#deviceCodePhishing
November 16, 2026 at 2:42 PM
@microsoft.com
Device code phishing against GitHub Copilot CLI enables session steering, memory poisoning, synced session reads and private repo access; demonstrated in a lab, not in the wild.
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IOCs: (None identified)
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#AIAgentSecurity #DeviceCodePhishing #OAuthAbuse #ThreatIntel
Link
www.microsoft.com
November 17, 2026 at 5:07 PM
@huntress.com
A device code phishing campaign disguises Microsoft 365 token theft as a Teams meeting booking, using a typosquatted domain and residential proxy to steal tokens from an...
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IOCs: gpimmlgration[.]com
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#AiTMPhishing #DeviceCodePhishing #OAuthAbuse #ThreatIntel
Link
www.huntress.com
November 13, 2026 at 12:32 PM
📢 Phishing par code appareil Microsoft Teams : une fausse réservation de réunion trompe les victimes

Cet article détaille une attaque de phishing par code appareil (device code phishing) observée mi-octobre 2026 par…

🟢 vérification factuelle haute
#MicrosoftTeams #DeviceCodePhishing #Cyberveille
Phishing par code appareil Microsoft Teams : une fausse réservation de réunion trompe les victimes
Cet article détaille une attaque de phishing par code appareil (device code phishing) observée mi-octobre 2026 par le SOC Huntress. La victime est une entreprise du secteur de la construction.
cyberveille.ch
November 13, 2026 at 5:30 PM
@huntress.com
Huntress launched Adversary Infrastructure to block attacker IP ranges fleet-wide after EvilTokens device-code phishing and AiTM token replay compromised hundreds of...
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IOCs: (None identified)
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#AiTMPhishing #DeviceCodePhishing #IdentityCompromise #ThreatIntel
Link
www.huntress.com
November 6, 2026 at 12:32 PM
#infosec

DeviceCodePhishing-as-a-Service. Cybercrime commoditization and insecure defaults (M365 Device Auth activated) are bad enough for most orgs.
SkyW4lker Phishing Campaign Expands, Threatening US Enterprises with Microsoft 365 Account Takeovers
SkyW4lker Phishing Campaign Expands, Threatening US Enterprises with Microsoft 365 Account Takeovers
A phishing kit called SkyW4lker (also branded SkyW4lker x365 Sentinel ) is quietly taking over Microsoft 365 accounts without ever stealing a password. Instead of cracking logins or breaking MFA, it tricks employees into approving a legitimate Microsoft device-code sign-in, handing attackers a valid session to corporate mailboxes, documents, and connected apps. The kit has been active since June 2026 and is accelerating fast. Researchers at ANY.RUN tracked 618 sandbox analyses tied to SkyW4lker between June and October 21, 2026, with monthly submissions climbing from 20 in June to 200 in September . Nearly half (46–47%) of those submissions came from the United States , more than twice the share of any other country. For US enterprises running on Microsoft 365, that makes SkyW4lker one of the more pressing identity threats of the quarter. This article breaks down how the kit works, who it targets, how it was traced back to a sibling phishing platform, and what SOC teams and security leaders can do about it. Key takeaways No password theft, no MFA bypass needed. SkyW4lker abuses Microsoft’s OAuth 2.0 device-code flow. The victim types a code into a real Microsoft login page; the attacker gets the token. Delivery looks like routine business. Password-protected PDF, DOCX, or XLSX attachments posing as contracts, invoices, statements, and service proposals, with the password in the email body. Trusted platforms are part of the chain. Lure and redirect pages sit on Google Sites, Miro, Zoom, Smartsheet, Axure Cloud, Cloudflare R2, Linode object storage, and similar services, so links pass reputation checks. The kit is professionally built. A PHP backend, obfuscator.io-style JavaScript, IP geolocation of every visitor, CAPTCHA gating to block scanners, and an admin panel with Telegram-based MFA and live victim notifications. It shares DNA with Gabagool. Identical JavaScript modules, landing-URL formats, CAPTCHA widget, and hosting directories link SkyW4lker to the Gabagool credential-phishing kit active since April 2026. ANY.RUN assesses with high confidence that one developer built both. US tech, manufacturing, and government organizations are the main submitters, followed by India, Canada, and the UK. Faster correlation shortened the investigation. ANY.RUN’s Related Threat Context surfaced earlier sandbox sessions with the same URL patterns, which let analysts pivot into Threat Intelligence Lookup, expand the campaign cluster, and locate the kit’s admin panel. What SkyW4lker is SkyW4lker is a device-code phishing kit: it rents or sells attackers a complete pipeline for turning a phishing click into a working Microsoft 365 session. It first appeared on June 23, 2026 and has been continuously updated since, with new endpoints and changing URL tokens. Attribute Detail Threat type Phishing kit (device-code phishing) Objective Microsoft 365 / OAuth access tokens, plus harvested emails, passwords, and MFA status Core techniques Device-code abuse, obfuscated JavaScript (obfuscator.io), IP geolocation and ISP profiling, CAPTCHA gating (Cloudflare Turnstile and a self-hosted widget) Delivery Password-protected PDF/DOCX/XLSX/EML attachments; redirect links on Google Sites, Google Maps, Miro, Zoom, Smartsheet, Axure Cloud Lure themes Contracts, invoices, approved statements, Fedwire payment notices, service proposals Hosting Mostly DigitalOcean VPS (50 of 92 backend IPs), look-alike domains with Microsoft-themed subdomain chains, free dynamic-DNS hosts Operator / brand SkyW4lker (SkyW4lker x365 Sentinel) Activity window June 2026 – present Related kit Gabagool (credential phishing, active since April 2026) Why US enterprises are in the crosshairs “SkyW4lker activity by country and sector, June–October 2026 (ANY.RUN data)” The United States accounts for roughly 47% of all SkyW4lker-related sandbox submissions. The organizations submitting samples cluster in technology, manufacturing, and government , sectors where Microsoft 365 is the default collaboration layer and where a compromised mailbox can expose contracts, financial data, and supply-chain partners. The risk is structural rather than technical. Device-code phishing succeeds against accounts that have MFA enabled , because the user genuinely completes an MFA-protected sign-in; they simply do it on the attacker’s behalf. That means four things for enterprise security: Identity policy gaps. If device-code authentication is allowed broadly, MFA alone will not stop this attack. Detection blind spots. Every step touches a legitimate service: a real document platform, a real CAPTCHA, a real Microsoft login page. Nothing in the chain looks obviously malicious to email filters or users. Wide blast radius. One token can unlock Outlook, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams, and any app federated through Entra ID, and it becomes a launchpad for phishing customers and partners from a trusted address. Higher response costs. Separating a malicious device-code sign-in from thousands of legitimate ones, then scoping what the attacker touched, consumes Tier-1 and Tier-2 time. Protect corporate accounts from Microsoft 365 phishing attacks with faster detection and response. Talk to ANY.RUN about enterprise protection → How a SkyW4lker attack unfolds The full chain, from lure document to device-code prompt, was detonated and recorded in the ANY.RUN Interactive Sandbox. You can replay it and pull indicators here: View the SkyW4lker analysis session → “The password-protected PDF lure opened inside the ANY.RUN sandbox” The lure lands. The target receives an email about a commercial offer, contract, invoice, or confidential document. Attached is a password-protected PDF, DOCX, or XLSX; the password sits in the email body. The encryption defeats attachment scanning, and the password-in-body pattern feels normal to anyone who deals with vendors. The redirect chain. The document contains a link, usually to a CAPTCHA page. Some variants add an intermediate decoy page on Miro, Google Sites, Zoom, or a cloud bucket before forwarding the victim. The CAPTCHA (Cloudflare Turnstile or the kit’s own widget) keeps automated URL scanners from ever seeing the payload page. The device-code prompt. The victim arrives at a branded phishing page that displays a Microsoft device code and instructs them to enter it at Microsoft’s real login.microsoft.com/device page. Once they do, and complete MFA if prompted, the attacker’s backend receives an OAuth access token for the account. No password ever crosses the wire to the attacker, and the sign-in shows up in Entra ID as a legitimate device-code authentication. “The device-code phishing page as rendered in the ANY.RUN sandbox” Inside the kit The phishing page is a thin front end for a PHP backend, and ANY.RUN’s In-Browser Data Inspection exposes how it works by showing the live DOM and HTTP traffic side by side. “Obfuscated JavaScript from the phishing page in the Browser Data view” The main script loads helper modules, wires up the page’s buttons, and talks to the backend through one endpoint, /session_public.php, with two actions: action=start sends the victim’s IP address, ISP, organization, and geolocation to the server and receives a session ID. action=poll fires every few seconds with that session ID, asking whether the victim has finished authenticating. When the answer flips to yes, the attacker has the token. “Repeated action=poll requests from the phishing page, visible in the sandbox network stream” Module What it does client_geo.js Fingerprints the visitor’s location via ip-api.com, ipapi.co, or ipwho.is (or a server-side client_geo.php). Used to profile targets and feed the admin dashboard. url_helper.js Utility wrappers for building GET parameters and normalizing URLs. endpoint.js Tracks the victim’s state and logs email, password, browser, MFA status, and country to php/endpoints/accounts.php. The JavaScript is obfuscated in obfuscator.io style; 520 of the 618 analyses carry ANY.RUN’s obfuscated-js tag. That is deliberate friction for anyone trying to reverse the page statically, which is why detonating it in an interactive sandbox and watching the requests is the faster route. From one URL to the whole campaign Finding one SkyW4lker page is easy. Finding the other 170-plus domains, the shared hosting, the admin panel, and the sibling kit is where most investigations stall. Traditionally that means repeated IOC lookups, manual correlation across old cases, and a lot of copy-pasting between tools. ANY.RUN’s Related Threat Context feature collapsed that work. Inside the sandbox session, a Related analyses panel listed earlier submissions that used the same /session_public.php URL pattern, giving analysts an instant starting cluster instead of a blank search box. “Related Threat Context surfacing earlier sandbox sessions with matching SkyW4lker URL patterns” From there, a one-click pivot into Threat Intelligence Lookup on the distinctive endpoint returned additional phishing activity, expanded the campaign to its current size, and exposed infrastructure overlaps that would otherwise have taken days to assemble. The same workflow applies to any suspicious URL or indicator a SOC receives: start from the alert, see what the community has already analyzed, and build on it rather than starting over. “Threat Intelligence Lookup query on the unique /session_public.php endpoint” The payoff shows up at both tiers. Tier-1 analysts spend less time re-researching indicators that someone else already resolved and get enough evidence to triage confidently. Tier-2 analysts receive richer context up front and can focus on the cases that actually need deep analysis. Give your SOC the context needed to speed up phishing investigations, reduce repetitive work, and boost Tier-1 productivity. See how the Interactive Sandbox connects threats → The admin panel Because each phishing page runs its own backend, the operator’s control panel usually lives on the same host. Combining Threat Intelligence Lookup results with external data turned up a login form at /admin/index.php, and its stylesheet (command-center.css) describes what the kit offers its customers: Operator login with MFA delivered over Telegram A victim dashboard fed by client_geo.js geolocation data Server management and generation of new phishing links Real-time notifications whenever a target opens a link “Login form of the SkyW4lker administration panel” “CSS class names revealing dashboard, server-management, and notification features” SkyW4lker and Gabagool: one developer, two attack modes Searching ANY.RUN Threat Intelligence for SkyW4lker’s module paths (/js/client_geo.js, /js/url_helper.js, /js/endpoint.js) also returns sessions tagged Gabagool , a credential-phishing kit first seen on April 23, 2026, two months before SkyW4lker. Feature SkyW4lker Gabagool First seen June 23, 2026 April 23, 2026 Analyses in six months 618 458 Shared JS modules client_geo.js, url_helper.js, endpoint.js (since July 2026) Same three modules (since late April 2026) Visit endpoint /assets/php/endpoints/confirm_visit.php Identical Self-hosted CAPTCHA /assets/private_captcha/public/widget.js?v=4 Identical Landing token zt[A-Za-z0-9]{32}op, then it[A-Za-z0-9]{32}us from Aug 10 Same tokens, it…us from Aug 5 Shared hosts and directories 5200m[.]com/kvme2/, torvion[.]life/ofulium/, ghethim[.]com/hyllen/ Same directories, within days of each other Hosting Mostly DigitalOcean Mostly DigitalOcean; shared IP 172.86.85[.]51 Main endpoint session_public.php (device-code flow) accounts.php (username/password harvesting) Some Gabagool sessions even load the kit from directories literally named skywalker and skyw4lker on goldcreekconcrete[.]com and goldcreekconcrete[.]org. ANY.RUN’s assessment: the same developer built both kits , and they are best understood as two modes of one phishing platform, one that harvests passwords, one that harvests device-code tokens. Whether a single operator runs both, or multiple customers bought the same product, the data cannot yet say. How to detect SkyW4lker and reduce exposure For SOC analysts and threat hunters Hunt the kit’s fingerprints. Alert on outbound requests to /session_public.php?action=start followed by repeated ?action=poll calls, and on the three module paths (client_geo.js, url_helper.js, endpoint.js) under /assets/js/. The landing token regex //it[A-Za-z0-9]{32}us (previously //zt[A-Za-z0-9]{32}op) is a reliable signature for the landing URL. Tie phishing to sign-ins. In Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs, filter for device-code authentications and correlate them against recent suspicious emails or document-share notifications to the same user. A device-code sign-in minutes after a “protected invoice” email is a strong compromise signal. Detonate, don’t guess. Password-protected attachments and CAPTCHA-gated links defeat static scanners by design. Open them in an interactive sandbox, supply the password, pass the CAPTCHA, and watch the real traffic. Pivot beyond the single IOC. Use Related Threat Context and Threat Intelligence Lookup to check whether the domain, endpoint, or module path already appears in other analyses. That turns a one-off alert into campaign-level visibility in minutes. Scope the follow-on. When a token theft is suspected, review mailbox rules, OAuth app consents, SharePoint/OneDrive access, and outbound mail from the account to catch lateral phishing against colleagues and partners. Give your SOC the speed to handle more threats with 20% less Tier-1 investigation time and 30% fewer escalations. Book an enterprise demo → For CISOs and security leaders SkyW4lker is a reminder that MFA is necessary but not sufficient. Three priorities: Close the device-code gap. Audit where device-code authentication is actually needed (typically headless devices, CLI tools, and some conferencing hardware). Block or tightly scope it with Entra Conditional Access everywhere else. This single control removes the attack’s payoff. Connect email, web, and identity telemetry. The kit only works because each stage is examined in isolation. Make sure the SOC can link a suspicious attachment, the phishing infrastructure it reaches, and the authentication event that follows. Shorten the investigation loop. Give Tier-1 analysts historical threat context and clear escalation criteria so routine phishing cases close at Tier 1, and reserve Tier 2 for incidents that truly need deeper work. Define a containment runbook for token-based compromise: revoke sessions, reset credentials, review app consents, and check for persistence. MITRE ATT&CK mapping Tactic Technique How SkyW4lker does it Reconnaissance T1589.002 Email Addresses Recipient address appended to the landing URL to personalize the page Reconnaissance T1590.005 IP Addresses client_geo.js records IP, ISP, organization, and location at action=start Resource Development T1583.001 Domains Typo-squatted company domains with Microsoft-themed subdomain chains; free dynamic-DNS hosts Resource Development T1583.003 VPS DigitalOcean for 50 of 92 backend IPs Resource Development T1608.005 Link Target Intermediate pages on Cloudflare R2, Linode object storage, Mintlify Initial Access T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Password-protected PDF/XLS/DOCX/EML named *-protected.pdf or DOC <random>.pdf Initial Access T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Google Sites, Axure Cloud, Smartsheet pages; maps.google[.]ie/url?q= redirects Execution T1204.001 Malicious Link Victim opens //it[A-Za-z0-9]{32}us landing path Defense Evasion T1656 Impersonation Subjects like “Approved Statement” and “Fedwire Funds Service Processed” Defense Evasion T1497 Sandbox Evasion Cloudflare Turnstile and self-hosted CAPTCHA in front of the payload page Defense Evasion T1027 Obfuscation obfuscator.io-style JavaScript (520 of 618 analyses) Credential Access T1528 Steal Application Access Token Abuses login.microsoftonline[.]com/common/oauth2/deviceauth while polling action=poll Collection T1056.003 Web Portal Capture endpoint.js logs email, password, browser, MFA status, and country Indicators of compromise All indicators were observed in ANY.RUN analyses between June 23 and October 21, 2026. The full list of 173 phishing domains , plus live sandbox sessions, is available in the original ANY.RUN research . URL patterns Pattern Purpose Seen //it[A-Za-z0-9]{32}us Current landing token (may end ? or ??) Aug 10 – Oct 19, 2026 //zt[A-Za-z0-9]{32}op Earlier landing token Jun 25 – Sep 28, 2026 /assets/php/endpoints/session_public.php?action=start&ip=… Session registration with geolocation Jun 23 – Oct 21, 2026 /assets/php/endpoints/session_public.php?action=poll&session_id= Device-code status polling Jun 23 – Oct 21, 2026 /assets/js/client_geo.js Geolocation module Jul 7 – Oct 19, 2026 /assets/js/endpoint.js Session state and credential logging Jul 22 – Oct 20, 2026 /assets/js/url_helper.js URL helper module Jul – Oct 2026 /assets/php/endpoints/confirm_visit.php Visit confirmation Aug 31 – Oct 15, 2026 /assets/private_captcha/public/widget.js?v=4 Self-hosted CAPTCHA gate Jul 7 – Sep 28, 2026 /assets/php/attach/js/mstoken_document_(adobe|onedrive|excel)_[A-Za-z0-9]{50}.js Brand-specific document script Jul 20 – Oct 20, 2026 (docshare|sdocshares|pdocshared|efaxdoc|reauth|statement|copilot|login|auth).*(outlook|onedrive|copilot|office365).* Microsoft-themed hostname chain on look-alike domains Jun – Oct 2026 Sample domains and infrastructure 5200m[.]com, torvion[.]life, ghethim[.]com (hosts shared with Gabagool) goldcreekconcrete[.]com, goldcreekconcrete[.]org (/skywalker/, /skyw4lker/ directories) sdocshares.auth.outlook2026common.copilos26.csr-rooflng[.]com pdocshared.payments2026.outlooks.common.ecmholdlnggroup[.]com flow505.mooo[.]com, bigbrain.chickenkiller[.]com, off365acess.jumpingcrab[.]com 172.86.85[.]51 (priorispace[.]biz), 162.243.64[.]121, 67.205.154[.]32 Sample lure SHA256: 9aa0b87974b9b4cd42603833b7ad44257578467d279b315a071108a5ed02c268 Conclusion SkyW4lker is not a novel exploit; it is a well-engineered abuse of a feature Microsoft 365 ships by default. Its growth from 20 to 200 sandbox submissions a month in a single quarter, its concentration on US enterprises, and its shared lineage with Gabagool all point to a phishing platform that will keep shipping new modes as long as device-code sign-ins stay open and SOCs keep treating phishing alerts one at a time. The defensive answer is equally unglamorous: restrict device-code authentication where it is not needed, correlate email and identity events, and give analysts the ability to detonate what filters cannot inspect and to see, in one view, what the rest of the community has already found about the same infrastructure. Protect corporate accounts from Microsoft 365 phishing attacks with faster detection and response. Contact ANY.RUN sales → About ANY.RUN ANY.RUN helps SOC and MSSP teams detect and investigate threats faster. Its Interactive Sandbox lets analysts open suspicious files and URLs, supply passwords, pass CAPTCHAs, and watch full attack chains unfold, while Threat Intelligence Lookup, Feeds, and Reports connect each case to activity seen across more than 16,000 organizations and 700,000 security professionals. ANY.RUN is SOC 2 Type II certified. Research credit: ShiFu, Threat Intelligence Analyst, ANY.RUN. Original report published October 27, 2026. The post SkyW4lker Phishing Campaign Expands, Threatening US Enterprises with Microsoft 365 Account Takeovers appeared first on Cyber Security News .
cybersecuritynews.com
November 4, 2026 at 7:16 PM
@microsoft.com
Two phishing campaigns exploited familiar business lures to deliver device code phishing and Agent Tesla malware, while security overrides allowed...
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IOCs: wekash[.]net, splace[.]co[.]za, carloxmextos[.]org
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#DeviceCodePhishing #Infostealer #Phishing #ThreatIntel
Link
www.microsoft.com
November 5, 2026 at 5:08 PM
Wazza phishkit gates its Adobe device-code lure behind signed tokens, so scanners see nothing. https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-3039 #ThreatIntel #Wazza #PhishKit #DeviceCodePhishing
October 8, 2026 at 11:13 AM
Device code phishing uses Microsoft's real login page — MFA completes normally, no red flags. Detections rose 37.5x. Now sold as a subscription kit.

Full breakdown: 

🇬🇧 diesec.com/2026/09/devi... 
🇩🇪 diesec.com/de/2026/09/d...

#CyberSecurity #PhishingSimulation #DeviceCodePhishing
September 2, 2026 at 8:00 AM
📰 Helix, Kelompok Vishing Baru yang Menargetkan Microsoft SharePoint untuk Mencuri Data

👉 Baca artikel lengkap di sini: https://ahmandonk.com/2026/07/10/helix-sharepoint-vishing-attacks/

#cyb
er#cybersecurityc#deviceCodePhishingx#helixa#keamananSiber##mfao#microsoft365e#sharepointy#shinyhunters href="/hashtag/te" class="hover:underline text-blue-600 dark:text-sky-400 no-card-link">#te
July 10, 2026 at 3:47 AM
📰 Forg365, Platform Phishing Berbasis AI yang Menargetkan Akun Microsoft 365

👉 Baca artikel lengkap di sini: https://ahmandonk.com/2026/07/10/forg365-phishing-microsoft-365/

#ait
m #aitmr#cybersecurityc#deviceCodePhishing3#forg365a#keamananSibero#microsoft365o#microsoftEntras#phaash#phishingh#phish
July 10, 2026 at 3:44 AM
Account Microsoft 365 violati senza password: ecco il nuovo incubo OAuth

📌 Link all'articolo : www.redhotcyber.com/post/acc...

#redhotcyber #news #cybersecurity #hacking #malware #phishing #devicecodephishing #microsoft
December 22, 2025 at 6:50 AM
Microsoft 365 Users Targeted by Russia-Linked Device Code Phishing Operations #AccountTakeoverThreats #CyberAttacks #DeviceCodePhishing
Microsoft 365 Users Targeted by Russia-Linked Device Code Phishing Operations
The global network infrastructure is experiencing a wave of sophisticated cyber intrusions as states-sponsored and financially motivated hackers are increasingly exploiting a legitimate Microsoft authentication mechanism to seize control of enterprise accounts in a broad range of sectors.  There has been a recent investigation which uncovered attackers with ties to both Russian and Chinese interests have been exploiting Microsoft's OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow in an effort to deceive users into unknowingly granting them access to their Microsoft 365 environments through this feature designed to simplify secure logins.  Through the use of fraudulently masquerading institutions and convincing targets to authenticate using authentic Microsoft services, attackers are able to obtain valid access tokens that enable persistent account compromises without requiring the compromise of the target's password. The Russian-linked threat actor Storm-2372 has been targeting government bodies and private organizations since August 2024 and has been one of the most active groups in this regard.  In order to get the highest level of effectiveness from the device code phishing tactics, it has been proven to be more effective than conventional spear-phishing tactics. It has been conducted throughout Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and North America. Government, defence, healthcare, telecommunications, education, energy, and non-government organizations have been included in the campaign.  It has been determined that the scale, targeting patterns, and operational discipline of the activity strongly point towards a coordinated nation-state effort aligned with Russian strategic objectives, as confirmed by Microsoft's Threat Intelligence Center.  The campaign is now more clearly connected to an organization believed to be aligned with the Russian government. It has been a sustained phishing operation that leveraged Microsoft's device code authentication workflow to compromise Microsoft 365 accounts by using a sustained phishing operation. Under the designation UNK_AcademicFlare, Proofpoint has tracked this activity since September 2025 under the designation UNK_AcademicFlare.  Investigators believe the attackers used email accounts that had previously been compromised from government and military organizations so that they could lend legitimacy to their outreach efforts. In both the United States and Europe, the messages were targeted at individuals and organizations within government agencies, policy think tanks, higher education institutions, and transportation-related organizations.  There are deliberate steps involved in the approach. It begins with seemingly innocuous correspondence tailored to the recipient’s professional background, usually framed as preparations for an interview or collaboration. In order for victims to be informed, the sender will offer a document purported to outline discussion topics. The document will be hosted at a link that appears to be a Microsoft OneDrive account impersonating the sender. There is a link within the email that actually redirects users to a Cloudflare Worker, which redirects the user to Microsoft's legitimate account lock page, during which the user enters the provided authentication code, which unwittingly authorizes access and generates a valid token that enables full account hijacking.  Researchers in the field of cybersecurity note that this technique has gained traction, having been extensively documented earlier this year by Microsoft and Volexity and linked to clusters that are associated with Russia, such as Storm-2372 and APT29.  Recent warnings from Amazon Threat Intelligence and Volexity have shown that it is still being used by Russian attackers. According to the latest technical details published by Microsoft and independent researchers, there have been several mechanisms behind the campaign that can shed light on the mechanisms that operate behind it.  A Microsoft disclosure dated February 14, 2025 confirmed that Storm-2372 had begun authenticating through a specific Microsoft Authentication Broker client ID while using the device code sign-in method, which in turn allowed attackers to get refresh access tokens with the new Authentication Broker client ID.  A device registration token can be exchanged into credentials linked to the device registration service after it has been acquired by an adversary, which makes it possible for that adversary to enroll attacker-controlled systems into Microsoft Entra ID and maintain persistent access for massive email harvesting operations.  As a result of investigations, high-profile institutions such as the United States Department of State, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the European Parliament, and prominent research organizations have been impersonated in the activities. Researchers have concluded that APT29, a group of malicious actors also known as Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, Cloaked Ursa, and The Dukes, may be the cluster that is driving this activity.  According to Volexity's case studies, operators are exploiting real-time communication channels as a means of accelerating victim compliance through real-time communication channels. In one incident, UTA0304 contacted a victim via Signal before moving the conversation to Element, and ultimately directed the target to a legitimate Microsoft page asking for an account code, pretending to be a secure chat service provider.  A malicious attacker might use immediacy and context to convince the victims to act quickly, a tactic similar to those employed by marketing groups to promote Microsoft Teams meetings held by groups related to the phishing attack.  A response from Microsoft has been to disable the device code flow whenever possible, restrict Entra ID access to trusted networks and devices via Conditional Access, and actively monitor sign-in logs for anomaly activity related to device code, including rapid authentication attempts and logins that originate from unknown locations, in order to prevent this from happening. It is highly likely that organisations will have to implement layered technical controls in order to reduce exposure to this evolving threat in light of the fact that employee awareness alone cannot counter this evolving threat. In its recommendation to enterprises, Proofpoint recommends explicitly limiting the use of device code authentication. This can be described as the most effective way to prevent misuse of the OAuth device flow by enterprises.  The adoption of such control systems begins with auditing or report-only deployments, which allows security teams to evaluate potential operational impacts by analyzing historical sign-in data before implementing them in their entirety.  Providing a more granular, allow-list-based approach where a complete block is not feasible, researchers recommend that device code authentication be limited to narrowly defined and approved scenarios, for example, specific users, operating systems that are trusted, or network locations that are well known. In addition to these safeguards, additional safeguards can also be implemented by requiring Microsoft 365 sign-ins to originate from compliant or registered devices, particularly in environments that use device registration or Microsoft Intune as authentication methods. Proofpoint warns, however, that misuse of OAuth authentication mechanisms is likely to increase as organizations begin adopting FIDO-compliant multifactor authentication, thus highlighting the need to implement proactive policies and continuous monitoring of these systems.  Furthermore, researchers have also discovered a broader ecosystem of infrastructure and social engineering techniques that are being used to maintain and expand the campaign, which is ongoing. During the analysis of the phishing URLs, researchers noted that some of them were temporarily inactive. However, the accompanying emails instructed recipients to copy and share the full URL of the browser in case of an error, which is consistent with the tactics used for OAuth device code phishing to extract usable authentication data. Among the domains involved, ustrs[.]com, seems to have been purchased as a result of a domain auction or resale service. Though the domain was originally registered in early 2020, WHOIS records indicate that it was updated in late 2025, a strategy that has long been used as a way of evading reputation-based security controls that rely heavily on domain age as a signal of trustworthiness. It was Volexity that observed the same sender approach additional organizations in November 2025, promoting a conference registration link on brussels-indo-pacific-forum[.]org, which has been created to mimic the Brussels Indo-Pacific Dialogue, in an attempt to fool the target audience. As soon as the victims attempted to sign up for the site, they were presented with a Microsoft 365 authentication process disguised as a legitimate signup process, which then sent them to a benign confirmation page. According to research conducted in connection with Belgrade Security Conference earlier campaigns, subsequent access to compromised accounts was routed through proxy network infrastructures to conceal the attackers' origin, as seen in earlier campaigns.  Further research has demonstrated that by exploiting standard professional courtesies, operators were systematically extending their reach. When targets declined event invitations, multiple times, as tracked as activity associated with UTA0355, they were urged to register for updates, to share contact details with colleagues who might be interested, and to share contact information with other colleagues who may have been interested as well.  At least one example involved an unwitting intermediary introducing a new target to the threat actor through an unwitting intermediary, which enabled the attackers to gather new leads organically. In addition, domain registration data related to impersonated events revealed other infrastructure that may have been associated with the same cluster, according to WHOIS data for bsc2025[.]org, a domain resembling Belgrade Security Conference, which was registered using the address mailum[.]com, a relatively unknown e-mail service.  The Volexity investigation was expanded to identify other domains masquerading as the World Nuclear Exhibition scheduled for November 2025, including world-nuclear-exhibition-paris[.]com, wne-2025[.]com, and confirmyourflight-parisaeroport[.]com, that gave the impression that the World Nuclear Exhibition was being held in Paris. In spite of the fact that researchers do not believe their domains were specifically utilized in confirmed attacks, they can assess that they might have assisted the campaign in its early stages.  Overall, these findings illustrate a shift in how advanced threat actors are increasingly relying on trusted identity frameworks in place of traditional malware and credential theft in order to carry out their attacks. It has been demonstrated that these campaigns reduce the likelihood of detection, increase user compliance, and decrease the likelihood of detection by weaponizing legitimate authentication flows and embedding them within credible professional interactions. Organisations may have to deal with longer-term risks associated with persistent access in addition to immediate account compromise, data exposure, internal reconnaissance, and follow-up attacks resulting from persistent access. As a result, security teams are urged to revisit assumptions regarding "trusted" login mechanisms, to improve identity governance, and to ensure visibility into events that do not involve interactive interaction and that are based on a device.  An attack surface can be significantly reduced by taking proactive measures such as tightening OAuth permissions, auditing registered devices and applications, and stress testing Conditional Access policies. Moreover, leadership and security stakeholders need to be aware that modern phishing campaigns are increasingly modeled on legitimate business workflows, and that defense strategies must be complemented by context-aware user education in order to protect themselves.  A number of low-friction, high-impact attack techniques are being refined by attackers to gain a higher degree of sophistication, which makes it more challenging for organisations that treat this aspect of their operations as a core operational priority to stop intrusions before they become systemic breaches.
dlvr.it
December 20, 2025 at 11:45 AM
AI-powered phishing has outpaced blocklists: attackers now create, rotate, and disguise infrastructure faster than indicators can be tracked. Technique-level behavioral detection is becoming the lasting defense. #AiTM #ClickFix #DeviceCodePhishing
How AI-powered phishing killed blocklists for good
AI has made blocklist-based defense obsolete by enabling attackers to rapidly create, rotate, and disguise phishing infrastructure faster than indicators can be tracked. The article argues that lasting protection comes from technique-level behavioral detection, with examples including AiTM phishing, ClickFix, device code phishing, and novel attacks like InstallFix, ConsentFix, and LLMShare. #AiTM #ClickFix #DeviceCodePhishing #InstallFix #ConsentFix #LLMShare #PushSecurity
www.hendryadrian.com
August 5, 2026 at 3:45 PM
Modern email attacks keep bypassing secure email gateways, MFA, and identity tools. A webinar on behavioral AI will explore detecting abnormal communication, automating investigations, and stopping Device Code phishing and trusted sender
Webinar tomorrow: Why modern email attacks require a new approach to defense
Organizations are still facing persistent phishing, business email compromise, and account takeover attacks even after investing in secure email gateways, MFA, and identity protection. A BleepingComputer webinar with Abnormal AI and Novant Health will show how behavioral AI can help detect abnormal communication patterns, automate investigations, and improve response to Device Code phishing and trusted sender impersonation. #BleepingComputer #AbnormalAI #NovantHealth #DeviceCodePhishing
www.hendryadrian.com
July 7, 2026 at 5:00 PM
Traditional email defenses are being bypassed by trusted identities and normal workflows. A July 8 webinar will explore how behavioral AI can help detect phishing, BEC, and account takeover attacks. #Phishing #BEC #ATO
Webinar: Why traditional email security is no longer enough
Modern email threats are increasingly using trusted identities, legitimate workflows, and compromised accounts to bypass secure email gateways and reputation-based defenses. A BleepingComputer webinar on July 8, 2026 will show how behavioral AI can help detect, investigate, and remediate phishing, BEC, and ATO attacks more efficiently. #BleepingComputer #AbnormalAI #NovantHealth #DeviceCodePhishing
www.hendryadrian.com
July 1, 2026 at 9:45 PM
Attackers are bypassing MFA by abusing legit login workflows. Device Code phishing, BEC, and ATO can evade traditional defenses, while behavioral AI helps spot compromise earlier. #DeviceCode #BEC #AbnormalAI
Webinar: How attackers bypass MFA and how defenders can respond
Many organizations rely on multi-factor authentication as a key safeguard, but attackers are increasingly bypassing it by abusing legitimate authentication workflows instead of stealing passwords. The webinar “Stop chasing alerts: Automating email security with behavioral AI” will show how Device Code phishing, BEC, and ATO attacks can evade traditional defenses and how behavioral AI can help detect compromise earlier. #DeviceCodePhishing #AbnormalAI #BleepingComputer #NovantHealth
www.hendryadrian.com
June 19, 2026 at 1:45 PM
Law enforcement seized 330 Tycoon 2FA domains, cutting attacks from 9M to 2M/month. Phishers shifted to Mamba 2FA, EvilProxy, and Sneaky 2FA, adopting device code phishing methods. #Tycoon2FA #DevicePhishing #Russia
Tycoon 2FA Phishers Scatter, Adopt Device Code Phishing
Tycoon 2FA's coordinated takedown knocked out 330 domains and sharply reduced its monthly attack volume, but the phishing ecosystem quickly adapted and dispersed. Competitors like Mamba 2FA, EvilProxy, and Sneaky 2FA have absorbed activity and attackers are increasingly adopting device code phishing techniques. #Tycoon2FA #Mamba2FA #EvilProxy #Sneaky2FA #DeviceCodePhishing
www.hendryadrian.com
April 18, 2026 at 11:45 AM
DCL: PhaaS targeting Microsoft Entra OAuth device code flow. PRT capture, FOCI token pivot, 14-day ESTSAUTH cookies, Cloudflare Worker deployment, cross-mailbox KQL sweep. Key IOC: api.controltkeusa[.]com #ThreatIntel #PhaaS #DeviceCodePhishing https://bit.ly/4wWy83m
May 28, 2026 at 3:23 PM
August 4, 2026 at 6:35 PM
📢 Explosion du device code phishing en 2026 : 37,5x d'augmentation et émergence du kit EvilTokens
📝 ## 🔍 Contexte

Article publié le…
https://cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-09-04-explosion-du-device-code-phishing-en-2026-375x-d-augmentation-et-emergence-du-kit-eviltokens/ #DeviceCodePhishing #Cyberveille
April 12, 2026 at 12:00 AM