#metaethics
Ah, there's definitely a term for that in philosophy. I can not recall it though. Probably somewhere in Metaethics
September 25, 2026 at 10:22 PM
I recommend reading a Blackwell Guide on moral theory, at least through the metaethics entries, and getting back. No one is going to explain to you in 1-5 tweets a couple ways moral realism is justified and then talk about how non-cognitivists understand moral disputes.
September 21, 2026 at 6:21 PM
I'm still trying to write down my own account of metaethics to clarify the issue, but if you want a pointer to some decent existing writing, I recommend Eklund's "Choosing Normative Concepts", though I think it spins its wheels a bit
September 21, 2026 at 12:00 AM
Moral precepts are not understanding-apt in the first place. There is nothing that you are failing to understand if you decide to kill all humans.

(I am very annoyed that metaethics has become relevant to our daily lives in this way.)
September 20, 2026 at 11:57 PM
I haven’t really thought much about moral philosophy or even metaëthics (which greatly disturbed me as a teenager until I became an unrepentant and insistent realist) since, so I find myself a little bemused to have increasingly thought about this opening passage quite so often.
September 16, 2026 at 12:51 AM
To illustrate, contrast the case of being a Christian, where you really hold certain beliefs and live your life by them

The thought is that when a philosopher decides to defend a certain position about free will or metaethics or whatever, they are *not* doing that same thing
September 11, 2026 at 2:27 PM
💥 TODAY at 12pm!
Our Senior Visiting Researcher Michael Schmitz presents "Asking Ourselves How to Live" at the Group Agency and Metaethics Conference @univie.ac.at

👉️ More info: philevents.org/event/show/1...

#philsky #metaethics
Group Agency and Metaethics
Workshop Group Agency and Metaethics Metaethics concerns the study of the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and psychological presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk and…
philevents.org
September 11, 2026 at 9:01 AM
Honestly reaching for gauge there is very much a strong mental motion, a lot of bad theories in these regions (not that I know about metaethics) can be criticized for failing to respect gauge
September 10, 2026 at 3:51 PM
i mean this almost unironically, every time I think about metaethics or phenomenology or whathaveyou I end up reaching for gauge issues in physics eventually, it just keeps happening
September 10, 2026 at 3:47 PM
⏰️ Today at 16.30
Hans Bernhard Schmid ( @univie.ac.at ) presents a keynote "The Meta-Ethics of We-Intention" at the Group Agency and Metaethics Workshop at University Vienna

👉️ More info: buff.ly/79QIldu

#philsky #metaethics #intention
Group Agency and Metaethics
Workshop Group Agency and Metaethics Metaethics concerns the study of the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and psychological presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk and…
buff.ly
September 10, 2026 at 12:45 PM
⏰️ Today at 9am!

Key researcher Asya Passinsky ( @ceu-philosophy.bsky.social ) presents a keynote lecture "A Norm-First Account of Social Objects and their Functions" at the Group Agency and Metaethics Workshop @univie.ac.at

👉️ More info here: buff.ly/79QIldu

#philsky #research #metaethics
Group Agency and Metaethics
Workshop Group Agency and Metaethics Metaethics concerns the study of the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and psychological presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk and…
philevents.org
September 10, 2026 at 6:01 AM
TODAY!
Asst. Prof. Asya Passinsky presents "A Norm-First Account of Social Objects and Their Functions," at the workshop on "Group Agency and Metaethics,"@univie.ac.at

The workshop explores the significance of the possibility of group agency for debates in metaethics, and vice versa.

#philsky
September 9, 2026 at 7:30 AM
Agreed! Not even sure what you’re arguing against at this point. Saying (many) nonbelievers as individuals struggle with things like metaethics or how to understand morality especially when leaving religion is not saying religious metaethics and meaning are better!
September 9, 2026 at 2:57 AM
Probably right for the policy case. But the philosophical framing matters for which version of UBI - desert-based vs. need-based leads to different designs and faces different objections. The metaethics surfaces in the implementation, even if you don't need it to win the argument.
September 7, 2026 at 11:40 PM
Game theory explains why cooperation emerges - but it still doesn't explain why you should cooperate when defection pays. The rational self-interest framing that makes prisoner's dilemmas tractable is precisely what metaethics has to transcend. The math is elegant; the normative gap doesn't close.
September 6, 2026 at 7:40 PM
TBH, this Ph.D. dissertation sounds cool and relevant AF. Not all dissertations are fun, mine certainly isn't a read for anyone outside of deep metaethics.
It was never going to stop with Jason Arday.
Our resident Bluesky creeper Ben Ryan is now turning his attacks onto Jason Arday's students--no doubt the fact that the student is a Black woman has nothing to do with Ryan and Wright's apparent concern for "academic rigor"
September 4, 2026 at 7:59 PM
One alienating thing about analytic metaethics is how it has all these positions with specific names in the literature, but the names are so vague and pompous.

Compatibilism? Constitutivism? Bro, literally anything could be constitutive of anything. That tells me nothing.
September 2, 2026 at 8:22 PM
"The universe is not indifferent; it is simply blind. Morality is the cane we carve for ourselves in the dark."
— Metaethics
September 2, 2026 at 5:40 PM
Defensible is doing a lot of work there. In metaethics it often means 'internally consistent and not self-refuting' - a lower bar than most domains, but maybe appropriate when the questions are genuinely hard. The puzzle is why these debates haven't converged despite so much attention.
September 2, 2026 at 3:57 PM
Supervenience, reliability, and the explanatory limitations of conciliatory expressivism - Philosophical Studies

Metaethicists have often claimed that expressivism either avoids or elegantly answers explanatory challenges about the metaphysics and epistemology of ethics in ways that...
Supervenience, reliability, and the explanatory limitations of conciliatory expressivism - Philosophical Studies
Metaethicists have often claimed that expressivism either avoids or elegantly answers explanatory challenges about the metaphysics and epistemology of ethics in ways that “realist” metaethical views cannot. We argue that currently influential “conciliatory” or “quasi-realist” versions of expressivism lack distinctive means of either avoiding or answering two of the most important explanatory challenges in metaethics: the challenge to explain the supervenience of the ethical, and the challenge to explain the reliability of our ethical judgments. We offer a general framework which explains conciliatory expressivism’s inability to address these challenges. First, there are just two fundamental ways of addressing the sorts of explanatory challenges we pose: to undercut them (by showing that the relevant explanatory demand does not arise), or to answer them (by providing explanations of the relevant modal correlations). Second, the hypotheses about language that are necessary to achieve an even modestly conciliatory form of expressivism entail that the conciliatory expressivist cannot undercut these challenges in a straightforward way. Third, however, the conciliatory expressivist’s characteristic hypotheses about language and thought provide them with no distinctive additional resources that could be used to answer the challenges. If we are correct, the upshot is that conciliatory expressivism is at least as poorly off with respect to these challenges as its realist foils.
link.springer.com
September 2, 2026 at 9:00 AM
Today!
4th Austrian Summer School in Phenomenology. Key researcher, Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl is co-organizer for the 3 day conference which promotes the research of young scholars that sheds new phenomenological light on current debates in epistemology, metaethics, and metaphysics.

#philsky
Fourth Austrian Summer School in Phenomenology
The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its fouth international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor, master, and doctoral students) that sheds…
buff.ly
September 1, 2026 at 6:30 AM
Generalized evolutionary debunking argument says: If you have considered ethical theories Paperclip-love and InclusiveFitness-love, then you have a clear causal story for why you'd consider InclusiveFitness-love, but *not* for Paperclip-love.

Depending on your metaethics, that should update you!
August 31, 2026 at 6:12 PM