#Logarithms
logarithms will pay for existing
November 16, 2026 at 6:16 AM
I can compute logarithms in my head to two decimal places.
What's your least useful talent?
November 17, 2026 at 4:04 AM
You see we had broken that man out of jail using the power rule of logarithms and now it was time to strip him
November 11, 2026 at 8:24 PM
I had to use logarithms to fix a real world (computer) problem today.
November 16, 2026 at 1:10 AM
I'll never escape the need for logarithms. 🙄
November 12, 2026 at 5:35 AM
Mrinal Dasgupta, Alexander Fraley, Pier Francesco Monni, Saad Nabeebaccus: A new angle on coherence-violating logarithms in color-singlet processes https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.21763 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.21763 https://arxiv.org/html/2611.21763
November 18, 2026 at 6:54 AM
Logarithms pull exponents down in front: log(x^n) = n·log(x). A log is just the power you raise the base to, so raising x to the n multiplies that power by n. #math
November 18, 2026 at 1:05 AM
A logarithm is a logarithm is a logarithm.
Garbage in, GARBAGE OUT.

(AI, y'all, is nothing more than interlocking logarithms. It ain't magic.
Mix it with "updates," deferred maintenance, DOGE & weather/backhoes? You get cyberterrorism from within.)
So the national weather service wasn’t down, a major news outlet amplified an AI news aggregator and it got picked up by multiple outlets
It’s a AI amplification problem that may have originated from Reuters… we don’t know yet until a full post mortem is done. But automated news aggregation seems to be a culprit.
November 16, 2026 at 5:00 PM
Quantum Algorithm for Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms with Space-Efficient Point Addition

The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is a fundamental problem in cryptography, and reducing the resource requirements of quantum algorithms for solving ECDLP is an important goal.
Quantum Algorithm for Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms with Space-Efficient Point Addition
The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is a fundamental problem in cryptography, and reducing the resource requirements of quantum algorithms for solving ECDLP is an important goal. In this work, we present a space-efficient quantum algorithm for solving the ECDLP over prime fields, a
arxiv.org
November 18, 2026 at 1:09 PM
I still can't make heads or tails of this table, though. The numbers for 12 inches and higher are correct, if you assume that they're computing the logarithms in feet (the log of 1 is 0.00000), but how can the log of 11 inches (0.91667 feet) be 9.96221? A nine as […]

[Original post on pawb.fun]
November 16, 2026 at 3:38 AM
This is a massive fraud. Sooner or later people will realize that and tech stocks will sink faster than the Titanic. Computers are stupid: They can't multiply, they add repetitively. They can't divide, they subtract repetitively. Higher math is solved by accessing tables such as logarithms.
November 17, 2026 at 11:44 PM
OK, that’s what it was. I found it under Moderation and it was turned on. I turned it off and now it shows the label and no image. It’s ridiculous that their logarithms detect that image as adul content. Go figure.
November 13, 2026 at 5:50 AM
A logarithm asks which exponent turns a chosen base into a given positive number. Since 2 cubed is 8, log base 2 of 8 is 3.

#Mathematics #Logarithms #Algebra #MathEducation
November 17, 2026 at 6:02 PM
Library of Babel: Every possible text exists somewhere in an immense combinatorial space.

Shor's algorithm: A quantum algorithm that exploits quantum computation to find mathematical structure (specifically, efficiently factoring integers and solving discrete logarithms).
November 14, 2026 at 1:36 PM
I think I've figured out what was going on with those tables yesterday that were giving weirdly high logarithms for small numbers. Numbers less than 1 but higher than zero have a negative logarithm, but the table was giving answers like 9.96221

It was giving the […]

[Original post on pawb.fun]
Original post on pawb.fun
pawb.fun
November 16, 2026 at 6:27 PM
We just covered the power rule of logarithms in one of my classes and one of my students said they couldn't stop picturing, like, an actual log. So it became the battering ram from Beauty and the Beast, there to break down the castle walls and free whoever's locked in the tower (the exponent)
November 12, 2026 at 12:07 AM
For multiplication and division, it's literally just adding or subtracting logarithms. The challenge is keeping track of the decimal point.
November 11, 2026 at 4:32 PM
Another "obsolete" "calculator" arrived today: Smoley's Four Combined Tables for Engineers, Architects, and Students. The book combines four different books into one large volume: Smoley's Parallel Tables of Logarithms and Squares, Smoley's Parallel Tables of Slopes […]

[Original post on pawb.fun]
November 13, 2026 at 2:18 AM
Grade 11: Logarithms. A log asks "what exponent do I need?", with evaluating, solving (plus domain check) and the three properties. What made logarithms click (or not) for your 11th grader? Links to resources are in the comments. #Matheaze
November 10, 2026 at 1:31 PM
Hilarious bit of writing by Ramamurti Shankar. HT @acollierastro.bsky.social

arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat...
November 14, 2026 at 6:56 PM
Twisted Towers: A Faster and Fully Costed SexTNFS Attack (Gautam Botrel) ia.cr/2026/2831
November 11, 2026 at 5:49 PM
Every time your browser negotiates a TLS handshake, we tell ourselves a comforting story about mathematics. But WebPKI is not an algorithmic triumph—it is a fragile, human-run geopolitical cartel.
The Illusion of Identity: Why WebPKI is a Geopolitical Truce, Not Cryptography
Every time your browser negotiates a TLS handshake and illuminates a lock icon in the address bar, an unspoken theological assumption is validated. We tell ourselves a comforting story about mathematics: that discrete logarithms, elliptic curves, and 2048-bit RSA keys protect us from an adversarial world. The math, to be fair, is flawless. No nation-state or rogue actor is factorizing 256-bit prime curves in polynomial time. Yet our reliance on this mathematical perfection obscures a far more precarious reality: the cryptography is merely the decorative paint on a rickety, human-run political institution. The real architecture of internet security—the Web Public Key Infrastructure (WebPKI)—is not an algorithmic triumph. It is a fragile, de facto geopolitical cartel. It operates less like a software standard and more like 17th-century maritime law: a series of reluctant armistices between sovereign states, profit-seeking corporate intermediaries, and an oligopoly of Silicon Valley browser vendors acting as judge, jury, and executioner. And now, as generative AI collides with automated identity verification, the paper-thin boundary between cryptographic proof and legal entity authentication is starting to fracture. * * * ### The Physical State vs. The Digital Frontier In the physical world, identity authentication is a recognized public good—and almost universally a sovereign monopoly. If you want to prove who you are, the state assigns you a birth certificate, a Social Security number, or a driver’s license. If you want to incorporate an entity, you petition a secretary of state. The state bears the overhead of enforcing identity because fraud introduces severe market externalities. When the commercial web exploded in the 1990s, the physical state was structurally incapable of assuming this role online. Territorial sovereignty stopped at the router. A German browser could not rely on a Chinese ministry or an American bureau to vouch for the cryptographic identity of a banking server hosted in Iceland. Furthermore, governments were—and remain—untrusted adversaries. A state-run global PKI would have granted intelligence agencies native root authority to issue arbitrary interception certificates against foreign nationals. So, the web privatized the production of trust. Into this vacuum stepped Certificate Authorities (CAs)—commercial enterprises whose sole business model was to sell trust. If you paid VeriSign, Sectigo, or DigiCert a recurring fee, they promised to verify that you owned your domain and sign your public key with their coveted root certificate. This created an immediate, fatal economic contradiction: a race to the bottom. * * * ### The CA Cartel and the Lemons Problem In economic terms, digital certificates suffer from a classic market for lemons. A browser does not reward a Certificate Authority for running exhaustive background checks on a customer. A mathematical certificate signed with grueling, meticulous verification looks identical to a certificate rubber-stamped after a five-minute ping test. Because CAs were profit-seeking firms competing on price and speed, their economic incentive was not to be rigorous; it was to issue as many certificates as humanly possible with the lowest operational overhead. The consequences were predictable: * In 2011, Dutch CA DigiNotar was breached, resulting in fraudulent certificates issued for *.google.com used to intercept Iranian dissidents. * In 2015, Symantec was caught issuing rogue certificates for domains like Google without authorization, kicking off a multi-year audit that eventually ended in Google and Mozilla forcibly distrusting Symantec's entire root empire. * Rogue intermediate CAs and compromised regional registrars repeatedly demonstrated that the chain of trust was only as strong as the most corruptible, least secure CA in the global root store. If WebPKI were purely a market, the market would have collapsed under the weight of its own fraud. What prevented total failure was not the market, nor a government regulator. It was a corporate coup. * * * ### The Sovereign Browsers: Unilateralism as Law The governing body of this ecosystem is nominally the CA/Browser Forum (CA/B Forum)—a consortium of browser vendors and CAs designed to negotiate baseline requirements. In reality, the CA/B Forum is a theater of consensus. Real power resides exclusively with the entities that curate the local root stores: Apple, Microsoft, Mozilla, and overwhelmingly, Google Chrome. Your operating system and your browser ship with a hardcoded list of roughly 150 trusted root certificates. If your root certificate is in that list, you can vouch for any server on planet earth. If you are removed from that list, your commercial business ceases to exist overnight. When Certificate Authorities dug their heels in against reforms that threatened their bottom lines, the browser vendors stopped negotiating: 1. **Certificate Transparency (CT):** When CAs resisted public accountability, Google mandated that any certificate not logged to public, append-only cryptographic logs would simply trigger an invalid security warning in Chrome. The CAs folded. 2. **Shortened Lifespans:** When CAs repeatedly voted down proposals in the CA/B Forum to reduce certificate validity from two years to one year (and eventually down to 90 days), Apple unilaterally announced at a conference that Safari would reject two-year certificates. Google and Mozilla followed. The forum vote was moot. WebPKI is not a democracy. It is an enforced corporate oligopoly. A browser’s rendering engine is the ultimate regulatory tribunal. * * * ### The ACME Shift and the Collapse of Identity To solve the lemons problem and eliminate commercial friction, the internet embraced automation. The advent of Let’s Encrypt and the ACME protocol (Automated Certificate Management Environment) transformed HTTPS from an expensive enterprise ritual into an automated HTTP-01/DNS-01 challenge. Over 85% of the web is now encrypted. It was a triumph for privacy against passive eavesdropping. But it subtly obliterated the concept of identity. A modern Domain Validated (DV) certificate does not verify who you are. It only proves that the entity requesting the certificate has control over a DNS record or an HTTP endpoint at that exact second. For years, the legacy CA industry tried to market Extended Validation (EV)—the green bar in the browser that displayed the verified corporate name. The promise was that manual human compliance officers had combed through legal registries, verifying that Bank of America was actually Bank of America. Browsers quietly killed the green bar years ago. Users did not understand it, attackers spoofed it, and human compliance verification was notoriously easy to social-engineer. * * * ### The Generative Threat: Smashing the Validation Boundary This brings us to our current frontier. The technical architecture of WebPKI was designed under the assumption that identity theft requires either cryptographic factorization, network interception (mitigated by BGP monitoring and DNSSEC), or deliberate human corruption. Generative AI dismantles the human validation boundary entirely. Consider the reality of how domain registration, business verification, and identity checks operate today: * Generating synthetic corporate filings, convincing articles of incorporation, fabricated utility bills, and spoofed officer identities used to require seasoned white-collar fraudsters. LLMs and deepfake pipelines have driven the marginal cost of this infrastructure to zero. * Autonomous agent frameworks can spin up disposable LLCs, buy aging domains, build rich digital histories, and systematically petition registrar and verification APIs at scale without a single human finger touching a keyboard. * If identity verification retreats to automated verification pipelines, we enter an adversarial machine-learning arms race where the verifier is a static parser and the attacker is an iterative optimizer. When an AI agent can mimic legal legitimacy perfectly, identity verification ceases to be an authentication mechanism. It becomes noise. * * * ### The Geopolitical Horizon Where does this leave us? As sovereign states wake up to the fact that four American tech companies control the global trust anchor of the internet, the pressure to fragment WebPKI along geopolitical fault lines is escalating. Authoritarian regimes have repeatedly attempted to mandate state-controlled root certificates within their borders. The European Union’s push under eIDAS 2.0 (Article 45) to force browser vendors to trust government-issued Qualified Website Authentication Certificates (QWACs) without the right to revoke them is the clearest warning sign yet: governments are tired of being regulated by Google and Apple. If the sovereign state takes back the root store, the global WebPKI collapses into regionalized state surveillance. If the browser oligopoly maintains control, we preserve technical integrity at the cost of corporate absolutism—while watching our identity frameworks get dismantled by synthetic intelligence. The green lock was never a badge of truth. It was a treaty between corporations who couldn’t afford to let the internet burn and browsers powerful enough to enforce the peace. As that treaty begins to fray under the weight of geopolitical division and synthetic reality, we are about to find out what happens when the math is the only thing we have left.
www.howonplanetearth.com
November 15, 2026 at 11:36 PM
The classic math puzzle of creating numbers using four 2s and various operators is solved by Paul Dirac. His general formula using nested square roots and logarithms allows any natural number to be expressed, effectively ending the challenge's fun.
Making any integer with four 2s (2025) (134)
news.ycombinator.com
November 8, 2026 at 9:28 AM
can u explain logarithms
November 5, 2026 at 12:30 PM