#EngineeringEthics
Good Engineering for Bad Purposes. A musing on #engineeringethics

https://chaasblog.wordpress.com/2026/09/28/156/
Good Engineering for Bad Purposes
# ### 1. A ventilation problem Suppose you are handed the following problem. A sealed room of known volume contains a toxic gas at a known concentration. The client wants the room cleared to a safe level quickly enough that it can be reentered and reused several times a day. Specify the exhaust fans, the duct layout, and the air-exchange rate. Any environmental or mechanical engineer who has taken a course in mass transfer can set this up. It is a well-mixed reactor with a first-order washout term; the clearance time scales with the room volume divided by the exhaust flow, and the design question reduces to how much fan you are willing to buy. I have taught problems of exactly this form for decades, and in environmental engineering it is a textbook exercise in protecting people from hazardous atmospheres. In March 1943, a fitter named Heinrich Messing from the Erfurt firm J.A. Topf & Söhne installed the ventilation systems in the two basement rooms of Crematorium II at Auschwitz-Birkenau. He logged thirty-five hours of overtime in a single week to finish the job, and on his work sheet he did not use the SS euphemism for the room, _Leichenkeller_ — corpse cellar. He wrote _Auskleidekeller_ — undressing cellar. The Topf & Söhne memorial in Erfurt preserves the documentary record of his work and of what it shows that he knew. The engineering was sound. That is the problem this essay is about. ### 2. An ordinary firm Topf & Söhne was not a creature of the Nazi state. It was a family business, founded in Erfurt in 1878, making brewery and malting equipment, industrial furnaces, and ventilation systems — the kind of respectable mid-sized manufacturer every industrial region of Europe or America had in abundance. It also made crematory ovens for municipal cemeteries, which is how it came to the attention of the SS. From 1939 onward, the firm’s Department D IV, under the senior engineer Kurt Prüfer, designed and supplied cremation furnaces for concentration camps, first Buchenwald and Dachau and then, at far larger scale, Auschwitz. Its engineers visited the sites, supervised installation, troubleshot failures, and answered technical correspondence from the SS construction office. The firm’s letters closed with a stock courtesy that the memorial now built on its grounds uses as the title of its exhibition: _Stets gern für Sie beschäftigt_ — “always gladly at your service.” In late 1942, Fritz Sander, Prüfer’s superior, filed a patent application for what he called a “continuous-operation corpse incineration oven for mass use.” It is difficult to read that phrase without flinching, and it is also, by the internal standards of the profession, a perfectly ordinary engineering move: a batch process has hit its throughput ceiling, and the engineer proposes a continuous one. The disturbing thing about Topf & Söhne is not that its engineers stopped being engineers. It is how thoroughly they remained engineers. ### 3. What the engineers knew There is a comforting version of this history in which specialization concealed the ultimate purpose from the people doing the technical work. The documentary record does not permit it. Karl Schultze, who headed the firm’s blower department, was responsible for the gas-chamber ventilation and travelled repeatedly to Birkenau, and Messing was finishing his installation in March 1943, the month Crematorium II went into operation. At least four Topf fitters went to Auschwitz to oversee installation and make sure the systems worked; as the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum notes, those tasks required them to observe the murder of Jews. Prüfer did not pretend otherwise when Soviet investigators questioned him: “I have known since spring 1943 that innocent human beings were being liquidated in Auschwitz gas chambers and that their corpses were subsequently incinerated in the crematoria.” Asked again in Moscow in 1948 whether he had known the purpose of the installations, he answered: _Ja, das wusste ich_ — yes, I knew that. The knowledge went back further than he admitted. On 19 August 1942, Topf’s chief engineer and a chimney specialist met with SS engineers at Auschwitz to plan the new Birkenau crematoria and the “special actions” they would serve, and the historians Jean-Claude Pressac and Robert Jan van Pelt conclude that “it was clear to all participants in this meeting that crematoria IV and V would be involved in mass murder.” When Soviet investigators interrogated Sander in 1946, he did not claim ignorance either. He offered something closer to a professional creed: > I was a German engineer and key member of the Topf works and I saw it as my duty to apply my specialist knowledge in this way in order to help Germany win the war, just as an aircraft construction engineer builds airplanes in wartime, which are also connected with the destruction of human beings. The historian Gerald Fleming brought these interrogation records to an English-language readership in his 1993 essay “Engineers of Death.” Sander’s defense is harder to dismiss than it first appears. ### 4. The aircraft engineer’s defense Engineers build fighter aircraft, design munitions, design prisons, and build surveillance systems. A society at war, or one that incarcerates people, needs specialist knowledge to make those systems work, and it cannot follow that every engineer who contributes to them is personally responsible for every use to which they are put. The division of moral labor is real; a profession that required each engineer independently to decide the justice of every public policy served by a project could scarcely function. But Sander’s analogy fails, and it is important to be precise about why. A fighter aircraft can be used lawfully or criminally — it is, in the usual term, dual use — and nothing in its engineering specifications determines which. Its designers receive requirements for range, payload, speed, survivability, and reliability, and decisions about where it flies and what it attacks are made elsewhere. Topf’s case was different. A ventilation system specified so that a sealed room could be rapidly cleared after repeated homicidal gassings, and cremation equipment redesigned around the resulting volume of corpses, did not merely have a possible criminal use; the purpose was embedded in the design basis. The camp ovens departed from the design and operating practice of ordinary crematoria because that practice no longer served the client: bodies were no longer burned singly and in coffins, individual ashes did not need to be preserved, and no families would attend. Topf also supplied the ventilation systems that cleared Zyklon B from the underground gas chambers. The engineering evolved with the requirements. It helps to think of a continuum. At one end is an ordinary technical contribution whose eventual uses an engineer cannot reasonably foresee. Then comes foreseeable dual use. Then participation in institutional purposes that are ethically contested, where reasonable engineers can disagree. At the far end is engineering whose specified function is itself the wrong. Topf & Söhne sits at that far end, and most defense engineering does not sit anywhere near it — which is precisely why the cases closer to the middle are harder. ### 5. When the questionable project arrives The ethical problem facing an engineer today is unlikely to announce itself as one. It will arrive as a project. The schedule is aggressive and the client is important. The project manager says the permits will catch up, legal has reviewed it, and someone higher up has decided that an ordinary approval is unnecessary. Your assignment is only the demolition plan, the ventilation system, the water and sewer design, the structural review, the environmental assessment, or the construction schedule, and the larger questions are outside your scope. Consider some possibilities. You are asked to prepare demolition plans for a historically significant building while the preservation review remains unresolved; perhaps the client has a defensible legal theory for proceeding and perhaps not, but demolition has an unusual property — the decision becomes irreversible before the dispute is necessarily resolved. You are asked to design utilities or environmental controls for a facility being built on an emergency schedule, and the occupancy assumptions seem incompatible with the sanitation, ventilation, medical, or life-safety provisions you have been given, and the normal pre-occupancy inspection has not happened. You are asked to certify a system even though a review that would ordinarily precede certification has been bypassed. The client assures you that each of these is a legal or policy matter, not an engineering one. None of these examples is Auschwitz, and they occupy the difficult middle of the continuum, where the project may be legitimate, the client may be right, and proceeding may ultimately be the correct professional decision. But they share with the Topf case a mechanism, and the mechanism is the point. At Topf, the purpose of the work was excluded from the scope of the work. In the ordinary cases, what is excluded is the review — the inspection, the permit, the certification check, the public hearing — whose job is to bring purpose and consequence back into view. Both are forms of scope-narrowing: a question that belongs to the whole project is converted into a bounded technical assignment, and the engineer is invited to answer only the bounded part. The extreme case teaches us to recognize the move; the ordinary case is where we will actually be asked to make it. ### 6. Friction has a purpose Engineers are professionally disposed to dislike friction. Permitting, environmental review, historic-preservation review, public hearings, independent inspection, and procurement rules all take time, and someone always has to prepare another document, answer another round of comments, or wait for another meeting. Our instinct is to make processes more efficient, and often that instinct is right; there is a serious and bipartisan case that some review processes have grown slower than any public purpose justifies. But not every inefficiency is a defect. Some processes exist precisely to slow consequential decisions down long enough for somebody other than the project sponsor to examine them, and I would argue that the test for which friction deserves respect is irreversibility. Where a step can be undone once the review catches up, streamlining is an ordinary tradeoff. Where the step — demolition, occupancy, certification, release — will be irreversible before the review can finish, skipping the review does not save time; it removes the only point at which anyone could have said no. Three recent cases, from different administrations and from the private sector, show what that looks like in practice. The first is the Boeing 737 MAX. The Department of Transportation’s Inspector General found in 2021 that the FAA had delegated 79 of 91 certification plans back to Boeing, that Boeing made a significant revision to the MCAS flight-control system in 2016 without directly informing FAA certification engineers, and that engineers in FAA’s Boeing oversight office worked within “an organizational culture driven by the demand to meet certification schedules.” The review existed; it had been narrowed until it no longer saw the change that mattered. The second is Camp East Montana, the immigration detention facility built at Fort Bliss. In June 2026 the Government Accountability Office reported that expedited acquisition and construction “negatively affected their planning and acquisition,” that the facility “opened without meeting key detention standards” — no perimeter security cameras, outdoor recreation space, or space for attorney and family visitation — and that ICE did not conduct the pre-occupancy inspection its own policy requires. ICE officials told GAO they skipped it “because of the expedited time frames for opening the facility.” One can support or oppose the government’s immigration policy without changing the engineering question: at what point should someone involved in designing, building, inspecting, or commissioning that facility have said, _we are not ready to occupy this yet_? The third is the White House East Wing, demolished in October 2025 for the ballroom project. The American Institute of Architects objected to irreversible demolition carried out “without full public engagement or clarity,” and its timeline of the project records that site preparation began in September 2025 before plans were submitted to the National Capital Planning Commission, that the East Wing came down between 20 and 24 October, and that construction plans were formally submitted on 22 December. The political, legal, and architectural merits of the ballroom are separate questions; the professional problem comes earlier. If you are the engineer preparing the demolition sequence, what do you need to know before the excavator starts? “Someone else has decided” may be a perfectly legitimate answer to the question of ultimate authority. It is not an answer to the question of professional responsibility. ### 7. “That’s not my department” Specialization is indispensable to modern engineering, because our projects are too complex for any one person to understand everything, and it also supplies one of our oldest excuses. Tom Lehrer captured it in his 1965 song about Wernher von Braun, whose rockets, once airborne, landed wherever they landed — “that’s not my department.” The joke works because _department_ means two things at once: an organizational division of labor, and a boundary around responsibility. Engineering needs the first. The danger comes when we allow it to become the second. Albert Speer, Hitler’s architect and later his armaments minister, described the same vulnerability without the joke. In his memoirs he wrote that he exploited the technician’s “often blind devotion to his task,” and of himself he acknowledged “the habit of thinking within the limits of my own field.” Speer’s memoirs are self-serving and historians treat them cautiously, but the professional habit he described is recognizable to anyone who has worked on a large project. The ventilation engineer does not choose the site, the structural engineer does not choose the tenant, the environmental engineer does not decide immigration policy, the demolition engineer does not adjudicate historic significance, and the software engineer does not decide whose name goes on the list. Usually that division of responsibility is exactly how a complex project should work. The danger begins when _not deciding_ becomes _not noticing_ — when a scope-of-work boundary becomes a boundary on perception. Certain circumstances should therefore make us more curious, not less: * The normal review process has been suspended or compressed. * The schedule is being invoked as the reason questions cannot be answered. * A project will become difficult or impossible to reverse before disputed approvals are resolved. * The engineer is being told that an unusual condition is “legal’s problem.” * The design assumptions conceal information about who will occupy the facility or how it will actually operate. * A request for clarification is answered by narrowing the engineer’s scope rather than by answering the question. None of these proves that the project is wrong. They are reasons to look. ### 8. What an engineer can actually do Discussions of engineering ethics often pose the moral problem and then jump directly to refusal, although most cases should never get that far. The first obligation is simpler: _notice_. What is unusual about this project, what ordinary safeguard is absent, what assumption about use or occupancy is buried in the design basis, and is the accelerated schedule merely difficult or is it preventing something important from being known? Then _ask_ : what is this facility actually for, who will occupy it and under what conditions, which approvals apply, have they been obtained, and who has authority to accept the risk if they have not? Then _document_. An engineering concern that exists only as a remark in a project meeting is remarkably easy to lose, and professional practice already gives us mechanisms — calculations, design memoranda, review comments, qualifications, exceptions, requests for information — for putting unresolved technical matters into the record. Ethical concerns sometimes deserve the same durability. Then _escalate_. The project engineer is not required to become a lone moral tribunal; a concern can go to the responsible professional, the project manager, an institutional safety or ethics process, the client, a regulator, or another body that actually has authority over the disputed question. This is not foreign to ordinary professional ethics. The NSPE Board of Ethical Review (Case 08-10) has endorsed exactly this sequence — further inquiry, then internal recourse, and only then external action — for unresolved public-welfare concerns. Sometimes the appropriate action is to _decline to certify_. An engineer does not need authority to cancel a project in order to decline to sign a drawing, seal a design, approve an occupancy condition, or represent that a requirement has been satisfied when she believes it has not. The NSPE Code of Ethics says engineers should approve only engineering documents that conform to applicable standards, and the Board of Ethical Review (Case 15-4) has concluded that an engineer whose employer insists on nonconforming work may have to report it to the authorities. And at the far end there remains _refusal_ , which should be unusual. Engineers live in a pluralistic society, and reasonable people disagree about prisons, weapons, surveillance, immigration enforcement, energy systems, highways, dams, artificial intelligence, and a great many other things engineers build. Individual engineers do not acquire a veto over democratically authorized policy because they hold professional credentials. But “I do not get to decide” and “I have no responsibility” are not the same proposition. Engineers may delegate authority over purpose. We cannot delegate awareness of it. ### 9. What the codes already say Our professional codes already contain the beginnings of this idea. The first fundamental canon of the NSPE Code of Ethics directs engineers to “hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public,” and the ASCE Code of Ethics directs them to “first and foremost, protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public.” We tend to interpret those obligations through engineering failures — the Hyatt Regency walkways, Challenger, Bhopal, Flint — and those are essential cases because something went wrong. Topf & Söhne presents the more unsettling case, in which people were harmed because the engineered systems worked. The distinction matters for contemporary practice. If a facility lacks adequate sanitation because its wastewater system was badly designed, we know how to classify the failure. But what if the calculations are impeccable and the design basis itself specifies conditions the engineer believes are unsafe, or the missing safeguard is not a larger pipe but an inspection that somebody decided there was no time to conduct? Professional responsibility cannot begin only after a calculation becomes wrong. Nor is legality enough to settle every case. Law is indispensable, but it is sometimes ambiguous, sometimes contested, and often slower than construction, and a professional obligation to ask questions need not wait for an engineer to conclude that somebody has broken the law. The harder question is what we do while the answer remains uncertain. ### 10. Before the excavator starts Engineering ethics courses are built around failures, and for good reason: failures are vivid, well documented, and extraordinarily useful for teaching competence, diligence, communication, and professional responsibility. But a curriculum built entirely around failed engineering can leave an unintended impression, that the ethical engineer is principally the engineer who gets the calculations right. Topf’s engineers did not always get their calculations right. The induced-draft blowers on the Birkenau furnaces ran so hot that they had to be dismantled, Topf engineers were called back to deal with cracked smokestacks and uneven heat transfer in Crematorium IV, and Sander’s continuous furnace was never built. But enough of their engineering worked. The gas-chamber ventilation worked, the cremation systems disposed of bodies on an industrial scale, and measured against the client’s requirements, Topf delivered. That is why I think engineers should study some cases in which the central ethical problem is not engineering failure but engineering success — not because contemporary projects should be compared with Auschwitz, but for almost the opposite reason. Auschwitz gives us the case in which the answer has become unmistakable with historical distance. Professional life gives us the case before the answer is settled, while the project is moving, the client is waiting, the lawyers are arguing, the schedule is slipping, and our own responsibility is one small box on the organizational chart. That is when the lesson matters. The ethical problem will probably not arrive labeled as one; it will arrive as a scope of work. Technical knowledge can tell us whether a thing can be built, and whether it can be built safely, efficiently, and economically. It cannot by itself tell us whether it should be built, whether it should be built _here_ , whether it should be built _now_ , or whether something irreversible should happen before the unresolved questions have been answered. The fan-sizing problem at the beginning of this essay has a technical solution. Before solving it, there is another question worth asking. **What is the room for?** * * * ### Sources and further reading * U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Topf and Sons: An ‘Ordinary Company’” and “Auschwitz: Key Dates,” _Holocaust Encyclopedia_ * Erinnerungsort Topf & Söhne, “Accessories and Accomplices within the Company“; “Mitwisser und Mittäter in der Firma” (induced-draft blowers dismantled); “Spuren sichern – Erinnerung – Leugnen” (Prüfer’s 1948 interrogation) * Volkhard Knigge, “Unschuldige Öfen,” in _Techniker der „Endlösung”. Topf & Söhne – Die Ofenbauer von Auschwitz_ (Stiftung Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora, 2005), pp. 5–11 * Bodo Ramelow, “„Stets gern für Sie beschäftigt, …”,” January 2011 * Gerald Fleming, “Engineers of Death,” _New York Times_ , 18 July 1993 * Eric Katz, “The Nazi Engineers: Reflections on Technological Ethics in Hell,” _Science and Engineering Ethics_ 17 (2011): 571–582 — source for the Speer and Pressac & van Pelt quotations * Albert Speer, _Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs_ (Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 113, 212, as quoted in Katz (2011) * Jean-Claude Pressac and Robert-Jan van Pelt, “The Machinery of Mass Murder at Auschwitz,” in Y. Gutman and M. Berenbaum, eds., _Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp_ (Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 183–245 (19 August 1942 meeting, p. 219; Crematorium IV defects), as cited in Katz (2011) * Annegret Schüle, _Industrie und Holocaust: Topf & Söhne – Die Ofenbauer von Auschwitz_ (Wallstein, 2010) — further reading * U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, _Weaknesses in FAA’s Certification and Delegation Processes Hindered Its Oversight of the 737 MAX 8_ , Report AV2021020, 23 February 2021 * U.S. Government Accountability Office, _Immigration Detention: Waste and Performance Issues at Camp East Montana Provide Valuable Lessons for Future Facilities_ , GAO-26-108886, 9 June 2026 * American Institute of Architects, “AIA Condemns Demolition of the White House East Wing and Calls for Transparency in Public Architecture,” 24 October 2025; “White House East Wing advocacy update“ * NSPE, _Code of Ethics for Engineers_ ; Board of Ethical Review Case 08-10 and Case 15-4 * ASCE, _Code of Ethics_ (2020) ### Disclosure of AI use This essay began with ideas and arguments developed by the author. Generative AI tools, including Microsoft Copilot, Claude (Anthropic), and ChatGPT (OpenAI), were used during its development to assist with drafting, restructuring, critical review, and source checking. The author substantially revised the resulting text, independently reviewed the arguments and cited sources, and takes responsibility for the final content. ### Share this: * Share on X (Opens in new window) X * Share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Facebook * Share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window) LinkedIn * Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email * Like Loading... ### _Related_
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