@HoneyLabs released Akin, an open HTTP request fingerprint. It records which of 32 fixed headers a client sent as a bitmask, so XORing two tokens tells you which headers differ. (Merely hashing header names can't give you that.)
They used it to link one favicon-sweeping visitor across 21 […]
@HoneyLabs released Akin, an open HTTP request fingerprint. It records which of 32 fixed headers a client sent as a bitmask, so XORing two tokens tells you which headers differ. (Merely hashing header names can't give you that.)
They used it to link one favicon-sweeping visitor across 21 […]
I'm sure I chucked it through the disassembler not long ago, and IIRC the sprites had interleaved masks but weren't zigzagged.
New post on Renegade:
www.superchartisland.com/renegade
I'm sure I chucked it through the disassembler not long ago, and IIRC the sprites had interleaved masks but weren't zigzagged.
Current players: 0
Avg players: 0
Peak players: 1
Total user reviews: 137
Avg gameplay hours: 0h
Price: Free
Find more information on SteamPulse:
https://steampulse.org/game/375220
Current players: 0
Avg players: 0
Peak players: 1
Total user reviews: 137
Avg gameplay hours: 0h
Price: Free
Find more information on SteamPulse:
https://steampulse.org/game/375220
Each time it iterates through the elements it corresponds to one of the boxes in the 2nd image. Try to see if you can see which parts of the core corresponds to which parts of the graph
Each time it iterates through the elements it corresponds to one of the boxes in the 2nd image. Try to see if you can see which parts of the core corresponds to which parts of the graph
XORing the encoded freelist pointer of the last object with any other encoded freelist pointer from the same slab results in a value similar to the slab's virtual address. This allows one to obtain the base address of a slab.
XORing the encoded freelist pointer of the last object with any other encoded freelist pointer from the same slab results in a value similar to the slab's virtual address. This allows one to obtain the base address of a slab.
This cryptographic challenge presents an RC4 encryption service with a critical implementation flaw. The service allows users to encrypt messages using RC4, a stream cipher. However, the implementation attempts to add an additional layer of security by…
This cryptographic challenge presents an RC4 encryption service with a critical implementation flaw. The service allows users to encrypt messages using RC4, a stream cipher. However, the implementation attempts to add an additional layer of security by…
is the opposite of
not(a) OR not(b).
Also, can be useful to bear in mind that:
ANDing two e.g. bytes tends to reduce the number of 1s,
ORing them to tends to increase the number of 1s,
but XORing them tends to keep the sameish number of 1s.
That's all I've ever needed!
is the opposite of
not(a) OR not(b).
Also, can be useful to bear in mind that:
ANDing two e.g. bytes tends to reduce the number of 1s,
ORing them to tends to increase the number of 1s,
but XORing them tends to keep the sameish number of 1s.
That's all I've ever needed!
they actually do things *extra* inefficiently; see if you can spot where.
they actually do things *extra* inefficiently; see if you can spot where.
www.deviantart.com/xoring/art/W...
www.deviantart.com/xoring/art/W...