled.
November 11, 2026 at 2:02 PM
SSL certificate private keys sit on disk as plain files. Copy the file, own the key.

CertKit Keystore 2.0 encrypts them on your server. You hold the files, CertKit holds the key. The files alone are unreadable.

www.certkit.io/blog/certkit...

#PKI #infosec
CertKit Keystore 2.0: private keys encrypted on your own hardware
CertKit Keystore 2.0 encrypts private keys on your own server, so a copy of the key files alone can't be read outside your CertKit account.
www.certkit.io
November 11, 2026 at 2:39 PM
Will go with keystore, something that I fully understand, and secure libraries are available.
November 9, 2026 at 7:49 AM
The latest update for #CertKit includes "CertKit Keystore 2.0: private keys encrypted on your own hardware" and "How eMudhra, TWCA, and GoDaddy incidents compare against other CAs".

#cybersecurity #certificatemanagement #devops https://opsmtrs.com/3JSzybv
CertKit
CertKit gives you one dashboard to see every cert, every renewal, every domain—before they expire and ruin your weekend.
opsmtrs.com
November 12, 2026 at 6:03 AM
I decided not to include new features today. I'm too tired to verify anything big. I will cut another release tomorrow to add in port listing and the keystore fix for Java.
November 12, 2026 at 6:53 PM
late night keystore glow. my kind of convenience
November 7, 2026 at 12:31 AM
A security firm reviewed a self-custodial crypto wallet and found no critical flaws across 21 findings. Hacken's review of Pera Wallet's rebuilt app on Algorand found one High issue, in an unused helper of a shared package, and it is marked fixed. #Security algorand.pxke.me/news/article...
Hacken's Pera Wallet review finds no critical flaws, with one High in shared code
Hacken's review of Pera Wallet's rebuilt app, published November 10, found no critical issues among 21 findings; the single High sits in a shared keystore…
algorand.pxke.me
November 12, 2026 at 11:16 AM
It is likely to prevent hacking, but a better way to do so would be to register with the device keystore and use private key encryption instead of public key so nobody can impersonate you.
November 3, 2026 at 3:02 PM
#Diabetes Ich habe vorgestern das Update auf die #AAPS 4.0.0 gemacht. Dieses hat angeblich wegen dem #keystore nicht funktioniert - so habe ich kurzerhand neu installiert.
November 4, 2026 at 7:00 AM
The user's keyring would make the most sense, basically the desktop equivalent of Android's keystore.

Don't worry I wouldn't just release packages on my own. I was just curious and had time to play 🙂
October 31, 2026 at 12:54 PM
On Android those are securely stored with the Android Keystore.
For my own testing on Linux I did not bother to make this better. I don't know what best practice is for Linux to deal with this.
October 31, 2026 at 12:37 PM
New book: Sign-In and Security Done Right. Passkeys with Credential Manager, Sign in with Google verified on your server, biometrics that unlock real Keystore keys, and Play Integrity for Android.

Free sample chapter: https://payhip.com/b/01OcP
Book: https://payhip.com/b/oZl1J
October 29, 2026 at 8:50 PM
[some-subscribed-rss] New Post: How to Review a 1,000+ File PR Without Losing Your Mind, by Mario Brcina https://shiftmag.dev/how-to-review-a-1000-file-pr-without-losing-your-mind-13054/
October 29, 2026 at 2:14 PM
New contract documented: Keystore (Nov 23, 2015). A public-key directory for an early decentralised marketplace dapp: each account stores the key others use to encrypt messages to it.

https://ethereumhistory.com/contract/0x8eca08610018be3c460f947fea4020a8be3d5e61
October 25, 2026 at 11:38 AM
New contract documented: Keystore (Dec 16, 2015). A public-key directory for an early decentralised marketplace dapp: each account stores the key others use to encrypt messages to it.

https://ethereumhistory.com/contract/0x819f0772fe6a196259dc2671f3ac3c39a9efa022
October 25, 2026 at 11:38 AM
My Ubuntu server installed the eMudhra fix and logged done. Its Java keystore was dated October 2025 and still trusted the bad keys. Patched is a property of a trust store, not a machine.

https://roamingpigs.com/field-manual/your-server-has-more-than-one-trust-store/
October 25, 2026 at 8:09 PM
A key can remain inside a device while an attacker asks that device to use it. Non-exportability and permission to decrypt are separate questions. A closer look at Android Keystore and UseCrypt documentation:
bringingprivacyback.com/a-non-export...
A Non-Exportable Key Can Still Be Used | Bringing Privacy Back
Android Keystore and UseCrypt documentation show why preventing key extraction and controlling decryption operations require different evidence.
bringingprivacyback.com
October 23, 2026 at 7:21 AM
Secure Keystore keeps secrets encrypted at rest with no service to run: a folder of encrypted values, and one user key that opens it. Six implementations of one specification, and each reads the stores the others write.

https://tech-style.co/open-source#secure-keystore

#Encryption
October 22, 2026 at 2:52 PM