Learn about the techniques used by the Mallox ransomware affiliate to compromise an MS-SQL server. Dive into our detailed technical analysis.

Among the malware deployed in this campaign is a previously undocumented backdoor called TorNet, which is being distributed via PureCrypter malware

Detect TorNet backdoor delivered via PureCrypter malware in a phishing campaign targeting Poland and Germany with Sigma rules from SOC Prime.

HomeMalware Analysis A Full Analysis of the Pure Malware Family: Unique and Growing Threat #### Recent posts * #### Turn Alert Noise into Threat Insights without Leaving QRadar SOAR with ANY.RUN 378 0 * #### Malware Trends Report, Q2 2025: Know the Key Risks to Your Business 761 0 * #### How MSSPs Detect Incidents Early with Threat Intelligence Feeds from ANY.RUN 743 0 HomeMalware Analysis A Full Analysis of the Pure Malware Family: Unique and Growing Threat In this article, we’re analyzing one of the most unusual crypters— **PureCrypter** , and a multifunctional stealer — **PureLogs**. We’ll look at several examples and identify patterns among Pure-malware families, and also explain how to detect PureCrypter and PureLogs. **Why did we decide to undertake this analysis?** While analyzing Public Submissions, we came across several interesting samples. We were intrigued by unusual traffic that showed signs of encryption operations on executable files with short keys, as well as TCP connections with high entropy in the connections. Inside, all samples looked different from other malware and were very similar to each other. Through network analysis, we found a couple of articles dedicated to PureCrypter and the family, which shed light on this group, but we wanted to add our insights and combine all the information in one place. Our objectives were: * Study the distribution system * Investigate the distinctive features of PureCrypter and PureLogs * Develop detection methods for PureCrypter and PureLogs * Examine the traffic # Pure: overview of the malware family The distribution of PureCoder products began in March 2021, according to information provided by the developer on the the malware’s old website. Information about the service on the old website On the main page of Pure’s current website, there is a message stating that the software is used for educational and penetration testing purposes. The website lies about educational and pentesting nature of the software However, it’s worth noting that we observe a trend where the code sold is actually being used for malicious purposes. Here are examples on services that tell us about the distribution of these products along with other malware: * ANY.RUN Submissions (PureCrypter, PureLogs) * Abuse.ch Bazaar Telegram update Pure’s update notes tell us that since March 2023, it is also sold through a Telegram bot. Telegram bots make purchasing malware more automated and anonymous. Bot usage shows that the author is developing the service, exploring new channels, and scaling up. Here are all the products that this group distributes under the guise of “educational purposes”: Pure products Despite the claim that these products are distributed for educational purposes, the presence of silent miners, botnets, and hidden HVNC seems odd. Comments and ratings on Pure’s website reveal high demand — every month there are at least couple of purchases. Comments and reviews on Pure’s website We attempted to follow the purchase flow and found that users are to make a cryptocurrency payment In Bitcoin. The payment page offers several Bitcoin wallets. These wallets are likely part of a Bitcoin mixer. The activity in these wallets started between **May 19-26, 2023** , and as of the writing of this article, one of them already had **250 transactions amounting to $32,000**(see it on Blockhain.com). Details about the Cryptocurrency wallet So far, we’ve established that there is a wide range of Pure malware, it is popular, and it has existed for several years. Now, let’s move on to the technical analysis of the Pure family. ## Staged and Stage-less loader The deployment of products from the Pure family usually begins with a loader that includes both Staged and Stage-less payloads. Let’s analyze the behavior using **PureCrypter** as an example. Perform in-depth malware analysis in ANY.RUN Try all features for 14 days at no cost Request a demo ### **What is PureCrypter?** PureCrypter is a crypter (or obfuscator), as its name suggests, that has a set of algorithms for data obfuscation and encryption. In combination, they hide malware from antivirus programs and also make it difficult to analyze for analysts. Behaviour flow of PureCrypter As seen in the diagram above, the loader has two stages: Staged and Stage-less payload. The decrypted resources contain libraries such as **Protobuf-net** and **Costura**. Using **Protobuf-net** , data are deserialized, forming a configuration with the compressed malware. Ultimately, after decompression, the malware is launched with parameters from the configuration in a new process. Let’s examine each variant separately. ### Staged Loader SHA256 | 3ACD90196DCF53DD6E265DC9C89B3CB0C47648A3B7AC8F226C6B4B98F39F2FC8 View the task ---|--- The static analysis of the sample under examination reveals that it’s written in .NET: Information from DIE After analyzing the sample in the ANY.RUN sandbox, we determined that a file with an .mp4 extension is downloaded: Payload download Additionally, we found examples downloading payloads with extensions like .vdf, .mp3, etc. **This is another characteristic of the loader — to download files with legitimate extensions.** In the image above, the downloaded file is not an actual .mp4 file, but an encrypted payload. It’s challenging to determine the encryption method right away, so we will analyze its internals. Code analysis in DnSpy allowed us to establish that the downloaded **payload is encrypted with an XOR operation** , with a key length of 3 bytes. You can see the overall scheme of payload downloading and decryption below: Source code To decrypt the file, we will use our CyberChef recipe. XOR with the key ”335” in Cyberchef As evident from the screenshot above, the downloaded and decrypted file is an executable or a library. Additionally, this type of encryption is not the only possible method and can be substituted with reverse encryption and others. Now, let’s move on to the analysis of the stage-less loader. ### Stage-less Loader SHA256 | 5030BC30C14139D9C48DC4CD175DE6C966E83A9059035D18AF33DDA06F2541AB View the task ---|--- Unlike the Staged payload, the examined Stage-less payload is protected by SmartAssembly, which you can see in DIE: Information from DIE In the stage-less loader, the payload is stored in a resource in an encrypted form: Resource on board First, the resource is decrypted using AES with embedded keys (KEY: dd2e7fe3fd9cb1b2f91a16460c8acb5b and IV: 80f3f9712e01f98fab92ab84ec40a8e5) and then decompressed: Rijndael Algorithm We will use a CyberChef recipe for decryption. Cyberchef – **AES+decompress** As a result, we get a .NET Assembly without executable code but with an encrypted resource, which is also decrypted and loaded into modules: **Nchya** resource The decryption of the second resource is done using 3DES with the key KEY “68433890991609093ead30a9d75c39db” and IV “4A64DD85048433D7” (CBC model). Let’s use a CyberChef recipe to decrypt this resource: Cyberchef – **TripleDES** After decryption, we obtain an executable file or library, similar to the case with the Staged Loader. Now, let’s move on to the analysis of the obtained files. ## PureCrypter Comparing the entry points of Staged and stage-less **PureCrypter** , we see that they are identical. From this, we can conclude that they are essentially the same. Here’s EntryPoint of **PureCrypter** : EntryPoint of PureCrypter **PureCrypter** can carry two types of payloads – 3rd party malware or its own proprietary product, **PureLogs**. Let’s examine each option separately. ### 3rd party malware (AgentTesla) The program begins decrypting and loading the .NET Assembly resource, similar to the stage-less process. This happens in an identical manner – using **AES (Rijndael) encryption**. Resource decryption with AES (Rijndael) We can use this CyberChef recipe for decryption. CyberChef **AES+inflate** After decrypting with the AES algorithm, the program takes this resource and proceeds to the second stage of its decryption. The first action the program performs is parsing the data of the header. The first 30 bytes are the length of the data, and the next 10 bytes are the XOR key: The header From the header, a license and key are obtained. The data can be decrypted using this CyberChef recipe. A similar string was already seen in **ZGRat**. XOR After calculating the data, the program selects a method of decryption. In our case, it is AES. Encryption selection In AES, **IV** is used, which is the XOR key 7C685406ED380C74532A9488BA58083D, and the KEY is the last 32 bytes in the decrypted header b2912dfe705af74a11e7d2bf3786103116adee71727185419bf7c4d7f986bd4c. We can decrypt the data using a CyberChef recipe. As a result of the decryption, we obtain a .NET Assembly with a set of resources and encrypted strings before the MZ header. Resources after decryption The header looks as follows: * 4 bytes at the beginning and end (for calculation purposes) * 1 byte for the message size highlighted in red * And the message itself afterwards. The header The messages can be decrypted using the following CyberChef recipe: Encoding and XOR The resource zJSLu is decrypted in the same way — using AES and decompression. It contains strings that will be used later (if the flag is set in the configuration). The zJSLu resource, once decrypted (subject to serialization) The malware uses **protobuf** for deserializing data, which is taken from the Issal resource after prior decompression. Deserialization At this point, having decrypted all the resources, we arrive at the program’s main function. But before starting the analysis of the main function, let’s take a look at what the **PureCrypter** builder interface looks like: PureCrypter builder From the screenshot, we can see a large set of functions, including anti-debugging, anti-deletion, and others. Let’s go through the main code and see what techniques are used in this version of the crypter. Code with configuration analysis and checks. In the version under study, the check for the presence of a virtual machine is disabled, but the functionality is present in the code of the program. It includes: * CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent to find a debugger; * Checks for the presence of the Sandboxie virtual environment by searching for the loaded library sbiedll.dll; * Executes a WMI query “select * from Win32_BIOS” to check the BIOS version; * Executes a WMI query “select * from Win32_ComputerSystem” and looks for one of the substrings “Microsoft|VMWare|Virtual” in the results; * Checks the width and height of the monitor screen, which should be more than 1024 and 768 pixels, respectively; * Checks whether the program is running on a 64-bit OS, as most modern operating systems are 64-bit; * Compares the current username with one from a list. Other capabilities include: 1. A feature to reset the network interface by executing the command “cmd /c ipconfig /release,” presumably to prevent security tools or antivirus software from communicating with their servers. In the sample analyzed, this feature is disabled. 2. Ability to use a mutex to prevent the launch of a duplicate copy. In this instance, the mutex is named “Gjrstoo,” but this option is not active. 3. A function to check if it is running with administrator privileges and to restart with the necessary permissions if needed. Moreover, the malware uses the command “set-mppreference -exclusionpath ” to add the entire “C:” drive to the antivirus exclusions. This function is also disabled. 4. A delay execution feature, where the delay occurs N times for 1 second each. 5. Capability to execute an arbitrary PowerShell command passed in Base64 via the “-enc” parameter. This function is also disabled. 6. Displaying a fake error message, but this feature is also turned off. 7. Ability to establish persistence in the system through Run registry keys or the Startup directory. The purpose of using “ipconfig /renew” is unclear, but the functionality exists (it allows the release of all dynamic IP addresses assigned to the computer using a DHCP server). Subsequently, the payload is loaded, which can be downloaded from the internet (as indicated by the HTTP Client), or from a resource (as in our example). Injection options 1. Ordinary library loading 2. Decryption of the resource followed by loading 3. Unclear — possibly, decryption is executed here. Subsequently, the malware reverses bytes and is decompressed using the same GZIP, the recipe for which can be found here. Cyberchef – Gunzip After decompression, PureCrypter creates a new process: And injects code into this process. This is how malware is commonly distributed, often including stealers and RATs. Now let’s move on to analyzing PureLogs, which can distribute PureCrypter. ## PureLogs Loader **PureLogs** malware is typically distributed by a loader covered by the NET Reactor protector. **PureLogs** is a small library that is involved in data theft. Usually, the library is loaded by the loader from a C2 server. Analysis of the loading traffic revealed that in the first connection an encrypted message is sent, and an encrypted response is received. All of this occurs within the loader. First connection in the loader Both messages within the first connection are encrypted in the same way, but the response has an additional layer of serialization and undergoes re-encryption with byte reversal. First, the data is compressed and then encrypted using 3DES with a key (which is stored in the loader’s resources, along with the IP data and client ID). However, the key itself is encrypted using md5Crypto, resulting in the hash ‘9F4D71CF2393253FB5324C6731B962F8’. After encryption, the program sends this message to the server. The process begins with sending 4 bytes indicating the size of the message, followed by the message itself. A complete decryption is presented here: Decryption key Now let’s consider the received message. After decryption, the data undergoes deserialization and is then re-encrypted again (3DES+GZIP), similar to the initial process. However, at the end, a Reverse bytes operation is applied. TripleDES+GZIP (you can immediately remove the first 4 bytes of length or use DROP) After deserialization: TripleDES+GZIP+Reverse As a result, we obtain our library, which is responsible for stealing data and then sending it onward. Let’s take a closer look at it. ## PureLogs **PureLogs** is a multi-functional stealer. Like **PureCrypter** , **PureLogs** has obfuscation and obfuscation methods that complicate its analysis. But what’s really interesting is its network traffic, which we will discuss in this section. Like other samples of the Pure family, PureLogs is sometimes confused with ZGRat — we are going to clear up this misunderstanding in this article. Let’s get to the analysis. Looking at the class library, we immediately see a class called PlgCore (We assume this stands for PureLogsCore). ClassLibrary1 Serialized data enters the library as an argument from a resource, which the loader has loaded from the C2 server. Configuration data Inside, they are deserialized and stored as configuration. Configuration Next, the library iterates through a vast number of functions and collects data from the system: * Browser data, including extensions * Data about Crypto Wallets * Complete information about the user * Full information about the PC configuration Below is an example of some of the system data. System data Next, all the collected data is serialized. Following the same principle, the data is encrypted before transmission: compression and 3DES encryption using a pre-existing key. Now, all the data ready for transmission is transformed, and the final connection is made to send the gathered data. Data transmission (first 4 bytes indicate size, followed by the message) Then, there are three transmissions: the first and last are hashes of the data, and the second one contains the actual data. To decrypt the traffic, we can use this CyberChef recipe. Decryption of the first message (the last one is identical) Decryption of the data And with this, we have dissected the traffic and the operation of PureLogs. Now, let’s consider another malware variant from the Pure family — a miner. ## PureMiner While examining samples on other services with detections for **PureLogs** and **PureCrypter** , we came across several samples that didn’t appear to be like either but exhibited a strikingly similar signature. **Firstly, the traffic they generated followed an identical pattern**(first 4 bytes for length, followed by the remaining bytes for data). What’s even more intriguing is that they were encrypted in the same fashion (using **3DES** encryption with a key that was similarly encrypted through **MD5Crypto**). **Secondly, there were similarities in code behavior and module loading** , such as the use of the **proto-buf** module for processing configuration data. Thirdly, the code structure and its resemblance to PureCrypter**** and PureLogs code were notable. Lastly, the configurations showed similarities in their structure. The diagram below shows this resemblance to PureLogs. It involves the transmission and reception of data from the C2 server (with the data being encrypted using 3DES). Based on all of this information, we have decided to conduct an investigation into the discovered sample: SHA256 | A20F2623022BC0D5BDC49B235736CC791A3392198D7A601B2478C1974D5D9F17 View the task ---|--- The first thing we noticed during our analysis was the sample’s behavior when executed with administrative privileges (we will see why we executed the sample with admin privileges later on). The process of restarting using cmd After the restart, the program creates a scheduled task in Task Scheduler to launch its copy at **%APPDATA%/HResult/TypeId.exe**. Following this, there is an injection into a new legitimate process. The process is launched under Task Scheduler After analyzing the behavior, we proceeded with an in-depth analysis of the sample. We discovered its configuration, which utilizes **proto-buf**. Configuration Additionally, there is an executable file that appears to be responsible for executing commands from the C2 server. In the strings, there is a mention of the XMRIG miner. We suspect that this is a distributor of the miner, which runs it quietly. Strings from the miner We decided to decrypt the traffic to understand what information is being transmitted and what we receive in response. We managed to obtain the decryption key. It was no surprise that the traffic was encrypted using the same 3DES encryption, and the first 4 bytes represent the length, which we remove: Decrypted traffic The decryption recipe is available here. And here’s the link to a server response. Response from the server And with this, we have found another malware from the Pure family — a miner. PureMiner collects information about the system and sends it to C2. After this, it receives a response with mining instructions. ## Let’s wrap up the analysis To summarize — this was one of the most comprehensive investigations we’ve done so far in ANY.RUN. We analyzed a widely popular and rapidly spreading malware family — Pure — and even uncovered a new variant — a miner. Pure tools masquerade as legitimate software created for “educational purposes”. But analysis of the code clearly shows that it is a powerful malicious tool. Recently, the creators began distributing it through a telegram bot, which indicates that they are scaling an operation. Currently, Pure receives at least a couple of orders every month, but it’s highly likely that its popularity will start skyrocketing in the near future. We hope that this analysis helped you better understand how to reverse and detect malware from the Pure family, so if that happens, you’ll be well prepared. If you have any information to add about Pure — we’d love to hear it. Let’s discuss in the comments below. And as always, make sure to share your thoughts about the article. ### About ANY.RUN ANY.RUN is an interactive malware analysis sandbox that streamlines the work of SOC and DFIR teams. Our service is trusted by 300,000 professionals worldwide who use it to investigate both emerging and persistent threats. Request a free trial of ANY.RUN for 14 days to explore all the features we offer. Request demo → ## MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Tactics | Techniques | Description ---|---|--- Defense Evasion | T1140 - Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Deobfuscate/Decode resourses and files Discovery | T1082 - System Information Discovery | Pure-malware discovery system information T1083 - File and Directory Discovery | PureLogs discoveries files for stealing Collection | T1119 - Automated Collection | Collect information T1005 - Data from Local System | Search local system sources for stealing Command and Control | T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols | Connection and delivery ## IOCs ### **PureCrypter** #### FIle 0f60f086665fd4d442821851c878c21b MD5 | 0f60f086665fd4d442821851c878c21b ---|--- SHA256 | 3acd90196dcf53dd6e265dc9c89b3cb0c47648a3b7ac8f226c6b4b98f39f2fc8 SHA1 | a4d4f31fb794bbf59be542f493aea9f9e3857d4 #### Dropped file Path | C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\ydVSL\ydVSL.exe ---|--- SHA256 | 3acd90196dcf53dd6e265dc9c89b3cb0c47648a3b7ac8f226c6b4b98f39f2fc8 #### Connections * 5[.]181.80.126 #### URLs * Http[x]://5.181.80.126/Hjysa.mp4 #### FIle QUOTATION_NOVQTRFA00541·PDF.scr #### FIle 0f60f086665fd4d442821851c878c21b MD5 | 83999a2ce0109ea4adbecb3a96744e8c ---|--- SHA256 | 5030bc30c14139d9c48dc4cd175de6c966e83a9059035d18af33dda06f2541ab SHA1 | 4b94f4b23b157c7ae2df54e251cd4d22c683134d #### Domain * gator3220.hostgator[.]com ### **PureLogs** #### FIle RH2023-17.exe MD5 | a7c14a39a5ee93ca25ab793be06c1478 ---|--- SHA256 | e5b27dc1672088a5a584467511a02844d45f4eb6af92a96373c803fd3dc5e6b7 SHA1 | c9eb61977fa0fd1bf1c9e7175a0088289e6b9bbd #### Dropped file Path | C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Xokmrjn.exe ---|--- SHA256 | e5b27dc1672088a5a584467511a02844d45f4eb6af92a96373c803fd3dc5e6b7 Path | C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Costura\1485B29524EF63EB83DF771D39CCA767\64\sqlite.interop.dll ---|--- SHA256 | 5f0e72e1839db4aa41f560e0a68c7a95c9e1656bc2f4f4ff64803655d02e5272 #### Connections * 91[.]92.120.119 #### Domain * Teleturismo[.]it ### **PureMiner** #### FIle 491310d10c0ea2d217c90a2403c20bea MD5 | 491310d10c0ea2d217c90a2403c20bea ---|--- SHA256 | a20f2623022bc0d5bdc49b235736cc791a3392198d7a601b2478c1974d5d9f17 SHA1 | 5bd371ae2edc0c2cf926e1543e4cdd7d92c83577 #### Dropped file Path | C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\HResult\TypeId.exe ---|--- SHA256 | a20f2623022bc0d5bdc49b235736cc791a3392198d7a601b2478c1974d5d9f17 #### Connections * 91[.]92.240.95 #### Domain * Farmjo[.]mine.nu ## More Submissions https://app.any.run/tasks/f972efd3-c053-42c2-a2d4-eade0f40acfb/ https://app.any.run/tasks/c4344ee1-bcd6-438f-9aba-f13c1c3dcca9/ https://app.any.run/tasks/629232cd-67e4-4f3b-880d-34c3675931a0/ https://app.any.run/tasks/50294ac2-f3c1-43bd-9bec-0527fb1b8443/ ##### khr0x Malware analyst at ANY.RUN at ANY.RUN | + posts I'm 21 years old and I work as a malware analyst for more than a year. I like finding out what kind of malware got on my computer. In my spare time I do sports and play video games. * khr0x #molongui-disabled-link __ Zero-day Attack Uses Corrupted Files to Bypass Detection: Technical Analysis * khr0x #molongui-disabled-link __ Recent Phishing Campaigns Discovered by ANY.RUN Researchers * khr0x #molongui-disabled-link __ Windows 11 UAC Bypass in Modern Malware * khr0x #molongui-disabled-link __ Client-Side Exploitation: abusing WebDAV+URL+LNK to Deliver Malicious Payloads __ ##### Jane Leading network traffic analysis expert at ANY.RUN at ANY.RUN | Website | + posts I'm ANY.RUN ambassador and a real network traffic numismatist. I also love penguins and tortoises. My motto is to do good and throw it into the sea. * Jane #molongui-disabled-link __ Investigating Phishing Threats with TI Lookup: Use Cases from an Expert * Jane #molongui-disabled-link __ Recent Phishing Campaigns Discovered by ANY.RUN Researchers * Jane #molongui-disabled-link __ How to Set Up a Network Research Laboratory: MonikerLink (CVE-2024-21413) Case Study * Jane #molongui-disabled-link __ 5 malware threats we discovered in the wild in November 2023 Share post TwitterRedditLinkedIn ANYRUN cybersecurity malware analysis khr0x Malware analyst at ANY.RUN I'm 21 years old and I work as a malware analyst for more than a year. I like finding out what kind of malware got on my computer. In my spare time I do sports and play video games. View all posts Jane Leading network traffic analysis expert at ANY.RUN I'm ANY.RUN ambassador and a real network traffic numismatist. I also love penguins and tortoises. My motto is to do good and throw it into the sea. View all posts Company site Twitter What do you think about this post? 7 answers * Awful * Average * Great Submit Rating No votes so far! Be the first to rate this post. Free malware research with ANY.RUN Start Now! ### Cancel reply Comment Name Email Save my name and email in this browser for the next time I comment. 0 comments

SecurityWeek relata que mais de 1.600 organizações públicas e privadas na Colômbia foram comprometidas pela operação de ameaça persistente avançada da América do Sul, Eagle Blind, também conhecida como APT-C-36, como parte de campanhas de ataque que estão em andamento desde novembro. Downloads, mas também permitiram a implantação de uma variante de malware do PureCrypter para compromisso de dados do sistema e do usuário e a eventual entrega do rato REMCOS, uma análise da pesquisa de Check Point revelada.

A financially motivated threat actor has been linked to an ongoing phishing email campaign that has been ongoing since at least July 2024 specifically targeting users in Poland and Germany. The attacks have led to the deployment of various payloads, such as Agent Tesla, Snake Keylogger, and a previously undocumented backdoor dubbed TorNet that's delivered by means of PureCrypter. TorNet is so

SecurityWeek relata que mais de 1.600 organizações públicas e privadas na Colômbia foram comprometidas pela operação de ameaça persistente avançada da América do Sul, Eagle Blind, também conhecida como APT-C-36, como parte de campanhas de ataque que estão em andamento desde novembro. Downloads, mas também permitiram a implantação de uma variante de malware do PureCrypter para compromisso de dados do sistema e do usuário e a eventual entrega do rato REMCOS, uma análise da pesquisa de Check Point revelada.

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SecurityWeek relata que mais de 1.600 organizações públicas e privadas na Colômbia foram comprometidas pela operação de ameaça persistente avançada da América do Sul, Eagle Blind, também conhecida como APT-C-36, como parte de campanhas de ataque que estão em andamento desde novembro. Downloads, mas também permitiram a implantação de uma variante de malware do PureCrypter para compromisso de dados do sistema e do usuário e a eventual entrega do rato REMCOS, uma análise da pesquisa de Check Point revelada.

A financially motivated threat actor has been linked to an ongoing phishing email campaign that has been ongoing since at least July 2024 specifically targeting users in Poland and Germany. The attacks have led to the deployment of various payloads, such as Agent Tesla, Snake Keylogger, and a previously undocumented backdoor dubbed TorNet that's delivered by means of PureCrypter. TorNet is so

MS-SQL（Microsoft SQL）のハニーポットに関する最近のインシデントにより、Malloxランサムウェア（Fargo、TargetCompany、Mawahelperなどとしても知られる）に依拠するサイバー攻撃者が用いる高度な戦術が明らかになりました。 Sekoiaの研究チームが設置したこのハニーポットは、総当たり（ブルートフォース）手法を用いる侵入グループに狙われ、複数のMS-SQL脆弱性を悪用してPureCrypter経由でMalloxランサムウェアを展開しました。 Malloxのサンプルを分析したところ、研究者は異なる手法を用いる2つの別個のアフィリエイトを特定しました。一方は脆弱な資産の悪用に注力し、もう一方はより大規模に情報システムを広範囲に侵害することを狙っていました。 MS-SQLサーバーへの初期アクセスは、「sa」 アカウント（SQL管理者）を標的としたブルートフォース攻撃によって行われ、展開から1時間以内に侵害されました。攻撃者は観測期間を通じてブルートフォースを継続しており、執拗な試みであることが示されています。 悪用の試行が観測され、明確に異なるパターンが特定されました。攻撃者は、特定のパラメータの有効化、アセンブリの作成、xp_cmdshellおよびOle Automation Proceduresを介したコマンド実行など、さまざまな手法を活用しました。 ペイロードは、.NETで開発されたローダーであるPureCrypterに該当し、その後Malloxランサムウェアを実行しました。PureCoderという別名で活動する脅威アクターによってMalware-as-a-Serviceとして販売されているPureCrypterは、検知と解析を回避するために多様な回避手法を用います。 PureCrypterの詳細はこちら：政府が攻撃対象に：新たなPureCrypterキャンペーンの検証 Malloxグループは、同名のランサムウェアを配布するRansomware-as-a-Serviceの運用体制で、少なくとも2021年6月以降活動しています。同グループは二重恐喝戦略を用い、データを暗号化するだけでなく、盗んだデータを公開すると脅します。 この研究では、Malloxのオペレーションにおけるアフィリエイトの役割も強調されており、特にMaestro、Vampire、Hiervosといったユーザーに焦点を当て、彼らが異なる戦術や身代金要求を示すことが述べられています。 さらに、この研究は、AS208091に関連付けられ、過去にランサムウェア活動との関連が指摘されてきたホスティング企業Xhost Internetについても疑念を提起しています。 「サイバー犯罪関連活動との正式な関連は未だ立証されていないものの、このASが過去にランサムウェア侵害の事例に関与していること、そしてIPアドレス監視が長期間にわたっている点は興味深い」と、技術レポートには記されています。「Sekoia.ioのアナリストは、このASに関連する活動の監視を継続し、関連するオペレーションの調査を進めていく予定です。」 翻訳元:

PureCrypter delivers DarkVision RAT, a versatile malware offering keylogging, remote access, and password theft.