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Talks from the PQCrypto 2025 security conference, which took place in early April, are now available on YouTube

www.youtube.com/@PQCrypto-ut...
May 1, 2025 at 3:49 PM
soatok.bsky.social
furry.engineer/@soatok/1147...

#crypto #pqc #pqcrypto #shitpost
Soatok Dreamseeker (@soatok@furry.engineer)
Old: MPC-in-the-Head cryptosystems Bold: Tulpa cryptosystens
furry.engineer
July 3, 2025 at 11:31 AM
craiggidney.bsky.social
Samuel Jacques has a quite timely and quite good talk at PQCrypto on the costs of quantum factoring and speculating about the future growth of quantum computers ( www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJxE... ).

My preprint fills in the "????" entry in his slides at 43:27 of the video.
Expected and Unexpected Developments in Quantum Computing
YouTube video by PQCrypto conference videos
www.youtube.com
May 23, 2025 at 2:11 PM
pqcryptoconf.bsky.social
Deadlines for PQCrypto2026 are around the corner! Papers must be _registered_ by 31 Oct pqcrypto2026.irisa.fr/callforpaper... You can still update your submission for another week, with the final submission deadline on 7 Nov. You cannot register new papers during that period. Get yours in now!
PQCrypto 2026 call for papers
PQCrypto 2026
pqcrypto2026.irisa.fr
October 24, 2025 at 7:00 PM
error024.bsky.social
🎤 My talk from #PQCrypto2025 is now live on YouTube!

I discussed rejection types in KEMs. Why they matter, how they impact security and which one should you choose.

Check it out & let me know your thoughts! 👇
📺 youtu.be/W-gUd_qTUs4?...

#PostQuantum #Cryptography #KEMs
Treating Dishonest Ciphertexts in Post Quantum KEMs – Explicit vs Implicit Rejection in the FO T
YouTube video by PQCrypto conference videos
youtu.be
April 27, 2025 at 11:26 PM
nono2357.bsky.social
PQCrypto 2025 Registration - Post-quantum cryptography conference
https://pqcrypto2025.iis.sinica.edu.tw/registration.php
February 26, 2025 at 8:15 PM
poivron.bsky.social
www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJxE...

good video !
Expected and Unexpected Developments in Quantum Computing
YouTube video by PQCrypto conference videos
www.youtube.com
April 16, 2025 at 12:28 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Olingo: Threshold Lattice Signatures with DKG and Identifiable Abort (Kamil Doruk Gur, Patrick Hough, Jonathan Katz, Caroline Sandsbråten, Tjerand Silde) ia.cr/2025/1789
Abstract. We present Olingo, a framework for threshold lattice signatures that is the first to offer all desired properties for real-world implementations of quantum-secure threshold signatures: small keys and signatures, low communication and round complexity, non-interactive online signing, distributed key generation (DKG), and identifiable abort. Our starting point is the framework of Gur, Katz, and Silde (PQCrypto 2024). We change the underlying signature scheme to Raccoon (Katsumata et al., Crypto 2024), remove the trapdoor commitments, and apply numerous improvements and optimizations to achieve all the above properties. We provide detailed proofs of security for our new framework and present concrete parameters and benchmarks. At the 128-bit security level, for up to 1024 parties and supporting 2⁶⁰ signatures, our scheme has 2.6 KB public keys and 9.7 KB signatures; while signing requires communication of 953 KB per party. Using the LaBRADOR proof system (Beullens and Seiler, Crypto 2023), this can be further reduced to 596 KB. An optimistic non-interactive version of our scheme requires only 83 KB communication per party. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
October 3, 2025 at 7:25 AM
pqc-raqcoin.bsky.social
Go mine!
#挖矿
#挖热矿！
挖 #Raqcoin

区块链革命
抗量子区块链
抗量子加密货币
做正确的事 大趋势还得是量子相关的投资

#PowPQC #PQC #NIST #Raqcoin #Algorand #TDC #QRLedger #PQAbelian #xxnetwork #MCM #CELL #QANX #BTC #BitcoinETFs #QDay #PQCrypto #ionq #DWave #Rigetti #LAES #Wkey #NVDA
May 26, 2026 at 4:52 PM
antifalexi.eurosky.social
Naja, ich glaube, OpenSSH unterstützt pqcrypto ja schon lange, insofern schadet das wohl auch nicht … ich habe die Warnung z.B. noch nicht gesehen
February 18, 2026 at 8:54 PM
altinucgen.bsky.social
Have you ever tried to click on “forgot your password?” option on PQCrypto registration webpage to receive your password by e-mail?🤡👹
February 25, 2025 at 5:09 PM
cosic.bsky.social
🎥 Just released! Watch the COSIC Seminar "FRIttata: Distributed Proof Generation of FRI-based SNARKs" by Hua Xu (KU Leuven): www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMHf...
📄 Read the full paper on #eprint: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1285
#FRIttata #SNARKs #PostQuantum #PQCrypto
COSIC Seminar "FRIttata: Distributed Proof Generation of FRI-based SNARKs" (Hua Xu, KU Leuven)
YouTube video by COSIC - Computer Security and Industrial Cryptography
www.youtube.com
July 28, 2025 at 2:52 PM
muens.io
Really interesting talk by Samuel Jaques on the current state of Quantum Computing and its potential future developments.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJxE...

The slides can be found here: pqcrypto2025.iis.sinica.edu.tw/slides/Invit...
Expected and Unexpected Developments in Quantum Computing
YouTube video by PQCrypto conference videos
www.youtube.com
April 16, 2025 at 12:52 PM
n0ahallen.bsky.social
🔐 Explore the future of digital security with the Post-Quantum Cryptography Market Research Report. Get insights on trends, growth drivers & key players shaping next-gen encryption. Stay ahead in cybersecurity!

#PostQuantum #CyberSecurity #Encryption #TechTrends #PQCrypto 🔒
Sample Request | Global Post -Quantum Cryptography Market Share, Size, Trends, Industry Analysis Report, By Solution, By Service, By Organization Size, By Vertical, By Region, Segment Forecast, 2024 -...
Post-quantum cryptography Market, including historical market sizes from 2019 to 2022 and forecasts for 2024 to 2031. The market is estimated to be valued at USD 357 Million in 2023 and is projected t...
www.statsandresearch.com
June 12, 2025 at 10:16 AM
eprint.ing.bot
Reducing the Number of Qubits in Quantum Discrete Logarithms on Elliptic Curves (Clémence Chevignard, Pierre-Alain Fouque, André Schrottenloher) ia.cr/2026/280
Abstract. Solving the Discrete Logarithm problem on the group of points of an elliptic curve is one of the major cryptographic applications of Shor’s algorithm. However, current estimates for the number of qubits required remain relatively high, and notably, higher than the best recent estimates for factoring of RSA moduli. For example, recent work by Gidney (arXiv 2025) estimates 2043 logical qubits for breaking 3072-bit RSA, while previous work by Häner et al. (PQCrypto 2020) estimates a requirement of 2124 logical qubits for solving discrete logarithm instances on 256-bit elliptic curves over prime fields. Indeed, for an n-bit elliptic curve, the most space-optimized optimized implementation by Proos and Zalka (Quant. Inf. Comput. 2003) gives 5n + o(n) qubits, as more additional space is required to store the coordinates of points and compute the addition law. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to the computation of point multiplication in Shor’s algorithm (on input k, computing kP where P is a fixed point). Instead of computing the point multiplication explicitly, we use a Residue Number System to compute directly the projective coordinates of kP with low space usage. Then, to avoid performing any modular inversion, we compress the result to a single bit using a Legendre symbol. This strategy allows us to obtain the most space-efficient polynomial-time algorithm for the ECDLP to date, with only 3.12n + o(n) qubits, at the expense of an increase in gate count, from 𝒪(n³) to $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^3)$. For n = 256 we estimate that 1098 qubits would be necessary, with 22 independent runs, using 2^(38.10) Toffoli gates each. This represents a much higher gate count than the previous estimate by Häner et al. (roughly 2³⁰), but half of the corresponding number of qubits (2124). Image showing part 2 of abstract.
February 17, 2026 at 4:23 PM
eprint.ing.bot
X24 Down: Cryptanalysis of Hankel-based Multivariate Signatures (Alexandre Camelin, Thai Hung Le, Brice Minaud, Phong Q. Nguyen, Florian Tousnakhoff) ia.cr/2026/803
Abstract. The X24 multivariate signature scheme was introduced by Di Muzio, Feussner, and Semaev at PQCrypto 2026. It offers remarkably short signatures, together with a new design approach for multivariate signatures that departs from the typical UOV and HFE frameworks. In this work, we present an efficient cryptanalysis of X24. Our attack recovers the secret key from the public key in time O(q ⋅ poly(n)), where n is the number of field elements in the signature, and q is the order of the finite field. An implementation of the attack recovers the secret key in a few minutes on the full X24 parameters. The attack makes essential use of the exterior algebra, and shows a different way of using that algebra for multivariate cryptanalysis, compared to the wedge attack introduced by Ran at Eurocrypt 2026. Another notable feature of the attack is that it eventually reduces the cryptanalysis of X24 to the cryptanalysis of a McEliece variant using Generalized Reed-Solomon codes, drawing an unexpected connection between multivariate and code-based cryptanalysis. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
April 27, 2026 at 4:33 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Reducing the Number of Qubits in Quantum Information Set Decoding (Clémence Chevignard, Pierre-Alain Fouque, André Schrottenloher) ia.cr/2024/907
Abstract. This paper presents an optimization of the memory cost of the quantum Information Set Decoding (ISD) algorithm proposed by Bernstein (PQCrypto 2010), obtained by combining Prange’s ISD with Grover’s quantum search. When the code has constant rate and length n, this algorithm essentially performs a quantum search which, at each iterate, solves a linear system of dimension 𝒪(n). The typical code lengths used in post-quantum public-key cryptosystems range from 10³ to 10⁵. Gaussian elimination, which was used in previous works, needs 𝒪(n²) space to represent the matrix, resulting in millions or billions of (logical) qubits for these schemes. In this paper, we propose instead to use the algorithm for sparse matrix inversion of Wiedemann (IEEE Trans. inf. theory 1986). The interest of Wiedemann’s method is that one relies only on the implementation of a matrix-vector product, where the matrix can be represented in an implicit way. This is the case here. We propose two main trade-offs, which we have fully implemented, tested on small instances, and benchmarked for larger instances. The first one is a quantum circuit using 𝒪(n) qubits, 𝒪(n³) Toffoli gates like Gaussian elimination, and depth 𝒪(n²logn). The second one is a quantum circuit using 𝒪(nlog²n) qubits, 𝒪(n³) gates in total but only 𝒪(n²log²n) Toffoli gates, which relies on a different representation of the search space. As an example, for the smallest Classic McEliece parameters we estimate that the Quantum Prange’s algorithm can run with 18098 qubits, while previous works would have required at least half a million qubits. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
June 6, 2024 at 7:06 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Quantum Lattice Enumeration in Limited Depth (Nina Bindel, Xavier Bonnetain, Marcel Tiepelt, Fernando Virdia) ia.cr/2023/1423
Abstract. In 2018, Aono et al. (ASIACRYPT 2018) proposed to use quantum backtracking algorithms (Montanaro, TOC 2018; Ambainis and Kokainis, STOC 2017) to speedup lattice point enumeration. Quantum lattice sieving algorithms had already been proposed (Laarhoven et al., PQCRYPTO 2013), being shown to provide an asymptotic speedup over classical counterparts, but also to lose competitivity at relevant dimensions to cryptography if practical considerations on quantum computer architecture were taken into account (Albrecht et al., ASIACRYPT 2020). Aono et al.’s work argued that quantum walk speedups can be applied to lattice enumeration, achieving at least a quadratic asymptotic speedup à la Grover search while not requiring exponential amounts of quantum accessible classical memory, as it is the case for sieving. In this work, we explore how to lower bound the cost of using Aono et al.’s techniques on lattice enumeration with extreme cylinder pruning assuming a limit to the maximum depth that a quantum computation can achieve without decohering, with the objective of better understanding the practical applicability of quantum backtracking in lattice cryptanalysis. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
September 28, 2023 at 3:59 PM
eprint.ing.bot
Chasing QuOCCAs in a Quantum World: Type-2 Oracles for CCA-Secure PKE (Barbara Jiabao Benedikt, Tommaso Gagliardoni, Patrick Struck) ia.cr/2026/1746
Abstract. In the context of PKE schemes, Gagliardoni et al. proposed at PQCrypto 2021 a qIND-qCPA security notion (a superposition-based analogue of the classical IND-CPA security notion), by using the theory of so-called type-2 unitary operators. On one hand, this notion is very natural, closely mirrors the classical intuition, and can be handled without relying on complex techniques such as Zhandry’s compressed oracles. On the other hand, it is restricted to a certain class of PKE schemes (so-called isometric). Moreover, it is not immediately clear how to extend the definition to chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) scenarios, mainly due to the possibility of decryption failures – something that is entailed by most quantum-resistant PKE schemes. In this work, we use the theory of type-2 operators to extend superposition-based security notions to any PKE schemes, in the CPA and CCA setting, without Zhandry’s compressed oracle technique. We start first by showing that a trivial extension of Gagliardoni et al.’s techniques to the general case is not possible, even for the CCA1 case, by identifying barriers preventing the realization of a ‘natural’ type-2 decryption operator. Then we define a subclass of PKE schemes (which we call ‘strongly decryptable’ ), for which it is easy to circumvent the aforementioned barriers and to define superposition-based CCA1 and CCA2 notions. Further, we introduce a novel transformation (that we call ‘purification’) which applies to any PKE scheme, producing a ‘quasi-PKE’ scheme, for which it is possible to define properties that mimic the security notions defined for strongly decryptable schemes; we can thus ‘unload’ the security definitions for an arbitrary PKE scheme on its purification. Finally, we show implications and separations between our security notions, as well as constructions. Image showing part 2 of abstract.
August 22, 2026 at 7:59 AM
throwable.bsky.social
📦 paragonie/ext-pqcrypto v0.3.2

PHP extension for post-quantum cryptography (ML-KEM, X-Wing, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA)

🔗 https://github.com/paragonie/ext-pqcrypto
August 19, 2026 at 10:01 PM
news.karthihegde.dev
NSA and IETF: Fairness
Discussion | hackernews | Author: WatchDog

#SecurityAndCryptography
NSA and IETF: Fairness
Older (Access-J): 2026.07.04: Bugs happen: The easy way to compare solo PQ to ECC+PQ. #pqcrypto #bugs #vulnerabilities #hybrids
blog.cr.yp.to
July 7, 2026 at 12:54 AM
jurrevanbergen.nl
Cryptographers working on PQCrypto:

OMG, McEliece has several MB of public keys! How is this ever going to be adopted??

The website of CNN is ~27MB.
January 27, 2025 at 5:42 PM
technovolaille.bsky.social
3. Les algorithmes post-quantiques

Conscient du problème, le NIST américain a lancé en 2016 une compétition pour trouver des algorithmes de chiffrement résistants à l’ordinateur quantique.
csrc.nist.gov/projects/pos...
Post-Quantum Cryptography | CSRC | CSRC
Short URL:  https://www.nist.gov/pqcrypto For a plain-language introduction to post-quantum cryptography, go to: What Is Post-Quantum Cryptography? The initial public draft of NIST SP 800-227, Reco...
csrc.nist.gov
February 23, 2025 at 9:10 AM
thomasfricke.23.social.ap.brid.gy
Is Post Quantum Crypto dead on arrival. At least there is a strange smell!

@djb

"Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography? #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #antitrust

It's normal for post-quantum cryptography to be rolled out as an extra layer of security on top […]
Original post on 23.social
23.social
October 12, 2025 at 11:49 AM